Banking regulation and deposit insurance: legal and comparative perspective. by Olanipekun, Oladapo Olumide
Banking regulation and deposit insurance: legal and comparative
perspective.
Olanipekun, Oladapo Olumide
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/1581
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
BANKING REGULATION AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE: 
LEGAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
OLADAPO OLUMIDE OLANIPEKUN 
CENTRE FOR COMMERCIAL LAW STUDIES 
QUEEN MARY 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
FOR THE A WARD OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF 
PHILOSOPHY 
2008 
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY 
I confirm that this submission is my own work. To the best of my knowledge, it 
contains no other material previously written or published by another person. All 
sources used in this thesis have been clearly referenced in both the text and the 
bibliography. 
SIGNED: ...... <. 
OLADAPO OLUMIDE OLANIPEKUN 
ABSTRACT 
A major point of debate in most financial systems is the relevance, form and scope of 
regulatory intervention, particularly on the trade-off between the benefits and costs of 
regulation. Deposit insurance is a prominent part of most modern regulatory financial 
safety nets. As with banking regulation in general, it is still debatable whether deposit 
insurance is necessary in all cases. While most deposit insurance schemes have the 
joint aims of financial stability and depositor protection, there are inherent difficulties 
posed by the introduction of such schemes, in particular the moral hazard and agency 
problems. For the purpose of this thesis, these difficulties have been generally termed 
as the deposit insurance problem. 
A number of issues arise for consideration if deposit insurance is to be provided. The 
thesis argues that the optimal design of deposit insurance schemes is dependent on 
three factors: an effective system of bank supervision and regulation; identification 
and prioritisation of the policy objectives which the scheme is to achieve; and 
adoption of incentive-compatible systems in line with sound practice guides but 
tailored to country-specific circumstances. 
There is generally no fixed or absolute model for all states. The thesis involves an 
assessment of deposit insurance schemes in the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Nigeria. An assessment of these schemes, as well as international and regional 
developments, will show that cross-country differences should play an important 
factor in the adoption or reform of deposit insurance schemes, but that there arc 
common concerns for policymakers whatever the distinctiveness of local 
circumstances. 
The challenge for policymakers is how to achieve a fair balance between the 
protection of depositors and banking system stability on the one hand and minimizing 
elements of the deposit insurance problem on the other hand. The aim is to 
recommend a future course of reform that includes a general support model and 
specific recommendations for the jurisdictions that are examined. 
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CHAPTER! 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Banking Regulation and Deposit Insurance: Overview 
The focal point of this thesis is an analysis of the concept and practice of deposit 
insurance l within the larger framework of banking regulation.2 
A recent wave of financial crises3 in most parts of the world has resulted in a two-fold 
concern for governments and banking authorities. First, in order to engender financial 
and economic stability,4 economies all over the world have come up with various 
financial safety net designs.5 A major function of financial safety-nets is to ensure the 
I Deposit Insurance is also referred to as 'deposit protection' and 'deposit guarantee' schemes. These 
phrases are generally used interchangeably to denote an indemnification program to protect depositors 
against loss, up to a specified maximum, if their bank fails or defaults; BA Garner (ed.) Black's La\\' 
Dictionary (8 th edn Thomson West, St. Paul, 2004) 816. 
2 For the purpose of this thesis the term 'bank' will be used broadly to connote any financial 
intermediary that accepts deposits from the general public and extends loans or other credit facilities to 
individuals or businesses. Because sector integration has blurred the distinction between banks and 
other forms of financial institutions, the terms 'bank' and 'financial institution' are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. On the definition of the term 'banking regulation' (and the related 
concept of banking supervision), see Chapter 2, para. 2.1.1. 
-' Financial crisis has been defined as 'a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel 
funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities'; FS Mishkin. Anatomy of ([ 
Fillallciul Crisis (NBER Working Paper No. 3932, 1992). Historically, the development of financial 
markets has entailed crisis and collapse; C. Kindleberger and R. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: 
A lIisf(}/y of Financial Crisis, (5 th edn, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005). 
4 There is no single definition of financial stability. In this thesis, the concept is used simply to refer to 
the absence of financial crisis or the existence of a sound banking system in which most of the banks 
are solvent. See generally a Issing, 'Monetary and Financial Stability: Is There a Trade-off!' 
Conference on MonetQlY Stability. Financial Stability and the Business Cycle. BIS, Basel. 28-29 March 
2003: J Drifill and others, 'Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: What Role for the Futures 
Market?' [2006] 2 Journal of Financial Stability (I) 9.5: OW Arner, Financial Stability. Economic 
Growth. and the Role of Law. (Cambridge University Press. New York. 2007) ch.l: G Sl'hinasi. 
'Defining Financial Stability' (2006) IMF Working Paper No.O'+1l87; A Cnlckett. 'The Theory and 
Practice of Hnancial Stability' (Dec 1996) 1.+.+ De Economist (.+) .531: C Lindgren and other~ Balik 
Soundness and ,\/llcroccollomic Policy (lMF. Washington DC. 1996) ch.3. 
:I CW Calomiris. The Postmodem Balik Safety Net: Lessons from Dn'eloped Clnd Derl'lopillg 
Fconol1lilY s (AEl Press. Washington. DC. 1997): C Isoard. 'Financial Safety Neh: Where We Stand' 
prescnted at II)!; Semillar. Washington. DC. 9 Sept 2003. 
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soundness and safety of the financial system by detecting and reducing risks that have 
the potential to undermine financial stability. Financial safety nets also aim to 
promote financial stability by enhancing and sustaining public confidence in the 
system.6 
Apart from financial stability concerns, consumer protection is the other aspect of the 
two-fold concern.7 A principal feature of financial safety net design is the Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (DIS). Bank deposit insurance schemes have evolved out of the 
need to protect depositors, particularly the uninformed small depositors, from the risk 
of loss; and to also protect the banking system from instability occasioned by runs and 
general loss of confidence. 
The banking system has been singled out for protection because of the special role 
that banks play in the economy. 8 In spite of the various safety net devices that have 
been adopted in most countries, instances of bank instability and failure continue to 
occur. Some of these failures were precipitated by regulatory failure thus prompting 
wide-ranging debates on how best to adapt regulatory devices, including deposit 
insurance, to ensure stability and minimize the effects of failure. 9 
hllp://\\\\ w. iadb.orgli ntltradcll cngl ish/4 special i nfolcull rerenccl2()O~/o scpt9 rcdcslisuardppt. pdf 
accessed 2 August 2006: A Demirguc-Kunt, 'Designing a Bank Safety Net: A Long-term Perspectivc' 
(2000) World Bank MimeD; A Greenspan, 'The Financial Safety Net' 37th Annual Conference 011 Bank 
Structllre and Competition of the Federal Resel1'e Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. 10 May 200 I. 
6 Interrelationship issues between financial safety-net participants are discussed in Chapter 4. 
7 On consumer protection, see generally P Cartwright (ed.) Consumer Protectioll in Final/cial Seri'ices 
(Kluwer Law International. The Hague, 1999): P Cartwright 'Optimal Consumer Protection in 
Financial Services' (20()1) http://\\ \\ \\.ccri.hclmcdialcvel1ls/pre\ iuus conflpcartwright.pdf, acccsscd 2 
August 2006; P Cartwright, Banks, ConSllmers and Regulation, (Hart Publishing, Oxford. 20(4): GJ 
Benston 'Consumer Protection as Justification for Regulating Financial Services' (2000), 17 joun/al oJ 
Fillallcial Sen'ices Research (3) 277. 
~ Sl'l' Chapter 2, para.2.1.2. 
9 F(lr L'\ampk. in the UK, the failure of Northern Rock has led to ongoing efforts to comprehensively 
reform tIll' Il'gulatory and deposit protection systems. SCl' Chapter 5. para. 5.1 .. ~.1. 
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Globally, there has been a growing concern about the structure and fitness for purpose 
of financial regulation in individual countries. to This concern continues to !!row 
'--
within the context of recent developments, which include globalization. the increased 
use of conglomerate structures and the gradual disappearance of demarcation lines 
between traditional financial sectors, services and products. These developments 
make it increasingly difficult for regulatory authorities to monitor and evaluate risks 
as financial institutions operate in more complex structures and the geographical 
spread of their activities cuts across several jurisdictions. 
A considerable debate on restructuring financial regulation has focussed on deposit 
insurance reform. There are approximately one hundred deposit insurance systems in 
operation around the world, and while most of these systems are still evolving, even 
the oldest systems are continuously undergoing reform. 11 This is due not only to the 
recent developments outlined above, but also to the problem of moral hazard, which is 
considered inherent to deposit insurance. 
Although there appears to be a presumption that the adoption of deposit insurance 
represents the hallmark of regulatory best-practices, the paradox of deposit insurance 
is that the attempt to make banks safer by protecting them against depositor runs may 
create adverse incentives which will weaken them and increase the probability of 
\0 For a discussion on the international debate over regulatory structure and the varying responses to 
re~ulation acwss jurisdictions, see OW Arner and J Lin Financial Regulation: :\ Guide to Structural 
R;fo rm (Sweet 8: Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong, 2003), . ' 
II There are 99 l'ountries that L'llrrently have some form of deposit protection scheme In place, while 2() 
other countries are considering or planning to introduce their own scheme". 
http://,'.,,w.i;ldi.ordLi,,tl ( ")Oofl ; 20Coul1tries(; ")O"ith(; 20a( ( ")OIkpll"ll( (20ln"urance(; 20Sy"lem/li,,1 
or l'punlrie" \\ Itb a DI S_\ l('C_I_\ 1.1) ():-\ Final.pdf. accessed 30 \ lay 200X. 
f '1 12 at lire. According to William Seidman, a former Chairman of the FDIC 10 the 
United States: 
Deposit insurance is like a nuclear power plant. Operated properly, it is 
beneficial; but only appropriate safety precautions can keep it from going 
out of control. Once out of control, it can blow up with great damage to the 
entire country.' 13 
This underscores the sensitive nature of deposit insurance adoption and design. To 
prevent deposit insurance from creating adverse effects, a well considered planning 
and implementation process is imperative. The major consideration for policymakers 
is to ensure that the various features of the scheme create the right incentives for 
stakeholders to minimize risk. 
1.1 Scope Of The Research 
The principal theme of the research is the optimal design and implementation of 
deposit insurance schemes based on three essential factors. These are: an effective 
system of bank supervision and regulation; proper identification and prioritization of 
policy objectives; and adoption of incentive-compatible mechanisms in line with 
sound practice guides but tailored to suit country-specific factors. 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter one entails a general introduction to the 
research. It provides a broad overview to the thesis and also includes a literature 
12 A Demir~lIc-Kunt and E Detragiache 'Docs Deposit Insurance Increase Banking Syslem Stahility? 
An Empirical II1\'L'sti~alion' (.200.2)'+9 Journal (~f ,\/ollerary Economics, I :'7:'. The moral ha/ .. lrll 
prnh\cm is disclIssL'd in detail in Chapter 3. 
1.1 WL Seidmann, 'Oeposil Insurance and Banking Frticiency' in Zuhayr. \1. (cd.), Bunkers' a"d Public 
,\uf/lOrifies ,\/w/{/gl'lIIellf (I/Risks (Macmillan, Lundon, Il)~~) I. 
1() 
review. The chapter explains the aims of the research and also proYides a ~ummarv of 
the seven chapters in the thesis. 
The second chapter examines the theory of financial regulation. The aim is to provide 
a theoretical background for the central focus of the thesis which is deposit insurancc. 
Deposit insurance schemes do not exist in a vacuum as they usually form part of a 
financial safety net. As such, it is important to understand the rationale for the 
existence of financial safety nets. Deposit insurance reform must also be considered 
within the context of the overall regulatory system. This involves an analysis of the 
main aims and objectives of financial regulation. The core terms are defined and 
differentiated with an ultimate aim of establishing the justification for regulation in 
the sector. The main regulatory tools and devices are examined. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the role of deposit insurance within the context of 
financial regulation. 
In Chapter three, the concept of deposit insurance is examined. The chapter explores 
the historical evolution of schemes to protect bank depositors in various jurisdictions 
across the world. The chapter aims to establish the basic theory and rationale for 
deposit insurance schemes. Although other objectives are identified, the two basic 
public policy objectives for the adoption of deposit insurance schemes, which ;Irc 
financial stability and deposit protection, are considered in detail. While it is argued 
that consumer protection concerns should take priority where deposit insurance i~ 
concerned, it is concluded that both are inextricably linked and thus the achic\cment 
of both aims is not mutually exclusive. 
17 
The deposit insurance problem is also examined in Chapter three. This centres on the 
moral hazard problem, on which considerable emphasis has been placed in the 
academic literature and policy debates. The various means by which moral hazard can 
be curbed are examined, and the advantages and disadvantages of each of them are 
considered. While it is argued that the introduction of risk-based deposit insurance 
premium and prompt corrective action mechanisms is the most effective way to 
minimize the effects of the deposit insurance problem, it is concluded that an optimal 
system of deposit insurance is hinged on the efficiency of the overall banking 
regulatory framework, and appropriate design, structure and implementation process. 
Chapter four of the thesis involves an examination of the basic design and structural 
considerations in the adoption or reform of deposit insurance schemes. The design 
features considered include institutional and organizational structure: ownership: 
funding~ mandates and powers~ deposit Insurance coverage~ membership~ 
interrelationship among financial safety-net participants; and the very topical issue of 
bank failure resolution. 
The objective in Chapter four is to explore the various options that are open to policy 
makers and consequently identify a set of sound practices to serve as a guide. The 
guiding principle is the need to tailor deposit insurance schemes to suit specific 
public-policy objectives and the need to adopt an incentive-compatible design to 
minimize the risks associated with the deposit insurance problem. This chapter 
involves a constant reference to and an analysis of the report of the Financial Stability 
Forum's Working Group on Deposit Insurance. 
IX 
Chapter four builds on the recommendations of the FSF guidance paper by 
attempting, where possible, to resolve the trade-offs identified in the report. The 
issues are also considered within the perspective of recent academic literature and 
policy guidelines on deposit insurance. Although a set of sound practices are 
identified, it is concluded that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach to deposit 
insurance design. Deposit insurance should be designed to suit institutionaL legal. 
economic and other country-specific factors. The scheme should also fit into and 
complement the general supervisory framework. 
In Chapter five, the thesis puts the issues discussed in Chapter four into context by 
examining the design and operation of deposit insurance schemes in two key 
jurisdictions. The chapter involves a critical appraisal of the operation of deposit 
insurance schemes in the United Kingdom and the United States. While the scheme in 
the United States represents a quintessential risk-minimizing scheme, the UK scheme 
is a typical pay-box scheme. The analysis is carried out against the backdrop of the 
overall regulatory framework in these countries. In particular, the UK Compensation 
scheme in the context of the recent Northern Rock crisis and the consequent 
regulatory response. 
In evaluating the schemes in both jurisdictions, it is observed that the prime objecti \'c 
of the UK compensation scheme is consumer protection while the main policy 
objective for the FDIC is financial stability. The chapter identifies the contrast in thc 
mechanisms that have been employed in both jurisdictions to deal with the deposit 
insurancc problem. While the UK schemc previously relied mainly on co-insurancc. 
risk-based deposit insurance premium and prompt corrective action mechanisnb han? 
been adopted in the United States. It is argued that the contrast in approach 
\9 
underscores the difficulty in developing a set of best practices to have general 
application to all jurisdictions. 
In the latter part of Chapter five, the effect of globalization and recent international 
developments on deposit insurance is considered. Globalization and sector-integration 
in financial markets has led to increased efforts at international co-operation and 
harmonization of financial supervision. The chapter considers the feasibility of 
extending such co-operation/harmonization to deposit insurance. It is argued that 
certain factors, particularly differences in regulatory culture. make this impossible. It 
is also submitted that such international co-operationlharmonization might be easier to 
achieve on a regional as opposed to an international level. The EU Deposit Guarantee 
Directive, which was made possible by the existence of the EU legislative framework, 
is used to illustrate this point. 
Chapter six entails a critical reVIew of the establishment and performance of the 
deposit insurance scheme in Nigeria. Nigeria is used as a model for a developing 
country. The design and implementation of deposit insurance schemes poses a 
peculiar challenge for developing countries, as the deposit insurance problem has to 
be tackled along with the myriad of economic, social, legal, infrastructural and other 
challenges. 
The chapter examines the history of banking and banking regulation in Nigeria as 
well as the framework for the regulation of the Nigerian financial market. The chapter 
identifies aspects of the deposit insurance problem within the Nigerian context then 
takes a critical look at the design and operation of the deposit insurance "cheme. 
qucstioning the footing un which some of the design features are ha"ed. 
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Chapter six also considers recent reform in Nigeria and argues that while the reform 
represents a step in the right direction, further improvements are needed for the 
Nigerian scheme to attain its stated objectives. With the aid of lessons drawn from 
analysis of the UK and US schemes in Chapter five, sound practice principles 
enunciated in Chapter four, and experience of about twenty years of deposit insurance 
in Nigeria itself, the chapter concludes with specific proposals for further reform of 
the Nigerian deposit insurance scheme. 
In contrast to the analysis of the UK and US deposit protection schemes in Chapter 
five, a disproportionate part of this thesis has been devoted to the Nigerian scheme in 
Chapter six. This is intentionally so, because of the dearth of relevant economic and 
legal literature providing a critical analysis of the operation of deposit Insurance 
schemes in developing countries in general, and Nigeria in particular. 
Chapter seven summanzes and concludes the thesis. The chapter links up all the 
arguments and major conclusions in Chapters two to six. A general framework of 
sound principles and guidelines is extracted from the thesis, with the aim being to 
serve as a guide to countries wishing to adopt deposit insurance and those wishing to 
reform existing schemes. This is necessary because there are common concerns for 
policy makers regardless of the distinctiveness of local circumstances. 
The concluding chapter also summarIzes the recommendations for reform of the 
deposit protection schemes in the United Kingdom. the United State,", and \:igeria. 
based on the appraisal uf the schemes in Chapters fi\'e and six. 
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A major theme throughout the thesis is that deposit insurance can only work if the 
appropriate institutional and legal infrastructures are first put in place and its design 
must reflect the historical background and environmental peculiarity of the particular 
country. Effective and efficient co-ordination of the activities of the safety-net 
participants is pertinent, particularly the support role of the lender of last resort. A 
continuous evaluation and improvement process is imperative in reshaping the form 
and future of banking regulation in general and deposit insurance in particular. 
1.2 Methodology 
The research is based mainly on the analysis of primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources examined include banking statutes and deposit insurance laws in 
various jurisdictions, particularly in the United Kingdom, United States and Nigeria. 
This research has also involved an examination of journal articles and newspaper 
publications, working papers, parliamentary hearings, conference proceedings, and 
reports of governmental and international agencies on banking regulation and deposit 
msurance. 
Comparative studies of the deposit protection schemes in the United Kingdom. the 
United States and Nigeria have also been carried out to achieve the following aims: 
I. To demonstrate how historical factors, policy objectives and country 
peculiarities shape the design and implementation of deposit insurance in 
di ffcrent countries. 
,., To demonstrate how the deposit insurance problem poses different challen~c" 
within different contracting enyironments. 
L 
11 
3. To compare and contrast the schemes in order to glean any useful lessons, 
which may be adopted in other jurisdictions, particularly for Nigeria. 
The analysis in this study is mainly theoretical and hypothetical; where relevant. I 
will refer to other empirical studies though no separate empirical study has been 
conducted for the purpose of this research. In analysing the main issues, the thesis 
applies a largely traditional legal review approach, with supporting historical and 
economical analysis of existing literature which cuts across several disciplines. 
Generally speaking, the thesis follows a mainly integrative approach to scholarly 
activity,14 with elements of discovery and application. IS 
This research was concluded in July, 2008. 
1.3 Literature Review 
There has been extensive economic literature in recent years covering the field of 
deposit insurance. A bibliography published by the FDIC indicates more than seven 
hundred references of literature on deposit insurance, albeit for a period of ten years 
(1989 to 1999).16 It is not the intention in this thesis to review the entire literature in 
the field as this will be an impossible task. The review contained in the thesis is 
limited only to literature relating to general deposit insurance theory and policy, and 
14 See E Boyer 'Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate' ;\ Special Repol1 of the 
Carnegie FOllndation for the Advancement of Teaching (Jossey-Bass. San Francisco. 1990). The report 
articulates the concept of scholarship activity, traditionally viewed as the scientific discovery or nl'\\ 
kll()wlcd~e, to include three other important aspects. These are the scholarship PI' integration, the 
scholarship of application, and the scholarship of teaching. Integration creates new knowledge h) 
hringing together and interpreting divergent knowledge or existing research \\(lrk. thus creating ne\\ 
insights and understanding. It means 'interpretation. titting (lne'S own research - or the re .... earch of 
others - into largl'r intellectual patterns.' 
l'i Application i1l\olves the USl' of knowledge in sohing significant s()ciL'lal i .... slle ..... 
16 Sec FDIC. 'Deposit Insurance: :\n Annotated Bihliography 19X9 - 1999' (Di \ i .... ion of Research ,[nd 
Statistics. Washington DC. 2000). 
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the design and implementation of deposit insurance schemes. The literature is also 
limited to the country schemes that are examined in the thesis. 
Chapters two, three, and four contain a review of the relevant literature in the area of 
banking regulation in general, and deposit insurance in particular. This reyiew is 
necessary in order to establish a theoretical framework for the thesis and also to 
establish the rationale for the existence of banking regulation and deposit insurance 
schemes. However, for the introductory purposes of this chapter, a brief reyiew of 
significant developments in the literature is undertaken here. 
The classic work of Diamond and Dybvigl7 laid the foundation for the contemporary 
understanding of the function of financial intermediation. They illustrate how 
financial panics can occur when financial institutions issue short-term debts to finance 
illiquid long-term investments. The theory explains how customer runs on individual 
banks can result in contagion, which leads to systemic failure and the role of deposit 
insurance in preventing market failure. This theory also provides the foundation for 
the justification of deposit insurance in this thesis but the text goes further to explore 
other justifications and also it is argued that deposit insurance has become a political 
necessity. 
The report of the FSF (Financial Stability Forum) Working Group on deposit 
insurance also forms an important part of deposit insurance literature. The FSF report 
proposes a general method for the benefit of countries considering the adoption or 
reform of an explicit. limited-coverage deposit insurance system. As observed earlier, 
17 D Diamond and P Dylwig. 'Bank Runs. Deposit Insurance and Liquidit) , (Il)~n) l) I JOI/n/al of 
political Economy. -+0 I. 
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this thesis builds on the FSF report by attempting to resolve the trade-offs identified in 
the report and analysing the issues within country-specific contexts. 
The works of Garcia,18 Ketcha 19 and MacDonald2o have also considered design and 
structural issues involved with deposit insurance systems. They also consider the 
rationale for deposit insurance against the backdrop that it creates the risk of moral 
hazard. This thesis differs to the extent that these issues are examined within country-
specific contexts and against the background of recent developments in the literature 
and in the markets. 
Kyei,21 Garcia22 and Hoelscher et al. 23 have conducted a survey of the key 
characteristics of deposit protection arrangements around the world. The statistical 
data contained in these studies have been referred to in this text where relevant. 
There are also general texts, which gIve an overvIew of banking regulation and 
supervision. Some of these texts provide an overview of the structure and practice of 
banking regulation in the countries that have been studied in this research while others 
provide an international perspective. Such texts include the works of Blair et al.,2.f 
18 G Garcia 'Deposit Insurance: Obtaining the Benefits and Avoiding the Pitfalls' (1996) IMF Working 
Paper No.96/83. . ., .' 
19 N J Ketcha, N J 'Deposit Insurance System Design and ConsideratIOns (1999) BIS Pobcy Papers 
No.7,221. 
20 R MacDonald 'Deposit Insurance' (1996) Bank of England, Centre for Central Banking Studies 
(CCBS) Handbook in Central Banking No 9. . 
21 A K vei 'Deposit Protection Arrangements: A Survey' (1995) IMF Workmg Paper No. 95/1.~-l. 
n G Garl'ia 'Deposit Insurance: ;\ Suney of ;\ctual and Best Practices' (1999) 1!\IF Working Paper 
No.l)l)/5-l. 
23 D S Hol'isl'hn and others 'The Design and Implementation of Deposit Insurance Sy"tem,,' (20061 
IMF Occasional Paper No.251. 
21 W Blair and others 'Banking and Financial Senil'es RegUlation' (Butterworths, London, 20(2). 
Cartwright,25 Macey et al.,26 Walker,27 Blair and Walker,28 Goodhart t I 29 d ea.. an 
Danjuma.30 
There are other texts that deal specifically with the subject of deposit insurance. These 
include the works of Campbell et al. 31, Campbell,32 Campbell and Cartwright;~3 and 
Umoh?4 
1.4 Remarks 
Although there is continuing debate on the pros and cons of deposit insurance 
schemes, the increasing number of countries that have adopted one form of scheme or 
the other to protect bank depositors suggests that such schemes have come to stay as a 
feature of the financial safety-net. This has raised awareness on the need to 
appropriately design and structure such schemes for effectiveness and efficiency. 
While it appears that the near inevitability of deposit insurance adoption has relegated 
deposit insurance theory to the background, with significant attention shifting to 
issues of design and structure, it should be noted that this shift in focus has mainly 
resulted from the emphasis that has been placed on the deposit insurance problem in 
1'1 P Cartwright Banks, Consumers and Regulation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004). 
26 JR Macey and others Banking Law and Regulation (Aspen Law & Business, Gaithersburg, MD. 
2001) 
n GA Walker, International Banking Regulation: LaH', Policy and Practice (Kluwer La\v International. 
London, 200 I): GA Walker (2006), European Banking Law: Policy and Programme Construction 
(BICL, London, 2006). 
28 M Blair and G Walker, Financial Sen'ices LaU' (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). 
19 CAE Goodhart and others Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (Routledgc, London, 
1998), 
30 N Danjuma, N. The Banker's Liability (Heinemann, Ibadan, 1993). 
31 A Campbell and others DepositlnslIf"{lnce (palgravc Macmillan, New York, 20071. 
32 A Campbell 'Protecting Bank Depositors: An International Perspective' ~()()-+ 7 Contemporary "'~uc" 
in Law (~), l-l(). 
n A Campbell and P Cartwright 'Banks and Consumcr Protection: The Deposit Protcction Schcmc in 
the II nited Kingdom' (1998) L10yds Maritime and Commercial La\\' Quarterly, I ~~: .\ Camphell and P 
Cartwright 'Co-insurance and I\I(lral Hazard: Some Rellections on Deposit Prntection in thl' U.K and 
U.S.:\.· (~()(U) 5 Journal of International Banking Regulation (1),9. 
academic theory. Thus the goal for policy-makers is to design deposit insurance 
schemes that will optimally minimize the deposit insurance problem. 
Deposit insurance design throws up different challenges in different situations and as 
a result it is argued in this thesis that schemes should be tailored to suit specific policy 
objectives and country factors. There are also common concerns and it is hoped that 
the model of sound practices in this thesis will serve as a useful guide. Countries can 
also learn, not only from their own experience but from the experience of others. and 
thus it is also hoped that the country studies in this thesis serve as a useful tool for 
companson. 
11 PN Ullloh. N. Balik Deposit /IIS/I/'{/II(,(, ill Nigeria ,\huja: NDIC. Ahuja. 1997. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BANK REGULATION: THEORY AND RATIONALE 
2.0 Introduction 
The global concern about the need for adequate regulation and superVISIon of 
financial institutions has been instigated by the expenence of systemic failures 
leading to the collapse of the banking systems in many countries. The ongoing 
financial crisis, which is the worst since the great depression, is a reminder of the 
perennial problem of excessive risk-taking in banking, I which has resulted in boom 
and bust cycles. These cycles have become more proximate, as the frequency, effects 
and costs of banking crisis continue to increase. 
In the last two decades, financial cnses have occurred in developed as well as in 
emerging economies.2 These crises have resulted in significant cost, not only to bank 
shareholders and depositors, but also to taxpayers. In some countries, the fiscal cost of 
bailing out the banking system has exceeded ten per cent of GDP.3 In the wake of the 
I RA Bennet 'A Banking Puzzle: Mixing Freedom and Protection', Ne~v York Times. 
19 February 1984, Business Section I, 12. 
2 A recent World Bank study reports 112 incidents of systemic banking crises in 93 countries het\\een 
the late 1970s and the end of the twentieth century. See G Caprio and P Honohan 'Finance for Growth: 
Policy Choices in a Volatile World' A World Bank Policy Research Report (Oxford University Press. 
Oxford, 200 I): Another study shows that 'relative to the pre-19l..+ era of financial glohalization. crises 
are quite as prevalent today.' See B Eichengreen and M Bordo 'Crises Nll\\ and Then: What Le'-.'-.nns 
from the Last Era of Financial Glohalization'?' (2002) NBER Working Paper No. 8716: see also G 
Caprio 'Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises' (World Bank, Washington DC. ~()()3) 
htl 11:1 l'-. i tcn:suurccs. \\urld han k.l )r~/l NTRES/RcsoLJrees/.4 (lL) ~ .\2 - I 107 44L),) 12 766/64S()S.~-
I lOX 1407SS422123·j'i6-,Llhk un s\ stcmic and non-s\ "[cmic hal1kin~ crl'-.l''-. Janu:ll:: _~_I ~I)().~.pdr 
acccssed 19 March ~()()6: C Kindleherger and R Aliher (2005). 'l\lanias. Panics and Cra"hl''': t\ HIstory 
uf Financial Crisis' (5 th cd, Palgra\c Macmillan, New York. ~()05): C Lindgren and others 'Bank 
Soundncss and l\LtlToeconomie Poky' (lMF. Washington DC. 1996) ~() . 
.1 H Da\ics and D Green Global Fil/al/cial Regulatiol/: The Essellfial Guide (Polity PrL'S'-.. CllllhridgL', 
~O()S) eh, I, 
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ongoIng credit cnSIS, significant amounts have been committed to bailino out 
b 
Northern Rock4 in the UK and Bear Stearns5 in the United States. With no immediate 
signs of the crises abating, it is likely that governments would have to keep providing 
significant support to financial markets to prevent systemic crisis. 
Three maIn denominators are found in banking cnses around the world: weak 
information and incentive structures; weak management and control systems within 
banks and poor regulation, monitoring and supervision.6 Thus national authorities 
continually aim to improve financial sector infrastructure, upgrade existing regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks, and promote sound macro policies as a means of 
reducing the likelihood and costs of financial crisis.7 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trend towards economic liberalization across the 
globe has brought the issue of regulating financial markets to the fore in public and 
academic debate. To some, the continuous introduction and implementation of 
regulatory measures and policies at national and international levels is inimical to the 
spirit of liberalization, which is characterized by less government control. Banking 
system failures have been attributed to the effects of the various regulations that have 
been introduced. 8 Traditionally, the banking system has been treated as an industry 
~ A Campbell 'The Run on the Rock and its Consequences' (2008) 9 Journal of Banking Regulation 
(2). 61; GA Walker 'Credit Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform' (2007) 22 Buttenl'ortlis 
Journul of International Banking and Financial LaH' (10), 567; GA Walker 'Northern Rock Falls' 
(2008) 2 Bankers' rull' (2). 4. 
5 'Rescue Me: A Fed Bailout Crosses a Line' New York Times. March 16,2008. 
hllp:l/w\\\\.nylil1ll'" c()fll/2()()X/o~1I ()/bu~inesslI 6~ret.hlml"!ref=bu~iI1e~~ ,acces~ed I: l\larch 20?8 
6 DT Llewellyn 'Lessons from Recent Banking Crises' (1998) 6 Journal of FlIwllcral RegulatIOn and 
Compliance 3 (September). 25~: G Caprio 'Banking on Crises: Expensi\e Lesson~ from ReLTnt 
Financial Crises' (199X) World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper No.1979. ~. 
7 ('aprio.(n6) 2. , 
8 L.I Sechrest Frl'l' Banking: Theory. History. and a Laiss£':. Faire Model (Quorum. \\ e~t~)(lrt. 20(8); 
GG Kaufman 'Bank Contagion: a RL'\ie\\ of the Theory and E\idence' (1994) 8 Journal of Fil/ul/cial 
SCIl'i('/'\ Rl'.\('(/rch(2) (April), 123; K Dowd (ed.) The t,'.rperience (~l Free Banking (RoutledgL', London. 
199'2): K D(l\\d Lais,\l':.-jllirl' Banking (Routledge. London. 199~): K Dowd 'The Ca~e for Financial 
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having strong public policy implications. Thus, the need for financial regulation has 
been motivated and justified by the need to protect the investing and depositing 
public, instil confidence in the system and ensure financial and economic stability. 
Existing theories have failed to provide a cogent argument for the role of regulation 
and they have not incorporated concepts of economic and social development that 
emphasise the importance of appropriately designing and tailoring regulatory models 
to the economy's specific stage of development. In order to prevent regulatory failure 
resulting in financial crisis, it is important for policymakers to have a clear 
understanding of their own goals, the available economic resources and in frastructure, 
the legal system and the quality of human capital necessary for enforcement of 
regulatory requirements. Banking regulation has also drawn considerable attention 
because of recent industry changes in developing and developed economics. Such 
changes include globalization and sector integration, increased use of conglomerate 
structures, innovations in technology, and the development of new and more complex 
financial instruments and risk management practices. These revolutionary changes are 
bringing banks closer to their customers, changing the way financial transactions and 
banking operations are conducted, and expanding the variety of services that banks 
can provide. It is important that banking regulation is kept relevant and in line with its 
objecti ves in the light of these changes.9 
This chapter examines the conceptual basis for bank regulation and supervision. Key 
theories and definitions are identified and clarified in order to asccl1ain the rationale 
for regulation. As a first step towards reform, it is important to consider \\hy 
Laisscz-Fain~' (Il)l)h) 106 The Economic jOi/mal ( .. B6) (l\Jay) 679: G Sclgin 'The Theory of Frl'~ 
l3anki ng' (R(l\\l1lan .\: Littlefield. Totowa. 1988). 
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regulation was introduced in the first place. Major regulatory devices and their 
respective functions will be considered. The import of this chapter is to provide the 
necessary background for the rest of the thesis, as deposit insurance schemes are often 
part of a larger and sometimes complex regulatory structure. A properly designed and 
implemented deposit insurance scheme should work to complement other components 
of the financial safety net. 
2.1.0. Rationale for Financial Regulation 
It is important to establish the justification for financial regulation. 1O Given the 
arguments against regulatory intervention, it is imperative that policies, practice and 
structures are tailored to suit the guiding rationale. Whether or not regulation is 
appropriate in the financial and other public utility sectors has been and still remains 
very contentious. Baldwin and McCrudden observe: 
'These bodies undertake important public functions but are constitutionally 
awkward because they combine powers that have traditionally been kept 
separate. They act on behalf of central government, yet they are not central 
departments of state. They expend considerable resources in deciding 
disputes between parties and in interpreting a particular body of law, yet 
differ from courts and tribunals. They enforce the law as well as interpret 
it. They employ a substantial number of specialist staff. They exercise 
continuing influence over a specific industry, trade or social practice. They 
constitute an identifiable species. yet they are the broader genus variously 
<) K Spong Banking Regulalion: lIs Purposes. IlIIpil'lIIenlaliofl and l:..jjl'<'I.\· (5 111 cd .. Federal Re"L'rn: 
Bank of Kansas City. 20(0). 
10 Sl'C para 2.1.1. for thL' defInition ll/" financial regulation. 
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referred to as quangos, fringe bodies, non-departmental public bodies or 
public corporations. I I 
2.1.1. Regulation and Supervision: the Distinction 
It is important to differentiate between financial regulation and supervIsIOn. These 
complementary concepts have generated considerable confusion in economic and 
legal writings. 12 This has resulted in further difficulty in attempting to develop an 
acceptable and coherent national and international policy, and justification for 
financial risk prevention and regulation in general. 13 
The need to differentiate between both terms is underscored by the fact that ' ... one of 
the important trends has been, and continues to be, a move away from regulation and 
towards supervision - a move, in other words, away from compliance with portfolio 
constraints, and toward an assessment of whether the overall management of a 
financial firm's business is being prudently conducted.' 14 The growing deregulation 
of most financial systems has been accompanied by an increase in prudential 
supervision and this has led to questions on whether or not deregulation is an illusion 
and whether 'supervision' is merely a euphemism for re-regulation. 15 This issue has 
succinctly been addressed thus: 
II R Baldwin and C McCrudden Regulation and Pllblic Lmv (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 
1987), 3. . . . ' . 
12 Both terms arc also used interchangeably in this thesis because ot the Inconsistency 10 the use 01 b(lth 
words in the literature. 
1.1 DT Llewellyn, 'The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation' (1996) FSA Occasional Paper 
Sl'ries http://,,\\,,.r,,;I.,,()\'.lIk/puhs/occpapers/OPOI.pt!r accessed 21 March 2006. 
1-' A Crud,ett 'Banking SlIpenision and Regulation: International Trends' 6·.{' Banking COIl\'ention of 
the McriclllI Bankers' Association, Al'aplllco, f\ larch 30 2001. 
h!..1.[l :I/W\\'\". hi S.lll'!.!/spee,-' he"/,,pO )(n30. htm accessl'd 21 [\ larch 2006. " . . 
G Malle"nns Stl'phen Jaqlll's Solil'itors '\lIsrr(/lillll Finanel' LaU' (-l.lh cd., LB( Information Sl'I\ Ill", 
Pyrmont. NSW, 1999), 
'Continued deregulation of the banking industry, while both necessary and 
beneficial, increases the potential level of risk in banking operations. 
Nevertheless, deregulation is not incompatible with increased superyision. 
Rather, by introducing new risks and increasing those risks already present, 
deregulation will contribute to a need for increased supervision.' 16 
Regulation can be defined as the body of legal rules, administrative and prudential 
requirements put in place by financial authorities or market participants to limit or to 
absorb the effects of the risks assumed by financial institutions. Supervision, on the 
other hand, refers to the process of monitoring or reviewing the compliance of 
financial institutions with regulatory provisions or with more general standards of 
prudence in any particular market. 17 Simply put, while regulation refers to the general 
body of legal and administrative rules or guidelines that must be complied with, 
supervision is the mechanism or process of ensuring compliance with the rules or 
guidelines and to ensure that banks do not behave imprudently. Supervision refers to a 
formal oversight with an emphasis on the way supervised institutions do business.
18 
Banking superVIsIon involves monitoring the financial condition of banks so as to 
promote sound and prudent operational practices and to engender public confidence in 
the sector. Supervision focuses on individual banks because the state of individual 
banks is symptomatic of the general state of the system. The objective of bank 
supervision is to protect depositors and avoid confidence crises or major capital 
16 RV Shumway 'The Compatibility of Deregulation and Increased Supenision' ( Il)X7) 6 Annual 
Review of Bankin!.! Law. 2'+7. 
17 GA Walker Inte~."ational Banking Regulation: Law. Policy and Practice (Kluwcr Law International. 
Lon<.hlll. 2001) I; DT Llewellyn, 'The Regulation and Supenision of Financial In'>tituti(lIh' (Il)X6) Thl' 
Gilbart Leelures (11/ Banking: B Quinn (199X), 'Rules \' Discretion: The CI,>e for Bankil1~ Supeni'>lol1 
in the Lit!ht 01 the Debate on l\lonetary Policy' in (':\1: Goodhart (cd.) The Flllergillg Frame\\'ork oj 
Finlln('i(;1 Regulation (Central Banking Publications. London. 19l)X) Ill), 
IS RM 1;1'>tr<1 I,egal FO/llu/atiolls ofIntematiullal,\fonerary Stability (Oxford llnivcr"lty Press. (ht'llrd. 
20(6) X4. 33 
flight.
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Supervisory functions are vested in the Central Bank in most jurisdictions. 
With reference to the role of the US Federal Reserve System, supervision has been 
defined generally in terms of three main functions. These are: 
• The establishment of safe and sound banking practices; 
• The protection of consumers in financial transactions; and 
• Ensuring stability in US financial markets by lending funds through its 
discount window. 
The goal of these duties is to minimize risk in the banking system.20 It is important to 
note that the review function within supervision necessarily assumes the existence of 
some applicable regulatory provision while the control component within regulation 
implies the existence of an appropriate compliance mechanism. 
Regulation and supervision can also be distinguished in terms of content as opposed 
to function. Some systems impose a degree of control and statutory direction while 
others allow a degree of flexibility and discretion to be exercised by the appropriate 
authority. While the United States, for example, operates a rules-based system, the 
United Kingdom follows a discretionary and judgement-based approach. 2\ 
Supervision can also entail the reVIew function of ensunng individual bank 
compliance with rules and prudent behaviour while regulation may refer to actions 
controlling the activities of banks. Financial regulation, in achieving its objectin?s. 
can be characterized as prescriptive and quantitatiH? \\'ith an approach that is 
19\; Gardener (ed.) 'UK Banking Supenision: E\'olution. Pral'licl' and Issues' (."lIen & Un\\in. 
London. 1986) ch . .:? .. 
20 111 Plaill FIIglish (a puhlication of thL' Federal RcsL'r\e Bank of St. Louis), 'Supc('\ ISing and 
Rc!.!ulatin!.! Banks' http://st\Ullisfcd.l)J·!.!/puhlicalions/sllpcn isiun/html acccsscd 2\ \brL"ll 2(X)6. 
21 \~Lllkl'l'~(200\) (1117).1. 
generally not flexible; for example, the prescribed amount of minimum risk based 
capital to be maintained by deposit-taking financial institutions is a regulatory 
requirement. Supervision is a qualitative process, which usually depends on the 
judgement and approach of the supervisory agency. The role of regulators has been 
compared to that of 'a flagman on the highway telling motorists when to stop and 
when to go and in what circumstances they may use the highway ... the bank examiner 
is a backseat driver.' 22 
Regulation can further be classified in terms of prudential and systemic regulation. 
The purpose of the latter is to ensure safety and soundness in institutions for systemic 
reasons. This is because the social costs of failure outweigh its private costs. 
Prudential regulation, however, ensures financial safety and soundness, in line with 
consumer protection practices. This is based on the premise that when an institution 
fails, the consumer loses, even if there are no systemic consequences.23 Prudential 
regulation focuses on the stability of the individual institution rather than the system 
as a whole. 
Although regulation and supervision are different concepts, in practice, the distinction 
between regulation and supervision is often blurred not least because the two 
functions are invariably performed by the same agency. Supervisors are often 
assigned with rule-making powers for refining legislation through principles and 
guidance. 2.+ Regulation and supervision are complementary concepts. For regulation 
to effectively achieve its goals there must be an efficient monitoring system \\hich 
n E Patrikis 'Supenision and Regulation', Speech before the PSA 1<)<)7 ,\IlIII/(// ,\/I'('(IIll; hy I:rnnr 
P(/trikis, First Vicc Presidcnt, New York Federal Reserre. 
Illlp//\\'\\'\\,Ill'\\ \orkkd,or~/nL'\\"L'\L'n",/"pl'l'chL',,1I L)l)7/cp97()"),lH,html . ;\((c""cd -l July 20(l5, 
," CAL (,llodhart Finallcial Regulation: H'It\', H(I\\' alld H'llere Now? (Routledge, Ll1ndon, 1(98). 
21;\ Grunhichkr and P Darlap (200-lL 'Integration ofELJ Financial \larkets Supenlsilln: 
Harmonisation or Unification?' (2004) 12 Journal of hnan(ial Regulation and Compliance ( I)' 36, 
permits feedback, a continuous evaluative process for early warning, and good crisis 
resolution. 25 
2.1.2. Why Banks are Special 
It is crucial to consider why financial institutions, deposit taking institutions in 
particular, are such an integral part of a nation's economy as to necessitate any form 
of intervention in their activities. Any argument to justify the regulation of financial 
institutions must be hinged on the premise that the banking system has special 
features that warrant its regulation. 
Four principal reasons have been identified as to why banks are considered special. 
• Banks play an important role in the financial system: 26 
• Bank runs pose a potential systemic danger; 
• Bank contracts have a distinct nature; 
• There are adverse selection and moral hazard27 problems associated with the 
lender of last resort role and other safety net structures that apply to banks. 28 
2S For further discussion on the distinction between supervision and regulation, see RM Lastra Celltral 
Banking and Banking Regulation: (Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics. 1996) 108: 
FS Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: What Works and ~\'hat Doesn't University of Chicago Press. 
Chicago, 2001) 13. 
2() These functions have been described to consist of facilitating payments in the exchange of goods and 
services: mobilizing savings; allocating capital; monitoring managers and exerting corporate control. 
and providing the relevant tools for managing and trading in risks. See R Levine, R. (1997), 'Financial 
Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda' (Jun 1997) 35 Journal of Ecollomic 
Literature (:~), 668. 
n AdnTsl' selection and moral hazard are closely related. Adverse selection refers to the tendency for 
the most risky banks to be the more likely to take ad\antage of safety net features so that their risk 
takin~ is subsidiled. Moral hazard refers to the incentive created for a party insulated from risk to 
beha~'e dilTerently and he less risk a\crse than it otherwise would. See Chapter J. para.,~).I. 
2~ Goodhart (1998) (n.:?3) 10. Banks have also heen tk.sLTihed as heing special hased on three 
considerations: First. they offer transaction accounts; sel'ond, they arc the backup source of liquidity 
for all other institutions and: third, they an: the transmission belt for monetary polIl·). G Corrigan' ,\rl' 
hanks specia\"!' (19~':?) Federal ReselTl' Balik of Mil/lleapo lis ... \lIl1ual Report Essay. 
hllp://11linnl'apoliskd.org/puhs/ar/arIl>,,>';.:?cllD ' al'Cl'SSl'd -l July .:?005. For further di'-.cu'-.'-.Ion on why 
hanks arc considered special. sel' I,. Hupkes 'The Legal :\spel'ts of Bank IllSlll\ency' (Kluwl'f. B(l'-.ton . 
. ~6 
Banks playa pivotal role in any economy primarily on two considerations. Banks 
constitute the only source from which a vast majority of borrowers get access to 
funds
29 
and they also manage the payment system. Banks perform the crucial role of 
intermediation through specialized services for borrowers and savers as they facilitate 
the mobilization of resources from the 'haves' (surplus units) and their transfer to the 
'have-nots' (deficit units), thereby aiding savings and investments as well as 
. . 30 
promotIng economIc growth. Banks are lenders to the corporate sector as \vell as to 
individuals, and thus determine how a large portion of credit is to be allocated. The 
nature of these services, therefore, justifies a degree of regulatory control and 
oversight 'more intrusive and expensive than the legal rules governing other business 
. ,31 
enterpnses. 
In most countries, banks are a means through which government channels its 
monetary policy and interacts with the financial sector. Through a combination of 
lending and deposit activities, they can affect the aggregate supply of money and 
credit, making them an important link in the monetary mechanism and in the overall 
state of the economy.32 Financial institutions may also be used to promote public 
policies, which are not necessarily related to the general health of the financial sector. 
In most developing countries, financial institutions are used to promote particular 
activities such as financing small and medium scale enterprises and agriculture . 
.20(0) 7; T !\sser Legal :\speers of Regulatory Treatment (~(Ballks ill Distress (1~11·. Washington DC, 
2000) 8. .. . " 
~l) B Bernanke 'Non-monetary \·ffeds of the Financial Cnsls 111 the Prop~l):atlon 01 the Great 
Depression' (1983) 73 :\meric(J1I Ecollomic Rel'i~H' .(3) 257 . 
. ~o On the economic role of financial intermedlanes. seL' generally CR Clark (1975). 'The Federal 
Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries' (July 1(75) S-l The Yale .Lal\', jOllrnal (X) 16()~: '\, 
Kashyap and othns (2002L 'Banks :\~ Liquidil) Providers: :\n Fxplanallon lor the COCXI'-lCIlL'C 01 
LL'ndin~ and Deposit-taking' (2002) 5X journal (it Finallce (I) 33. 
11 EH .I~'l·kson and I I S) nHlns Rc,t.:lllorio/l of Fillancia/lnstitutions (WL"t Group. St Paul. 1(99) 5 . 
. n ,\,'POI/g (200()) (n9). 
The case has been made that with good corporate governance. regulatory mechanisms 
such as deposit insurance and capital requirements would not be required to keep a 
firm stable and sound.33 However, this argument ignores the special nature of banking 
contracts, which makes instability inherent. Bank contracts invohe money ce11ainty 
on assets with an uncertain value. This, coupled with the potential for contagion, 
makes banks prone to runs where the collapse of a particular bank leads depositors of 
other banks to make panic withdrawals. Banks are now interconnected with each 
other in many ways (clearing systems, inter-bank deposits etc.), thus failure In one 
bank can also have consequences for the others. 
The nature of bank contracts creates the problem of maturity transformation or 
mismatching difficulties. Banks collect liquid deposits from customers that they use to 
finance the acquisition of illiquid assets and other investments of uncertain value and 
returns. These deposits are redeemable on demand irrespective of the asset value or 
rate of return of the banks' investments. Bank contracts, by their nature, are thus 
risky. No bank, no matter how solvent, can guarantee a full redemption of total 
depositors' funds at any particular time. Such an unexpected demand can only be met 
by disposal of assets. This situation will invariably lead to a bank having to sell its 
assets at a loss. This 'distress selling' could trigger insolvency in what would 
otherwise be a solvent bank because, owing to problems of asymmetric information, 
the market is unable to assess the quality and value of the assets being sold. 3.t 
.1.1 M Dcw;llripoint and J TiroIc 'Efficicnl (Jo\crnanl'C S~ructll.rc: [rnplicati~)ns I'm I.··inancial Rc,gulalllm' 
. eM' 11 ..... VI'\, ". ("<.1.: ) ('(lIJI'wl \/urker\ lllld F/I/(/IICwllll{al1ln/wtlOlI «( ;llllhnd!..'l' L nl\Crslt\ III a y L' I a I <. . " l: ,~ '- .~. ' . -
Prcss. Camhridgc, 1993) 12.. . .') . . . .' 1 
JI M I.L'\\is and" Da\ is Dome\rrc lllld /Iltenwrrollu/ Ballklflg (I hlhp :\1.111. [)Lddlllt-tnn. 19X7). 
Failure of a large number of banks or a small number of large banks could set off a 
chain reaction with systemic effects on the financial system. 35 According to Bagehot, 
'in wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the 
derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them. ,36 As a result of 
information imperfections, the news that some banks have failed may result in 
destructive panic runs on other solvent but illiquid banks by depositors who are 
unsure whether the shock may affect their banks.37 The failure of one institution can 
also be transmitted to others through inter-bank markets because inter-bank 
transactions are large, opaque and difficult for outsiders to monitor. 38 
Systemic considerations constitute the principal justification for the prescription of 
regulatory capital so that the probability of insolvency is reduced. In this regard. 
regulation also seeks to achieve allocative efficiency by controlling the risk return 
behaviour of banks so that deposits are directed into the highest yielding form of 
investments. Operational efficiency is also achieved so that service is provided at a 
minimal cost and dynamic efficiency enables the system to be innovative and adapt to 
changing needs and raise productivity.39 
Banking institutions provide a safe depository of wealth; they are also involved in 
other important activities within the financial system. In particular. banking 
organizations, through the use of financial conglomerates, are expanding into new 
1) There has heen considerable debate on whether or not contagion risk exists in banking. See for 
example: Kaufman (1994) (n8). ., 
36 W Bagehot Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market H.S. King and (ll .. London. 1873. 
51. 
37 S Bhattarcharya and AV Thakor 'Contemporary Banking Theory' (1993) 3 Journal of Financial 
Intermediation (1)~. 
38 J Guttentag and R Herring (1987). 'Emergency Liquidity Assistance to International Banks' in 
Portes. R. and S\\oboda. :\.K. (cds.). Threats to International Fil/al/cial Stability. (Cambridge 
Uni\ersit\ Press. Cambridge, 1993) 150. 
II) C\lllphcll Committec. ':\ustralian Financial System: Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry' 
(.\ustralian ell\ l'fnJllent Publishing SLT\ il'l', Canberra. 1981). 
markets and services as a result of sector-integration in financial services and markets. 
It is thus the duty of the government to ensure safety in the sector by providing 
depositor and investor protection in the form of regulation. 
2.1.3. Theory of Financial Regulation 
Regulation has been defined as a 'sustained and focused control exercised by a public 
agency over activities that are valued by a community' .40 In all spheres of human 
enterprise, there are two approaches to economic organization. First, individuals and 
groups may be left free to pursue their own goals and interests. Interactions are based 
on the legal system but mainly through the instrument of private law, and regulation 
has no significant role to play. The second is a system in which the state seeks to 
direct or encourage certain forms of behaviour, which it believes would not occur 
without its intervention. This is aimed at correcting perceived deficiencies in the 
system in order to achieve public interest goals:+1 The means of directing or 
encouraging the intended form of behaviour is generally referred to as 'regulation'. 
There have been different approaches to regulation, particularly to financial sector 
regulation. These approaches range from direct and total government control to the so 
called 'free banking' episodes.42 The degree and nature of regulatory intervention is 
generally determined by the philosophy underlying regulation. The two main theories 
for justifying financial regulation are known as the 'public interest" theory and the 
'private interest, market or capture' theory. 
40 P Selznick 'Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation' in Roger G. Noll (cd.). Reglliatory 
Polin alld the Social Sciences. (University of California Press. Berkeley, 19X5). For other dcfinitions 
of rc·!.!ulation. see MB Mitnick The Political Economy of Reglllatioll: Creating. [)esigning lind 
Rel1lO~'ing Regulaton' Form (Columhia Uni\crsity Press. Ncw York, 1980). 
41 IA Ogus Rt',{~[/I(/tioll: regal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press. Oxford. I 99-l). 
40 
The public interest theory argues that regulation exists to maximize social welfare, for 
the benefit of the public at large and that there is a desire to achieve collective goals. 
The private interest theory is premised on the view that certain stakeholders have a 
vested interest in regulation. This interest is largely perceived in terms of the existing 
participants trying to monopolise the market and exterminate competition. Regulation, 
to them, is a means to achieving this end. Thus, proponents of this theory argue that 
regulation operates in favour of market participants and against public interest. 43 
It is impossible to formulate a general list of public interest goals, which may be used 
to justify regulatory intervention because what constitutes 'public interest' will vary 
according to the specific values held by different social systems44 at different times.45 
Given the special role that banks play in any economy, the public interest in 
regulating banks would invariably be to foster economic development.46 Bank 
regulation has been described as a 'public good' ,47 and in reference to financial 
regulation, 'public interest' can be defined to include two basic goals, which are: 
• Financial stability;48 
• 
. Ie . 49 DepOSItor onsumer protectIon . 
42 For example, the Scottish free banking era between 1695 and 1864, and the free banking era in the 
mid-1800s in the United States. For a detailed discussion on free banking, see Dowd (ed) (1992) (n8); 
Sechrest (2008) (n8). , 
43 For an extensive discussion on the Public Interest and Market Interest theOrIes, see Ogus (1994) 
(n41) ch3 and ch4. 
44 E Bodenheimer 'Prolegomena to a Theory of Public Interest' in CJ Friedrich (ed.), The Public 
Interest (Atherton Press, New York, 1962). 
45 Following recent events, prevention of financial c~i~e and terr~ris~ have bo~h beco~e regulat?ry 
aims in many jurisdictions. This can also be claSSIfied as publlc mterest ratIOnale for regulatmg 
financial markets. See for example Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, s. 2(2). 
46 See for example FSMA 2000 S.2 (3) (d),(e),(t),(g), , . 
47 CS Dow 'Why the Banking System Should Be Regulated (May 1996) 106 The Economic loumal 
(436),698; Hupkes (2000) (n28) 8. , '. , 
48 A Crockett 'Why is Financial Stability a Goal of Publl~ Policy,?, (1997 Qtr ,4) Fed~ra~ R~ser\'e Bank 
of Kansas City Economic Review, 5; P Jackson 'FinanCIal Stablllty as a Pollcy Objective (2004) II 
Journal of Financial Crime (4) 256. 
41 
Banking regulation evolved from the need to protect citizens and the economy from 
the consequences of bank failure. It has been noted that 'the demand to be protected 
from bank failures arose with economic development, as development was met by 
demands to be protected from the negative consequences of industrialization, which 
became more evident and more expensive.'50 
Protection from the consequences of bank failure is desirable both for the individual 
citizen and the economy. A safe and stable banking system will encourage savings in 
banks, which would have been directed to other uses that are less productive for the 
economy.51 Apart from the loss of individual savings, banking crisis is usually 
followed by economic recession. The pressure and cost of a banking crisis can lead to 
reduction in public spending in other important areas such as health and education.52 
The public interest justification for financial regulation was developed in reaction to 
the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and the consequent economic depression (the Great 
Depression).53 Several laws were promulgated in the United States, which still form 
49 P Cartwright (ed.) COl/sulller Protection in Financial Senices (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague. 1999): P Cartwright 'Optimal Consumer Protection in Financial Services' (200 I) 
hllp:/h\\\\'.ccri.hclIl1cdia/cvcnts/prc\iolls contJpcartwrighl.pdf, accessed 2 August 2006: P Cartwright 
Banks, Consulllers and Regulation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004): Spong (n9) ch 1. Financial 
regulation has also been described as a process of creating incentives for tinancial institutions to 
'behave in a way consistent with the social objecti\'es of tinancial stability and invcstor protcction·. Scc 
L/ell'e1m (n 13) 7. For a contrary view, see GJ Benston 'Consumer Protection as Justitication for 
Rcgul~ting Financial Services', (2000) 17 Journal of Financial Serl'ices Research 0) 277. 
50 IR Barth and others Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels COI'ern (Cambridge Univcrsity Prl'ss. 
Cambridge, 2006) 26. 
5\ Following the US banking crisis in 1933. President Roosevelt noted: 'People will again he glad to 
have thcir money wherl' it will be safely taken care of and where they can use it conveniently at any 
timc. I can aSSlIrl' you that it is safer to keep your money in a rcopened hank than undcr the mattress.' 
Sl'l' 'Franklin D. Roosl'\L'lt's First Firesidc Chat' Sunday. March 12. 1933 
http://\\'\\'\\ . in fop Ie <ISl' .cllmli p;t/\()l)()() 146. h I ml acccssed 29 ~ lay 2007. 
~2 Barth (n50). 
".1 For a detailed disclIssion scc L Chandler. :\/1/erica's Greatest [)cpression (Harper 8: R(l\\. Nl'\\ 
York. 1(70): ~1 Fricdman and :\J Schwartz ,\ Monerary History of the United Srlltt's, /807-/<)00 
(Princeton llni\l'I'sity Prcss. Princl'lnn. 1(63). 
the basis of modern financial regulation.54 The original public interest theory was 
premised on the assumption that financial markets were inherently imperfect and that 
the public required protection from the inevitable consequences (market failure). 
Supervision of the sector would thus help to achieve a safe operation of the market. 
The explanation that regulatory intervention is premised upon the attainment of public 
goals has been given judicial affirmation.55 Thus, whenever a question of interpreting 
a regulatory statute arises for determination, the court must consider the 'mischief 
which the legislation was intended to remedy, particularly where there is ambiguity in 
the meaning of the legislation. 56 In such situations, the court attempts to determine the 
'social purpose' of the statute,57 although this must be done with caution as it is a 
delicate exercise. 58 The power of the courts to undertake judicial review is to ensure 
that the implementation of regulatory policies is kept in line with the public purpose 
for which they were promulgated. 59 
The public interest theory became subject to criticism and scepticism that marked the 
advent of the market or capture theory.60 Regulation had been adopted in most spheres 
of public utility and regulatory agencies were given wide and discretionary powers. 
5-1 Examples of such laws include the Securities Act 1933. The Glass Steagal Act 1933 and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act 1999. 
55 For an analysis of how governments use law to pursue policy objectives, see T Daintith 'Law as 
Policy Instrument: A Comparative Perspective' in T Daintith (ed.) Law as an Instrument of Economic 
Policy: Comparative and Critical Approaches (De Gruyter, New York, 1987). 
56 This is known as the 'mischief rule' or 'purposive approach' to legislative interpretation. The rule 
has its origins in the Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 ER 637. 
57 RD Miers and CA Page Legislation (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1982). 
58 It has been observed that 'many lawyers still react with unease or even distaste when invited to vie\\ 
law as an instrument of policy, and even those who find nothing strange about the notion will readily 
admit that the relationship between law and policy remains a problematic one.' See K McGuire 
'Emergent Trends in Bank Supervision in the United Kingdom' (Sept 1993) 56 1\10dern Law Review 
(5) 669. . .,. , 
-;" Baldwin and McCrudden (n II) ch-+: M Andenas 'The Courts and the Regulation 01 FinancIal 
Markets' (1997) C( '15 I:'ssays in International Final/cial and Economic Law, No. 7: ~ 1 SllppL'l'~I()ne 
and others Judicial Re\';ell' (LcxisNexis Butterworths, London, 2(05) ch I: P Cane :\dm;lI;strar;\'c Lml' 
(Oxford lIniHTsity Press. Oxford, 200-+) chI. 
However, it became increasingly difficult to justify most regulatory mechanisms from 
a welfare-maximizing perspective. Inherent institutional flaws and poor incentiYe 
mechanisms led to the failure of regulation and it became apparent that the principal 
purpose of regulatory intervention was to restrict competition in these markets. Thus 
the capture theory argues that the principal reason why financial services regulation 
was enacted was to serve the interests of governments, legislators and regulated 
financial firms. 61 Hence regulation exists to fulfil private ends. 
The private interest theory considers the regulatory process as one which is made up 
of competing well-organized interest groups, which make use of the legislative power 
of the state to capture rents at the expense of more dispersed groups. 6~ Governments 
are also viewed as beneficiaries of the regulatory process, as government imposed 
regulation exists to 'facilitate the financing of government expenditure. to funnel 
credit to politically attractive ends, and more generally to maximise the welfare and 
influence of politicians and bureaucrats, even where loftier public interest objectives 
are the ostensible goal. ,63 
This capture theory emerged from the close relationship that existed between the 
regulators and the regulated at the time, with the result that the authorities could not 
exercise fair and independent judgement in making policies.64 This relationship had 
60 Also described as the 'grabbing hand.' See A Shleifer and RW Vishny The Grabbing Hand: 
Government Pathologies and Their Cures (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 1998).. . 
61 GJ Benston Regulating Financial Markets: a Critique and Some Proposals (London:. Institute of 
Economic Affairs, London. 1998); R Kroszner and P Strahan (200 I). 'Obstacles to Optimal Policy: 
The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supenisio~ and ~egulation. R~f~)rms' in FS 
Mishkin (ed.) Prudential Supen'ision: What Works and What Doesn t. (UI1IVerSll y of C hlcag(l Pre". 
Chicago. ~()() I) 23.'. . . . _ 
(12 f\1 Olson The r(lgic at Collectil'l' Action (Harvard Unl\Crslty Prcss. Camhndgc \1:'. 1(6)): 
S Pel!lI11an 'Toward a f\1(l('c General Theory of Regulation' (April 1976) 19 jOllrnal (1/ UlH' (/1/d 
Economics ( I) 109. 
6.1 Barth (n50), 35. 
M For an historical analysis of the cloSL' relationship that 11;1' ah\ays cxisted he!\\CL'n gmcrnments and 
financial institutions. SL'e ibid. 
44 
developed for various reasons; recently, these include the fact that the information 
required for effective regulation may be obtainable only from regulated firms and the 
regulator might also have to recruit experts and other staff from the industry and vice-
versa.
65 This close relationship created the notion that the regulators had been 
'captured' .66 
As with public interest, what constitutes private interest also varies over time and 
place. This is due to the fact that in every society, there is a rivalry of interests and the 
balance of power continually shifts between various groups. Variations in the size, 
influence, and organization of interest groups provide the rationale for policy 
changes.67 Hence, banking regulation at a particular point in time will be in line with 
the interests of the dominant group. 
It is important to note that despite these criticisms, banking regulation, regardless of 
what is considered as its primary purpose, will invariably serve the public interest. 
This is due to the pivotal role that banks play in the economy and the uncertainty 
associated with them, which makes regulation essential. However, it is arguable 
whether regulation, in all circumstances, would serve the public interest more than it 
would serve private interests. Proponents of the capture theory argue that while there 
are always public interests in regulation, the industry's gain in regulatory outcome is 
much greater, and that the private interests of a few are given priority over the general 
bl " 68 pu IC mterest. 
(>5 PJ Quirk Industr\' Inf7uence in Federal Regulatory Agencies (Princeton Uni\l:rsity Press. Princeton 
Nl. 199 I), 
hh KG Wilson 'Social Regulation and Explanations of Regulatory Failure' (19g4) 32 Political Science 
(2), 20,. 
67 !\ros::lIl'/' lind Strahall (n61). 
68 Uo rth (n50) 3.5. 
Because regulatory policies are amenable to both private and public interests, 
regulators will be under pressure from both sides in determining policy outcomes, It 
has been posited that the outcome will depend on the regulator's personal 
characteristics and the available incentives, and thus vacillation of policies between 
both competing ends is to be expected.69 
2.1.4. A Functional Approach to Bank Regulation 
The challenge to the original public interest theory led to new attempts to re-evaluate 
the purpose and role of regulation in the financial sector. While private and public 
interests dictate the direction of public policy, it should be noted that in times of 
crisis, the influence of special interests would be significantly weakened. Regulatory 
policies at such times tend to be an instant reaction to the crisis that has occurred. 
Examples of regulatory response to market failure abound; as will be seen in Chapters 
three, five and six, deposit protection schemes were adopted and reformed in the 
United Kingdom and Nigeria in response to specific developments in the banking 
industry.70 Kane also notes that restrictions on interstate banking in the United States 
were removed in the 1990s because of 'sustained surges in the failure 
rates ... experienced in the deposit institution industry during the prior decade and a 
half. High failure rates among geographically confined banks and S&Ls teach 
taxpayer-customers important lessons about the longer run dangers of doing business 
(,l) I J Kane 'Ethical Foundations or Financial Regulation' (1997) NBER Working Paper No. 6020. 
70 r\ fta authorities in :\rgl'ntina repealed deposit insurance in the 19ROs, it \\as reinstituted in lYY:\ 
shortly after the Tl,t)uila crisis began in Dccemher 19lJ-+. Sl'l' Barth (n50) -+7. 
..+6 
with under-diversified institutions, especially at a time when advancing financial 
technology is fusing financial markets across the nation and across the globe.' 71 
Failure is a fact of life in financial markets; hence the justification for financial 
regulation can be hinged on the inherent instability and inefficiency within the 
market. Even the best of markets can fail; thus regulatory intervention becomes 
necessary because of the negative impact of such failures on economic efficiency. 
safety and fairness. 
The approaches to bank regulation considered above have been mainly normative in 
nature. However, it is important to take a functional approach to bank regulation. 
Bank regulation exists because markets fail; if markets continue to fail despite the 
introduction of regulation, the original rationale has not necessarily become invalid 
even though regulation has failed to achieve the desired objective. Thus the 
'ineffective hand' view of regulation does not question government's intent but 
asserts that the means and mode of regulation is ineffective. The pertinent question for 
policy-makers in regulatory reform is therefore how best to design and structure 
efficient regulatory mechanisms to achieve the desired objectives.72 
2.1.5. Sources of Market Failure 
It is important to understand the sources of market failure and the regulatory tools that 
are available to counteract them. The failure of financial markets to produce efficient 
outcomes can be attributed to one or more of four factors. These are: 
71 EJ Kane ·nl' Jure Interstate Banking: Wily Only Now'?' (1996) 2X Journal of f\!nney, Crl~dit and 
Banking, 141. 
• Systemic instability; 
• Information asymmetry; 
• Anti-competitive behaviour/natural monopolies; 
• Market misconduct. 
I. Systemic Instability 
This relates to the cost of contagion and systemic collapse that, over the years, has 
emerged as the most potent argument for financial regulation. Financial institutions 
function efficiently when there is public confidence in their ability to honour their 
obligations and to effectively perform the functions for which they were designed. 
Systemic instability occurs when a bank failure induces customers into a paillc 
withdrawal from other institutions. The threat of contagion can leave institutions, 
which are otherwise sound, prone to failure. 73 Systemic problems can lead to heavy 
social costs as borrowers find it difficult to get credit to finance investments, which in 
turn could exacerbate macro-economic problems.74 Significant bank failures can also 
threaten the integrity of the payments system and undermine the effectiveness of 
monetary policy.75 The appropriate regulatory tool to contain this type of market 
failure is the lender of last resort facility76 and deposit insurance. 
II. Information asymmetry 
7'2 This is thc approach that is adoptcd in the analysis of the main subject of this thesis. which is deposit 
insurance. 
n B/wrracarm and Thakor (n37); 0 Schoenmaker 'Contagion Risk in Banking' LSE Financial ,\lurkers 
GrollI' Disclissioll Paper. no. ::39 (London School of Economics, London, March 1996). 
74 Bemallke (n29). 
75 This is bccausl' monetary policy operates primarily by changing the quality of hank loans and this 
would he difficult to control in a crisis. See BS Bcrnanke. and ,\S Blinder 'The Federal Funds Ratc and 
the Channels of Monclar~ rransmission' (1992) 82 . \meric(lll Fcollomic Re\'iew (J-l) 901. 
76 Sl'l' para 2.5.5. 
Information asymmetry arises where a party on one side of a transaction possesses 
. + . 77 
more Inlormahon than the counterparty. Bank contracts are inherently more opaque 
than other firms; hence there are different levels of information, in terms of quality 
and accuracy, possessed by financial institutions and their customers.78 This results in 
a limitated availability of information necessary to make an informed investment 
decision. If a competitive market is to function well, bank customers must have 
sufficient information to evaluate competing products. Yet, even where such 
information is available, it is usually too complex for investors and consumers alike to 
decipher. 79 
Information asymmetry is fundamental to the existence of banks and their role in 
intermediation. It has been aptly observed that 'banks might not exist if there were no 
information asymmetries or contracting costs, for otherwise those with surplus funds 
and those seeking access to them could come together with equal information and 
. ,80 
sIgn contracts at no costs. 
Information asymmetry, if not properly managed, can potentially lead to a bank run 
and consequently, a crisis. Bank managers have more information about the quality of 
bank assets than depositors and creditors. The opacity of information means that it is 
difficult to accurately assess the condition of a bank. In the absence of information 
imperfections, the likelihood of bank runs occurring would be minimal because fully 
77 JE Sti~litl 'Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics' (2001) Nohel Prill' Lecture, 
I; Mi,\ltkill (n25) 2: GA AkerIof 'The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the t\larket 
Mechanism' X-l The Quarterly Journal of Economics (3), -l88: FA Hayek (ll)-l5). 'The Use of 
Kn()wkd~L' in Society' (Sept 19..+5) 35 The American Economic Review (..+) 51l). 
7'8. It has h~een shown that major rating agencies have more significant disagreements on hanks than they 
do OVCl' other finns. Sec D t\lorgan 'Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry' (2()()2) 
l)2 ;\mericlllI Fconomic Review. ~n-+. 
79 It has heen aptly OhSC('\L'd that 'in no other tield invoh'ing sllch largc puhlic interests IS there more 
uncL'I'tainty for the imL'stor. .. partly hecallse of the difficulty involving loans and discounts ... and partly 
hL'causc ... any flllctuation in the value of the assets hulks so large for the small net worth.' Sec. Nc\\ 
HG (iuthnwn '\lIolysi\ (~r Fil/(/llcial Stutnl/ol!.' (-lth L'L1 .. Prentice-Hall. York. 195~) -ll)-l. 
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informed depositors and creditors would demand higher interest rates from risk\' 
banks. This would serve as a means of checking excessive risk-taking. 8 ! 
The proper regulatory tool to deal with this is the adoption of strict disclosure rules. 
Additional conduct of business rule prohibiting insider trading, non-disclosure and 
false or misleading information, may also be adopted. 
III. Anti-competitive behaviour/natural monopolies 
Natural monopolies82 exist in financial markets, as they tend to move towards high 
levels of concentration and dominant positions.83 As firms grow in size and as the 
main institutions merge, they are able to generate increasing returns mainly through 
cost savings. As there will be little or no competition, customers will have a restrictive 
access to capital for business and the oligopolistic market will have the advantage of 
dictating the price of products and services. This leads to a situation where there will 
be no other mechanism, apart from the public oversight role of regulation, to ensure 
that customers receive a fair service and at a reasonable price. 
The principal measure used in counteracting anticompetitive behaviour is competition 
law and policy which include rules designed to deal with business structure (merger 
and antitrust laws) and laws that ensure markets remain contestable by allowing free 
d . 84 entry an eXIt. 
80 Barth (n50) 23. 
81 lI)id .2.+. 
S2 W Sharkey The Theory o/Natllral Alollopoly (Camhrid~e University Press. Camhridge. 19X.2). 
S.l For a re\i'e\\ of ar~lIl11ents (In L'conomiL's of scak that could lead to a natural monopoly in hankin~. 
:-'l'L' K Dowd 'Is Banking a Natural ~ Inl1opoly·.'· ( 199.2) .+5 Kyklos (-'). 379. 
8.\ On Compl,tition la\\. see R Whish ('ol1lperirioll Lalr (5 th ed .. Le.xisNexis Butterworths. London . 
.20(3); J h'jo\lol1opoly. LaU' lIlId .\/arkt·{ (Kluwer Law and Taxation. De\enter. 1(90). 
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By counteracting anti-competitive behaviour, regulation ensures efficiency in the 
financial system as efficiency and competition are closely linked together. A 
competitive banking system will encourage banks to operate efficiently and utilize 
their resources wisely if they are to keep their customers and remain in business. 
Competition is a driving force for innovation in the provision of financial products 
and services. 85 It is therefore important that regulation should not overly restrict the 
activities of banks, place them at a competitively disadvantaged position with less 
regulated firms, or hinder their ability to cater for their customers' financial needs. 
IV. Market misconduct 
Market misconduct is a major cause of market failure. 86 Unfair and fraudulent 
conduct of management has been a major factor in the collapse of many financial 
institutions. It has been observed that mismanagement and fraudulent practices 
became 'more attractive to managers and shareholders in the riskier and less 
profitable world of the 1980s. ,87 Because of the systemic risk of contagion that the 
failure of one institution poses to the others, it is imperative that market participants 
act with integrity. Regulation seeks to ensure this and to protect the customers as well 
as other market participants from unfair and fraudulent practices. 
Asymmetry of information means that in the retail market, the nature of the proposed 
contract between the firm and the individual may not be entirely clear, especially in 
terms of the purpose, outcome and charges involved. The performance of such 
contracts depends on the financial soundness of the firm, which the retail consumer 
S:i Spollg (n9). . 
86 For e\ideIlCL' of the role of mark.el misconduct in financial crises. sec: G;\ ;\kL'r1ot and PM 
RUI11L'r 'L()otin~: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for proril' (199,,],) Brookillgs Pupas Oil 
FOJl/0111;C ;\cfi\'ifY, No.2, 1-73. 
87 ~1 Dl'\\alripont and J Tirok Thl' Prudl'llfiul Rl'gillarioll ofBullk\ (i\IIT, Cllnhrid~l' \1.\, )99,,],), 
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does not have access to, either because of cost restraints or due to a lack of requisite 
expertise. Hence, regulation is required to protect the interest of the customer who 
relies on the solvency and prudent behaviour of the firm long after a purchase 
decision has been made.88 
Market integrity regulation usually focuses on conduct of business rules, disclosure of 
information, entry restrictions, corporate governance and fiduciary responsibilities. 
The aim is to ensure the honesty and integrity of firms and their employees in dealing 
with customers. These rules also provide guidelines for the objectivity of financial 
advice. 
2.2. The Case against Regulation 
Free market proponents have argued that market failure is a direct consequence of 
regulation and that market forces will be best suited to achieve allocative efficiency 
on their own. Introducing regulation into an otherwise free market is seen to weaken 
incentives for owners and managers to monitor and control themselves. The case has 
been made that an unregulated banking system tends to achieve an optimal allocation 
of resources, given four important assumptions: (a) a given endowment of wealth 
among individuals; (b) a competitive market; (c) government regulation cannot 
improve administrative efficiency; and (d) there are no externalities that could justify 
government interference. It is believed that violations of the first two assumptions do 
not support the regulation of banking while the third and fourth might. 89 
SS Do\'ics ond G'-(,CII (113) 22. 
S') G Iknston and GG Kaufman 'The . \ppropriall' RlliL' of Bank Regulation' (i\ Lt:- 1996) 106 The 
Fcollomic Journal ( .. B6 \. hXX. 
The above argument Ignores the important role that banks play in financial 
intermediation. While it is true that in today's economy, 'many non-bank firms 
provide the same financial services as banks', it is equally true that such non-bank 
firms are usually part of a conglomerate structure, which more often than not, is 
dominated by a banking institution.9o This argument is also based on the assumption 
that banking industries do not naturally gravitate towards oligopolies and even where 
they do, it is a direct consequence of regulatory policy that restricts entry or subsidises 
a favoured bank. 
Systemic risks and the perceived fragility of banks are also considered as insignificant 
to the financial system 'if depositors and bankers are aware of it and act 
appropriately' .91 This argument might be correct if it is assumed that the information 
on which depositors and bankers are to act is available and understandable, and that 
financial institutions are not susceptible to a sudden loss of confidence. However, 
information imperfections exist and the relevant information is, more often than not, 
only available to the relevant supervisory agency. 
Bank depositors find it more difficult to protect their interests than customers of other 
businesses. General judgements about the condition of banks tend to be difficult and 
prone to error. As a result of the opacity of bank operations, individual depositors 
cannot determine the solvency of a bank. It has been observed that supervisors also 
find it difficult to determine whether a bank has a liquidity or a solvency problem.92 
Where a few depositors are well informed, they may equally fear that a solvent bank 
90 ThcSL' other 'non-hank' firms ;t1su pose systemic dangers and in some countries. 11a\e heL'n hrought 
under the samL' rL'~lIlat()ry amhit as hanks. 
91 Bellstoll lind 1\1lI~ti1/1I1l (nX9) 6XX. 
92 EP Da\ j" 'Deht. Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk' (Clarendon, Oxford, 1992). 
can be made insolvent by uninformed actions of others.93 As noted earlier, banks are 
vulnerable to runs from the interaction of liquid liabilities that are repayable on 
demand and illiquid assets that can only be realised at short notice by accepting a 
discount on their book value. Failure of a large number of banks or a small number of 
large banks can create a general loss of confidence with systemic implications 
because: (a) information asymmetry makes it difficult for depositors and creditors to 
judge the strength of a bank based on publicly available information~ and (b) there is a 
network of interlocking claims and liabilities through inter-bank transactions (for 
example clearing systems and inter-bank deposits).94 
It has been aptly observed that in comparison to other industries, bank failures tend to 
occur faster, spread more broadly, result in a larger number of failures, result in larger 
losses to creditors, and do more damage to the economy.95 Although other regulated 
industries (for example, telephone and power) also play vital roles in the economy, 
unlike in the financial services, failure of one company would not necessarily cause 
systemic disruptions in the same way.96 
The case has also been made that the empirical literature gives very little credence to 
the theory that a run on one bank might give rise to runs on other solvent banks.
97 
While this may be true to some extent,98 there is another dimension to the debate, 
which is the 'risk vs. seriousness' of the issue. Accordingly, it has been noted that: 
'while the probability that the failure of a single bank will induce a systemic problem 
<)1 Llewelyn (n 13). 
<)-t J Muiler 'Inter-Bank Credit Lines as a Channel of Contagion' (2006) 29 JOllmal oj Fill(lllcial 
Selviccs Research (1). :'7; X Frei/as and other 'Systemic Risk, Inter-Bank Relations and I,lquidity 
Pw\'isiun 11\ the Central Bank' (2000) 32 JOllrnal oj MOllcy. Credit (lnd Bunking (3) 61 \. 
95 A ('n)(h:U 'The TIK'()r~ and Practi(l' of Financial Stahility' (Dec 1(96) 1-l-l De Economist (-l) )~1. 
<)6 Jackson (n-lX). 
1)7 Kalil/nan (n~n: GJ Benston and others P('(\j)ccti\'cs 011 S(~fe and SOllnd Blil/king: p(l\f. Pr('\('nr and 
FliflIn~ (1\1IT, Call1hrid~l' 1\1:\. 1(86). 
may be very low, if it were to occur it would be serious and the costs would be hi£h. 
'-
Thus, regulation to prevent systemic problems may be viewed as an Insurance 
premium against 'low-probability-high-seriousness' risks. ,99 
Regulation performs an important role in financial stability, primarily by promoting 
confidence and guaranteeing the safety of depositors' funds and investments. Yet, it 
should not be overly prescriptive and needlessly restrictive. The following problems 
have been articulated as direct consequences of a highly prescriptive regulatory 
regIme: 
• An excessive prescriptive regime may bring the entire regulation system into 
disrepute as it is perceived by the market participants as mainly redundant. 
• Risks are often too complex to be covered by simple rules. 
• Book entries only reflect an institution's financial position at a paI1icuiar point 
in time, although its position can change within a short period. 
• A rigid approach to regulation prevents firms from adopting a suitable cost 
effective mode of regulatory compliance, thus inhibiting financial innovation. 
• A prescriptive regime tends, in practice, to focus upon processes rather than 
outcomes. This makes it easy for institutions to circumvent regulatory 
provIsIons. 
• Regulation may lead to friction between the regulatory authorities and the 
regulated institutions, or alternatively lead to o\'erreaction on the part of the 
regulated institutions in an attempt to achieve internal compliance out of fear 
'--
of being challenged by the regulatory authorities. 
<lS For a contrary \iew. Sl'l' Scl!ol'lIl1laker (073). 
1Jl) Ul'H't'/vlI (n 13). 
• A highly prescriptive regulatory regime may be too inflexible and unable to 
adapt to dynamic market conditions. 
• Excessive regulation may lead to a potential moral hazard. Regulated 
institutions may assume that areas not explicitly covered by the regulatory 
regime fall outside the scope of regulation. 100 
Arguments against regulatory intervention are based on the fact that regulation alters 
the natural and independent functioning of financial markets and is costly for market 
participants. IOI The costs of regulation include compliance costs,102 institutional 
103 d I 104 Th· . h d· h d . k . d costs, an structura costs. IS notwIt stan mg, t e cost an ns s aSSOCIate 
with market failure is greater than that which can be imposed by regulation and less 
than the benefits derived from regulation. Regulation is therefore a response to the 
gap between the private cost of failure of financial institutions and the public cost. IOS 
Adopting a cost benefit analysis, regulation and its costs will be justified if it succeeds 
in achieving its set goals and objectives by promoting financial stability and 
preventing the disruptive effects of bank collapse. I06 An important factor is that the 
regulatory model adopted should be best suited for the prevention, resolution and 
mitigation of market failure. 
It is also important for regulatory policies to be kept constantly in alignment with the 
objectives for which they were introduced. It is important to note that: 
100 Goodhart (n24) chI. 
101 Ibid. ch8. 
102 This is the C()st of monitoring compliance with regulatory guidelines. 
103 This is the cost of establishing and maintaining institutions to administer and supervise regulator! 
compliance. ..
1Q.t This is the cost incurred because business has to be conducted In a Illore complex torm to comply 
\\ith ret!ulation. 
J()~ p J~~ckson 'Inll'rnational Financial Regulation and Stahility', (2()03) 2 71le ICFAI journal of Balik 
,\lllIlllgl'lIlt'lIt (I), ~l). 
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• Regulatory intervention cannot prevent all banks from failing. Concerns about 
individual bank failures should not be the focus of regulators provided there 
are no systemic risks, depositors are protected and uninterrupted banking 
services can be maintained. If the purpose of regulation is to prevent all bank 
failures, the result will be to sacrifice one of the objectives of regulation. 
which is to maintain the integrity of the financial system. If poorly managed 
banks are not allowed to fail, their owners will be protected from competition 
and market discipline. This will create incentives for mismanagement and 
excessive risk-taking. 
• Bank regulation and supervision is not a substitute for the banker's role in 
operational decision making. A bank supervisor is not in the best position to 
determine policy at a bank or to establish particular lending or investment 
practices. For example, credit decisions which are partly based on the 
characteristics of individual borrowers are best made by the lending officer 
rather than the supervisor, who spends only a few days or weeks in a bank. \07 
Policymakers should ensure that bank regulation balances the need to maintain 
prudential banking practices against the financial needs and services available to 
bank customers. An excessive regulatory regime or one that focuses on 
inappropriate objectives will result in avoidable costs which may exceed the costs 
of failure. 
I!)(l I,'or a disclission on the Ct)st-hendit analysis approach to regulation, see BL Lave 'Bcncfit-C{l"t 
Anah sis: Do thL' BL'nefits L\.cCL'd the l\lsts'?' in IA Oglls (cd.) Reglllatio1l. Lcol1011lin (llld the Lmr 
(Fd\\';,rd L1gar. Cheltenham, 200 I). 
107 S{I/)lIg (n9) ch I. 57 
2.3 Legal Rationale for Financial Regulation 
From a legal perspective, financial regulation can be justified on two grounds: 
(i) In most jurisdictions, banks and financial institutions are required to be 
incorporated companies. According to Kyd on Corporations, a company is 'a 
collection of many individuals, united into one body, under a special 
denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form and vested, 
by the policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects. as an 
indi vidual. ,108 
From the perspective of the economic theory of law, a company is a means of 
raising and organizing capital by investors who aim to reduce risk through 
diversification, and to liquidate their investment quickly and cheaply. \09 The 
concept of legal personality and limited liability ensures that the company is a 
distinct person from its members and that liability of the shareholder for the 
debts of the corporate entity is limited to the amount, if any, unpaid on the 
value of his shares. This principle was established by the House of Lords in 
the famous case of Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd. 110 and it has been justified 
on the ground that it enables business to be undertaken with limited financial 
liability in the event of the business proving to be a failure. 111 
Bank managers are agents of the shareholders and they are hired to run the 
bank on their behalf. This creates a separation between ownership and control 
lOX JH Farrar and others Farmr's CompallY Law (4 th cd .. Buttcrworths Law. London. 199X) 6. 
109 RA Posnn (20(1.~). Fcollomic Allalysis (~f Lmr (:\spl:n Puhlishers. Ncw York. 2003) ch I·t 
110 II X97] :\C 22. HL. 
III Sel' I,ord DiploL"k in Dimbleby & SOilS \. ,\'utional l 'nion of Journalists ( 19X4) 1 . \11 I:R 751: al,,!) 
Jenkills \' P/wnllaC('l/riClll Sociery (1921) I Ch 392.393. 
and also creates a principal-agent problem, where the principal (shareholder) 
strives to ensure that the agent (management) runs the firm in the principal's 
best interest. The principal interest of bank owners is to make profit and this 
can be achieved by risky investment. This position is detrimental to the 
interest of the more risk-averse depositor. Although limited liability 
encourages investment as the members' risks are minimised, it certainly 
encourages risk-taking by managers, knowing well that the liability of 
members is limited. As risk is effectively moved to the corporation's creditors. 
they have developed risk-monitoring mechanisms to protect their interests. 
These include secured lending by fixed or floating charges, board 
representation and increased interest on loans to reflect risk. 112 
Most financial institutions are either public or private limited liability entities 
operating in the normal course of events to make profit and to shift risk to 
creditors. The special nature of banking business, which is funded by short-
term deposits, usually repayable on demand, 113 places the relationship between 
a bank and its customers in a debtor-creditor category. The contractual nature 
of this relationship was judicially articulated in Foley v. Hil1.114 While bank 
deposits are repayable on demand, there is no obligation that they be repaid in 
specie. Hence, banks have a high degree of discretion with the way they can 
use depositors' funds. liS The implication of the decision in Foley v. Hill is that 
a bank is not, in strict legal terms, the agent of its customer. There is no 
112 JM Samuels and others Munagement of Company Finance (6th ed .. International Thomson Bu-.ines-. 
Press. London, 1996) ch I .. L J Hudson 'The Case Against Secured Lending' (1995) IS International 
Rl'l'icH' (~lL{lH' and F('onomics (I) ..t.7. 
113 jo{/cltil11son \. ,I,lwiss Bank Corporation (1921) 3 KB 110. 127. 
Ilot ( 1 x..t.~n 2 HL Cas 28. This approach is reflected in other common law jurisdictions. Sec gener;dly R 
Cranston (cd.) European Banking La\\': the Bal/ker-customer Relationship (Lloyd's of London Pres". 
I.on<.lon, 1998). 
II:> Ub\'llll Arab Fon>igl/ Bank \. Bankers lms! [ 19891 QB 72X. 746, 
imposition of strict fiduciary duties, which would have been too burdensome 
for banks and their business, as it would have imposed a continuous obligation 
to give meticulous accounts for their use of customers' funds. 116 
The implications of the rule in Foley v. Hill should ordinarily make customers 
wary of placing their funds in banks that are at liberty to use the funds at 
whatever risk they consider necessary. However, bank managers are required 
to manage their banks, like every other corporation, in good faith in the 
general interests of the corporation. 117 What constitutes the 'interests of the 
corporation' is open to debate. 118 Generally, it is construed to refer to the 
shareholders' interests. 119 Directors are obliged to manage their corporations 
to maximize shareholder value. They are not obliged to take other interests, 
such as creditors' interests, into account except where there is a legal 
requirement to do SO.120 Imposing such an obligation would create 'insoluble 
problems of reconciling conflicting interests.' 121 This remains the position if 
h .. I 122 t e corporatIon IS so vent. 
There is a departure from the traditional position above where the company is 
insolvent or is of doubtful solvency. The duty to manage the company in good 
116 PE Smart Chorley and Smart Leading Cases in the Law of Banking (6 th ed., Sweet & Maxwell. 
London, 1990) 4. 
117 Perciml l' Wright r 1902] 2 Ch 421; Re Smith & Fmvcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304; Howard Smith Ltd r 
Ampol Petrol Ltd [197'+] AC 821. . . . 
118 The corporate governance debate has revolved on whether mangers of corporations sh.ould locus 
ex.c1usively on protecting the interests of shareholders or if their duty should be expanded to Il1clude the 
interests or other groups. generally referred to as 'stakeholders'. 
119 Brad)' l' Bradr r 1988] BCLC 20. ss~, 
I ~l) This' is also t'he dominant \iew in the United States \\here it is believed that 'needless complex.ity 
would result if corporations \\en.' required to serve the interests of groups other than shareholders,' Sl'e 
JR I\Ltl'ey and M O'Hara 'The Corporate Governance or Banks' (2003) 9 Economic Policy Rel'iell' (I). 
91. 
121 Rl Barrell 'Direl'!ors' Duties to Creditors' (1977) 40 ,\/odem La\\' Rel'ieu' (2) 226, 
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faith is then extended to creditors. In West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. y. Dodd123 
the Court of Appeal, referring to the decision in Kinsela v. Russel Kinsela Pty. 
L d 124 t. ,held that directors owed a duty to have regard to the interests of 
creditors. 125 
While the question of whether directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors when 
the company is insolvent or at risk of insolvency may be beyond doubt,126 it is 
still uncertain whether such a general duty exists at all times. Furthermore, the 
directors are only required to act in the interests of the creditors as a whole127 
and they owe no duty of care to individual creditors for economic IOSS.128 
The foregoing, coupled with the fact that bank depositors are unsecured 
creditors, leaves depositors in a precarious position. Under most legal systems, 
secured and preferential creditors rank ahead of unsecured creditors in a 
liquidation process. 129 Information asymmetry and cost restraints also mean 
that they are unable effectively to monitor the risk behaviour of banks. Thus, 
in the absence of regulation and its resolution mechanisms (and deposit 
insurance scheme where available), bank depositors will have little or no 
protection in an insolvent liquidation. Thus financial regulation is necessary to 
122 A Camphell and D Singh 'Legal Aspects of the Interests of Depositor Creditors: The Cas~ for 
Deposit Protection Systems' in A Camphell and others (eds.) Deposit Insllrance (Palgrave Macmillan. 
New York, 2(07). 
123 11988 J BCLC 250. 
12.t (1986) 10 ACLR 395. 
12:> For a disclIssion of directors' duties to creditors in the context of insolvency, see BS Butcher 
Directors' Duties: ;\ Nell' )\!illenllillm, a Nell' Approach? (Kluwer Law International. Boston, 20(0) 
l'h6. 
12(> J Lowry 'The Reco~nition or Dircl'tors Owing Fiduciary Duties to Creditors' (200..f) 1 IlIfcn/(/liOlwl 
('(}lpol'llte Rc.\('ul' (I). 
127 Rl' H'eltili} FII,~illeen Ltd [19(0) BCLC 8.~3, 
12S Nordic' Oil Scn'iccs Ltd \' Ball/lIlI. 119931 Sl 1 116-L Re Panton£' 485 Ltd [20()2j 1 BCLl' 2()n. 
121) h)r a detailed disClISsi(ln or the position or the hank depositor as an unsecured creditor.,,~e 
Clllllphdl aI/(/ Sillgh (nI22), 
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protect depositors' funds and interests in the event of bank failure and to 
monitor and prevent excessive risk-taking. l3O 
(ii) Most advocates of free and unregulated markets proceed on the basis that 
market failures tend to be either a direct result of, or precipitated by, 
regulatory failure. This postulation may be true in the sense that there has 
never been an entirely unregulated market. However, regulatory intervention 
has been a consequence of the search for an antidote to market failure. Thus, 
regulation has been imposed because the inherent rules of the market, 
prescribed by the common law, as enshrined in privately enforced and 
contractual rights, have failed to achieve the desired effects. Hence the choice 
is not strictly between free unregulated markets and regulated markets but 
between the regulatory mechanism of the common law and that of the 
d ... fbi' I 131 a mlnlstratlve system 0 pu IC contro . 
A fundamental difference between the common law approach to regulation 
and the direct administrative regulatory control is that the former is reactive 
while the latter is largely proactive. 132 The common law relies on public 
officials to function Uudges and court officials) but their regulatory 
intervention can only be triggered by the action of private citizens (litigants 
and lawyers). Judicial power has to be invoked; its exercise does not begin 
until a court of competent jurisdiction is called upon to take action. I :n Apat1 
from the fact that it is left to individuals and not the state to enforce rights, 
130 A Mullineu\ 'Re-Regulating Banks: The Unfinished ;\gl'nda' (2000) X JOllnwl of Fillallcial 
Regulation L~ Compliance (I L 9. 
1.11 Posner (n 1(9) L'h I.~. . .. 
132 The l'(lIllIllOn la\\ fal'ilitates pri\ate arrangements while administrative conlrolcnforL'l's ohllgall(ln". 
1.11 ,\'IIl'1l ('n. of :\{nfmlia \" In/alii Commissioner (~l TaxlItioll (19~ I) ,\C 275, 2l )'i; . \f/ak\\'ffl;'l' \' 
;\nel\l' IIl)X51 1 NWLR (pt -+) 771, 7X I. 
obligations are also incurred on a voluntary basis in the sense that they can 
always be displaced by agreement between the parties. H..+ Common law rules 
are only obeyed because of the fear of sanctions and the possibility of haying 
to pay compensation to a victim where there has been a breach. 
Direct regulation is carried out mainly through public officials and bodies 
whose duties have been expressly stated by statute. The aim is both 
prophylactic and counteractive, to forestall the occurrence of failure and where 
it occurs, to mitigate its disruptive effects. Under the common law, directors of 
corporations are deemed to hold a position of trust and as such owe certain 
fiduciary duties to the corporation. 135 A director must carry out his 
responsibility with reasonable care and skill and must act in good faith, in the 
best interest of the company and avoid conflict of interest. Although these 
duties are owed to the corporation as a whole,136 in certain circumstances, they 
are also owed to others with vested interests in the corporation such as 
creditors 137. Breach of these duties will usually attract sanctions: 138 however, 
the complex and seemingly impossible conditions for proving that the duty is 
owed to the particular claimant, more often than not, leaves these breaches 
unresolved. 
In apparent contrast to the remedial approach of common law controL direct 
administrative controL through its authorisation and market control 
1.14 o I.; liS (1141) eh I. 
13:; II~ thL' United Kingdom. the common law principles on directors' duties have hecn codified in 
Chapter .2 of Part 10 of the Companies Ad .2006. under the heading 'General Duties of Directors'. Sl'l' 
CnmpaniL's Act .2006. ss.170-177. 
\lh Pcrci\'(z/ \' H'right (n 117): !Jnkin l' :\m/erson [:200 I J I BCLl' ~ 7 2. 
1.17 /.onrho Ud \' Sltell Petrolcllm Company Ltd [ 1961 J .2 :\11 ER 456. 
\3~ M Bruce Righ" lind f)lIties d Directors (~th cd. Totkl Puhlishing. Haywards Heath. 20(6): also J 
l.oWl'\' and /\ J)1~llal1l Company LUll (:2 nJ cd .. Butterworths. 1,0ndol1. 20(n). 
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mechanism, prevents fraudulent and incompetent management from entering 
the market. Prudential regulation and the general oversight function of 
supervision also ensure that bank management conduct their affairs in a 
prudent manner by creating and enforcing standards. 
The special nature of banks renders the general regulatory tool of the common 
law inappropriate and inadequate thus requiring specialized regulation. 
2.4. Sources of Financial Regulation 
There are three principal sources of financial regulation in any system. These are: 
• Statute; 
• Secondary legislation and Regulation; 
• Administrative practice. 
2.4.1. Statute 
This is the primary source of regulation in most countries. There are specific laws 
governing financial institutions and there are other relevant laws such as company and 
competition legislation. The statutory framework varies from country to country. 139 
2.4.2. Secondary Legislation and Regulation 
The details of regulatory requirements are mostly set out in secondary legislation. 
This allows the primary statute to be kept devoid of complex provisions. It also allo\\'s 
the primary statute to be easily amended, revised and interpreted. It is often the case 
IJI) JR Barth and othcrs 'Thc RCt!ulation and Supl'l'\ision of Banks ,\round the World: i\ \.;l'W 
[)alaha~l" (.~OOI) Wprld Bank Polil'Y RC~l'ar(h Working Papl'r No. 25XX, 
that the primary legislation provides the basis for the secondary legislation and gi yes 
the power to make such regulations to a particular authority or person. 
Secondary legislation involves the use of less formal rules to implement the actual 
regulatory requirement. An example of this practice in the United Kingdom is the 
issuance of rules under Section 138 and guidance under Section 157 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000. 
2.4.3. Administrative Practice and Non-legal Supervisory Policy 
This source of financial regulation is derived from the substance of administrative 
decisions and supervisory policy developed in applying any relevant statutory 
prOVIsIon or other rules set out by secondary legislation. This involves the use of 
discretionary power; the degree of discretion exercisable will depend on the content of 
the particular regulation to be applied. 
2.5. Structure/Form of Financial Regulation 
The term 'financial safety net' refers to the various institutions, mechanisms and rules 
that exist to protect the safety and soundness of the financial system. 140 In broad 
terms, a financial safety-net comprises of three basic components. These are 
Prudential Supervision, Lender of Last Resort and Deposit Insurance. 141 
140 CW Calomiris The Posflllodem Bank SO/l't\' Net: Lessons from Derdoped llnd Del'eloping 
Economies (AU Press, Washington DC. 1997): C Isoard 'Financial Safety Nets: \\'here Wl' Stand' 
If)B Selllinar, \\'{/SllillgfOIl, D,C,. ScrtclI/her 9,2003, 
http://,,'ww ,1~ldl), (1r~1 111tlt ('add I cn ~ Ii sh/-l SI1L'( ial i Il fulL'llll fCl"cllcc/ ~()( Hlp sept l) redc,/i 'l lardppt ,pd f. 
al'l'l'SSl'd 2 ,\l1~l1st 2006. 
I,tl ;\ De1l1Ir~11l'-Klint 'Dl'signing a Bank Safet~ Nct: .\ Long-term Pcrspectin," (2000) World Hank 
l\ 1 i IllCO. 
Financial safety nets are designed to prevent bank failure and, where it occurs. to 
. '. 142 
mItigate Its effects. The components of the safety net perform different but 
complementary functions. Banking crisis, globalization, sector integration and 
advances in technology have brought the form and structure of bank regulation to the 
fore in policy and academic debate. As stated earlier, the focus of regulatory debate 
should be on the nature, form and scope of regulation, and how best to achieve 
efficiency. The approach to regulation varies from country to country. While some 
countries have adopted a functional approach to regulation, others have adopted an 
institutional approach. 
The objective of a functional regulatory system is to control the activity (function) of 
the regulated firm and not the firm itself. Separate regulatory regimes cover different 
aspects of financial services and markets. This approach aims at supervising the 
individual components and activities of diversified entities. The United States and 
Australia are countries that have adopted this approach to regulation. 
While the functional approach focuses on the activity of the regulated firms, the 
institutional approach focuses on the firm. Where a regulated institution provides 
diversified financial services, the scope of the regulation is extended to cover the 
other services provided. This is the prevalent approach in European economies. I -B 
Both approaches to financial regulation have their advantages. As a result of the 
specialized nature of functional regulation, it is generally perceived to be more 
suitable to the needs of specific types of business. Functional regulatory systems often 
I I~ :\ Grl'l'llspan 'The Financial Safety Net' 3th Allllual CO/~ferellce 011 BlIllk Structure alld 
COIII/Jetitioll FL'dcral RCSl'I"\L' Bank of Chicago. Chicago. Illinois. I 0 ~ lay 200 I. 
66 
lower market entry restrictions and this may contribute to market dynamism as new 
participants bring innovation and also increase competition. 1.u A functional approach 
to regulation is also more adaptable to the dynamic nature of financial markets and 
services. Functional regulation can provide a more stable framework than institutional 
regulation because functions tend to be more stable over time than the institutions that 
provide them. 145 
Furthermore, functional regulation ensures that power is diversified and not 
centralized in a single entity. This tends to reduce the scope for discretionary and 
arbitrary action. The intention of market participants to capture the regulatory 
authorities will be more difficult to achieve, as there are more regulators to be 
'captured' . 
However, where financial conglomerates are involved, functional regulation tends to 
compartmentalize regulation thus enabling conglomerates to avoid regulation for 
some activities. Moral hazard may also arise in the sense that conglomerates may be 
erroneously led to assume that certain activities, not covered by a specialized 
regulatory feature, fall outside the scope of regulation. 
The potential for disharmony among functional supervIsory bodies regarding the 
allocation of often overlapping supervisory roles could lead to disagreements over 
enforcement of prerogatives and a rush for assets in the event of insolvcncy. To 
prevent this situation, supervisory authorities could put pressure on financial 
conglomerates to scparate the particular function that falls under the SPCl'j fic 
I U RJ Hcrrin~. and RE Litan Fillallcial Regulatioll ill the Global ECOIIOI11Y (Brookin~s In ... titution Prl''''s, 
Washington nc. Il)l)-l) 1-l.2. 
I~~ RJ Hnring,lUntitkdl (Sept 199.,) -l8 Journal of Fillall("(, (-l) 155~. 
'-
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regulatory ambit as an incorporated subsidiary, thus subjecting corporate structure to 
regulatory convenience. 146 
An integrated approach has been adopted by some countries where regulation of all 
financial activity is carried out through a single regulatory entity. This is the approach 
that has been adopted by the United Kingdom under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000. 147 As the traditional distinction that existed between financial 
markets had been blurred, it became necessary to develop an integrated and 
harmonized approach to their regulation. Different arguments have been canvassed 
for the justification of this approach to regulation, but it is generally believed to be 
more effective in achieving efficient regulation. 148 
This approach comes at a cheaper cost to market participants and taxpayers because 
of the economics of scale in supervising banks. 149 The cost of supervision falls as the 
number of institutions to be supervised decreases. Because it is a cheaper option, 
145 R Merton 'The Financial System and Economic Performance' (1990) 4 Journal of Financial 
Services Research, 263. 
146 RJ Herring and AM Santomero 'The Role of the Financial Sector in Economic Performance' (1995) 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Working Paper 95-08. 
147 Other countries that have adopted this approach include Singapore, Norway, Sweden, Japan and 
Austria. See J Martinez and T A Rose 'International Survey of Integrated Supervision' in DArner and J 
Lin (eds) Financial Regulation: A Guide to Structural Reform (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong. 
2003 ). 
J·jS D Llewellyn 'Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Isslles' 
World Bank Seminar: Aligning Super\'isOIy Structures with Country Needs, Washington, DC.. 6-7 June 
2006; CAE Goodhart 'Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision' (2000) FSI Occasional Papers, 
No.1. 
149 In comparing the fragmented system of banking supervision in the United States to the United 
Kingdom's integrated model, Jackson notes that 'Total U.S. annual cx.penditure on financial regulation 
in the United States during 1998-2000 was in excess of $4.5 billion or 13.7 times the annual 
expenditure of the FSA, .. Personnel len:ls of the U.S. (41,722) were more than 15 times higher than 
those of the FSA (2,675) ... these multiples do not simply rellect differences in the sile of the t\\() 
eL'ollOlllies in question ... Nor is the difk-rence simply a reflection of financial markets ... L'\'CI1 if one 
normali/cd annual cxpcnditures for the si/c of the cconomy or capital markets, substantial differencL's 
would rcmain.' Sce HF Jackson 'An r\merican Perspcctin' on the ll.K. Financial Sl'niL'cs .\L1thority: 
P(llitics, (,oais and Regulatory Intensity' (.~()()5) Harvard La\\' and l:l'onol11ics Discussion Paper ;\lo. 
522. 
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single regulatory authorities are particularly ideal for low-income countries: 50 There 
is also more consistency and coherence in the design and enforcement of regulatory 
policies because there is less friction between regulatory goals. 151 
As a result of the overlapping nature of the regulatory bodies and different country 
practices, it is most suitable to describe the structure of financial regulation in terms 
of the functions that regulatory institutions perform. Some of these functions are 
considered below. 
2.5.1 Authorisation! Licensing 
Authorisation or licensing requirements may either be formal or market based. The 
requirements cover initial market entry and continuing business compliance as well as 
professional chartering. 152 These requirements set market entry standards and bar 
imprudent or incompetent managers from the market, thus reducing the risk of 
collapse occasioned by poor management and excessive risk-taking. In some 
developing countries, the infiltration of the market by fraudulent shareholders and 
unskilled and incompetent management has led to bank failure. This has been 
characterized by insider related loans as well as non-disclosure and misrepresentation 
f · ~ . h . 153 o lillormalIon to t e supervIsor. -
150 A survey of 153 countries conducted by Barth (n50) showed that only Nigeria, among the low-
income countries, has a multiple bank supervisory system. 
151 C Briault 'The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator' (1999) I:SA 
Occasional Paper No.2; RK Abrams and MW Taylor 'Assessing the Case for Unified Financial Sector 
Supervision' in 0 Arner and J Lin (ed) Financial Regulation: :\ Guide to Structural Reform (Sweet 8: 
Max well Asia, Hong Kong, 2(03). 
152 See for l'xaInple the general prohibition of regulated activity in the UK under s.19, FSr-..I:\ 2000; see 
also the licensing requirement in Nigeria under s.2. Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 
(BOHA) 1991. 
I.".~ An example of this was the failure of Banco Latino in VenCluc\a. The bank lured about 1.2 million 
depl)~it()rs hy setting interest rates t~lr ahme what was obtainable in sound banks. The fund~ were u~ed 
III 'build a Lnish hl'adquarter~, charter jets for each director of the bank. throw lavish parties and make 
69 
Regulatory entry restrictions, apart from promoting the stability of the banking sector 
by allowing only high-quality entrants, also ensure that the number of superyised 
banks is kept in tandem with the capacity of the supervisory authorities. 
In addition to initial authorisation requirements, there are also provIsIons for 
continuing compliance. After a bank has been authorised to conduct deposit-taking 
business, it must continually conduct its activities in a prudent manner.ls-t These 
continuing compliance provisions are also market entry conditions insofar as the 
benefit of entry is withdrawn except strict compliance is adhered to. 
2.5.2 Prudential Supervision 
Banks, occupy a pivotal position in any economy and must continually conduct their 
business in a prudent and transparent way. The relevant prudential supervIsory 
authorities prevent institutions from exposing themselves to risks that can lead to 
insolvency. Forms of prudential regulation include bank examination, capital 
requirements and requirements to submit regular accounts on a consolidated basis. 
The aim of prudential regulation is to protect consumers, who are not well informed 
and are not in a position to assess the soundness of financial institutions. Prudential 
regulation also serves to prevent unnecessary costs to the safety net and deposit 
protection or compensation schemes, especially where the premium payable in sLlch 
deposit protection schemes is not risk-based. ISS 
loans to insiders.' J Brooke 'Failure of High-Flying Banks Shakes Yeneludan Econofll)' ,\,('1\' Yod 
Filllcs. ~Lt\ 16 199-L 
I.~ I W JL Blair and others Ba1lki1lg a1ld Fi1lll1lcial Sen'ices Regllllllio1l (Bultl'rworths. London. 20()2). 
155 Good/IlI,., (1124) eh I. 
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Banks are not only regulated on an individual basis but full account is taken of all 
group and connected relationships. Where such group relationships exist, it is 
important that any additional financial risk or contractual relationship that may arise 
out of the corporate affinity is properly identified and monitored. 156 This has become 
crucial with the emergence of large conglomerates which usually consist of more than 
one financial institution. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has adopted the consolidated approach 
at the international level. A statement issued in 1979, which was incorporated into the 
1983 Revised Concordat, recommended that all banking supervision be conducted on 
a consolidated basis. 157 This was mainly in response to the failure, in 1982, of Banco 
Ambrosiano in Italy. The Italian regulatory authorities attributed their failure to detect 
corrupt practices in the bank's foreign operations to the fact that they occurred outside 
their jurisdictional authority, as the bank operated through several foreign subsidiaries 
but was managed by the Italian holding company.158 Consolidated supervision was 
introduced in the ED by the adoption of the First Consolidated Supervision Directive 
in 1983.159 
2.5.3 Failure Resolution! Winding Up 
An effective system of bank regulation and superViSion should ffillllmize the 
occurrence of bank failure. However, when individual failures occur. it is important to 
have an effective failure resolution mechanism in place to ensure that the failed bank 
156 GA Walker. G.A. (1996). 'Collsolidated Supervision' (February 1996) Part I: BlIffem'ol1hs JOllrnal 
oj"lntemational Bankil/g al/d Final/cial Law. 7'+. 1~7 Basel Cmnmitlcl' on Banking Supervision COl/solidated Sllpen'isiol/ (~l Banks' Intematiol/al 
Acril'ities' (1979): Basd Committcc on Banking Supenision Principles for the SlIpel1'isioll or Ballks' 
FOfl'i ~n Estahlishments (the COl/cordat) ( 19X3). 
15X G 'BiallL'ili 'Thc Banco Ambrosiano Casc' (1992) 3 International Company and Commercial LaU' 
Rl'\'il'lI' (6), .223. 
159 Council Dirccti\l' X3I.'SO/l· LC of 13 June 19X3. rl~placed by Council Dirccti\ c l)2130fEEC in 1992. 
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is resolved in a timely and efficient manner. This would ensure that such failures are 
isolated events and do not result in systemic crisis. 160 
A termination authority may terminate a depository institution that is at risk before it 
becomes insolvent and causes loss to depositors. It is important to have a statutory-
based system that enables early intervention and for determining when a bank has 
failed. The relevant laws should provide appropriate exit rules and procedure for an 
institution that has to leave the market. There should also be provision for liability and 
asset resolution procedures; and determination of claims brought by creditors and 
d . 161 eposltors. 
The termination power is usually vested in the Central Bank or in the Deposit Insurer. 
It is pertinent that the relevant law clearly states the conditions that will initiate the 
powers of the termination authority. These powers are either exercised through rules 
or regulatory judgement. 
2.5.4 Lender of Last Resort 
The origins of the name 'lender of last resort' can be traced to Sir Francis Barings: in 
1797 he described the Bank of England as the' dernier resort' from which all banks 
could obtain liquidity in times of crisis. 162 The lender of last resort (LoLR) function 
helps institutions with liquidity problems and in danger of insolvency to meet 
depositors' claims and other obligations. The LoLR maintains 'a strategic stock of 
160 For further disclission. see Chapter -l. para.-lX2. 
161 For a detaikd disclission on failure resl)lution. see JF Bovenzi and ME l\luldoon 'Failure Resolution 
l\ Ictlwds and Policy Considerations' (1990) 3 FDIC Banking Reriew (I). 1: \\' Su .( ~L'ncral GuidanL'L' 
for the Resolution of Bank FailurL's' in A Camphell and others (eds.) Deposit II/stlral/Cl' (Pal~ra\c 
Macmillan. Ncw Y ork. ~()()7) ch 10. I('~ T Humphrey and R Keicher 'The Lender of Last Resort: :\ Historical PerspectiH:' (Sprin~/SuIl1l11er 
199-l)-l C\10Jotlma/(I) 275. 
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high powered money' used to satisfy demands for liquidity at critical times. 16J This 
prevents a fire sale disposal of assets and its distressing consequences. The immediate 
availability of central bank credit makes the LoLR particularly suitable to confront 
emergency situations. 164 The LoLR doctrine is based upon four pillars: 
1. The central bank, acting as lender of last resort should prevent temporarily 
illiquid but solvent banks from failing. LoLR lending is by nature short 
term. 165 
2. Central bank lending should be free but at a penalty rate. 
3. The central bank should accommodate anyone with good collateral valued at 
pre-panIc pnces. 
4. The central bank should make its readiness to lend freely clear ex ante. 
As stated earlier, the focus of financial regulation is not to prevent individual bank 
failure per se but to prevent systemic instability. Thus, in providing LoLR facility, the 
main consideration is whether the failure of a particular institution will pose systemic 
risks. 166 
Some advocates of free banking argue that the provIsIon of LoLR facility has 
potential costs to the system. It may prejudice what would otherwise have been a 
16.~ Bagehot (n36); H Thornton 'An Enquiry Into the Nature and Effects of the paper Credit of Great 
Britain' (1. Hatchard. London. 1802). 
16.t RM Lastra 'Lender of Last Resort. An International Perspective' (April 1(99)'+X The Illternational 
alld ('ompamri\'c Law Qllarterly (2) 3'+0. 
H,:; It has been argued elsewhere that LoLR assistance should be available to insolvcnt institutions and 
that the distinction bet\\L'cn insolvcnt and illiquid institutions is a 'myth'. since banks cxperiencing 
liquidity problems will more often than not become insolvcnt. Scc CAL Goodhart Th~ Eroillrioll (~l 
Celltral Ballks (London SL"llOol of Economics and Political Science. London. 1(85): ( .\1: Goodhart 
'Why J)p Banks Need a Ccntral Bank?' (l\larch 1(87) 39 Oxford Economic Papers. New Snie" (I) 7). 
1(lh See ~L'llLTal)Y: T Humphrey 'The Cla"sical Concept of the Lender of Last RL,,,t1rl', (1anlFeb 197)) 
Fcdl'ra/ R()"t'I"\"~' Balik of Richmond Ecollolllic Rn';('I\', 2; Thomas Humphrcy 'The Lender of I.a"t 
Resorl: The ('onL'L'pt in History' (1\Iarchl.\pril 1(89) Federal Resent' BUllk of Richmond FcolI()l11ic 
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timely distress signal. It may also tacitly encourage incompetent management and 
excessive risk taking when market forces would have disciplined the institution 
concerned. This may lead to expectation of future assistance and intense political 
lobbying for such assistance. 167 Where political lobbying is involved, a potential 
conflict may arise where the same agency acts as lender of last resort and termination 
authority. They also contend that the need for LoLR has evolved only because central 
banks hold a monopoly over the issue of currency. 168 
While the provision of LoLR has a cost, in each case the cost should be less than the 
potential cost of leaving the bank to fail. 169 The provision of the LoLR facility by the 
central bank is predicated on the need to maintain market confidence. The central 
bank therefore chooses to act as LoLR when it fears a general loss of confidence that 
could have systemic implications. The central bank can exercise its discretion not to 
provide the facility where it considers a particular crisis as isolated one, and posing no 
systemic concerns. The following elements have been articulated as basic 
considerations for the central bank in the exercise of its discretion as LoLR: 170 
1) The size and inter-bank exposure of the institution 
2) The danger to a particular market 
3) The reputation of a financial market 
In addition to these considerations, the central bank should also ensure that liquidity 
assistance is not only provided where necessary but that it is provided promptly. This 
point has become particularly important in the wake of the Northern Rock crisis in the 
167 Herring and Sanfolllero (n 1"+6). . . 
«,x See generally: (;:\ SL'lgin 'Legal Restrictions. Financial \\\'akcning and the Lender 01 Last Resort. 
(Fall Il)X9) 9 C\ 70 JOllrnal (~), "+~9. 
Ih<) DUl'ics lind Green (n.~) 18. 
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United Kingdom where the Bank of England has come under criticism for not 
intervening early enough to avert the crisis. I71 
It is important to decide whether to vest the central bank with powers and 
responsibilities for bank supervision in addition to its role as LoLR and responsibility 
for monetary policy. In While the disadvantage of having the central bank perform all 
roles is the potential conflict of interests involved, the main advantage of having the 
central bank as supervisor is that it will have direct information and knowledge of the 
condition of the banks it regulates. l73 As such it will be in a better position to identify 
emergency situations that could raise systemic concerns and act promptly and 
appropriately. 174 The central bank will also be better informed in deciding the fine line 
between solvent and illiquid banks when exercising its discretion in providing the 
LoLR. 
2.5.5 Capital Adequacy 
Banks playa crucial role in financial intermediation because they are able to convert 
liquid deposits from the liability side of their balance sheets into loans as illiquid 
assets on the asset side. By providing this important function, banks are open to credit 
170 RM Lastra 'Crisis Management and Lender of Last Resort' in RM Lastra and HN Schiffman (eds.) 
Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition (Kluwer Law International. 
Boston, 1999) 25. 
171 __ 'MPs Attack BoE for not Preventing Northern Rock Crisis' The Independent Friday 21 
September 2007 
1111 p:/ 1\\ \\ \\. i ndepe nde nt .eo. uk/ne \\s/hus i ness/ne\\,s/mps-allae k -hoe- 1'( lr- not -pre ven till ~ -'l<lrt Ill' rn -n lC k-
nisis--1-(n066.htmL accessed 17 December 2007. 
In CAE Goodhart and D Schoenmaker 'Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banki Ilg 
Supervision he Separated?' (1995) -1-7 Oxford Economic Papers (4) 539. . 
173 On the athantages and disadvantages of the central bank as a bank supenlsor. see JR Barth and 
others 'A Cross-Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance' (2003) 
12 Fin{[ncial ,\lurkets. Institutions & Instruments (2) 67; Goodhart (n 148). 
17~ The wisdom of splitting responsibilities between the Treasury. Bank of England and the FSA. has 
becn questioned in thl' UK following the Northern Rock crisis. See -- 'Tripartite Regulatory System 
Simply Hasn't Worked' The Independent, Thursday, 20 Septemher 2007. 
h tip :11\\ \\' \\'. i ndc pl' ndc Ill. Cl 1.1I ).jnl' ws/bll s I nl' ..,..,/ Ill' "sit ri pa rt i tc- rc!! lIL \ I, \ 1\ -.., \ .., Ie 111- simp I y -ha.., IlI- \\ {lrkL'J-
-1-02l)~ll~I'1l1. al'ccssl'd 17 I kL'cl11her 2007. 
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risk. Credit risk refers to the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty \\ill 
default on his obligation to pay either the principal or interest, or both. This raises a 
mismatching difficulty, as to the source of the funds and its application. which could 
result in liquidity problems for banks in the event of a shock. The primary role of 
capital requirement is to provide protection against the risk of credit default by bank 
customers in the bank's loan book. 175 Liquidity problems in a single bank may trigger 
systemic reactions that may undermine systemic stability. A strong capital base thus 
enables banks to withstand severe financial pressure and losses. Historically. markets 
have always promoted the adherence to healthy capital ratios even in the absence of 
regulatory capital prescription. 176 
The viability of a bank is dependent, to a large extent, on public confidence. 
Although the availability of capital is not a perfect indicator to the state of a bank' s 
health, it represents a major standard for assessing its solidity. Capital is the major 
yardstick against which the market measures a bank's capacity to withstand adverse 
conditions and to manage the risks encountered in the course of business. I77 Capital 
cushions serve as a line of defence against abnormal financial pressures that may 
result in a sudden and relatively high level of realized losses.1 78 
Capital requirements achieve two maIn aims: 179 the reduction of risk-shifting by 
bankers whose assets are insured l80 and the prevention of destructive bank runs. 181 
175 Walker (n 17) 571. _, 
176 It has heen noted that 'all hanks need capital to cover and extend IIxed assets and huslnes .... 
investments. to enahle trading to continue and increase. to maintain the confidence of depu .... itors. and to 
ensure viahility in the face of loss arising from the inevitahle husiness and political Iluctuation and 
uncertainty. particularly in an inflationary climate.' See Carden,er (,ed.) ~n 19) ch 12. , 
177 RM Pccchinli Pmdcllrial SlIpen'ision in Bunking (Orgal11satlon lor I'.conomlc Cooperation and 
Den'lopment. OEeD Puhlications and Information Ccnter. 1987) ch6, 
m Gardl'lIl'1'(ed.) (nI9) chl4, 
17') T I'allsch and P \\'cllL" 'Credit Risk and the Role or Capital J\dequacy Regulation .... · (2002) 
llnivcrsitaet :\llgshurg Inslitute for EL'onomiL's Discussion Paper. No.224, 
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Financial safety nets create incentives for lowering market disciplinary standards: 182 
thus, regulators require capital to insulate themselves from the costs of financial 
distress, moral hazard and agency problems arising from the reduction in market 
discipline. In this regard, the interests of the regulator are akin to those of the 
uninsured creditor.
183 
Regulators also respond to other externalities associated with 
financial intermediaries, particularly systemic risks and the potential disrupti ve effects 
on the system. Concern about the social costs associated with a systemic crisis may 
lead regulators to strive for a higher degree of safety for banks by requiring higher 
capital ratios than if they were acting solely to protect the government's position as an 
uninsured creditor. 184 To this extent, it has been noted that market forces cannot. on 
their own, efficiently 'cull' institutions whose debts are explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the government, unless supplemented by regulatory pressure. 185 
Therefore a high capital standard will reduce the incentive for shareholders and bank 
managers to take excessive risks. 
Capital ratio can be described as the amount of a bank's capital expressed as a 
percentage of its risk weighted credit exposures.1 86 The measurement process is 
complex and the aim is to arrive at a proximate measure of the degree of possible 
cumulative default in the loan book. 187 A simple approach is to require banks to hold 
such a high level of capital that the risk of default becomes negligible. However this 
ISO J Rochet 'Capital Requirements and the Behaviour of Commercial Banks' (1992) .36 European 
I:'('onomic Reviell' 1137. . 
lSI DW Diamond and RG Rajan 'A Theory of Bank Capital' (2000) 55 Journal of Fl1lallce 2-D I. , 
IS2 For example, deposit insurancer can lower market discipline where de~ositors ~re gu.arant~ed tull 
re ayment if their banks fail. This is known as moral hazard .. See c~ap~er 3, tor a detailed discussion. I~r AN Berger and othns 'The Role of Capital in Financial InstitutIOns (June 11)95) I I) JOllmal of 
Banking and Finance. (3--+) .393. 
I ~I II ./ )[( . .. ~.. I I . . . IS5 ,.J Kane (11)95), 'Three Paradigms for the Role of Capitalilatlon III Insured hnancla n ... l1tutlons 
(June 1(95) 19 JO/l/'lllll (~rBallking and Finance (3--+) ·nl. 
IS6 Berg l'f' (11 I ~(" ) . 
187 \'-ulkl'l'(nI7) 571. 
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would reduce the availability of capital for financial intermediation. 188 It has also been 
shown that where equity is increased beyond the market requirement, the yalue of the 
bank is reduced.
189 
Thus, in setting capital standards, regulators are in\'olved in a 
trade-off between the benefits of reducing the risks associated with negatiye 
externalities from bank failures and the cost of reduced intermediation. 190 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision191 has developed a general standard for 
the measurement of capital adequacy for internationally active banks.19~ This is a 
minimum capital of eight per cent of risk-weighted assets. Although the committee's 
recommendations are meant to apply to internationally active banks, they have 
nonetheless been adopted as a policy guide in developing capital adequacy standards 
in most countries. Generally, the Basel core principles have become the most 
important global standard for prudential regulation and supervision. Although the 
capital accord was initially adopted in 1998, the fact that it took a period of six years 
to agree on a final set of proposals, known as Basel 11,193 underscores the complex 
nature of capital regulation. 194 
188 Where excessively high capital adequacy standards leave banks with less funds to intermediate, they 
may seek to make up for their reduced earnings by investing in more profitable but risky assets. See 
o Di Cagnio Regulation and Banks' Behaviour Towards Risk (Dartmouth Publishing, Sudbury, MA. 
1990). 
189 Berger (n 183) 407. 
190 A Santomero and R Watson 'Determining an Optimal Capital Standard for the Banking Industry' 
(Sept 1977) 32 Journal of Finance (4) 1267. 
191 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a forum, created by the Central Bank Governors of 
the Group of Ten (G 10) countries, for international cooperation in banking supervisory matters. For a 
detailed discussion of the committee's nature, structure and method of operation, see Walker (n 17) 39. 
l'l2 The Basel Accord was introduced following concerns 'about a decline in capital held by hanks, 
exacerhated hy the expansion of off halance sheet activity, and worries that hanks from some 
jurisdictions were seeking a short-term competitive advantage in some markets by maintaining too low 
'a level of capital.' See P Jackson 'Bank Capital Standards: the New Basel Accord', (Spring 2()OI) Bank 
of Enoland Quarterly Bulletin. http://~,\\\\.htlllk:l)ll.'Il!2lalll!.l'll.lIUplIhlication~/L!lIartl'rlyhulletin/L!hOI()I()I.pdr.al'cc.-..-..cd .) August 
2005. 
193 ___ 'International ('oll\LTgellce of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Re\i-"l'd 
Framework (Basel II), (Cnmprehensi\e Version. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 20(6). 
19.t See (;A WalkLT 'New :\l'cord' (Fehruary 20() I) Fillallcial Reglllation Illfematiollul I: (;" Walker 
'The Nt'\\ Capital :\ccord' (:\pril 2()() I) Fillallcial Reglllatioll Intenwtiol/al I: G,\ W~dker 'So CIO'>l' 
hut So Far' (1\ lay 1(99), Fillallcial Times. Fillallcial R('glilatioll Report, I: G \ \\'alker .. \cl'ord ,\t 
Last' (llllyl:\ug 1(99) Fillallcial limfs Fillal/cial Regula(ory Repor(. For the dcticiencil's in the Il)l}X 
7S 
While the revised Accord has retained the requirement to hold mInImUm capital 
equivalent to eight per cent of risk-weighted assets, the main innovation is the reliance 
on banks' internal models to assess the risk position of their portfolios and to 
determine the required capital cushion. The second major difference is that the new 
accord recognises the role of complementary mechanisms in ensuring bank safety. by 
building on two additional pillars to strenghten the minimum capital requirement 
provision. 195 The three mutually reinforcing pillars of the new accord are: 
• Minimum regulatory capital requirement (pillar 1); 
• Supervisory review (pillar 2); 
• Market discipline (pillar 3). 
Pillar one imposes the minimum capital requirement. In implementing this, banks and 
supervisors may adopt the Standardized Approach,196 or one of two internal ratings 
based (lRB) approaches. These are the Foundation or Advanced IRB Approaches. 197 
Supervisory Review (pillar 2) will require that effective internal processes are put in 
place to manage banks' capital positions with regard to their lending and trading 
exposures. Pillar 3 is based on market discipline 198 through enhanced disclosure. This 
Accord. sec generally 25 Journal of Banking and Finance (1) The 2001 special issue; see also P 
Jackson and W Perraudin 'Regulatory Implications of Credit Risk Modelling' (Jan 2000) 2-1- JOllrnal of 
Banking and Finance (1-2) 1; F Moshirian 'The Financial System in the Third Millennium: 
Perspeclives and Problems' (2001) 25 JOllrnal of Banking and Finance (12) 2125. 
195 Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden 'Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation Under the New Basel Al'cord' 
(2004) 13 Journal of Financial Intermediation (2). 90. 
196 This is seen as appropriate for banks without sophisticated risk models. 
197 The IRB approach allows banks to use their own internal models to forecast the average le\eI of 
credit l(lsses it can reasonably expect to experience. This forecast is translated into an e~timated 
p01L'1l1 ial future loss amount, which forms the basis of the minimum capital requirement. Sec .- . An 
Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions.' (2005) Basel Committee on Banking 
Supcr\'isi()J1. 
I<)~ The phra~l' 'nw'ket disl'ipline' is often used to incorporate t\\O components: the ahility of market 
ill\e~tors to monitor and identify changes in hank l'unditions (market monitoring). and their ability to 
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will lead to effective market discipline as market participants would have more access 
to the risk profile and adequacy of capital positions, and exert market discipline 
accordingly. 199 
The purpose of the new capital accord is to make capital requirements more risk-
sensitive. The introduction of the Standardized and IRB options has also been 
commended for creating 'a degree of compliance flexibility for banks with differing 
levels of operational and management sophistication.' 200 As the new framework 
revolves around internal risk control mechanisms, an additional incentive is created 
for banks to improve their internal risk control systems. This would bring a reward of 
lower capital charges in the short term, and more stable institutions and a sound 
financial system in the long term. 201 
The inclusion of the two additional pillars should shift much of the focus away from 
the mere prescription of capital requirements to the steps to be taken to ensure 
compliance and further necessary action when banks fail to comply. Capital standards 
should provide early warning signs and regulatory intervention thresholds for failing 
banks. The recourse to market discipline is also justified by the increasing complexity 
of banking activities and the difficulty encountered by banking supervisors in 
effectively monitoring these activities. Therefore, bank monitoring by professional 
investors and financial analysts can serve as a complement to bank supervision and 
intlllcncc a bank's actions accordingly (markct intlllcnce). Sce 1\11 Flannery 'The FacL's of \larkct 
DisL:iplinc' C~()()I) 20 Journal of Fillallcill/ Services Resellrch (2/3) 107., _ . 
191) h)J' a detailed explanation of thc Standardizcd and IRB Approaches. seL' H a/ka (n 17) '-'76: Dm'lc\ 
(llId Crall (lL~) -l-l. 
2lXl \\(rlka (n 17) 592. 
201 Ibid. 
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the information provided by these market sources can be used by supervisors In 
addition to the information provided by bank examination. 202 
2.5.6 Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance can be described as a mutual insurance system supported by 
insured banks, and administered either through a government controlled agency or a 
privately held one.203 Deposit insurance has also been defined as the protection 
offered under a system which provides a guarantee that all or a limited amount of the 
principal and the interest accrued on protected accounts will be paid.204 
There are two principal functions of deposit insurance: 205 
(i) Deposit insurance indemnifies the depositor In the event that the risk 
insured against (bank failure) occurs~ 
(ii) Deposit insurance provides confidence and thus ensures that problems at 
individual banks do not spread to the entire system. To this extent, deposit 
insurance promotes stability in the financial system. This is supported by 
the lender of last resort function which provides emergency liquidity 
support for illiquid but solvent banks. 
While regulation serves to prevent exceSSIve risk-taking and promote prudential 
management of financial institutions, deposit insurance exists to mtnlffilse the 
20] On the thrl'c pillars of the new Basel Accord, see generally: J Decamps and othcrs 'The Three 
Pillars of Basel II: Optimi/ing the Mix'. (200-l) 13 Journal of Financial Intermediation. (2) J ~2: J 
Rochet 'Rehalancing thc Three Pillars of Basel II' (Sept 200-l) I 0 Federal Resen'e Bank of Scw }"ork 
Economic Polin' Reril'H', (2) 7. 
2(H ML Frl's-Felix Deposit InslIrance Schemes: Its Nature, Role and Isslil's (South \'a,,! r\sia Central 
Banks Resl'ard1 and Training Centre (SEACFN). Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia. 199 J ). 
~(l,1 G (iarL'ia 'Deposit Insurancc: Ohtaining the Bcndits and .\ \oiding the Pitfalls' (1996) 1\, F Working 
Paper HP/<J6/83, 
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disruptive and costly effects of bank failure. Bank failure results in loss of depositors' 
funds, restricted access to funds for borrowers, and the risk of contagion, which could 
lead to the insolvency of otherwise sound banks. It is important to note that bank 
failure in itself is not necessarily an indicator of financial sector instability. A 
financial sector can still be described as generally stable, even where bank failure has 
occurred, if the risk of contagion can be contained and an effective failure resolution 
regime is in place. 
Deposit insurance promotes effective and efficient competition between financial 
institutions. The overall competitiveness of the system increases as the distinction 
between the bigger and smaller banks is blurred because the assumption that the 
bigger banks are generally safer is removed. 206 
The issue that often arises is whether deposit insurance and regulation are mutually 
exclusive concepts or whether the existence of one necessarily implies the redundancy 
of the other. The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance requires a 
continuing role for regulation even where deposit insurance has been adopted.207 
While deposit insurance can foster financial stability, it can also create perverse 
effects. The protection provided reduces the incentives for depositors to monitor 
banks' risk-taking and also encourages banks to pursue riskier strategies, thus the 
need for prudential regulation is reinforced with the existence of deposit insurance. 
Where deposit insurance has been adopted. regulation is retained to enforce 
institutional and depositor discipline. 208 
205 TIllS is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
20(> Di Cagllio (n I XX). 
207 Mllral ha/ard is cnnsiderl'd in detail in Chapter 3. 
Where explicit deposit insurance has been put in place, the main focus of regulation 
becomes the prevention of excessive risk-taking associated with moral hazard. 
Regulation thus becomes part of the cost of deposit insurance. It has been observed 
that 'the counterpart of Government insurance is some degree of government 
regulation because, if the government merely provides safeguards, it would tend to 
create excessive risk-taking by the banks. The central question is where one strikes 
the proper balance between differing levels of regulation. ,209 It is for this reason that 
the various national deposit insurance laws confer extensive regulatory powers on the 
deposit insurer to minimize the risks associated with deposit insurance. 
It is important to note that while deposit insurance can promote financial stability, the 
existence of a deposit insurance scheme on its own does not solve the problem of 
bank runs. Inasmuch as there is no full guarantee or cover. there is still the incentive 
for depositors whose balances are not fully covered to run on their banks. Hence, 
policy makers must ensure that deposit insurance schemes are closely co-ordinated 
with, and fully integrated into, other safety net devices providing the functions of 
lender of last resort, regulation and supervision, and failed bank resolution. It is not 
uncommon to find the deposit insurer performing one or more of these functions. 
Deposit insurance is often used to inject capital into distressed banks and to purchase 
their assets, thus it is entwined with the lender of last resort function and the 
resolution mechanism. It is important that the statutory framework clearly sets out the 
duties and functions of each regulatory agency. Policymakers should also ensure that 
the agencies work together without conflict where their functions overlap. 
------------------------------- ---
20S Ul!ll'el/rll (n 17). 
2(}9 William R Cline in Belllll'! (n I). 
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2.6. Effective Regulation 
Regulation has evolved mainly as a reaction to banking failure. It has been observed 
in relation to the US regulatory system that: 
'Much of the U.S regulatory system has developed in response to financial 
crises and other historical and political events. No central architect was 
assigned to design the overall system or layout a single set of 
principles ... As a consequence, bank regulation has evolved to serve 
numerous goals - goals which have changed over time and on occasions 
have been in conflict with one another. ,210 
As financial crises continue to occur, the scale and scope of financial regulation will 
also be evaluated in order to prevent the reoccurrence of a previous crisis. This is a 
continuous process because new sources of risk will always emerge due to the 
dynamic nature of financial markets. The challenge to banking regulators is thus to 
keep pace with the changes, while maintaining the traditional goals of financial 
stability and consumer protection. Part of the ongoing efforts toward a more effective 
system of regulation is the shift away from a prescriptive system of bank regulation to 
a risk-based approach, which recognises the role of effective market discipline in 
financial stability. It is pertinent to note that reliance on internal risk-management 
might not be entirely appropriate for developing countries in transition, where 
institutions are not as sophisticated and bank supervisors lack the capacity to 
effectively monitor and assess risk. 
210 Spong (n9) 5. 
An additional concern is what regulatory structure will be most appropriate in the face 
of new developments such as sector integration, technological innovations, increased 
use of conglomerate structure by banks, and the development of more complex 
financial instruments and services. As noted earlier, the structure and approach to 
banking regulation varies across jurisdictions?11 Regardless of the structure adopted. 
a system of banking regulation should have at least six functions in place to offer a 
credible approach to maintaining financial stability. These are: 212 
• Regulation to ensure a set of standards for prudential behaviour and conduct of 
business; 
• Supervision and monitoring of individual institutions to ensure regulatory 
compliance and development of risk management; 
• General oversight of the financial system to help In the identification of 
systemic risk; 
• A means of providing emergency support in the event of a crisis or sudden 
lack of liquidity in the system or in individual solvent institutions; 
• An effective means of resolving troubled banks, including a defined bail-out 
policy and an orderly and rules-based exit mechanism, to prevent isolated 
problems from spilling into the system as a whole; 
• A means of protecting small depositors so that they have confidence in the 
banking system. 
These functions should be supported by an institutional and legal framework that 
includes sound macroeconomic policies, good corporate governance and disclosure 
regime as well as an effective judicial system. As regulation seeks to adapt to a 
211 Chapter 1. para 1.0: Chapter 2. para 2.5. . . 21~ JR Lahwssl' and DG ~1a~es 'Promoting Financial Stahility through EITl'ctlve Depositor Protection: 
The Case for F\plil'it Limited Dq10sit Insurance' in A Call1phell and others (cds.) Deposit II/sural/ce 
(Pal~raVl' Macmillan. Nl.'w York. 2007) 1-1.. 85 
changing environment, policymakers should ensure that the evaluation process 
examines the best way to achieve the stated regulatory objectives. 
2.7. Provisional Conclusion 
Regulation of the banking system is necessary because instability is inherent in banks. 
The importance of confidence in the banking sector cannot be overemphasized. It has 
been aptly noted that 'a special importance attaches to the integrity and stability of the 
banking system; if people cannot trust their banks, whom can they trust?,213 
Regulation aims to achieve two general public policy aims of financial stability and 
consumer protection. While there are polarised views on the fragile nature of banking 
and the threat of systemic risks, there is apparent consensus that the introduction of 
government safety nets makes prudential regulation necessary to curb excessive risk-
taking as a result of moral hazard. 
While the rationale for regulation has been outlined, it has been stated that the focus 
should be on the scope and nature of regulation, and how best to structure regulation 
to achieve its aims. Recent developments in the academic literature have also raised 
awareness of the role of moral hazard in regulation in general, and this has led to 
efforts to re-engineer incentive mechanisms in existing regulatory frameworks. 
The arguments for regulation notwithstanding, there are limits to what regulation can 
achieve in practice. The existence of financial safety nets does not imply that banks 
would not fail or financial crises would not occur. It also does not imply that 
consumers would be fully insulated from the effects of such failure. Thus, it is 
213 S BrislOlI and R (Jpotk '1992: The Insohency Implications for Banks', in R Cranston (cd.). Till' 
Sing/l' ,\/lIrk({ lind rhl' LaH' (flll/nking (2IlJ cd .. L10yds l)f London Press. London. 1995) 121. 
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important that the limitation of safety net mechanisms IS clearly understood by 
regulators, regulated institutions and consumers. 
There is no doubt that regulation imposes high costs on taxpayers, consumers. 
financial institutions and markets. Thus, in all cases, the benefits of regulation 
should clearly exceed the costs imposed. If regulation becomes excessive, the 
costs may come to exceed the benefits. Effective regulation involves striking a 
balance between the objectives of regulation, and providing a regulatory regime that 
is not overly burdensome and costly to the taxpayer, that provides appropriate 
incentives for market discipline, and gives institutions the flexibility to compete in a 
dynamic financial system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE: CONCEPT AND THEORY 
3.0 Introduction 
A safe and competitive banking system is critical to a nation's economic growth. The 
central role that banks play in financial intermediation, the payment and settlement 
process and the formulation of monetary policies was discussed in the preceding 
chapter. The nature of bank contracts make them susceptible to runs which could 
threaten systemic stability. Deposit insurance) has increasingly been utilized by 
policy-makers, as part of the safety net, to maintain financial stability and to protect 
depositors from losses associated with bank failure. 2 
This chapter examInes the theory and concept of deposit insurance. The analysis 
starts with a discussion of the historical evolution of schemes to protect bank 
depositors in several jurisdictions. Furthermore, it examines the two main forms of 
deposit insurance, implicit and explicit deposit insurance, and argues that a well-
designed explicit deposit insurance system is generally preferable to implicit 
guarantees. 
I For thc definition of deposit insurance, see Chapter 2, para 2.5.6. The terms 'deposit insurance', 
'deposit guarantee'. and 'deposit protection' are interchangeably used to denote schemes that cxist for 
the protection of bank depositors. 
2 lP Sabourin 'The Deposit Insurer's Role in Maintaining Financial Stability' Chicago Federal Resenc 
COI!ferellce all: Systemic Financial Crisis: Resolving Large Bank Insol\'encies, .30 ~eptember 200-.f; JR 
Labrosse and DG MaYl's 'Promoting Financial Stability through Effective DepOSItor Protection: The 
Case for Explicit Limited Deposit Insurancc' in A Campbell and others Deposit Insurance (Pa\gLI\C 
Macmillan. New York. 2(07) I; R Cull and others 'Deposit Insurance and Financial Dc\clopmenl' 
(2001) World Balik Polin' RlJsearch H'orkillg Paper. No.l.68:}: :\ Baglioni and (; i\larolla 'Deposit 
Insural1l'e: Implicatillns from Financial Intermediation Theory' in V C(ll1ti and R Hamaui (ed..,.) 
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The conceptual analysis of deposit insurance involves a comparison between deposit 
insurance and general insurance practice. The rationale and objecti yes for such 
schemes are examined to determine the primary essence of deposit insurance. and to 
establish the desirability of its inclusion in the financial safety net. While explicit 
deposit insurance can reduce the incidence of bank runs if designed properly. its 
design is often complex and the provision of deposit insurance can exacerbate the 
problem of excessive risk-taking in the banking system. The chapter concludes by 
examining the deposit insurance problem and exploring different solutions to the 
problem. Although the moral hazard and principal/agent problems are isolated. the 
chapter concludes that the deposit insurance problem is essentially one of design. 
3.1 History of Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance schemes, whether privately or publicly owned, exist worldwide. 
The exact origin of deposit insurance is unknown. However, as a consequence of the 
wave of financial crises around the world, the number of countries that have initiated 
deposit insurance schemes has significantly increased in the last three decades. Most 
member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), as well as most developing nations, have adopted some form of explicit 
deposit protection.3 
Financial Markets Uberali-;(/tion and the Role of Banks (Camhridge University Press. Camhridge, 
1993) ."1,37. " . , 
J Deposit insurance schemes can he found in every region of the world. except In ChIna and .\Inca. 
where only h countries have deposit insurance. Among the devclope,d countrIes, AustralIa, Israel.'-lI1d 
New Zealand are important exceptions. ('enerally. there are 99 countnes that currently have Sl~me torm 
or deposit protection scheme in place. while 20 other l'lHlntries arc c~)llsid~ring or pla~nlllg to Introdul.."l' 
their OWI1 sl'hemes. Most recent schemes are transition countnes ot Eastern .Europe that ha\ e 
estahlished their scheml's in compliance with the LU directi\l' on DepOSIt .lnslI,rance, Sl'l' 
lU1U://"" \~,iadi,llr!:! I~( '001'(; 20('lHIlltril',,(,(.~()with(:; 20a(·; 1()Dl'po"it(/~ 2011l~ural1l.."e(,( 20S\ "temll.l"t 
llr I.."lllllltrie" \\ith a DIS :\1(,(, I \1,1\()~ hnaLpd\. aCl.."essed ,"1,0 \1.1)' 20()X. 
Indeed, the establishment of an explicit and government funded deposit insurance 
scheme is widely believed to be an antidote to financial instability and crisis. It has 
become part of the generally accepted best practice advice given to developing 
economies.4 The historical evolution of deposit insurance in some of these 
jurisdictions will be considered below. 
3.1.1 The United States 
In the US, deposit protection can be traced back to 1829, when the first scheme to 
protect bank depositors was established in New York. Prior to this time, there was no 
formal regulation scheme and banks were chartered by special acts of state 
legislatures or congress, usually for a number of years. Bank failure was a rare 
occurrence during this period with the exception of the Farmers' Bank of Gloucester, 
Rhode Island in 1809.5 This incident was followed by a series of bank failures a few 
years later, which prompted the introduction of regulation. 
New York became the first state to establish a bank insurance scheme. The 1829 
scheme was the innovation of a businessman named Joshua Forman. Under this 
scheme, merchants who held special charters to trade with foreigners were required to 
be liable for each other's debts. There were three core features of the 1829 scheme. 
These were: 
..j A key feature of IMF crisis management advice has been to recommend the est~lblis~men~ of dep~)~it 
insurance schemes. See D Folkerts-Landau, C Lindgreen, Toward a Frameworkjor FlIwllcwl Stabtltty 
(1MI-", Washington DC. 1998); G Garcia 'Deposit Insurance: A Sun ey of Actua~ and Bcs~, Pra~ticcs', 
( 1999) 1M F Working Paper H'P/99/54. The World Bank has also proVIded loan~ tor take-~)tl ca~llal 01 
deposit insurance in some countries. Between 1993 ,and ~OO-L there ~\ere ,60 1I1stances 111 \\hl~h the, 
World Bank ga\L' assistance in deposit insurance rctorm 111 35 countrIes. Sl'l' - '( )\:D Rn le\\ 01 
Bank Assistance for Financial Sector Reform' (2()05) World Balik Report No. 33030 . 
.'i CH Gn\cmhl' 'Origins llfDeposit Insurance in the l\lidd\c West. 183-+-1866' (June 1955) U The 
Indial/ll Milgil:::in{' (~lf{isron' (2): JR Barth and others ·:\\tcrnati\e Fcderal Depo"it In,urance Rcgime,' 
( 1989) Fl'deralllol1le rOlin Blink Board Research Paper No. 152. 
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• An insurance fund to which all banks had to pay an assessment; 
• A board of commissioners vested with bank examination powers: 
• A specified list of investments for bank capita1.6 
Five additional states, Vermont, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Iowa, adopted deposit 
protection schemes in the US between 1831 and 1858. The objective of the schemes 
was to protect communities from the severe economic effects of bank failures and to 
protect individual depositors against losses.7 Following the banking panic of 1907. 
eight additional states also introduced formal deposit guarantee systems for state 
chartered banks. These schemes attempted to establish a safety fund, through 
assessments on participating banks, which would be available to meet their insurance 
obligations in the event of bank failures. 8 These various schemes all collapsed when 
banking crises escalated in the 1920s.9 
As a result of the proliferation of bank failures in the United States,10 one hundred and 
fifty deposit insurance bills were introduced in Congress between 1886 and 1933, 
which culminated in the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) in 1933. The creation of the FDIC has been described by Milton Friedman as 
the 'most important structural change in our (US) monetary system in the direction of 
6 See generally FDIC 'A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the United States' (FDIC Washington 
DC, 1998). 
7 Ibid. (h2. 
8 The states that estahlished these schemes were Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas. Nehraska. Mississippi. 
South Dakota, North Dakota and Washington. 
9 J Gunther and others 'Adverse Selection and Competing Deposit Insurance Systems in Pre-
Depression Texas' ( 1997) Federal Rl'sen'e Bank of Dallas. Fin(lnciallndllsfry Srlldie\ Working Paper. 
No. 97-./. 
10 An avera~e of 600 hanks was suspended each year hetween 1921 and 1921). Between I L)~() and 19~4. 
this avera~~ roSl~ to 2250 with 4000 suspensions in 193_~ alone. The Bank of United States \\a" the 
lar~est har;k to haH' faikd up 10 that lime in liS history and the effects of its failure \\ere magnified h) 
its ~name which created the falsl' impression that il was affiliated with the government. See FDIC (nh): 
see also 1\1 \:ricdman and AJ Schwanl ,\lonerary Hisrory (~l rhl' Vnired Srares. 186--/960 (Princl'ton 
UniH'rsit\' Press. PrincL'lon NJ. 19(3) 43X: als(l CI\I Bradley ',\ Historical Perspective on Depll"l1 
I nsuralK~ Cll\L'I"a~c' (2000) U I DIe Blinking Rerinl' (2) 1_ 
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greater stability since the post-Civil War tax on state bank notes. ·11 The FDIC ha", 
since remained a model for most countries that have subsequently introduced formal 
explicit deposit insurance schemes. 
3.1.2 Europe 
Prior to the establishment of the FDIC in 1933, Norway had established a nationwide 
deposit insurance scheme for savings in 1921, which was followed by a scheme for 
commercial banks in 1938. Finland and Czechoslovakia also established nationwide 
deposit insurance schemes in 1924. In Czechoslovakia, deposit insurance was 
established as one of the measures aimed at resuscitating the banking system. which 
had been badly affected by the effects of World War I. The scheme was designed to 
generate savings by increasing the safety of deposits and encouraging prudent 
banking practice in the country. 
In general, deposit protection schemes in Western European countries started between 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The introduction of deposit insurance schemes was a 
result of the occurrence of bank failures in some European economies. I2 The systems 
that existed at this time have been described as 'bare-bones' 1) because they offered 
protection only to depositors in the major financial institutions and to those resident in 
the country offering the guarantee scheme. 
II M Friedman The COllfrol of MOlley: 1\ Program for MOlleflllY Stability (Fordham Llni\ersity Pre ......... 
New York. 1959) .2 I. The introduction of deposit insurance has also heen descrihed as. the 'most 
important monument' of the New Deal regulall1ry reforms intro~uced after the Gre.at Depre ........ I.on.( 19.2,l)-
Yn. See EN WhilL' 'Deposit Insurance' (1995) H'or/d Bank Poltcy Research \\'orklllg Paper .~('rtes. ,\0. 
/5,/1. . '1 d 
12 The United KlIlgdom L'\perienced a secondary hanking crisis in the 1970s. Bankhau .... Her .... tatt tal e 
in (inlllany in 197-+ and Banco Amhrosiano. an Italian Bank chartered in Luxemhourg Lli kd in .ll)X.2. 
IJ (~ G:lrcia and H Prast 'lkpositor and il1\estllr PnllL'l'lion in till' LU and the Netherland·.,: ,\ Bfll'l 
Ilisl{)ry' (~(}(}3) 32 jotlmal {i/i:'tlroP('(lI/ Lcollolllic History (2) 307, 
The systems were established to ensure a degree of consumer protection and to 
promote systemic stability. Following the EU directives on deposit insurance and 
investor protection,14 member states have been compelled to revise and adapt existing 
schemes and to create new schemes where none previously existed. Is 
There is no single EU-wide deposit insurance scheme. Rather what exists IS the 
minimum harmonization of basic features of national schemes. In 1986, the European 
Commission approved a formal recommendation to persuade member states of the 
need to establish a deposit guarantee scheme. I6 This document included some basic 
policy recommendations for member states to adopt in their deposit protection 
schemes. These can be summarised as follows: 
• Compulsory membership of the Insurance scheme for all banks including 
branches of foreign banks; 
• Such schemes should be established primarily to protect small and weak 
depositors 
The 1986 recommendation, though not a document creating mandatory obligations for 
member states, was widely accepted and implemented. 17 The recommendation was 
followed by a proposal for a Council Directive on deposit guarantee schemes in June 
14 Commission of thc Furopean C(lmmunities Il)l)--l. Directivc l)4119IEC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of ~oth r..la~ Il)l)--l on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes. . . 
I) H Hui/inga 'The LLI Dep(lsit Insurance Directi\"l~: Does One Size Fit All?' (2008) CEPR DIscussIOn 
Paper No.5277. 
16 Commissi(l\l Rccommcndation 87 /6~/ EEC of 22 Decembcr 1986. .., 
17 Apart from ,\ustria. Bclgium. France. Norway. United Kingdom. Netherlands and Sp:l\l1 whIch 
already had dep(lsit protcL"lion sL'ilemcs. Denmark. Ireland. Italy and Luxcmhourg also adopted the 
rel"()Jlllllcndation and l'stahlished deppsit prptectipn schemes. 
1992. The proposal was amended in December 1992 and in March 1993. 18 This 
culminated in the final enactment of the directive in May 1994. 
An important innovation in the 1994 EU Directive is the requirement of 'home 
country control'. Unlike the 'bare bones' systems that previously existed, the directive 
ensures the protection of depositors of branches operating in a state other than that of 
its head office. 19 
3.1.3 The United Kingdom 
Prior to 1982, there was no formal deposit protection scheme for depositors in the 
UK.20 In place of a formal deposit protection scheme, the government and the Bank 
of England rescued failing financial institutions by deciding on appropriate action on 
an ad hoc basis. 21 When deposit protection was introduced, the main UK banks were 
opposed to the idea of a deposit protection scheme with a flat-rate assessment method 
on the ground that it would amount to subsidization of riskier and smaller banks by 
larger and safer ones.22 
The deposit protection scheme consisted of a Deposit Protection Board that 
administered the Deposit Protection Fund. The board was set up to protect deposits 
made with the offices of UK authorised institutions against such institutions' 
insolvency.23 Rather than the sustenance of financial stability, consumer and investor 
18 M Andenas 'Deposit Insurance' (Oct 1993) 14 The Company Lml'\,l"r Digest (10), 
19 M Andcnas 'Deposit Guarantee Schemes and Home Country Control" in R Cranston (cd,) Till" Single 
M(/rkl"t and the Law of Banking (2 nd ed .. Lloyds of London Press, London, ILJLJS) 107. 
~() Deposit protection was introduced hy the Banking Act 197LJ. 
~I A Camphell and P Cartwright 'C(l-insurance and Moral Hazard: Some Retlections on Depo-..it 
protcdinn in the LI K and LISA' (2003) .) JourIlal (~llllr(,rIlafiollal Banking Regulatioll ( I) LJ. 
22 SJ Maisn 'Supcn isnry IsSlIl's' in F Gardener (cd.) UK Banking SlIpelyision: Emll/rion. Prucricc 
lIlId /s.\III'S (Allen & Unwin. Lnndon. 20()l)1. 
23 \V Blair and others. BlIllking lIlId Fillllllcial SOY ices Regl/Illrioll (Butterworths. London. 20(2). 
protection concerns appear to have influenced the introduction of the scheme althouoh 
e 
systemic concerns began to be viewed as increasingly significant. 24 
The need for increased depositor confidence also appears to have facilitated the 
emergence of deposit protection. The building societies, which had grown rapidly in 
the 1970s and had started to challenge banks effectively for deposits from the general 
public, were aware of the need for depositor confidence. Thus, before the introduction 
of a deposit protection scheme for building societies in 1986, the Building Societies 
Association and its member societies organised informal rescues to maintain the 
stability of the building society movement and to protect depositors. 25 
The deposit protection scheme went through a few changes, which mainly concerned 
the level of protection offered to depositors. The most radical change to the scheme 
was effected under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, with the creation of 
a single Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide compensation for all 
sectors of the financial market. 
The new scheme recognised the increasing disappearance of traditional barriers 
between financial markets, financial services and delivery. The scheme covers bank 
deposits, investments and insurance policies, and it is designed to maintain consumer 
confidence and to offer a certain level of protection by assuring consumers that where 
a firm has become insolvent or ceased trading, the debts due to them and other proper 
claims wi 11 be met by the industry as a whole. 26 
2~ l\ UB Hall 'The Deposit Protection Scheme: The Case for Reform' (Aug 1l)~7) :Vi/tional H'est1llillster 
Balik Quartl'rlr Rel'il'lI'. 46. 
~.'i Campbell and Cartwright (n21) 
26 M Blair and others Blackstolle ',\ (;lIide to tlil' Financial SCll'ias & .\larkets .\ct 2000 (Black"lone 
Press. London. 200 I) l'h 17. 
3.1.4 Other Countries 
In Canada, the introduction of a compulsory deposit insurance scheme with a flat rate 
in 1967 was also met with resistance from the country's large banks, which protested 
cross-subsidizing their smaller rivals.27 Deposit insurance was introduced follov.'ing 
the report of the Porter Royal Commission. The commission was set up to revie\\' 
structural and operational issues affecting the Canadian financial system. The 
commission's report indicated that the financial system had developed at a pace faster 
than the state of laws and regulatory practices. As a result of this, the public was not 
adequately protected from loss in dealing with financial institutions.28 The Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) was established to ensure the safety of small 
deposits and improve the standard of deposit-taking institutions in Canada. 29 
In Asia, India was the first country to introduce deposit protection in 1961. This was 
followed by the Philippines in 1963. The establishment of the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (DIC) in India was necessitated by the various bank failures experienced 
in the country. These include the failure of Travancore National and Quilon Bank in 
1938, the Laximi Bank and the Palai Central Bank in 1960. In India, as in most other 
countries that have established deposit protection schemes, deposit insurance was 
introduced as a measure of protection for depositors from the risk of loss of savings 
resulting from bank failure. 
The first deposit insurance scheme in Africa was established in Kenya in 1985. The 
establishment of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) followed thi" in 
27 L LUl'\l'n 'The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance' (200...J.) World Balik Policy R(\('arch 
\\'(/rkil1~ Paper No.3l47. 
2S The l~(lI11J1lission did not l'xpressly recommend the adoption of deposit insurance. 
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1988.
30 
The Collective Deposit Guarantee Fund was introduced in Morocco in 1993 
and Uganda established its own deposit insurance scheme in 1994. Tanzania (1994), 
Sudan (1996) and Zimbabwe (2003) have all introduced deposit insurance schemes. 3) 
Other African countries such as Cameroon, South Africa, Ghana, Burkina Faso and 
Gabon have implicit deposit insurance systems. The purpose of these schemes is to 
promote depositor confidence and to protect the small and uninformed depositors. 
Most of the deposit insurers are also vested with bank supervisory powers. 
While a number of developing countries are currently introducing deposit insurance 
schemes, other countries, especially the developed countries, are introducing 
significant modifications and reform to existing schemes. The need for reform can be 
attributed to two factors. First, the systems are trying to find a response to the ever 
changing and improving financial environment which has been characterized by 
trends of globalization, conglomeration and the blurring of traditional distinctions 
between financial markets, services and delivery. The second factor is the theoretical 
and policy debate on financial regulation, which has raised awareness on the role of 
moral hazard and the importance of incentive mechanisms in regulation in general. 
This has necessitated the need to re-design financial regulatory laws and mechanisms 
to produce an optimal deposit insurance scheme that will ensure that moral hazard is 
kept at the barest minimum if not completely alleviated. 32 
~<) Sl'C !!cncrally -- 'Deposit Protection in Canada' (1992) CDIC A \'ailahk at hllp:/lLbp-
Il~d .tP:!!L'. !!L' .L'.I/.( '01 kct ion- R/L(lPBd P/B P/~p312-~ .~1l111 , acce~sed. 16 ~ay 2008. 
JO SCl' Chaptcr 6 for a historical analysis ot deposltll1surance 111 Nigeria 
31 PN Umoh 'Deposit Insurallcl': ConCl~pt, Practil'c and Relevance in Africa' at International 
Assol'iatinn ()f Ikposit Insurns (1:\01) rcgional confL'rencc on 'Deposit Insl/rance in :\/I"icU: /.uw's. 
C/rallengn alld Pro'pects' :\huja, June ~004. 1-1 NDIC QlIarter!." (2), 32 . 
. ~2 Garcia and Pmst (n 13) I. 
97 
3.2 Concept of Deposit Insurance 
3.2.1. Rationale and Objectives 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, there are generally two approaches to 
justifying regulatory policies. These are the public interest theory and the market or 
capture theory. From a public interest viewpoint, the rationale for the provision of 
deposit insurance is the protection of small, uninformed depositors as well as the 
enhancement of economic and financial stability.33 
From the market or capture theory perspective, deposit insurance is viewed as another 
mechanism of regulation brought about as a result of increased pressure on the 
political authorities by market participants.34 To this extent, the banks with high-risk 
portfolios will encourage deposit insurance because they will receive a net subsidy at 
the expense of the safer banks, with an explicit deposit insurance scheme in place.35 
Thus deposit insurance has been described as 'a tax on less risky firms and a subsidy 
to more risky firms. ,36 Proponents of free banking also oppose deposit insurance on 
the grounds that it destabilizes the financial system by weakening the economy's 
incentive structure. 37 However, there is no country that operates an unregulated 
banking model to its full extreme; even countries that are prepared to tolerate 
occasional bank failures may intervene based on systemic considerations and political 
13 0 Diamond and P Dybvig 'Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity' (I9~n) 91 JOIln/al of 
Political Ecolloll/Y 40 I. 
34 Accordin o to White, deposit insurance was adopted in the U.S. only because of 'the succcss of a \cry 
narrow grOl~p of spccial interests that wantcd to tilt the structure of thc tinancial system in thcir L.I\ or.' 
Scc H'lIlte (n II); scc also CW Calomiris and EN White 'The Origins of Fedcral Dcpo,it Insurallcl" in 
C Golden and GO Libecap (cds.) The Reglllated Ecolloll/Y: ,\ Historical .\pprollch ro Polirical 
F('(Jl/omy (lTninTsity of Chicago Prcss, Chicago, 1994) 145 . 
. IS Lael'l'lI (2004) {n27). 
1() JL CIIT, GI: Mathcwson and NC Quigley 'Ensuring Failurc: Financial S) stClll Stahility and Dcpo"il 
Insurancc in Canada' 36 Ob.\(,I1'atio/l, ('.0 Howc Institute. 
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pressure.
38 
To this extent, regardless of the position one takes on the percei \ed 
benefits or otherwise of deposit insurance, it has come to stay mainly as a result of 
political necessity. 
It is still important to determine if deposit insurance is useful or not, so that if it is. its 
design can consequently be policy and objective driven and also incentive-
compatible, to minimize aspects of the deposit insurance problem. Throughout the 
literature, several reasons have been espoused to justify the existence of deposit 
insurance schemes.39 Principal among these are: 40 
• The protection of depositors, especially the small and unsophisticated ones; 
• The promotion of financial stability; 
• The promotion of competition in financial serVIces by reducing competitive 
barriers in the deposit-taking industry;41 
• To mitigate the pressure on government to provide an implicit one hundred per 
cent guarantee and to redistribute the costs of failure;42 
• The promotion of an orderly payment system; 
• Reducing the effects of a recession. 
37 A Dcmirouc-Kunt and E Detriache 'Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stahility? :\n b 
Empirical Investigation' (2002) .+9 Journal of Monetary EconOl~i~s (7), 1 ~7~. , . , . 
38 G Garcia 'Deposit Insurance: Ohtaining the Benefits and AVOIdIng the Plttal\s, (1996) l.\Ir Horklllg 
Paper WP/96/83. . . . . 
3'> Sec for example, Diamond and Dybvig (n33); D Llewellyn 'The RegulatIOn and SupervIsion 01 
Financial Institutions', (1986) The Gilbart Lectures on Banking: SH Talley and I :\Ias 'Dcp(l'>lt 
Insurance in Developing Countries', (1990) The World Balik, Policy Research H'orkillg Paper Ser;e.\ 
No.5.J8: Lahrosse and Mayes (n2). . . 
.to Deposit insurance schemes form part of most modern regulatory systems. As such. the,>e oh.leClI\e" 
arc similar to the ohjecti\'cs of tinancial regulation discllssed in Chapter 2. 
-tl Di C(/~lIio (nI87) l·h6. 
-t2 A W ~ IpY"l'Y 'Deposit Insurance and Other Compensation Arrangements' (1998) Research Pap(:"/ 
Prepared/ill'- the Tas/.: Force 011 rhe Furure of rhe COlladilll/, Fil/al/cial .\('/1';C('\ SecTor. 
http://w\\·\\.filu,!c.l·a/1;\..,kflll\:l'lrc''l'arch/pdUrrI3 l'.pdL accessed 7 I~ehruary 2006: "ee aJ..,p /\ 
The working group of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in its report also states that 
the principal objectives for deposit insurance systems are to contribute to the stability 
of the financial system and to protect less-financially-sophisticated depositors.43 For 
the purpose of this thesis, the two main objectives of deposit insurance schemes. 
which are financial stability and depositor protection, will be considered below.-+-+ 
3.2.2 Deposit Insurance and Financial Stability 
There are generally two types of risks associated with failing banks. First, when a 
bank fails, it is usually unable to honour its contractual obligations and to payoff its 
depositors in full. Secondly, the failure of one bank may directly or indirectly lead to 
the failure of other banks. It may directly lead to the failure of other banks if. for 
example, the failed bank serves as a correspondent for other institutions. It may lead 
to indirect failure of other banks if it causes other depositors to withdraw their funds 
in panic from other solvent but illiquid banks.45 As explained in the preceding 
chapter, this is generally referred to as the risk of contagion.46 These two risks, 
associated with depositor and systemic concerns, have been the major underlying 
justification for financial regulation and supervision on public interest grounds. 
As with the debate on the regulation of banks in general, the financial stability 
justification for deposit insurance is also controversial. Benston and Kaufman posit 
that banks are not inherently unstable and that the cost of an individual bank failure is 
Demirguc-Kunt and E1 Kane 'Deposit Insurance Around the Glohe: Where Does it Work'!' (2002) 16 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (2) 175. 
·u __ 'Guide for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems.' (2()O I) FSF 
·H These two ohjectives arc common to most jurisdictions, the other ohjectives listed ahovc Illay vary 
according to n~tional conditions. hut are often incidental to the pursuit of financial stahility and 
depllsitor protection... ., . '. 
4S GP {)'Driscoll Jr 'DepOSit Insurance In Theory and Practlcc (\\ Inter 1(88) 7 (uto JOlllnal ()) 
http://\\\\\\.calll.l 1r!2/plIhs/jollrT1:tIlcj7n.Vcj7n3-Q.j2!J .. L accessed on 7 Fehruary 2006: C Goodhart and 
others Financial Regulation: H hr. HoII' lind Where NolI'? (Routledge. London. 1(98) ch I. 
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relatively small and not greatly different from the failure of any non-bank firm of 
comparable importance. They argue that in the absence of deposit insurance 
prudential regulation of banks would be unnecessary, and that regulation is required 
only because of moral hazard brought about by deposit insurance:+7 Kaufman also 
concludes in his review of the empirical literature that concerns about the threat of 
contagion in banking have been greatly exaggerated.48 
Although Kaufman concludes that the evidence does not support the existence of a 
threat of contagion in banking, Schoenmaker differs in his empirical analysis of bank 
failures in the United States between 1880 and 1936.49 He concludes that the results 
are consistent with the existence of contagion risk and that an initial failure could 
generate further failure without intervention by the authorities. 
As noted in the preceding chapter, there is another dimension to the debate, which is 
the 'risk vs. seriousness' of the issue. As long as the threat to financial stability 
remains, safety net measures such as deposit insurance are necessary for protection 
against 'low-probability-high-seriousness' risks.5o Accordingly, financial crises that 
have occurred in recent decades, particularly in East Asia and the Mexican Peso 
crisis, have underscored the existence and threat of contagion risk. 
46 The systemic functions of deposit insurance schemes have been developed by Diulllolld and DY/Jl'ig 
(n33). 'h)' . 
47 G Benston and GG Kaufman 'Deposit Insurance in the FDIC Improvement :\l"t: r e :xpenem:e to 
Date' (1998) 22 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Ecollolllic Perspecril"{Js (2) 2. 
IS (J(; Kaufman 'Bank COlltagion: :\ Review of the Theory and L\idence.' (1994) 8 JO/lrnal of 
Financial Sarias Research (2) 12.~. . . 
II) D schoellmakn 'Contagion Risk in Banking' (1996) LSE Financial ,\larkers Group. DISC/lSSIOIl 
Paper No.l39. ........ . .... , . ~() DT Lkwcllyn 'The EconomIc RatIOnale tor hnanclal Regulallon (1996) r,\"\ O((wlOnal Pll{JlI 
Saies. No.1. hllp://w\\"\\"l'.L~\)\·lIIJPllb,/(lccpapL'rs/(}P() I.pdf aCl'l's,cd 21 ~larch 2006. 
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Deposit insurance schemes give consumers the assurance that their deposits are 
protected and this confidence reduces the incentives for depositors to withdra\\' their 
deposits and trigger a run. Thus deposit insurance promotes financial stability by 
promoting confidence in the financial system, and to this extent it can be considered 
as a supplement to the lender of last resort function. It is pertinent to note that in terms 
of preventing depositor runs on banks, it is the knowledge and awareness of the 
existence of these facilities, as opposed to their mere existence, that serves to promote 
and sustain public confidence. 
Kaufman concedes, 'for the sake of reality' that deposit insurance 'is a political fact 
of life' and that even countries with no explicit deposit insurance systems generally 
have implicit one hundred per cent guarantees.51 This fact is buttressed by the 
increasing number of countries adopting explicit deposit insurance schemes. The 
increasing popularity of deposit insurance can be attributed to various factors. Deposit 
insurance promotes political stability as it removes the political pressure that would 
result if the government allows depositors to suffer large losses. Such losses could 
potentially threaten the stability of a democratic government. 5~ The rapid 
globalization of financial markets has also contributed to the increasing adoption of 
deposit insurance as most countries are unwilling to allow banking panics jeopardize 
their reputation and international confidence, which could prevent access to 
international capital markets. 53 
51 GG Kaufman 'Bank Failures. Systemic Risk and Bank Regulation' (1996) 16 C\TO JOllma/ (I) 
http://\\'\\'w.cato.llrgLrllh .... /lournallcjl (111/ /l'j 161l1-2.pdf Accessed 16 f\ Lt: 2006. .. 
52 lR Macl'\ and (iP f\liller 'Deposit Insurancl'. the Implicit Regulator: Contract. and thl' \ll .... lllatch 111 
th~ Term Sirul'turl' of Banks' :\SSl'ts and Liabilities' (1995? 12 }"ule ~(}II"'1lI1 ~II ~eg~t1£lfiol/ ( I) I. . 
:n TM HUl'ni!.! 'Financial Moderni/ation: Implications tor the Sakty Net (ol/jerOlCl' 011 Dcpmlf 
I . '111('(' ~'('~\'I'OI1 Oil Depmif InslIral/ce {/nd Fil/{/I/cial Afodemi;'lIfioll (FDIc' \\'a .... hill~ton. DC. Il)l)~) 11.\ III l •• } .. 
http://\' \\ \\.kc.rrh.llr~/Slwl·llll~I\)/fdic.htlll. accessl'd 14 December 2007. 
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As a result of the near inevitability of explicit deposit insurance, the main concern for 
policy-makers is not whether deposit insurance should be adopted or not, but how to 
design and implement an optimal deposit insurance scheme in which the benefits far 
outweigh the costs. 
3.2.3 Deposit Insurance and Consumer Protection 
Consumer protection is considered to be the principal rationale for deposit insurance 
schemes. 54 Depositors, as users of banking products and services can be likened to 
purchasers and consumers of other products and services. 55 Due to problems of 
information asymmetry, there is little or no information available for potential 
depositors to assess the financial position of banks before depositing their funds. Lven 
where such information is available, the average depositor may have difficulty in 
interpreting such information. 56 Thus deposit insurance serves to protect the interests 
of the small and unsophisticated depositor by guaranteeing sums placed by such a 
depositor in financial institutions. 
Deposit insurance also helps in saVIng costs that would have been incurred by 
depositors in monitoring their banks. If all depositors would have to monitor their 
banks individually, they would incur costs, which would be duplicated in the case of 
each individual depositor. This would also mean that small depositors would find it 
more expensive to monitor their banks than big depositors. This cost can be greatly 
)·1 On consumer protection, see generally P Cartwright (cd.) Consumer Protection in Financial S(:nic~'s 
(KILJ\\'er Law International. The Hague, 1999): P Cartwright 'Optim.al Consumer P.rotecllon 111 
Financial Sen' ices' (2001) http://,,\\\\.ecri.bc/media/e\l'llls/prevlouscllnllpcar.t\\I"I~ht.~)dl,al"Cl'<,<,ed 
2 Au!..'.ust 2006: P Cartwright Banks, Consumers and Regu!ation (Hart Pubhshll1g, O,tord, 2()O-l): GJ 
Ikns;on 'Consulller Protection as Justification for Regulating Financial Services', (2()OO) 17 jU/lmal oj 
Fin(///('ia! L\'cr\'iccs Research (3) 277. 
») Cll,.tH',.i~ht (2001) (n5-l). 
)(> R Macd~)nald '1 kposit Insurance' ( 1996) Bank (~ll:·ngllll/(i. Celltre for Cel/fral Banking Sflldies 
«(.( 'US) I/aml/wok in ('('film! Banking No Y. 
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reduced and evenly spread by transferring the monitoring function to a centralized 
body such as the deposit insurer. 
Another justification for deposit insurance on consumer protection grounds is that the 
savings of an average household will often be poorly distributed. with financial 
wealth concentrated in deposit accounts in one or two banking institutions. This 
inability to spread savings and investments means that the average family will be 
worst affected in the event of a bank failure. Hence deposit insurance could be 
described as a means of guaranteeing the wealth of the average household and 
providing it with access to a safe means of making payments. 57 This consumer 
protection justification is also motivated by political factors. Governments all over the 
world fear the political repercussions of the failure of a big bank. This is because the 
safety of a significant portion of public wealth placed with such banks is perceived to 
be a responsibility of government. This explains why governments often exert 
political pressure on regulators to keep large banks afloat.58 Thus, as mentioned 
earlier, deposit insurance exists mainly as a result of political necessity. 
3.2.4 Financial Stability or Consumer Protection? 
The case has been made that the purpose of deposit insurance is mainly to enhance 
macroeconomic and financial stability. This opinion is predicated on the view that 
deposit insurance only protects small depositors as an incidental benefit and is not the 
nlain social purpose of deposit insurance. This view has also been supported by the 
:'7 DS HuL'ischer and others 'The Design and Implementation of Deposit Insurance S!slelll": IM"-
Occasiol/al Paper No. 251. (lMF. \\'ashington DC, 2(06) eh.III. .,' )~ 1\1 Giles 'International Banking: Coping \\,ith the lIps and Downs' The Ecollo11l1\( (U.S). 27 Apnl 
1996. 10-l 
argument that citizens face many risks from which government is not obligated to 
protect them. 59 
While it is accepted that an important function of deposit insurance is to promote 
financial stability, it is doubtful whether this should be viewed as the most critical 
function of a deposit insurance scheme. Deposit insurance is a guarantee to depositors 
that if their banks fail, they would receive a refund of their deposits up to a specified 
coverage limit. By providing this guarantee, the level of public confidence in the 
financial system is increased and this reduces the incentives for depositor runs; thus 
the likelihood of contagion is greatly reduced.6o It would thus appear that deposit 
insurance promotes financial stability as an incidental function, derived from its main 
function, which is to protect depositors. The reduction of the risk of a systemic crisis 
has thus been described as the 'indirect rationale' for deposit insurance. 61 
Citizens do face many risks from which governments do not protect them, leaving 
individuals and groups to protect themselves through private insurance. However, 
where the life, health, safety and wealth of the public is concerned, it is usual for the 
government to step in for purposes of licensing and quality control for connected 
activities that may affect the public.62 It is usual practice for manufacturers and 
service providers to provide warranties for their products and services. This is 
important especially when the product or service concerned is expensive and 
sophisticated so that the manufacturer or provider has more information on the quality 
59 AS Blinder and RF Wescott 'Reform of Deposit Insurance' (2001) ,\ Report to the FDIC 
hit )://wv.w.rdic.go\/depo.-..itJinsuranceiinitiati\l'lrdorm.htmL accessed 16 1\1a~ 2()06. \\ Illte holds an 
cn:irc1Y different \icw and argues that deposit insurancl: \~as not. aJ~)pteJ to p~otect, the deposItor nor to 
incrcasl' the soundill'ss of the hanking system, hut to satls!y sPCl'tallIltl'rC-..1S. Sl'l' \\ 11111 (1995) (n II). 
60 UeH'l'I/\'1/ (1986) (n:N). 
61 ,\!i/ct!O;/ll/d (1996) (n56) 8. '" 
(,~ i:xample.s inl'lmk aviation, health scnil'CS and products. Banking -"l'rVICl'-" :lre e4ually IInportant 
hl'ClllSl' of the spcclal rok that hanks play in an econom~. 
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than the consumer. This informational deficiency is similar to the problem of 
information asymmetry that exists between banks and their customers.63 Consumer 
protection concerns dictate that governments should intervene to regulate banks and 
to protect depositors because depositors lack the information and expertise required to 
monitor banks. 
It is also important to note that deposit insurance would not, on its own, achieve the 
objective of financial stability. As long as deposits are not fully covered. the potential 
for depositors to run on their banks still remains. Thus, to function effectively, deposit 
insurance has to be properly co-ordinated with and integrated into the general 
regulatory framework. Prior to the twentieth century, banking panics were a frequent 
phenomenon in Europe and in the United States before the advent of Federal Deposit 
Insurance. Central banks were introduced to eliminate panics and to ensure financial 
stability64 and over time, other financial regulatory and supervisory devices have 
evolved to ensure financial stability.65 
The justification of deposit insurance schemes on consumer protection grounds has 
not generated as much debate as the financial stability rationale for deposit insurance. 
While deposit insurance is usually the only scheme available for the protection and 
guarantee of depositors' funds per se, there are, generally speaking, other factors and 
mechanisms that affect macro economic and financial stability. The contribution of 
deposit insurance to banking stability has been questioned in the academic literature. 
63 Garcia (1996) (ld8). 
(d The tirst central hank was the Bank of Sweden which was introduced mer 300 years a~l). For a 
discussion on central hanks and hank regulation, see RM Lastra Central Banking and Banking 
Regulation (Financial Markets Group. London School of Economics. London. 19(6); CAE (;(lodhart 
Thl' Fl'olution (lr Central Banks (M IT Press. Camhridge. 1988). 
(1) For a disl'ussion of hanking s~ stl'm panics and runs. see F ;\\Ien and D (;ale 'Optimal Financial 
Crises' (1998) 5.' Thl' JOllmal (~l Fillal/ce (-l): see alsu VV Chari and R Jagannathan 'Banking Panics. 
Informatillll and Rational E'pcL'tatioJls Equilihrium' (1988) .. +3 The JOllrnal of Fillal/ce (3) 749. 
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It has been observed that 'on the one hand, credible deposit insurance contributes to 
financial stability by making depositor runs less likely. On the other hand. unless 
capital positions and risk taking of insured institutions are supervised carefully. 
deposit insurance may lead to excess risk taking and undermine bank stability in the 
long run. ,66 
Indeed, an effective system of bank regulation and supervIsIon IS a necessary 
counterpart to deposit insurance in order to mitigate the deposit insurance problem. 
Deposit insurance schemes exist mainly because bank failures have caused losses and 
considerable hardship to depositors. If banks never failed, or if they failed without 
depositors suffering any form of loss, then governments and regulators would be 
under no political pressure to provide deposit insurance.67 
Furthermore, in some countries, for example the UK, deposit protection schemes 
exist mainly to protect depositors. The White Paper on Banking Regulation published 
in 1985 noted that the aim of the deposit protection scheme was to provide 'a degree 
of protection sufficient to prevent severe hardship among the most vulnerable of 
depositors. ,68 As deposit insurance is focussed solely on compensation, the deposit 
protection bodies in these countries are not invested with other powers of financial 
regulation and supervision.69 Most financial systems have put in place an effective 
66 A Demirguc-Kunt and EJ Kane 'Deposit Insurance Around the Glohe: Where Docs it Work?' (2002) 
16 Journal of Economic Perspectil'es (2) 175. Demirguc-Kunt and Detriache also find cvidence linking 
deposit insurance with an increased risk of hanking crisis in a cross-country study of 61 countries in 
1980-1997. Sec Delllirguc-Kllllt and Detriache (2002) (n37), 
67 B Ely 'Regulatory Moral Hazard: The Real Moral Hazard in Federal Deposit Insurance' (Fall 19<)<) 
-+ The Independent Rain\' (2) 241. 
68 'Banking SlIpenision' (Cmnd 9695, 1985) ch3.5; see also FSMA 2000, s,2(2), In thc contc.xl of the 
EU Singk market. depositor protection also helps to achiC\e a \eyel playing field for cros'>-horder 
hanking sL'I'\'il'eS, Sce 1\1 ;\ndenas (1<)95) (nl<), 
69 Systemic L'lHlsidlTations were \LTy important to the adoption of deposit insurance in the Linited 
Stat~'s, "l!lTC dep(lsil inSlIranCl' \\ as initially sccn as a means of pre\L'nting hank run,>, Sl'C 
CH Cinkmhl' 'ThL' Deptlsi I Insurance Legislation of 1<)33'. ( 1<)60) 75 Political S( 'ienC{' Qua r(aly I X 1. 
HowL'\ cr. it has also heen noted that 'although as a strictly political matter. dcposilllr proledion was 
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lender of last resort facility, in addition to deposit insurance, to help banks in crisis 
management where there is systemic failure. 
On one hand, if the principal aim of deposit insurance is to achieve financial stability. 
it can indeed be argued that there would have been no need for deposit insurance in 
the first place; since deposit insurance has inherent problems and cost, particularly 
moral hazard, it would be wise to reject it and adopt other available means of 
achieving financial stability. On the other hand, if it is recognised that the main reason 
for deposit insurance is to protect depositors and that other incidental benefits are 
derived from this, reform measures would be channelled towards minimizing the risks 
that arise from deposit insurance and the harmonization of other financial safety net 
features to ensure economic stability. 
While there are different jurisdictional approaches to this issue, these objectives are 
not mutually exclusive and a well-structured and adequately funded deposit insurance 
scheme can achieve both objectives. The two objectives can be described as 
complementary, and it has been observed that 'if customers are to have confidence in 
their banks then those banks must be subject to effective supervision. If the 
supervision is to be effective, then customers must have confidence, and be dissuaded 
from withdrawing their funds in the event of a bank facing difficulty. Bank safety and 
consumer protection are inextricably linked.' 70 However, it is important for 
policymakers to give relative prioritization to these objectives, as this has fundamental 
effects on the design and operation of the deposit insurance scheme. 
thc (l'ntral moti\ alion for till' passa~e of deposit insurance in congress.' Sl'l' i\ID Flood 'Thc Great 
Dcppsil Insurallcl' Dehatc' (July 1992) 7-t. Federal Resen'£' Balik (lISt. LOllis RerieH' 51. 
70 P Cart\\r1~ht 'Ikpllsil Ciuarantees and thc Individual Bank Customer' in P Cartwri~ht (cd.) 
COllslIlller Protectioll ill Fillallcial Scrric('\ (KluWLT Law International. Thc Hague. 1(99) 130. 
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3.3. Deposit Insurance and Private Insurance 
The exact genesis of the concept of insurance is unknown. It has been traced back to 
the Babylonians and the Town Guilds of Europe in the mid-fourteenth century.71 The 
history of insurance can also be traced to the contract of marine insurance, which 
evolved in the early years of the fourteenth century in the commercial cities of Italy. 
The concept of 'risk' was introduced into the ordinary commercial contracts and 
insurance allowed the early merchants to share this risk either through prior 
agreements to provide cover for a member who has suffered loss or through a third 
party known as the insurer.72 Insurance can thus be described as a transfer of risk or 
collective risk-bearing. 
Insurance is a contract of indemnity and it has been defined as 'a contract by which 
one party (the insurer) in consideration of a premium, undertakes to indemnify 
another (the insured) against 10ss.73 With modernization and development in 
commerce and financial markets, the concept of insurance has expanded and grown 
from marine insurance to such areas as fire and life insurance. Insurers provided cover 
for those individuals whose wealth was invested in tangible property.74 As a result of 
the multi-dimensional nature of insurance, it has now become practically impossible 
to agree on an all-embracing definition of insurance. Indeed, it has been described as a 
concept, which is better to describe than to define. 75 
71 J Lowry and P Rawlings Insurance Lmr: Doctrines and Principles (2nd ed .. Hart Publishing. Oxford. 
20(5) I. . . 
72 W Holdsworth 'The Early History of the Contract of Insurancc' (1917) 17 Columbia La\\ RC\lcw. 
85. 
73 I bid. 
7-1 tOWIT lIl/(i RlIwlings t20(5) (1171) ch I. 
75 See Sir Rohert l\ k~arry \' -C in ,\Iedical Defena l 'Ilion Ltd \' Department of Trade [ 1980) Ch 82 at 
95. 
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Although deposit insurance is a peculiar type of insurance, there are certain 
similarities as well as differences between deposit insurance and conventional 
insurance practice. It has been observed, in relation to the introduction of Federal 
deposit insurance in the US that 'the general argument employed to promote the 
guarantee plan began with the premise that property can be insured and bank deposits 
are property. It travelled to the broad assumptions that the principle of the distribution 
of risk through insurance could be applied to bank deposits.' 76 
Deposit insurance compensates the depositor if the risk protected against (the failure 
of an insured institution) materialises.77 The basic elements in the definition of an 
insurance contract, which are payment of premium and a promise of indemnity upon 
the occurrence of a special event, are present in a deposit insurance scheme.78 
An insurance contract must relate to a risk, which involves uncertainty. The insured 
peril mayor may not occur: 'there must be either uncertainty whether the event will 
happen or not, or, if the event is one which must happen at some time, there must be 
uncertainty as to the time at which it will happen.' 79 Bank failure is an uncertain 
occurrence and the deposit insurer bears this risk in consideration of payment of 
premium by participating institutions. 
That the deposit insurer is usually conferred with other regulatory and superVIsory 
powers to forestall the occurrence of the event insured against does not make deposit 
insurance less of an insurance contract. Risk-minimizing powers of some deposit 
76 American Bankers .\:-':-'(lL'iation The Guarantee of Bank Deposits (Economic Policy COlllmission. 
American BankLTs /\ssol'iation, Ncw York, 1933), 
77 Linl'l'I/"1I (19R6) (n39), 
78 SCl' Ch~lI1nell J, 's dl'finition of an insurancc l'ontract in Prudellfia/ln\IIIWICe COl1l!J(lIlY l'll//alld 
Rel'l'llIll' COllllllissiOI/('n [190-l] 2 K.B 65R, 663. 
79 Ibid.: Fllji Filllll/('l' Inc. \. \ellIa LUi' IllS, Co. [19951 Ch 122, 129, 
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Insurers can be compared to the practice in general insurance where insurers take 
steps to mitigate the risk, for example, a term requiring the insured to install sprinklers 
in the insured premises;8o a term requiring that the insured vehicle should be fitted 
with approved locks and alarm systems;81 or a term restricting the use of an insured 
car.82 
These basic similarities notwithstanding, deposit insurance differs from regular 
., 83· Insurance In many respects. The fust point of departure is that while the latter's 
objective is to reduce the liability of the insured in the event of an adverse outcome, 
deposit insurance works to reduce the risks associated with bank panics. S~ 
In ordinary insurance, the premIum IS paid by the insured whereas in deposit 
insurance, the bank, not the depositor, pays the cost of the insurance.85 The effect of 
this is that there are more parties involved in the contract of deposit insurance than 
there are in ordinary insurance.86 The doctrine of privity of contract, which bars a 
person from enforcing a contract to which he is not a party is fundamental to the 
contract of insurance. 87 In deposit insurance however, the depositor is not, strictly 
speaking, a party to the contract even though the scheme exists largely for his 
b f · 88 ene It. 
80 Kler Knitwear Ltd v Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd [2000] Lloyd's Rep IR 47 
81 De Maurier (Jell'els) Ltd t' Bastion Insurance Co. [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 550. 
82 Farr r Motor Traders' Mutual Insurance Society [1920] 3 KB 669. 
~3 JR Barth and others 'The Federal Deposit Insurance System: Origins and Omissions' (1989) Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board Research Paper No. 153. 
8.t LA Sjaastad (1996), 'Deposit Insurance: Do We Really Need It'?' Proceedings of Confercnce: 
Preventi~g Banking Sector Distress and Criscs in Latin America, Washington DC, ;\pri I 15-16, 1446. 
World Balik Discllssion Paper No. 360, --18. 
~) Umoh (2004) (1131 ). 
86 It is also possihle in general insurance to insure against third party risks. Sl'e \\illial1/s r Balric 
Insllrers 1\.\SOcilltioll (~lLondon Ltd [19241 2 KB 2X2. . ., 
87 \ 'lllldepitfe t' p,.c!i.,.red /\ccide1/f IIISlirance COIpomtioll (~l New York [19.'31 r\C 70. ThiS pnnclp\c 
has hO\\c\l')' bl'cn \aril'd in the lll\. hy the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) .\L'\ 1494.. . 
~x In Palll \' (;l'I'many (C-222/o2) (Unreportcd, Octoher 12 20()4). the Luropean Court 01 Justice held 
that the Deposit Guarantee Din.:cti\L' l,1 1494 did not confer any individual rights on depl1\itors C\ en 
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Furthermore, while general insurance only protects the insured against the occurrence 
of events, which are independent or fortuitous,89 depositors under a deposit insurance 
scheme would still be covered even where bank failure is a result of mismanagement 
or excessive risk-taking. Bank failures tend to occur in waves, partly in response to a 
severe recession or to some other macroeconomic shock or even to legal and 
supervisory inadequacies. Bank failures can also be contagious when the failure of 
one bank brings down its counterparties.9o Also, to the extent that where the deposit 
insurer is conferred with intervention powers, the timing of such intervention can 
determine the extent of loss which occurs when a bank fails, bank failures cannot be 
described as entirely fortuitous events.91 
Deposit insurance can be described as a hybrid of a contract of guarantee and 
insurance.92 To this extent, it acts as a form of guarantee insurance or a surety because 
the deposit insurer assures the depositing public that their banks will perform their 
obligations while also undertaking to indemnify the depositors, to an agreed limit, in 
respect of any loss that may be incurred in the event of insolvency of a financial 
though the directive has as one of its objectives the protection of depositors. See 'No Recourse Against 
Supervisory Authority' (2004) 153 EU Focus (5): See also the House of Lords decision in Three Rh'ers 
Districf Council and others v Governor and Company o/the Bank 0/ Englalld (No.3) [20001 :2 WLR 
15 (HL). 
89 This is known as the doctrine of 'causation', where only the proximate cause of a loss is to be looked 
to. The loss must have been caused by a peril, which the insurer contracted to cover. Where the insured 
risk materializes as a consequence of the insured's action, the court will han: to decide if the action 
was negligent. reckless or intentional. See Harris ~' Poland [1941] I KB 462; also Soft v Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 559. On causation, see generally, HLA Hart and T Honore 
Causation in the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985); on causation in insurance law. sec J Lowry and 
P Rawlings 'Proximate Causation in Insurance Law' (2005) 68 Modern Law Re\iew 310. 
90 Garcia (1996) (n38). 
91 HL Baer 'What We Know About the Deposit Insurance Problem' (1990) 35 Chicago Fed Letter I. 
l)2 It is often a question of fact whether a particular c()ntract is one of guarantee or of insurance, hlr 
judicial guidance. see Trade Indemnity Co. ~'. \\'orkingtoll Harbour Board [1937] AC I: see abo Romer 
'ITs judgl'l11cnt in SCi/ton r Heath [1899] IQB 782 (Re\LTsed in [1900] AC 135 on other gmunds). In 
e,l\:h·case. the qUl'stion would depend nn the e";,pressed intention of the parties. Sec Lord F"hcr in U(lIle 
\' Mo,.r~(/~l' /II\UIWICl' [ I S941 I QB 54. 60, 
, , 
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institution.93 Unlike in general insurance where the insured is protected against losses 
due to defined risks, with certain policy exclusions incorporated in the terms. explicit 
deposit insurance is a guarantee to reimburse depositors' funds regardless of the cause 
of bank failure. 
The major difference between deposit insurance and general insurance appears to be 
that deposit insurance schemes are governed by clearly laid out rules and procedure 
which are found in the statute establishing the scheme, whereas general insurance 
practice is governed by a combination of statutes, codes of practice, terms and 
conditions and judicial pronouncements, which depend on the facts of each case. 
3.4 Forms of Deposit Protection 
Conceptually and in practice, deposit insurance schemes generally take two forms: the 
Implicit Deposit Protection Scheme (mpS) and the Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS), 
which is known as explicit deposit insurance.94 
3.4.1. Implicit Deposit Protection Scheme (IDPS) 
Implicit deposit protection refers to an implied protection of bank depositors in the 
absence of any formal deposit protection arrangements. Where there is no legal 
obligation to protect deposits, government can elect to protect depositors of a failed 
bank because it believes that the attainment of some public policy objective. for 
example economic development and social justice. requires such an action. The 
provision of implicit deposit insurance can also be a consequence of political or 
9J I:.J Kane 'Three Paradigms for the Role of Capitalization in Insured Financial Institution,,' (1<,)<,)5) 1<,) 
Journal (~l Bonking ond Financ£' (.~--+). 
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market pressure on the government. Implicit deposit insurance is characterized by 
discretion; the government is usually at liberty to decide whether or not to grant any 
relief to depositors and the amount of such relief. The basic characteristics of implicit 
deposit protection are: 
• There is no enabling law such that legal obligation is absent and assistance 
can only be predicted by past behaviour of government or by statements of 
officials; 
• There are no legislated rules regarding the coverage limits and form of 
compensation; 
• There are no earmarked funds for the purpose of deposit protection.95 
The provIsIon of implicit deposit insurance is usually channelled through ad hoc 
institutions or arrangements. The respective ad hoc bodies usually determine the 
extent and form of the protection offered. There are usually no pre-existing laws to 
guide the general administration of the scheme, although prior conduct in similar 
circumstances may serve as precedence. The government makes the decision, on a 
case-by-case basis, on the form in which protection is to take and the manner in which 
it will be financed. The funds for depositors' compensation are usually sourced 
through the central bank or through the government's contingency expenditure 
provision in the budget. It has been argued that implicit deposit insurance exists to the 
extent that the political incentives that shape a government's reaction to crisis make a 
taxpayer bailout of insolvent banks seem inevitable.96 
94 Tallev and I\Lls (1990) (n39): SH Talky and I 1\las 'The Role of Deposit Insurance' in D Vittas (cd.) 
Fil/al/cial Regulaliol/: Changing Ihe Rules (~llh(' (;1l111e (The World Bank, Washington DC. 19(2) .~21. 
()~ A K\ei 'Deposit Pwtcclion Arran~cl11cnls: :\ Sliney' (1995) 1,\lF H'orkillg Paper <)5113-1. 
I)(, A Demir!..'.lIc-KlIllt and LJ Kane 'Dcp(lsil Insurance: Handk \\'ilh Carl" (2003) \\'orking Paper" 
Central Hank of Chile No 227. 
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Implicit deposit protection can also be implemented through the use of stringent 
prudential regulations, monitoring and supervision and failure resolution options that 
ensure depositors' protection.97 In an implicit deposit protection arrangement. 
government can provide protection to depositors of failed or failing financial 
institutions in three basic ways. The first and most commonly used method is the 
direct payment of funds to depositors or the arrangement for a failed bank's deposits 
to be assumed by another bank. A second method is for the government to arrange 
and financially support another solvent bank to merge with or acquire a failing bank.98 
The third alternative is for the government to directly rehabilitate the failing bank. 
This could be through direct equity capital injection or by acquisition of the failing 
bank's non-performing assets at book value.99 
With the second and third options, which will invariably involve rehabilitation, the 
government is likely to emerge as the controlling shareholder in the concerned bank; 
100 Wh h h b'l' . . it would thus have effectively nationalized the bank. ere t e re a 1 Itatlon IS 
successful and the bank starts operating at a profit again, the government will be able 
to recoup the funds invested to rescue the failing institution. 
3.4.2 Explicit Deposit Insurance 
Explicit deposit insurance is usually provided in the form of a deposit insurance 
scheme (DIS), and is created by a legal instrument, a deposit insurance law. which 
97 JU Ehhodaghe '" Century of Banking in Nigeria: Lessons for Bank Deposit PwteL'tion' (1992) .2 
NDIC Quarterly (-l) U. .' . 
()~ Where this method is adopted. the gmernment or relevant authonty \\111 he acttng to prevent till' 
failure of the ailing hank rather than to compensalL' depositors for lu"s of fund". 
99 Mac[)ollald (1996) (n.56). 
100 Taller {llld ,\IU\ ( 1(90) (n39). 
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sets out the rules governing the operation of the scheme. lOt The deposit insurance law 
states the objectives of the scheme and defines the financial institutions and categories 
of deposits covered by the scheme. Typically, the law also states, inter alia, \\·hether 
participation in the scheme will be compulsory or voluntary, the method of funding 
the scheme and the failure resolution devices to be used by the deposit insurer. 
Coverage of insured deposits under a DIS can either be limited, \02 one hundred 
percent or discretionary. 103 Under the limited coverage scheme, deposits are 
guaranteed up to a maximum amount prescribed by law. When an insured institution 
fails, the deposit insurer is obliged to payoff depositors up to the stipulated maximum 
amount. The purpose of a limited coverage scheme is to protect small depositors when 
banks fail. Under a limited coverage scheme, uninsured depositors, shareholders and 
general creditors are not protected and the deposit insurance law does not confer on 
the deposit insurer the power to rehabilitate failing banks or to facilitate mergers. To 
do so will be extending de facto protection to uninsured depositors as in an implicit 
deposit insurance scheme. 
The one hundred percent coverage deposit protection scheme involves the full 
guarantee of all insured deposits. The deposit insurer is allowed to employ different 
methods of failed bank resolution including financial assistance, mergers and 
rehabilitation of failing banks. This type of deposit insurance scheme is rarely adopted 
lOt For example the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDle) Act 1967. the ~ederal D~p(l"it 
Insurance Corpllration (FDIC) Act 1933 and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance CorporatIOn (.:'-JDIC) .\ct 
1989. In countries that practise integrated financial regulation and supenision. the enahhng law for 
deposit protection sdll'llles is usually contained in the general financial senices law. Sec f(1I' eX~llllple 
the Financial SenicL's and ~larkL'ls AL·t (FS~lA) 2000. . . 
to.' Fxplicit limitL'd L'(l\erage deposit insural1L"e is the most Cllll11110n model adopted \1) countnes with 
DIS. 
10.1 Isslles relatlllg tll deposit insurance L'll\ crage are also discus"L'd in the Ilext dlapter. 
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· 104 In practIce. The full coverage of the deposit protection scheme can either be 
provided for by statute105 or operate as government policy.106 A one hundred percent 
coverage deposit insurance scheme would create a very high level of moral hazard 
risk in the financial system. 
A discretionary coverage deposit insurance scheme is similar to a limited coveraoe 
b 
scheme in that deposits are only guaranteed up to a prescribed limit. However. with 
discretionary coverage, the deposit insurer has the power to extend its coverage under 
certain special circumstances. These special circumstances would be: 
(1) The banking system has been affected by a loss of public confidence and as such 
is at risk of contagion and 
(2) The need to protect against bank runs outweighs the risk of moral hazard that will 
result from extending coverage of insurance to uninsured depositors. 107 
In exercising its discretion to extend coverage, the deposit insurer can arrange or give 
financial assistance for the merger or rehabilitation of a failing bank. It can also make 
use of a purchase and assumption transaction to rescue a failing institution. 108 
A deposit insurance scheme with discretionary coverage operates as a limited 
coverage scheme under normal circumstances. The special circumstances can 
however convert its functions into a full coverage deposit protection scheme. 109 
104 This was the system of deposit insurance practised in Argentina between 1946 and 1971; !a~an, 
Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey and Sweden have also changed from a blanket guarantee ~yslL'm to a 11l11lted 
explicit system. 
105 Japan. Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey. . 
106 Korea ( 1997 -20(0), Sweden (1992-1996). Thailand, and MalaYSIa. 
107 TolI('\' and MilS ( 1(90) (n~9) 13. 
108 This 'in\ol\'l's an arrangl'l11ent with another snl\ent bank to assume all of a failing hank'.., dep(l~ih 
and aL'lluire all or S(lme of the failing hank's assets in rdurn for a cash pa~ ment h~ the insurer. This 
method is ab(l u~l'd "here implicit deposit protection is pn.nided. .. . 
109 This is thL' t\pe uf dep(lsit in..,urance practised in the US where the FDIC IS gIven se\cral uptHll1.., tu 
rl'soive institution t'ailurl's such as selling deposits and l(lans of failed institutions to another institution. 
This is also the praL'lice of till' NOll' in Nigeria. 
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3.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of IDPS and DIS 
One obvious advantage that an explicit deposit insurance scheme has over implicit 
deposit insurance is certainty. An explicit scheme provides legal certainty and because 
its operations are rules-based, the handling of failing banks and the protection of 
depositors would be faster, smoother and generally more predictable and consistent. 
Certainty is also ensured because an explicit scheme is usually administered by an 
agency or body solely dedicated for this purpose. Implicit protection, on the other 
hand, is usually administered by ad hoc bodies whose decisions are based on 
discretion. 
It has been shown that implicit deposit protection systems are more prevalent in 
developing countries. In these countries, most of the banks are government owned or 
have strong ties to government. Consequently, the government is expected to interfere 
where these banks fail; in such cases, private banks, with no state ties, may be allowed 
to fai1. 110 
In contrast to implicit deposit insurance, explicit deposit insurance can be provided at 
a cheaper and defined cost to the government and the taxpayer. Implicit deposit 
insurance is usually financed by government's contingency funds, thus the tax-payer 
invariably bears the cost. Also, because an explicit system would have its own 
dedicated funds, it would be capable of eliminating time delays associated with the 
determination of funding sources. Where implicit protection is practised, delay will be 
inevitable. as most national laws would require parliamentary approval for funds to be 
utilized for the purpose. 
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Implicit deposit protection exposes the government to intense political pressure and 
lobbying. In this regard, the European Shadow Financial Regulation Committee 
(ESFRC) has noted that 'the practice of bailing out institutions creates expectations of 
official support beyond deposit insurance limits, thereby distorting market incenti yes 
and undermining financial discipline (the so called moral hazard problem).111 Market 
discipline is jeopardized because bank managers are encouraged to take excessiye risk 
with the knowledge that they will benefit from a government bail-out if their 
institutions fail. 
The various legal and administrative constraints involved in the operation of a DIS 
can however make it a more expensive option of deposit protection. With implicit 
deposit insurance, there could be more options available because of the high degree of 
discretion involved. Implicit protection gives the government flexibility to assess and 
respond accordingly to individual cases of bank failure. Most deposit insurance laws 
mandate the deposit insurer to payoff depositors in cash but with implicit protection, 
payments can be made in form of cash or other government securities. Payments can 
also be prioritized and spread out over a period of time. The administrative and 
operational costs involved in maintaining a deposit insurance agency, especially 
where there is a long and uninterrupted period of banking and economic stability. also 
makes explicit deposit insurance potentially more expensive than implicit 
. IP protectIon. -
110 K\'ci ( 1(95) (n95) 2. . 
III 'A New Rolc for Deposit Insuralh..'e in Europe' Ellropean Slllldmr Financial Regulawry Commtffl'l' 
Statement No.5. 18 Octoher 1999. . 
111 DL'\1L'ndin~ on the SOurCL' of funding an L'\plicit DIS. it is ~ossi~le t.hat ~he ~()\ernI11ent Cl)Jll,nhutes 
littiL' pr np funds to the sdlL'me: in the UK for example the FJIlanclal Se[\ Ices Compens;ltJOn Scheme 
(FSCS) is funded hy the industry. Ho\\L'\L'I'. implicit protection is usually funded hy the ~ll\'ernmenl. 
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Explicit deposit protection also creates the risk of moral hazard b\ encouragmg 
excessive risk-taking which is often not checked by depositors as they become 
indifferent to the financial and risk positions of their banks thus ignoring the use of 
available information in the placement of their funds. Moral hazard can however be 
checked if the extent of deposit insurance coverage is limited. 
The pnmary objective of both systems of deposit insurance is to protect small 
depositors and to prevent systemic runs. However, an explicit limited coverage 
deposit insurance scheme will serve this purpose better. Where an explicit DIS is in 
place, the protection of small depositors becomes a legal obligation. The deposit 
insurer is mandated to protect insured depositors and is given reasonable discretion to 
extend this protection to uninsured depositors. Conversely, arrangements involving 
the rescue or rehabilitation of failing banks would invariably result in the provision of 
full coverage to all categories of depositors rather than restricting protection to small 
and uninformed depositors, who are unable to assess and monitor the financial risks 
involved with the placement of their money in particular banks and who are most 
likely to be affected by the effects of bank failure. I 13 The ESFRC, in its statement of 
18 October 1999 noted that deposit insurance should play a role primarily in the 
liquidation of insolvent banks without the need for bailouts. The committee held the 
view that uninsured depositors and other creditors should not be protected by deposit 
insurance.ll.f In this regard, it should be noted that explicit deposit insurance scheme~, 
governed by clearly laid out laws and regulations, ensure transparency and public 
trust. In most countries there are strong links between politicians and major 
shareholders of comIl1l'rcial banks. \\,ith an explicit system it will therefore be 
11.1 '\/u(Dollald(I()()()) (nS()). 
III Implicit deposil insurance invariahl;. pwvllks s~pport for shar~11Olders 01: the ar~cc~ed hanks as \\cll. 
This is in addition 10 the pwtc\.,tion they ah\.'ady enJoy under thl' IlIllllcd IIahllll;' prtnclple. 
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difficult for the government to justify the motives of deposit protection where such 
protection is extended to cover failing institutions to which it has links. 
The advantages of an explicit deposit insurance system outweigh that of an implicit 
system. The working group of the Financial Stability Forum in its report rightly posit 
that: 
• A deposit insurance system is preferable to implicit protection if it clarifies the 
authorities' obligation to depositors and limits the scope for discretionary 
decisions that may result in arbitrary actions. 
• To be credible and to avoid distortions that may result in moral hazard, such a 
system needs to be properly designed, well implemented and understood by 
the public. 
• A deposit insurance system needs to be part of a well-designed financial safety 
net, supported by strong prudential regulation and supervision, effective laws 
that are enforced and sound accounting and disclosure regimes. 115 
3.5. The Deposit Insurance Problem 
Although relatively straightforward as a concept, expenence has shown that the 
implementation and practice of deposit insurance is complex. This demonstrates why 
deposit insurance has assumed centre stage in the academic literature and 
international debate. 116 It also explains why even the oldest deposit insurance schemes 
are still constantly undergoing modifications. 
II~ '-SF C~()OI) (n .. B). 
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While the need to continuously evaluate and modify deposit insurance schemes is 
partly due to the dynamic nature of banking business, it can be mainly attributed to 
the problems which are intrinsic to the existence of deposit insurance. These problems 
border on the need to ensure that deposit insurance schemes are designed to eliminate 
perverse incentives, which are capable of exacerbating the problems which deposit 
insurance was intended to solve in the first place. The two main aspects of the deposit 
insurance problem, which are moral hazard and the principal/agent problem will now 
be considered. 
3.5.1 Moral Hazard 
The existence of any form of insurance is believed to create moral hazard. Moral 
hazard in general insurance has been defined as 'the risk that the proposer will in 
some way act dishonestly in relation to the insurance policy, in particular the risk that 
he will make false claims. ,117 This definition is, however, not all-embracing~ it IS 
easier to identify what constitutes moral hazard than to attempt a general definition. 
Moral hazard refers to facts which may influence the behavioural pattern of the 
insured, such that the likelihood of the occurrence of the risk insured against is greatly 
increased. In other words, moral hazard refers to the adverse effects, from the point of 
view of the insurer, which insurance may have on the insured's behaviour. 118 
Accordingly, such facts as the insured's claims history and prior refusals of cover: 119 
116 A hihliut!raphy puhlished hy the FDIC indicates more than 700 sources of deposit insurance 
literaturl'. See FDIC Deposillllsltrallce: ;\11 1\llllolaled Bibliography 1989 - 1999 (FDIC. Division of 
Research and Statistics. Washington DC. 20(0). 
117 ;\ I\k( Il'l' 'fhe ,\Iotien! LaH' of II/SlirallCe (Butterworths. London. 200 I) 69. For a discussion of the 
ori!!ill and (Ulll'Cpt of moral ha/ard in t!eneral. see T Baker 'On the Genealogy of Moral Hal.ard· 
( 19(6) 75 le.rels Lal\' Rerinl' (2) 237. 
liS ,\Ic1c"/)Ollllid (19lJh) {n56). 
11<) Sl'l' (ilicb!lul1I ,. Lallcllshire l( Gel/eml:\ \SIIIWICl' CO [19271 AC 1 ~9: LOlldoll ;\.\SlImIlCe r .\lonsel 
(IX79)41 LT22:\ 
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the insured's criminal record and integrity; 120 and other factors such as sex, disability 
or age of the insured 121 could constitute moral hazard, 
In relation to financial regulation in general, moral hazard refers to the consequences 
of the fact that the insured no longer needs to fear harm if the risk insured against 
comes to pass. As noted earlier, private insurance only covers the insured from losses 
arising out of defined risks, and as such preventable losses would not be covered. 
Deposit insurance however covers the depositor regardless of the cause of bank 
failure, thus the insured depositor no longer has an incentive to take precautions to 
avoid the harm of bank failure,122 or to monitor the risk behaviour of banks, or 
demand interest rates that correspond with that behaviour. 123 
Moral hazard creates the incentive for economic agents to maximise their own utility 
at the expense of others in situations where they do not bear the full consequences of 
their actions. 124 It is the incentive for insured financial institutions to engage in riskier 
behaviour than would be obtainable in the absence of insurance. 125 Thus moral hazard 
has been defined, in the context of deposit insurance, as having two components: 
'first, potential incentive to management to take excessive risk due to the promise of a 
government bail-out; and second, the consequent risk to the public purse due to the 
. I ,176 potentIa expense. -
120 Schoolman I' Holl [1951] I Lloyd's Rep 139: Woolcot I' Sun Alliance & London InsuU/nce [197'8.11 
All ER 1 ~5,~. 
121 Sl'l' ~cnerally LOIIT" and Rawlings (~()()5) (n71) ch4. 
122 SCl' JR I\tal'l'Y and' others (~OOI), 'Banking Law and Regulation' (3rd ed. Aspen Law 8: Businc:-,:-" 
Gaithshurg MD, ~O() I) rid. 
12.~ (I Hanc 'Deposit Insurance Reform: Stalc of the Dehatc' (1999) 1 ~ FDIC Bunking Rel'ieH' (3) I. 
121 I\. Alexander 'Cl1rporate (Ill\ lTnance and Banks: The Role of Regulation in Reducing thc Principal-
:\!2cnt Problem' (~(}(}()) 7 Jllllrnal of Banking Regulation (II 2) 17. 
I'~ H)IC Ft'dl'ml Depmir Illsurallce C(!I]Jof'lltion: rhe First Fifty }'curs: a f1i,t(lry of the Ff)IC 1c)33-
Ic)S3 1-'1)1(', Washingll)ll DC. 1l)'8.4. 
126 J Norton and othcrs 'Il'gal :\Spl'Ch of Depositor Pwtcdion Schemc:-,: Comparati\c Pcr:-,pecti\c'. 
Illternatiollal Seminar 011 tl'gal alld Rc,t;lIlarory Aspects (~l lillullcial Stahility. Basel. S\\ir:.erlcllld. 
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The presence of moral hazard is generally engendered by the following factors: 
• A shareholder's loss and liability is limited to the amount of his investment in 
the event of a bank failure. 127 There is a strong incentive for management of 
insolvent or failing institutions to favour risky behaviour; where a loss occurs, 
it is passed on to the insurer and where profits accrue, the shareholders enjoy 
the benefit; 128 
• Deposit insurance premiums have been unrelated to, or have not generally 
reflected the risk posed by a particular bank (unlike other forms of insurance). 
Since insured financial institutions do not pay increased deposit insurance 
premiums when they adopt risky policies, the owners keep all the increased 
h f · d . k 129 returns t at may accrue rom Increase ns ; 
• If deposit insurance means that depositors no longer feel obliged to assess the 
risk involved in depositing funds with a particular bank, they are likely to base 
their decisions solely on the attractiveness of the interest rates on offer. The 
effect of this is that moral hazard will be increased as the normal impact of 
market forces in promoting prudent financial behaviour is reduced and 
d . 130 unsound banks may attract more eposIts.-
~ 1-~3 jaIlU(/'-\, lOUl. A Report Produced by the International Financial Law Unit. Centre for 
Commercial L'aw Studies. Queen Mary UnivC[sity of London, 2002. 
1~7 This is known as the principle of 'limited liability'. For a general discussion of this principle see R 
(;rantham and C Ril'i-;ett (eds.) COlporate Personality in the lOlh Celltury Hart Publishing, (hford, 
1998; PI. Da\ ies Cower and Dm'ies' Prillciples of Modnll CompallY Law (S\\l'l't & r-.1ax wL'l1. London. 
20(3) chs ~. 8 8: 9: J l.l)\\TY and A Dignam Company Law (~Jld cd .. Butlerworths. London. 2()O~). 
12S Ul'll"d/\'11 (1986) (1139). 
I~() D Di (':1~1l10 Regulatioll and BUllks' Behm'iour Towards Risk (Dartmouth Puhlishing. Sudhur) i\1:\. 
1990) L'h6. 
un ,\/c/c 'dol/old (1996) (1156). 
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It follows from the above that moral hazard in deposit insurance is, generall y 
speaking, triggered by the actions of three agents, which are: the insured banks, the 
insured depositors and the regulator (through its premium assessment policy and 
regulatory forbearance).131 
President Roosevelt expressed initial reservations on the adoption of explicit deposit 
insurance in the United States in 1933 because he considered it 'would put a premium 
on unsound banking in the future.' 132 Moral hazard is believed to be inherent In 
deposit insurance. However there is no consensus on the extent of its effects In 
practice. It has been argued that the relative absence of bank failures in the United 
States after the establishment of Federal Deposit Insurance fostered the illusion that 
deposit insurance is a low cost way of preventing banking crises. Confirming 
President Roosevelt's fears, this illusion was dispelled following the Savings and 
Loans crises in the 1980s, revealing how substantially deposit insurance had exposed 
taxpayers to loss from risk-taking at insured institutions. 133 Conversely, it has also 
been posited that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance can be linked to the 
reduction in bank risk taking in the EU. This argument is based on the view that in the 
absence of explicit deposit insurance, European banking systems have been 
characterised by implicit insurance because of the expectation of public intervention 
at times of distress. Hence, the introduction of an explicit system would limit the 
scope of the safety-net and consequently, the potential for moral hazard. 134 
131 This is kIHl\\n as 'regulatory moral ha/ard', SL'L' Ely (1999) (n67), 
13~ QuotL'd in P:\ I\lcCoy 'ThL' Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and Evidence' 
Semillar 011 ('//rrelll f)('\'elopmellfs ill ,\/ofletlllY and Financial Lau', (ktohn 23-27 2006 (1\11-'. 
Washington nc, 20(6), 
1.11 /Jl'IlIirg/l('-KIIIIf alld kllllt' (2002) (n~2), 
1.'-1 R Gropp and J Ycsala '))l'pt)~it In~urance and Moral Ha/ard: Does the CounlLTfactual \1alter'?' 
(2001) FeB H'orkiflg Papa, ,\'0,-17, 
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Moral hazard is intrinsic to the existence of deposit insurance although its scope and 
effect may be in debate. Hence it is important to ensure that the benefits of a deposit 
insurance scheme outweigh its potential costs by creating appropriate mechanisms to 
mitigate the effects of moral hazard. 
3.5.2 Limiting Moral Hazard 
There are several measures that are available in general insurance practice to tackle 
the risk of moral hazard but not all of them can be adapted to deposit insurance. 
Therefore, some mechanisms have been developed specifically to tackle the problem 
of moral hazard in deposit insurance. These include narrow banks, risk-based 
premiums, coinsurance, an improved corporate governance regime, market discipline 
by uninsured depositors and other creditors, and regulatory discipline by the 
supervisory authorities and deposit insurers. Some of these measures of checking the 
effects of moral hazard will be considered below. 
3.5.2.1. Narrow Banking 
The concept of narrow bankingl35 involves the creation of low-risk banks by 
separating insured deposits from risky lending and investment. 136 Narrow banks can 
generally be referred to as banks that specialize in deposit-taking/payment activities 
but are prohibited from lending activity.137 Such banks are only allowed to invest in 
safe and liquid assets. The purpose is to offer depositors an essentially risk-free 
11:; Alsu known as 100 perL'l:nt Resene Banking. 
136 There arl' <.Ii Ilerl'nt conceptual classi fications of narrow banking proposals. Sec for example RE 
Litan What Should Banks Do? (Bwokings Institution Press. Washington DC 1987) ch5; JL Pierce The 
Future o{ Banking (Yale L1ni,ersity Press. Nl'\\ Han'n. 1991): LL Bryan Core Banking (1991) I 
1\ Ie Kinsl:' ()lIarterl~. For a comparati,e analysis of the pwposals sec S Kohayakawa and H Nakamura 
II. ':\ Th~'orctil'al /\nalysis of Narrow Banking Propusals' (20()O) 1M ES Discussion Paper No. ()()-£-IY. 
1.17 r.:oiJorukml'll and Nakamura (2000) (n I.~(). 
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deposit account. It involves a high degree of restraint on banking activity and it has 
been described as taking 'the regulation of banking to its very limit.' 138 
N arrow banking has been proffered as a solution to the moral hazard problem. Moral 
hazard exists because banks have the latitude to invest depositors' funds and there are 
incentives for them to invest in risky assets. Hence the moral hazard problem would 
be solved if banks are required to invest only in safe assets. The proposal involves a 
separation of the transaction and intermediation functions of banking business. 139 It 
has been argued that this would eliminate concerns that 'depositors' funds either 
would be used to bailout risky non-bank activities or unfairly channelled to 
customers of non-bank affiliates.' 140 
Under a narrow banking system, while regulation attempts to ring-fence insured 
deposits and restrict their use, existing restrictions on bank activities and investments 
relating to uninsured deposits will be removed. To this extent, it has also been 
described as 'an interesting combination of heightened regulation, for narrow banks 
with insured deposits, and reduced regulation for other banks without insured 
d ·,141 eposlts. 
Ordinarily, the concept of narrow banking appears to eliminate the problem of moral 
hazard associated with deposit insurance. Banks would be prevented from using 
insured deposits to engage in high-risk activities and banking stability would be 
I3X Sec J H Boyd and AJ Rol nil' k .;\ Case for Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance' (1988) Federal 
RL'SLT\e Bank of Minneapolis ,\llllual Report hllp://\\ \\ \\ .l1lilllleapoli,.red.org/puh,,/ar/ar 19XX.cfm. 
'lL'cessL'd 20 March 2006. 
13') It has heL'n argued c1se\\here that hanks can only function efficiently when hoth functions arc 
L'tllllhined. SeL' 1\ Kashyap and others 'Banks as Liquidity Providers: :\n Explanation for the 
COL'\.istL'ncc of I.ending and Deposit-taking' (2()()2) 58 Journal of Finance ( I ) 3.~. 
I-tO /jrllll (19X7) (n136) p6. 
l-tl ,\Iaar (2(X))) (n122) dd. 
127 
sustained because deposits are fully backed by safe assets. Thus there is no reason for 
depositors to lose confidence or even fear a bank failure. 142 By restricting banks to 
only high quality debt of short duration, potential losses associated with credit and 
interest rate risks are virtually eliminated. 143 Credit or default risk will be reduced by 
eliminating all private sector lending with the exception of lending to other banks. 
Narrow banks would only be allowed to invest in low-risk financial assets, of short to 
medium-term maturity, which would match the maturity of their deposits. This means 
that the risk factor associated with bank deposits is removed thus the need for deposit 
insurance would also be obviated. 144 If runs on narrow banks occurred at all, the 
banks would be able to meet them by liquidating a portion of their assets without 
delay, significant cost or disruptive effects on capital markets. 145 
Narrow banking is based on the reasoning that bank failures occur because banks 
invest in assets that lose value over time. This proposition however neglects the 
problems of excessive risk-taking by bank managers and the failure of regulatory 
authorities to curb such risk-taking. In relation to deposit insurance, this problem is 
particularly caused by the existence of wrong incentive mechanisms for bank 
managers, regulators and depositors. Narrow banking is aimed at eliminating the 
consequences of the problem and not the causes of the problem. The solution does not 
address the issue of why banks take excessive risks by investing in assets that lose 
value and why regulators have failed to stop this trend. Because the narrow banking 
1·12 Bord and Ro/nick (1988) (n 138). 
I·B CiG Kaufman and RS Kroszl1er 'How Should Financial Institutions and Markets Be Structured? 
Analysis and Optiol1s for Financial System Design' (1996) !nfer-/\111crican Dn'e/opmenf Bank (fADB), 
Resl'i/reh DI'parf111enf H'orkillg Paper No.338. 
IH I)L'p(l~it insural1L'L' would he l1eL'lkd only for failures caused by fraud and other external factors. F(lr 
a L'Ol1trar\ \ in\, SL'e JB Burnham 'Deposit I nsuranL"e: The Case for thL' Narrow Bank' (1991) 14 
Rl'gll/llfi(;11 (fhe C\ TO Rl'r;I'\\' (~rBIIS;lles, & GO\"('rIlmenr) (2) 35. 
II' I/illle (1999) (n 123). 
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concept fails to recognise the role of incentive mechanisms in the behavioural pattern 
of bank managers, regulators and depositors, it is likely to throw up more problems 
than solutions. 146 
The narrow banking concept has the tendency to create a two-tiered regulatory 
system. While narrow banks would attract a lot of savings because of the security they 
provide, more depositors could also be attracted to the unregulated banks because of 
the higher interest rates that would be on offer. These unregulated institutions face the 
risks and consequences of instability and failure that banks and depositors face in the 
absence of deposit insurance. If enough public wealth is concentrated in these 
unregulated banks, a failure could expose the economy to the danger of disruptive 
banking panics and financial instability.147 Furthermore, if these banks were to be 
insured, they would be affected by the risk of moral hazard, from which the narrow 
banks would be immune. 
Narrow banks, by definition, cannot meet all of the demands of traditional banking 
services. Implementation of the narrow banking proposal would therefore have 
adverse consequences on the financial intermediation role of banks. The concept has 
the potential of reducing the supply of credit to borrowers. Most economies rely on 
micro finance because the majority of borrowers lack direct, cost-effective access to 
the capital market. Where narrow banks attract more deposits as a result of the 
security they offer, small and medium scale borrowers would be denied access to 
credit because deposits placed in narrow banks would be channelled solely into liquid 
l-ttl B I :I\' (190 I), 'The Narww Bank: A Flawed Response to the Failings of Federal Deposit Insurance' 
(1091) i.-f Rcgll/orion (The ('A TO Rn'inl' o/Blisinl'\s and GO\'('IWnellt) (2) .-f-k LJ White 'Litan's What 
Should Banks Do'!: t\ Re\ll'\\ Fssa~ , (19XX) 19 The Rand Journal of Economics (2) 305, 
147 ,\lacty (2001) (11122), 
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government and high-quality corporate obligations. 148 In the absence of narrow banks, 
there would be an unrestricted and cheaper access to credit while deposit insurance 
would serve to mitigate the effects of harmful bank runs that may occur as a result of 
deposit-funded lending. 
Narrow banking has the potential of leaving the regulatory system susceptible to a 
high level of political pressure and manipulation since regulators or legislators 
determine what constitutes a 'safe' asset for narrow banking purposes. Deposit-
funded lending is generally more profitable and as such, owners of narrow banks 
might exert political pressure in order to obtain relief from asset restrictions. 1.+9 Policy 
makers may be tempted to define these assets for political and social, as well as 
prudential reasons. Narrow banking could thus become an instrument for government 
d· 11 . ) so cre It a ocatIon. -
It appears from this that the costs of introducing a narrow banking policy far outweigh 
the benefits that would be derived from it. Narrow banking would not effectively 
solve the problem of moral hazard or improve the safety of the banking system but 
would only shift the risk to another part of the financial system. ISI 
3.5.2.2. Coinsurance 
Coinsurance involves the sharing of risk between the insurer and the insured, with 
only a proportion of deposits covered per depositor as opposed to one hundred percent 
liS Halle (Il)l)l)) (11 1 ~3). 
I~I) II . I )/( . 
I:'iO K m~f",a II (/ lid K 1'0'::11 l'/' ( 1l)l)6) (n 1.+ -' ). 
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152 Th' d . . 
coverage. e Insure IS requIred to bear an agreed part of the risk insured against, 
as deposits are only insured in proportion up to different amounts. Unlike the narrow 
banking concept, the principle of coinsurance is aimed at creating the right incentive 
for depositors. The aim is to enforce market discipline through depositors, by creating 
the incentive to assess and monitor the risk position of their banks and place their 
funds accordingly. 
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in its report notes that the use of coinsurance, 
whereby a pre-specified proportion of deposits is insured, helps to foster market 
discipline. The report however notes that 'even under a coinsurance system, 
individuals who have small account balances may not exercise market discipline 
because of a lack of financial incentives or sophistication, or because the costs of 
d . d h b f' ,1 ")3 OIng so excee t e ene ItS. --
Where coinsurance is adopted in its traditional form, the potential for bank runs might 
be exacerbated as some part of every deposit would be uninsured. 154 Depositors 
would therefore be concerned about the uninsured portion of their deposits. ISS The 
small and unsophisticated depositor would also be left unprotected thus defeating one 
of the traditional justifications for deposit insurance. This can however be addressed 
by insuring deposits in full up to a certain limit and then introducing coinsurance after 
this limit. 
1)\ Bowl and Rolnick (1988) (n 138). 
1)2 As' at ~()03. 21 countries with l'xplicit deposit insurance schemes had coinsurance features. In most 
of tllL'Sl' countril's. the coinsurance requirement ranges between 107< and ~YX . See A Demirguc-Kunt 
and othL'l's 'Deposit Insurancl' Around the World: A Comprehensivl' Database' (2005) World Bunk 
Polin Rcs('uu'h \\'orA.ing Paper No. 3628, 8. http://www-
\\ds. ~\()rldhanl-...llr~/Sl'r\ ktIWDSContentSL'I'\'L'r/WDSPIlB/200S106/08/0000 12009 _200S0608111717 IR 
l'ndL'l'ed/PDF/wps36280rn.pdf, accessed 2.+ I\larch 2006. 
\53 I:SF (2()()!) (n23). 2'+. 
\'i-t The coinsural1L'l' c1l'I11l'ntllf thl' ll.K. Compensalion SL'heme \\as partly responsible fur the reel'nl 
rlln on Northern RoeI-... 
131 
In determining an appropriate level of coverage, it would be helpful to ascertain the 
average size of a nation's individual deposit account and to relate the maximum level 
of coverage to this amount. I56 These limits will vary according to country-specific 
circumstances. Economic data such as per capita national income and average annual 
disposable income can be used to calculate this amount. I57 Accordingly, the highest 
levels of insurance coverage are found in the most developed countries while the 
developing countries have the lowest levels of coverage. 158 Coverage limits involve a 
trade off between achieving banking stability through depositor protection, and 
retaining the incentives for depositors to monitor banks' risks. 
Considering the problem of information asymmetry, it is doubtful whether or not it is 
realistic to expect small and uninformed depositors to carry out any form of risk 
monitoring on their financial institutions even with the imposition of coinsurance. It is 
more difficult and expensive for potential depositors to assess the financial condition 
of banks than it is for purchasers of other goods to verify quality before purchasing 
the products. Information on the risk portfolio of financial institutions is scarcel y 
available and even where it is available, the average small depositor does not possess 
the necessary sophistication to interpret such information and make informed 
decisions thereon. A potential danger in requiring small and uninformed depositors to 
monitor their institutions is that these depositors can take actions based on faulty 
conclusions and this in itself can trigger a run. According to Campbell and 
Cartwright 'possible indicators of risk, such as the level of interest paid might be 
I ~'i KC, ~ bntripragada 'Ocpllsitnrs as a Source of ~ larkct Oiscipline' ( 1992) 9 Yale Journal Oil 
Rl>gll/lllioll 5 .. U. ))). 
1)(> ,\!l1ci)ollo/d ( 1996) (n56) 17. 
157 //Jid. 
I:'iS f)emirguc-!\/l1I1 (.2005) (n I ).2). 
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misleading. For example, building societies in the UK have traditionally paid higher 
rates on interest on savings than banks, but have seldom been regarded as high risk. It 
is the bank regulator who will be in the best position to judge the levels of risk.' 159 
Where limits are fully covered up to a sufficient amount that would ensure that small 
depositors enjoy one hundred percent coverage and coinsurance introduced for larger 
deposits, market discipline will be fostered by the larger depositors who are presumed 
to have better access to, and better use of the relevant information to exercise market 
discipline than small depositors. 160 
3.5.2.3. Risk Based Premiums 
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in its report states that 'policy makers have a 
choice between adopting a flat-rate premium system or a premium system that is 
differentiated on the basis of individual-bank risk profiles. The primary advantage of 
a flat-rate premium system is the relative ease with which assessments can be 
calculated and administered. However, in a flat-rate system, low-risk banks 
effectively pay for part of the deposit insurance benefit received by high-risk 
banks. '}61 
The logic behind a risk-based system of assessing deposit insurance premIUms IS 
simple: to remove the incentive for banks to take excessive risk, knowing that a high-
risk posture would attract a higher premium. This makes risky business more 
159 Call/pbell and Cartwright 00(3) (n~ I). 
160 L I,;\nl'n 'Pricin~ of Dep()sit Insurance' (~()O~) World Bank Polin' Research Working Paper .\'0, 
:!S7/, 26 I1l1p://\\\\\\-
\\ d", wllrldhanJ...,( )q;/sl'n kl/\\' I)S( 'onll'nl Sl'r\ l'r/\\' DS P/I HI -'002/oX/2 ,VOOOOl)-+l)-+6 0.20X 100-+0 I O-N6IR 
~'~dL"l'll/l~PFlI1l11ltiOpa~l"pdr, aCl'cssl'd 2-+ ~Ltrdl ~O()6, 
II" I'-S ~,' {~OO I ) (n ~ 3 ). .2 X. 
expenSIve for banks and this additional cost would serve as a source of market 
discipline that would reduce incentives for excessive risk taking. 
A risk-adjusted system of assessing deposit insurance premium is desirable from an 
equitable point of view, as it reduces the cross-subsidy between banks. 162 In a 
competitive market without deposit insurance, depositors would choose among 
competing institutions on the basis of their soundness. Riskier institutions would only 
be able to attract deposits by paying higher interest rates and this increased cost of 
funds to risky institutions would act as an incentive towards reducing excessive risk 
taking. 163 
In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDCIA) 1991 introduced the concept of charging premiums based on risk factors. 
The discussion on moral hazard has focused less on how it relates to or can be solved 
by consumers but more on how it relates to banks and their officers. The aim is to 
provide an incentive for banks to avoid the adoption of high-risk policies. As the 
discussion in the U.S. did not focus on the introduction of coinsurance but on risk-
based premiums, instead of charging the depositor with the responsibility to monitor 
the risk levels of the banks, it is the FDIC that would calculate the risk factors and 
h ' d' I 164 C arge premIUms accor mg y. 
The argument for risk based deposit insurance premiums is cogent and consistent with 
sound insurancc practice. If banks are made to bear the cost of exccssive risk-taking, 
they will appropriately balancc the trade-off between risk and return. Ho\\'c\l?r. it 
161 R Craine 'Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance and Bank Charter Policy' ( 1995) 50 Jotlrnal of Fillullce 
(5) 1735, 
appears that risk-based deposit insurance is not enough to tackle moral hazard, and it 
might be more difficult to implement in practice than it is to postulate in theory. 
For deposit insurance pricing purposes, it is practically difficult accurately to ascertain 
risk. Deposit insurance premium can fully reflect risk only under full information 
conditions.
165 
The nature of a bank's portfolio is difficult to determine because the 
nature of banking is characterised by private information 166 or information 
asymmetry. The opaque nature of bank contracts explains the extensive debate on 
how best to make the Basel capital requirements reflect risk more accurately. 167 
Furthermore, banks are usually classified as 'high-risk' based on their interest rate 
policies but interest rate related risk is distinct from credit risk. The former is clearly 
more measurable than the latter, but even in this case, 'it is easier to determine that 
one institution faces greater risk than another than it is to determine how great that 
risk is.' 168 Risk based premiums can effectively deal with perverse incentives where 
the deposit insurer has the information and capacity to observe the investment strategy 
of banks and calculate premiums to reflect this. 
It is important to distinguish the risks of bank failure from conventional insurance 
risk. 169 In general insurance, there are various indices available to the insurer to 
163 PM Horvitt 'The Case Against Risk-Related Deposit Insurance Premiums' in E Gardener (ed.) UK 
Banking Supervision: Evolution. Pracrice and Isslles (Allen & Unwin, London, 1986). 
lId Campbell and Caml'right (2003) (n21). 
165 ES Prescott 'Can Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums Control Moral Ha/ard'!' (2()()2) 88 
Federal Resl'l'l'c Bank (~f Richmond Economic Quarterly (2) 87; CE Blair and GS Fissel 'A Frame\\(lJ"1-.. 
for Analy/ing Deposit Insurance Pricing' (1991) -l FDIC Banking Re\'ieH' (2) 25.. . 
1(>(> This refers to a situation where the relevant information upon which a transactIon or contract Is 
hasL'd is known to only one of the parties. 
167 SL'L' <- 'hapter 2. 
168 lIorl'ir:: ( 1983) (n I (3) 280. 
I Ill) In cOIlH'ntional insurance. the risk of the insured eyent (lccurring and the risk of 1o"" t(l the 
insurallcL' c()mpall~ are imariahly the sallie: \\!JL'n the eyent lKClIrS, in the absence of ;111) vitiating 
clement. the insurer must pay the contraL'lual sum. 
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calculate premIums based on risk. However, deposit insurers have considerable 
control over the extent of their losses when an insured event is imminent. Strictly 
speaking, the losses of the deposit insurance system are not solely determined by the 
risk-posture of insured institutions because losses are more a function of the timina of 
b 
closure of a failed bank. 170 
In addition to the introduction of risk-based premIums, deposit insurers should 
improve on their ability to detect early signs of a failing bank and to act promptly and 
effectively. 171 The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) 
recommends that a system of prompt corrective action (PCA) should be put in place 
as part of the supervisory process in EU member states. PCA involves an approach in 
which certain values of indicating the financial viability of a bank trigger pre-
determined supervisory action. The committee notes that PCA would help to reduce 
the probability of a sudden banking crisis. 172 
Even where the indices are available for the calculation of risk, the main problem that 
would be encountered, in practice, with risk related premiums, is the difficulty of 
measuring risk ex-ante. The complexity involved in calculating banking related risk 
ex-ante makes it difficult for deposit insurance premiums to be related objectively to 
risk. 173 As a result of financial innovation, new sources of risk continue to emerge 
over time thus leaving a time lag before they can be incorporated into the calculation 
170 Hon'ir-;. (1983) (n 163): Baer (1990) (n91). 
171 (; Bierwag and GG Kaufman ,\ Proposal for Federal Deposir II/sural/cc Wirh Risk Sel/sili\'e 
Premium (Federal Reser\'l' Bank of Chicago. 19~3). 
17~ European Shado\\ hnancial Regulatory Committee 'Reforming Ba~king Supe~\'ision i~ ~:uro~e' 
Statemel/t No.23. 21 No\'('mber. 2005. SL'L' also Asia Pacific Econolllic CooperatIOn. ,\pre Policy 
f)i({lo~ue 01/ f)eposit II/sural/a: Kcy Policy COl/cll/siol/s Paper, JIII/e 25. 2004. 
173 C:\L (ioodhart 'Bank Insl1\\enc) and Deposit Insurance: A Proposal' in P A['eslis (cd.) .\/oney and 
Banking: Isslll".lill· rhl' {lImt." First eenrlllY (I\tacmillan. Basingstoke. 199J) 77. 
lJ6 
of insurance premium. 174 The implication of this is that the premium will be adjusted 
at a time when the bank is already experiencing liquidity problems. It has been noted 
that because 'a risk-based system would force banks to pay higher premiums only 
when they encountered difficulty and consequently became more risky, such a system 
probably would exacerbate the risk of bank failure' .175 
Risk-based deposit insurance systems are also susceptible to subjective judgement and 
political manipulation. Most national laws give the deposit insurer the ultimate 
discretion to set and adjust insurance premiums as deemed necessary. McCoy notes 
that 'at best, this discretion can result in inconsistency; at worst, it can result in 
retaliation; or, conversely, persistent undercharges.' 176 Banks also place constant 
political pressure on deposit insurers to keep the amount of deposit insurance 
premiums 10W. I77 
Risk-related insurance premiums are desirable for the reasons stated earlier and a step 
in the right direction towards creating an incentive-compatible deposit insurance 
system. However, the problem of determination and calculation of the degree of risk 
ex-ante means that its efficacy as a solution or remedy to moral hazard is limited. 
Moral hazard incentives could be further engendered where mispriced deposit 
insurance under a risk-based system leads to subsidies for bank owners and managers, 
as they become the main beneficiaries of deposit insurance. Furthermore, an upward 
adjustment of premium by the deposit insurer to correspond with risk, may amount to 
a tacit approval of high-risk strategies of certain banks by the regulators. 
171 Campbell alld Cartwright (.2()()3) (112 ~ ); ,\/~l1ltripr~lgada (1992) (15~)5-lX.. . . 
m I.S (ioodmal1 and S Sharkr '\:cOl1nIllICS of Oeposll InstJrJl1cc: A CritIcal L\aluallOll of Pn )P\ )'L'L1 
Reforms' (19X-l) .2 Yale JOllrnal 011 R()glliariull (I) 1-l). 
137 
It is pertinent to note that the determination of insurance premiums based on risk is an 
information-intensive exercise, which can only be successful in a strictly monitored 
and supervised banking sector. I78 In developed nations with sophisticated and 
advanced regulatory and supervisory mechanisms, it is possible to develop a workable 
model for risk-related insurance where the benefits would outweigh any 
disadvantages. 179 The problem of calculating risk ex ante can also be solved by 
increasing the frequency at which premiums are paid to allow prompt adjustment of a 
bank's insurance premium as soon as its risk position changes. 
An example of an attempt to develop a workable model for determining risk in order 
to assess insurance premium is the requirement under the FDCIA for the FDIC to 
implement risk-adjusted premium. I80 Section 302 (a) of the Act stipulates that risk-
based premiums can be assessed based on: 
( I) The probability that the deposit insurance fund will incur a loss with respect to the 
institution, taking into consideration the risks attributable to: 
(I) different categories and considerations of assets; 
(II) different categories and considerations of liabilities, both insured and 
uninsured, contingent and non-contingent; and 
(III) any other factor the FDIC determines are relevant to assessmg such 
liability 
(2) The likely amount of any such loss; and 
176,\/('Co\' 00(6) (n U.2) 18. 
177 Ihid. 
178 B/airlllld Fissel (1991) (nI65). 
171) The FSI: Reportnotl's that differential or risk-adjusted premiulll assessment systems may he 
dillil'ult to dl'sign and implelllL'nt in Ill'\\ systems and in emerging or transitional economies. 
1 xu Sl'L' Chapter). 
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(3) The revenue needs of the deposit fund. 181 
Despite the innovation of these obviously sophisticated indices, FDIC insurance IS 
still viewed as under-priced and thus still poses the threat of moral hazard. 182 
For newly developed systems, it is important to apply 'simplicity and gradualism' in 
applying a risk-adjusted method of assessing deposit insurance premiums. This is 
because new systems have to develop capacity for risk-monitoring and measurement 
of banks' investment strategies. Newly established systems should adopt a flat-rate 
system that can be changed gradually through time as need, experience, and capacity 
dictates. 183 
3.5.2.4. Effective Regulation and Supervision: Early Detection 
and Prompt Corrective Action 
Moral hazard risk can be counteracted by a closer and more effective regulatory 
regime. This involves an effective system of prudential regulation which incorporates 
improved off-site and on-site surveillance and examinations,184 sound corporate 
governance and effective internal control mechanisms. This should be accompanied 
18112USC§ 1817(h)(I)(c). 
IS~ M Flannery 'Pricing Deposit Insurance When the Insurer Measures Bank Risk With Error' (Sept 
1991) 15 Journal (~f Banking & Finance (.+-5) 975; GS Fissel 'Risk Measurement. Actuarially-Fair 
Deposit Insurance Premiums and the FDIC's Risk-Related Premium System' (1994) 7 FDIC Banking 
Rev;l'Il' 0) 16. 
IS.~ AC Dil 'Differentiating Premiums in Deposit Insurance Schemes' (Feh 200.+) SEDESA H'oding 
Paper No.2. 
180t The L'llecti\eness of hank examinations in regulatory discipline is considered in AN Berger and Si\l 
Davies 'The Information Content of Bank Examination' (1998) 1.+ Journal ~f Financial Sell'iCl' \ 
Rl'\l'llldl (.:n 117. Sl'e also TJ Curry and others 'Financially Dis!rl'ssed Banks: How 1~lkctin: ,\rc 
Enfllrl'ellll'nt :\({ions in the Super\ is(lry PWlTSS'?' (1999) 12 FDIC Bal/king Redell' (2) I. 
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by legal provIsIons for early intervention and prompt corrective action (PCA) to 
prevent harmful regulatory forbearance. 185 
PCA mechanisms formalise specific ratio tripwires for mandatory supervisory action. 
PCA has been adopted in the United States where increasingly stringent regulatory 
restrictions apply to banks as their solvency deteriorates. Supervisors are mandated to 
take actions which include increased monitoring, increased capital requirement 
restructuring and closure of the distressed bank. 
It has been noted that the most effective counterforce to moral hazard is a strong 
capital position: 'because losses will be absorbed first by bank capital, the likelihood 
(other things being equal) that they will be shifted to the FDIC diminishes as the 
capital of the bank increases.' 186 The approach is also to ensure that moral hazard is 
neutralized by increasing the risk position of those who are best placed to influence 
banks' behaviour. Moral hazard incentives have been found to be particularly strong 
for under capitalized banks. 187 Increased capital requirements would encourage 
shareholders to have greater interest in the prudential management of banks because 
there is more equity at risk. 
The application of a strict capital adequacy regime can achieve a result similar to that 
intended by risk-adjusted premiums if relatively high-risk banks are required to place 
their capital at risk.188 A combination of risk-adjusted premiums and risk-adjusted 
capital standards is more effective at combating moral hazard than anyone form of 
185 For analysis of the relationship hetween forhearance and PC". sec K Narayana and I Shim 
'Forhearance and Prompt Corrcclin' t\ction' (2007) 3Y journal oj'.\/olley. Credit alld BUllkillR (5) 
1107. 
186 I/olle (I (99) (n I ~3); Di CllRllio ( I YYO) (n 129) ch6. 
IS7 :\ lI11\aJ...imian and others 'How Country and Safety Net Characteristics Affect Bank RisJ...-Shifting· 
(200~) NBFN \\'orkillg PO/J('I" No, 93':2. ~. 
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risk adjustment. I89 This is not to say that the implementation of risk-adjusted capital 
standards, like risk-adjusted premiums, would not encounter practical problems. It is 
possible for depositors to use public information on capital ratio and insurance 
premium to judge the financial position of banks. This information can trigger a run 
on weak but solvent institutions, leading to failure. The deposit insurer eventually 
shoulders the resultant costs of such failure. 190 
A strengthened supervIsory regIme should include early warnmg mechanisms in 
addition to efficient reporting and accounting requirements. In particular, legal 
requirements for independent audits and public disclosure of financial statements have 
been shown to be effective in curbing moral hazard. 191 The use of general market data 
to predict the future soundness of banks should be employed to detect banks with 
potential liquidity problems. Increased capital requirements would also lengthen the 
period between the time a bank starts to experience liquidity problems and when it 
finally becomes insolvent. The use of early warning and intervention mechanisms 
would enable the deposit insurer to detect problems early and have adequate time to 
apply the necessary rescue or resolution procedure, thus minimizing the costs and 
effects of failure. 192 
It is important that the deposit insurer is empowered by the relevant law to apply legal 
sanctions against certain activities of bank management such as conflict of interest, 
insider dealing, negligence, fraud and failure to comply with regulatory requirements. 
188 Di~ (:~oo--+) (n 18)). 
I~N KP Fischer and EM Fournier 'Docs Corporate Governance Matter in Deposit Insurance? DI and 
Moral Hazard in Joint Stock and Mutual Financial Intermediaries' (2()02) CIRPEE. Cahier.\' de 
rechl'rchd H'orking Paper O:!-06. 
Il){) l\ID Flood 'Deposit Insurancc: Prohlems and Solutions' (Jan/Feh 1(93) 75 Federal Resenc Balik of 
Sr. LOllis, 28. 
191 JR Barth and others 'The Regulation and Supcnision of Banks Around the World: ,\ Ncw 
Datahasc' 2001 H'orld B(/Ilk I'otic." Rc.\('urch H'orking Paper No.:!588. 22-2).29. TahIc 7h. 
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This is particularly crucial where such action has led to failure of an institution and 
I t th d " 193 Th l' f . . oSS 0 e epoSlt Insurer. e exc uSIon 0 deposits belongmg to senior 
executives, directors and major shareholders (and of their close relatives and 
associates) from the benefits of deposit insurance is also a means of discouraging 
imprudent behaviour. 194 
Although depositors are in a relatively weak position in terms of bank monitoring, 
they still remain an important source of market discipline. It has been observed that 
'the predominance of insured deposits typically observed in banks' funding structure 
implies that even relatively minimal responsiveness by these deposits to a bank's 
condition could have substantial implications for the bank's cost and supply of 
funding.,] 95 As noted earlier, it is important that depositors' actions to move their 
funds between different financial institutions are well informed and not based on false 
information or perception. 
Large depositors, shareholders, and other unsecured creditors of banks also have an 
important role to play in limiting the effects of moral hazard. Deposit insurance 
features such as coinsurance and coverage limits create incentives for uninsured large 
depositors to demand risk premiums. In the United States, evidence shows that 
uninsured depositors demand higher returns on their accounts to reflect risk. They 
. b f 196 Th . also tend to move their deposits to banks that they perceIve to e sa er. ere IS a 
risk that a mass withdrawal of funds by uninsured depositors could trigger a bank run. 
Il)~ (;(Iodmall llnd SI/(~ffer ( ll)~-+) (n 175). 
193 This is similar to the right of suhrogation in general insurance contracts. 
1<)1 M{/(DOIwld (1996) (n56): FSF (.~OOI) (n4_~) 8-9; sel' also Chapter 4. 
195 A DaH'npnrt and K McDill 'The Depositor Behind the Discipline: ,\ \licro-Lncl Casl' Stud: of 
Ilamilton Bank', (~()().5) FDIC eel/fa/l)r Financial Rescilrch. Working Paper No. 2005- 07. 
Il)1l Mc'Cor (~O()6) (I11~L 
Although this has only occurred in one instance in recent U.S. banking history.197 the 
risk remains potent and as such, reliance on uninsured depositors as a source of 
market discipline should be placed within reasonable limits.198 
3.6 The Agency Problem 
The agency problem is closely related to the issue of moral hazard in deposit 
insurance. The term has been defined to refer to 'situations in which an agent binds 
the principal but acts in a manner not in the best interests of the principal. either 
because the two parties' compensations are not aligned or because the principal lacks 
the information or power needed to effectively monitor and control the actions of the 
agent. '\99 Thus, moral hazard has been explained, in the context of the principal-
agent issue, as a form of post-contractual opportunism where the agent sets out to 
pursue self-serving goals at the expense of the principal. 200 
Principal-agent problems are attributable to two sources: imperfect information and 
misaligned incentives between the principal and the agent. 201 Imperfect information 
occurs because the principal cannot effectively monitor the agent's actions. This is 
due to the problem of information asymmetry. Regulators (agent) are assigned the 
task of bank supervision because they have knowledge of, and can interpret the 
information that is required to monitor the activities of financial institutions. In 
197 Large depositors withdrew about $10 Billion in deposits, which eventually contributed to the failure 
of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company in 1984. 
198 Evcn though Continental Illinois is the only recent U.S. example of a run triggered by large 
uninsured depositors. it remains the largest institution ever to have been rescued by the FDIC and its 
collapse has created far reaching implications for the US banking system and regulation, See generally 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center The Collapse of Continental Illinois National Bank alld Tn,,! 
Company: The Implications for Risk Management alld Regulatioll The Wharton School. Uni\ersity of 
Pl'IlIlSY I vania, A \ailahlc at htl p:llfic. wharlt 1ll,lIPl' n n ,l'du/tidcase(!c 2()~llldies/cont i 11I:ntal ( ; 2ot'ull. pd r 
Al'Cl'o.;Sl'd 18 Nt l\ember 2007. 
Il)l} /Ialle ( 1l)l)9) (n 12::\). 
~()() ! \ I ('\{Illder (200()) (n 124), 
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performing this function, their alms are not necessarily aligned with that of the 
taxpayer or depositor (principal).202 
Deposit Insurance is viewed as constituting a multiparty principal-agent contracting 
problem.
203 
Unlike general insurance contracts, deposit insurance involves various 
contracting parties that include banks, depositors, supervisors and taxpayers. 20.+ It has 
been posited above that the risk of moral hazard and any resultant loss can be 
mitigated if deposit insurers and other supervisors adopt an early detection and 
resolution mechanism. It has however been noted that even where problems are 
detected early, it is possible for regulators, as agents of the tax-payer, to ignore early 
warning signs and delay taking appropriate action either to cover up their own 
inadequacy or in the hope for an improvements in the economy?)) 
The delay by regulatory authorities may result in a situation where the institution's 
losses surpass the value of its shareholder-contributed net worth. thus placing the cost 
of the supply of risk capital on the tax-payer. 206 This situation may be partly caused 
by the fact that operating losses still accrue during the period of the delay. Thus 
deposit insurance creates a contract where the agent (regulator) pursues policies not in 
the interest of the principal (tax-payer).207 
~()I Ibid. However, in a strict legal agency relationship, an agent is under.<I ?uty to keep hi:-- principal 
informed ahout matters that arc of his principal's concern and not to let hIS Intercsts conflIct with that 
of his principal. '" 
~()~ For a legal definition of the contract of agency and the relationshIp that eXIsts het\\L'cn the partlc:--. 
scc FMB Reynolds BOll"stl'{/{/ ond Reyno/ds 011 Agency (16th cd .. Swcet & i\1a\wcll. London. 1~96). 
~(}.1 E.I Kane' 'Three Paradigms for the Role of Capitalization Requirements in Insured hnanl'lal 
Institutions' (1995) 19 JOllrna/ of Banking and Finallce (3-.+) .+31. 
2o.t Dl'Il1irgllc-Klillt alld Kalil' 00(2) (n'+2). . . 
205 "."olle ( 1995) (n93): Sl'e also A \\':\ Bont and .\ V Thakor 'Self-intere:--tcd Bank RegulatIOn (1993) 
~n ,\lIIcricllll n'(lnolllic Rl'l'iell" (2) 206. 
~(}6 DClllirgllc A.'lIl1t (/Ild A.·alle (2()02) (11.+2). .. , . 
207 The 'principal' in a depnsit illsurancl' sdlemc vancs accordl/lg to country model:--. 1 hI'> I'> 
dctcrmincd by thc mcthod of funding. 
The agency problem can also be explained in terms of the owner/management 
dichotomy that exists in financial institutions. Owner/managerial risk aversions may 
also trigger the excessive risk-taking factor associated with deposit insurance. While 
managers (as agents of the shareholders) of troubled financial institutions may want to 
preserve the benefits of control, their career paths and reputation by adopting low-risk 
policies, the shareholders (principal) may prefer high-risk policies as they will have 
nothing to lose. Conversely, where the institution is solvent, managers may favour a 
more risky position than shareholders, where their pay is tied to growth rather than 
profit.
208 
Managers also possess information that is not available to either the 
shareholder or the depositing public. 
Efforts to solve the agency problem should be geared towards designing a contract 
that aligns the motivation of the agent with that of the principal, thus ensuring that the 
agent pursues the principal's goals. 209 This can only be achieved within an improved 
regulatory framework and supervisory environment. A strict corporate governance 
regime, which places a high level of corporate social responsibility on bank managers, 
should strive to align the interests of shareholders, depositors and creditors.210 
Excessive risk-taking strategies can be curbed by the promulgation of laws creating 
civil and criminal liability for managerial actions. The law should give regulators the 
discretion to apply administrative penalties and civil sanctions for breach of 
regulatory provisions. It is however important that this discretion IS kept within 
reasonable bounds so that it does not result in arbitrariness and possible violation of 
208 RS Demsetz and others 'Agency Problem and Risk Taking at Banks' (1997) Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. Staff Reports No. 29. . . 
269 S Ross 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem' (1973) 53 Amencan ECOllOmic 
Review (2) 134. . . 
210 Demsetz et al have shown that the owner-shareholder agency problem IS only present In a "mall 
number of banks: those with no insider holdings. Thus an alignment of objectives can be achieved in 
these banks if the shareholdi ng structure is varied. See Demser: ( 1997) (n208). 
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human rights provIsIons such as the rights to fair hearing, appeal and renew of 
administrative actions.211 
Bank shareholders are generally considered to be a source of moral hazard mainly 
because of the limited liability rule. In curtailing moral hazard, double liability laws 
for bank owners that make shareholders liable for a portion of depositor losses in the 
event of a bank failure would serve to increase the incenti yes for shareholder 
monitoring of bank management. 212 It has been observed that 'double liability 
transforms shareholders from investors seeking to advantage themselvcs at the 
expense of other investors by increasing the riskiness of the banks in which they have 
invested into investors who benefit themselves by decreasing the riskiness of thesc 
firms.,213 Evidence from the U.S. suggests that risk-taking was reduced in banks 
chartered in states with double liability laws prior to the Great Depression. 21~ Thus 
while deposit insurance serves to prevent bank runs and to preserve public confidence 
in the banking system, a regime of double liability can serve to mitigate the incentives 
for excessive risk-taking created by deposit insurance. 
To reduce the effects of the principal/agent problem and losses that may be associated 
with it, some countries have introduced risk-based capital standards, which are to be 
readjusted whenever they are rendered ineffective by regulatory standards. In the US. 
the capital based PCA rules adopted in the FDCIA are aimed at reducing the effects of 
~II See ,\/ex(/I/der (2()()6) (n 12'+). . , 
~12 Unlimited pro rata shareholder liahililY has also hecn proposcd ,<IS a Illci.m,s 01 rc~ucmg the 
, t' I'· 'v ""'SI'\'l' ",',,1. t'lkl'll(l Sec H Hansman and R Kradkman '10\\ ard Unlllllltcd Sharcholdn Illl'cn I\CS III l"l"," "I\., C" • , 
Liahilit\ for Corporate Torts' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal IS79, For a contrary \iew. "l'l' le 
:\k\an~kr. .I,C. 'llnlimited Shareholdcr Liahility Through a Proccdural Ll'I1'" (1992) I06l1w,\,urd I.aw 
Rel';l'Il' (2) JX7. , , , , 
2U IR ~1al'e\ and (;t> ~Iiller 'Douhk I iahility of Bank Shareholder,,: Hlstl)l) and ImplIcation" (1 t)q2) 
27 '\\'i1klJ F(}~'lJSI LllIl' Re\';ClI 31. 33, 
.'1-1 RS (~lllss1l1;ln 'Oouhk Liahilit) and Bank Risk Taking' (2()() I)n Journal (,( ,\lUI/C\', ('redil lIl/d 
Blinking (2) Part I. 1'+3. 
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both moral hazard and the principal/agent problem. The Act imposes a duty on 
regulators to act promptly to resolve problem banks by closing institutions \\'hose 
capital position fall below a specified minimum and increasingly tight regulatory 
restrictions on banks as their capital standards decrease. The Act also places 
restrictions on Federal Reserve advances to undercapitalized banks and mandates a 
least cost resolution of failed banks and thrifts except where there is a threat of 
. . k 215 Th D . 
systemIc ns . e eposItor Preference Act of 1993 also gives additional 
protection to depositors and tax-payers by giving priority to the claims of the FDIC 
over that of non-deposit creditors in bank liquidations. 
This emphasizes the importance of the legal and superVIsory environment In the 
successful design and implementation of a deposit insurance scheme. Although most 
countries that have adopted deposit insurance have laws that impose duties on 
company directors and agents in general, as well as legal procedure for reviewing the 
actions of administrative bodies, it is important to have banking sector specific laws to 
')16 I" h f~ . tackle the moral hazard and agency problems. - t IS pertment to note t at e lect1 ve 
regulation and optimal deposit insurance entails more than the promulgation of 
banking laws. These mechanisms must be instituted within an environment which is 
conducive for enforcement, with integrity, freedom from political interference, 
government accountability to the public and strong rule of law. 
215 fllll/(' (I t)t)t)) (n 123), " , 
21h This is hl'callSl' of thl' failure of the Ctllll1110n law in al'hil'\'ing dfcctin' regulation (dISl'lI-'Sl~d III t~le 
prl'l'l'ding chapter). It is also douhtful whether the .pr,i~cipal~agl'nt rclationsh~p tha,t l'\I-.h In a financial 
rl'!.!lIlatprv perspeL'li \ l' \\ i II fall under the legal dctImtlon of an agenl'Y relatIOnship, ,n a-. to attr;lcl the 
in~positil;n of fiduciary duties, See Lurd l!pj\)hn in Philips \' Boardmall 11967J 2 ,\( ..J6, 127, 
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3.7 Provisional Conclusion 
Deposit insurance is a doubled-edged device. While it can contribute to financial 
stability it can also create adverse effects. Although explicit deposit insurance is being 
adopted by an increasing number of countries, most jurisdictions still operate implicit 
deposit protection schemes. While countries in Europe,217 the Western hemisphere 
and Asia have established deposit insurance schemes, only a few countries in Africa, 
the Middle East and the developing world in general have established successful 
deposit insurance schemes. 
One major challenge facing policy makers in these countries is how to avoid the 
moral hazard and agency problems associated with deposit insurance. It is imperative 
that a deposit insurer has in place a mechanism to control its risk. Unfortunately, most 
of the devices to counteract deposit insurance risk are not without their own 
inadequacies. 
Mechanisms for counteracting the deposit insurance problem have been considered in 
this chapter. It appears that the most effective way of limiting moral hazard is an 
approach which seeks to increase the risk exposure of those who are in a position to 
influence banks' behaviour, with an effective mechanism for handling troubled banks 
and resolving failed banks to reduce the incentive for regulatory forbearance. This can 
only be achieved by a properly designed and well implemented deposit lOsurance 
system, which would preserve the benefits of financial stability and depositor 
protection, without increasing moral hazard or reducing market discipline. Hence the 
deposit insurance problem can generally be considered as a problem of design. 
1.+8 
It would appear that the level of legal, economic and financial development attained 
by a country is partly responsible for the successful design and implementation of a 
deposit insurance scheme.218 In countries lacking the relevant legal and institutional 
infrastructure, explicit deposit insurance might offer no significant advantage over an 
implicit system. The success of an explicit deposit insurance system is strongly 
dependent on the quality of banking regulation and supervision219 and the appropriate 
design of the fundamental features of the scheme. The major design and policy 
considerations in achieving an optimal deposit insurance scheme are considered in the 
next chapter. 
217 Most European Countries adopted deposit insurance in compliance. with t~~ 19l)~. ~:U~i~ec,ti\.c: , 
.'18 L Lae\"L'11 and others (2006) analysed data from 181 sample countnes: thc countllcs. \\.CII.: part,I~lonc,d 
into -l grpups based on per capita il1l'(ll11e to show that the propensIty to adopt depOSIt IIlSUranlC n"I.:" 
with income. 
211) R Cull and others 'Deposit Insurance and Bank Intermediation in the Lung Run' (2()O-l) B/'\ 
\\'(lrkillg l'iI/Jl'/"S No 15(). 
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CHAPTER 4 
SPECIFIC STRUCTURE AND DESIGN FEATURES OF 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS 
4.0. Introduction 
The working group of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), in its report. recommends 
that as part of a self-assessment process in the implementation of a deposit protection 
scheme, policy makers should focus on issues such as the mandate, powers and 
structure of the deposit insurance system. The report also notes that in recognition of 
the interconnectedness of a deposit insurance system with other safety-net functions, 
it is critical to address interrelationship issues among financial safety-net 
• . 1 partiCIpants. 
Although deposit protection schemes are generally desirable, they need to be properly 
managed and operated under a tight regulatory and supervisory regime to avoid the 
disadvantages associated with them. This can only be achieved if deposit protection is 
delivered through appropriate and cost-effective structures that are properly designed 
and integrated into the larger supervisory framework. The potential for moral hazard 
and other perverse effects underscore the need for appropriate balance in developing 
incentive-compatible deposit insurance schemes. 
I Finanl'i,tI Stability Forum '(;uidanl'l: for De\elopin~ I:rrl.!cti\l' Dep{lsit Insurance S)"ll'm,,' C:~()()I) 
hllp://""'" r"forlllll.ol~/pllbliL'atiolb/(;uidalll·l' depositO I.pdf, al'cessed .20 Januar~ 20()5. 
I )() 
These structural and design issues are considered in this chapter. While constant 
reference is made to the work of the FSF (FSF Report), the intention is not to develop 
another set of 'best practice' principles. The aim is to formulate the relevant factors to 
be taken into consideration, the various options open to policy makers, and the trade-
offs involved in the design or reform of deposit insurance schemes. 
4.1. Public Policy Objectives 
It is important for countries transiting from an implicit blanket guarantee of deposits 
to an implicit DIS and those contemplating the reform of existing systems to fully 
consider the public policy objectives of introducing the scheme and tailor design 
features as well as reform measures to suit these objectives. ~ In order to achieve an 
efficient and incentive-compatible design, the goals of the scheme must be consistent 
with its design and structure, and also with country-specific factors. 3 
The FSF report notes that the first step in designing a deposit insurance system is to 
understand the public-policy objectives, which it is expected to achieve, and these 
objectives must be well understood.4 The choice of how a deposit insurance scheme is 
to be designed and operated depends on country-specific factors, which include 
historical, legal, political and financial variants. It has been aptly observed that 'the 
historical evolution of banking in any country provides or can provide the rationale 
for, and methodology of prudential regulation of banking in that country.') However. 
in most of the countries with recently adopted explicit deposit insurance schemes. it 
has been shown that the necessary internal political, economic and other factors have 
2 Sl'l' IADI Core Principles for E.tfective Deposit Insurance Systems (.2008) 
http://w\\\\.iadi.oq;/Li~hl.\I1IHllll1l·l.IllL·ntsl.\llaL.illlle nts/6-lIFS Flit .2()- . 
I ( .201,\J)I( I 20Curl,I,; 2()Princlpk~1 I ")Orinal(;'£ .202W; 20Feh2008.pdl Accessed 7 April ~008. 
f-Pt~icv 11l;ll--ns should give consideration to institutional facturs such as the stale of the kgal ~ystem. 
the state or till' pnH.iL'ntial rl'guiatury and supenisury system. and the \ch'l of economic de\L'\oprnenl. 
I I:SF Report (2001) (11 I) II. 
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been undermined by pressure to emulate developed-country safety net arrangements 
without recourse to idiosyncratic differences in public and private contracting 
environments.6 
The objectives of a deposit insurance scheme discussed in the preceding chapter are 
not universal. However, a well-designed deposit insurance scheme should strive to 
achieve the two main objectives, which are: the protection of small and 
unsophisticated depositors and the promotion of financial stability. 7 Deposit insurance 
should also enhance the ability of regulators to achieve other related policy 
objectives.8 These objectives must be construed in relation to the public and 
individual contracting environments and requirements. 
The FSF report recommends that policy makers in countries seeking to adopt or 
reform deposit insurance systems should conduct a 'situational analysis' to guide their 
decision-making. The factors to be taken into consideration include: (a) economic 
factors, the state and structure of the banking system and public attitude and 
expectations, and (b) the state of legal, prudential regulatory, supervisory, accounting 
and disclosure regimes.9 When experts recommend deposit insurance, they do so with 
the presupposition that countries have the appropriate institutional framework and 
5 GO Nwankwo Prudential Regulation of Nigerian Banking (University of Lagos Press, Lagos, 1990). 
6 A Demirouc-Kunt and others 'Determinants of Deposit Insurance Adoption and Design' (2()()6) Co 
World Bank Polier Research Working Paper. No. 38-19. 
7 Objecli\'L's of deposit insurance schemes around the world are broadly ~imila~': these. arc the 
promotion of financial stahility and confidence in the hanking system. protection of unsophl"llL'ated 
depositors and the prmision of tlrderly rL'solution mechanisms for failed institutions. 
~ DD hanoff 'Designing an Efll'L'li\L' Deposit Insurance Structure: An Internatillnal Perspecti\c' (Jul! 
200 I) 167c Fed terra. Federal RL'''L'I"VL' Bank of ChiL'agll. 
http://\\ww.d1IL·;lgllll:d.org/publiL'alion,,/fedlctterI20() I Ie Jl i uly2()() I 167L' .pd r, accessed 2() r\UgU\1 :!( H\ 
!) FSI· Report (nl). 12. 
they fail to consider the impact of differences and imperfections in their contractin~ 
'-
environments. 10 
Countries wishing to adopt deposit insurance should first address weaknesses in their 
institutional environment. II An advantage of an explicit deposit insurance scheme is 
that it is backed by law, which provides certainty in its operation. A sound legal 
regime is a prerequisite for effective and efficient supervision. Regulation cannot exist 
in a vacuum and the coercive element in law is necessary for the enforcement of 
regulatory requirements and the imposition of sanctions. The FSF report suggests that 
a situational analysis should focus on 'the level of enforcement, the efficiency of the 
judicial system, and the effectiveness of creditors' redress mechanisms' .12 The deposit 
insurer needs to be backed by a strong legal system for early intervention and prompt 
corrective action, and for an orderly resolution process. It is also important that the 
functions of the deposit insurer do not violate existing laws, especially human rights 
legislation. 
A strengthened pnldential regulatory regime would ensure accountability, effective 
corporate governance and risk-management. Elements of the legal, regulatory and 
supervisory framework that would ensure the smooth operation of a deposit insurance 
scheme include sound accounting and financial reporting schemes, effective licensing 
or chartering regime and regular examinations. 13 
10 EJ Kane and A Dcmirguc-Kunt 'Deposit Insurance Around The Globe: \Vhere Docs It Work?' 
(2001) The World Bank. Policy Rese(/rch Working Paper Series ;\'0. 2()79. 
\I SH T:t1Jey and I 1\1as 'The Role of Deposit Insurance' in D Villas (ed.) Financial Regulation: 
('hanging the Rules (~lthl> Game The World Bank. WashingtonDC 1992.321. 
12 FS\: Report (n I) I.t 
\.1 /hid. 
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4.2. Institution/ Organizational Structure 
Issues regarding institutionalization of deposit insurance do not revolye around 
whether deposit insurance should be explicit or implicit, but whether a separate and 
autonomous institution or agency is required to administer the scheme or the deposit 
insurance function should be assigned to an existing regulatory entity.I-+ The law 
establishing a deposit insurance scheme should provide for the means and mode of its 
administration. The institutional framework of a deposit insurance scheme is critical 
for the achievement of its aims. Consequently, the nature of a deposit insurer's 
mandate plays a significant part in the institutional set-up.IS 
The report of the FSF Working Group notes that the deposit insurer can draw on skills 
and staff resources of a larger organization if the deposit insurance function is 
assigned to an existing entity, for example adding a department to the Central Bank.16 
This would also enable the deposit insurance scheme to cut back on administrative 
and other operational cost that would have been incurred with the establishment of a 
separate agency. Another advantage of incorporating a deposit insurance scheme into 
an existing supervisory body is that it promotes cohesion between policies. Since the 
deposit insurer is part of a wider regulatory body, it will be very unlikely that the 
supervisory policies of the deposit insurer will differ from that of the wider body. 
The main disadvantage of incorporating the deposit insurance function into a larger 
organization is that the organization may find it difficult to separate its other 
14 B Shull 'How Shlluld Bank Regulatory Agencies be Organized?' (1993) II Contemporary Economic 
Polin (I) 99. 
l'i D~pllsit insurers with \\idl' mandates usually rcquire a separate institutional structure. Sec DS 
Hlll'lschcr and othcrs 'Thc Dcsign and Implclllentation of Dcposit Insurance Sy stcms' 1M F Occasiollal 
Par('/" 251 (ll\lF. Washington DC. 2(06) 9: Carminc di Nola 'Structuring Dcposit Insurance in Europc: 
S(lIllC Considcrations and a Regulatory Camc' (1995) H'harloll Fill£lnciullllstitlltioll\ CenrC/, H'orking 
Pur('/' No, 1.J.J-3 J. 
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responsibilities and interests from that of the deposit insurer,17 potentially leading to a 
conflict of interest. 18 To carry out its functions effectively, a deposit insurer requires 
independence as well as a separate legal personality.19 In times of crisis, supervisory 
authorities come under intense political pressure, which can sometimes lead them to 
make decisions that are not in the overall interest of a stable and sound economy. 
Independence of the deposit insurer would place it in the best position to withstand 
such pressure.20 Creating an independent agency would also avoid harmful regulatory 
forbearance on the part of supervisors. Supervisors have strong incentives to delay 
bank closures or to take other decisive action because closure would indicate a failure 
on their part, impacting negatively on their reputation. 21 
It follows from the above that it is generally preferable to have a separate and 
independent institution to administer a deposit protection scheme. In practice, most 
countries that have introduced explicit deposit insurance schemes have established 
designated bodies to administer the schemes. 22 Whether or not the deposit insurer is a 
separate organisation, it is vital that the system is explicitly defined in law and 
regulation, and the deposit insurer should be independent from political interference 
and industry domination. It should also be accountable for its actions, especially its 
16 FSF Report (n I), 18. 
17 Ibid. 
18 EJ Kane 'The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance' (MIT Press, Camhridge, 1985). For a 
discllssion on the separation of supervisory functions, see CAE Goodhart and S Dirk 'Should the 
Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?' (1995) O\ford Economic 
Papers 47, No.4 pp 539-60. 
19 R MacDonald 'Deposit Insurance '(August 1996) Centre for Cenfuil Banking Srlldies, Bank of 
Fngland. Handbook in Cellfral Banking No.9. . 
~() NJ Kctcha .Ir 'Deposit Insurance System Design and Considerations', Policy Paper No.7 (Bank tor 
International Selllcments (BIS). 1999). 221: CE Blair and others 'Instituting a Deposit Insurance 
System: Why? Hl)\\?' (2006) 8 JOllrnal (IlBanking Regulation (I) -L 
21 AWA Boot and AV Thakor 'Sl'If-interestL'd Bank Regulation' (199~) 83 ,\merican Economic Rl'Ii(\\ 
(2) 206. 
22 Alexander K\ei 'Deposit Protection :\rrangements: A Survey' (1995) /MF H'()rkin~ Papa 
HP/()51/34. TIlL'~L' schemes are linen managed hy a goverllJl1L'nt agency or hy a puhlic-pri\ate 
partnership. S\\ it/L'r1and. Gcrmany and :\rgL'ntina Jl1i.lI1agL' their sdlemes privately. 
mistakes?3 Where the deposit insurance function is designated to a separate body. 
particular attention must be paid to the balance of power among the financial safety-
net authorities. Potential conflict of interests arising from varying incenti yes can 
create friction, thus policymakers should address interrelationship issues in the design 
of deposit insurance systems. 
4.3. Ownership 
Ownership of a deposit insurance scheme can take three basic forms: public24 • 
private25 or joint (public and private)26 ownership. A fourth approach has been 
adopted in Slovenia where the scheme consists of the banks themselves, with no 
special fund established but only the legal obligation by which banks guarantee to pay 
deposits. 
Where the scheme is publicly owned, the government or relevant agency holds the 
equity. The government may however make a decision to establish a deposit 
insurance scheme but leave its ownership and management to participating banks, 
Alternatively, the deposit insurance scheme may be jointly owned and shares will be 
held in a specified ratio while the management is made up of representatives of both 
, 27 partIes. 
2.' G Garcia 'Deposit Insurance: A Survey of Actual and Best Practices' (1999) 1M F Workillg Paper 
H'PI9915.J. Accountahility can hc achic\i:d hy requiring the issue of an annual report. independent audit 
report and periodical reports to parliament. Independent dispute settlement mechanisms can also he 
estahlished. 
2.t Practised in the US, Canada, Nigeria and other countries. 
2:'1 PraL"l iSl'd in Brazil. Finland and I·rance. In Bnllil, the decision to privati/e the deposit insurance 
schcme was hasl'd on the consideration that a government owncd entity may imply a hlanket guarantee 
of deposits. 
~h Practised in Japan, Cirel'l'l', Spain and Argl'ntina 
~7 PN Umoh 'Deposit InsuranL'l~: Concept. Pral,tice and Re!c\<Ince in Africa' (June, 2004) 14 Nf)IC 
Quarterly (2). 
Proponents of private sector owned deposit insurance argue that it encourages 
efficiency by ensuring freedom from political interference, flexibility in monitoring 
and risk control, and a better incentive structure for mitigating moral hazard. 28 Despite 
the perceived merits of private deposit insurance, it is doubtful whether such a system 
would be able to provide the same level of public confidence as a government backed 
scheme. It has been rightly observed that ' ... the government may have a natural 
advantage in providing deposit insurance because private companies that have no 
power to tax would have to hold reserves in order to make their promises credible.' 29 
Other possible drawbacks of a private scheme include the lack of regulatory authority, 
lack of risk measurement information and adverse selection.3o 
4.4. Mandate and Powers 
A mandate has been defined as a set of official instructions or statement of purpose." I 
In this regard, power can be seen as the legal discretion and empowerment to carry 
out instructions under a mandate. 32 The mandate of a deposit insurer should be 
expressly specified in law so that its role within the financial safety net is clarified. 33 
The FSF report notes that a clear mandate reinforces the stability of the financial 
system and contributes to sound governance and greater accountability. 
28 For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of private deposit insurance, see C England 'A 
Proposal for Introducing Private Deposit Insurance' in Proceedings of a Conference 011 Balik Structure 
and Competition, Federal Resen'(' Bank of Chicago, Chicago, 1-3 A/u.\', 1985, 316; B Ely 'Private 
Sector Depositor Protection is Still a Viable Alternative to Federal Deposit Insurance' (Winter 19X6) 
Issul's in Banking Regulation, 40. 
2') D Diamond and P Dybvig 'Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity' (198J) 91 JOllrnal of 
Political Econol1/Y 0) .+0 I. .+16. 
JO W Lee and eKwok 'Domestic and International Practice of Deposit Insurance: a Survey' (2000) 10 
JOllrnal (ltA/llltinariol/al Financial Mwwgement 29. 
]\ I,'SF R~'port (200 I) (n I). 17. In pri\ate law, a mandate can be defined as an authority gi\l~n b) one 
person to another to tak.L' some course of action. Sec EA Martin (ed.) ,\ Dictiol/ary of Law (5 th ed .. 
nxford Uni\'ersity Press, Oxford, 20(2) . 
. ~2 This is known as incidental power. which exists beL'ause it is necessary to the accomplishment of ;\11 
express purposL'. n.\ (,arner (cd.) (20()'+). Black's Lal\" Didiol/ar), (X1h ed .. Thomson West. St Paul. 
200.+) I 207. 
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The mandate and powers of a deposit insurer can be interpreted either broadly or 
narrowly. Where it is narrowly interpreted, the deposit insurer takes a passiYe role. 
only managing the insurance funds and paying depositors when a failure occurs.)-+ 
This is typical of privately run schemes with less proactive responsibilities and is 
generally referred to as the pay-box model of deposit insurance. Where a deposit 
insurer has been given a broader mandate, it is referred to as a 'risk-minimizer'. 
usually empowered to perform other functions such as supervision, intervention and 
resolution. It is also possible that the deposit insurer's mandate may fall somewhere 
between these two classifications.35 
It has been opined that a wider mandate enables the insurer to protect the insurance 
fund and that the role of deposit insurance in the promotion of systemic stability and 
strengthening the financial sector is achieved when it effectively enforces prudential 
supervision and regulation on its members. 36 It can however also be argued that 
because the mandate of a pay-box system is restricted, such a mandate could be more 
easily fulfilled as the deposit insurer only has to concentrate on one thing, which is the 
reimbursement of guaranteed sums. 
The FSF report notes that even though pay-box systems are largely confined to the 
payment of depositors' claims and normally do not have prudential regulatory or 
supervisory responsibilities, they require appropriate authority as well as access to 
33 Sl'l' I:\DI (200R) (n2) Principles 3 & -+. 
\.t G (;arcia 'Deposit Insurance: :\ Suney of Actual and lksl Practices' (1999) 1M F Working Paper 
HP/()()/5.J . 
3:'\ These depusil insurers are gi\en 'more than pay-hox' powers hut not full risk minimi/ing pov..crs . 
. ~6 Gl\l Llanto 'Dep()sil Insurancc: Rule, Limitation and Challenges' (2()())) PDIC Resollrce Cel/fn. 
PDIC On·asiol/a/ Papa ,\'0. J. 
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deposit information and adequate funding, for the timely and efficient reimbursement 
of depositors when banks fai1. 37 
Generally, all forms of deposit insurance systems serve the twin purpose of financial 
stability and depositor protection. However, it appears that the extent of a deposit 
insurer's mandate and consequently its powers will depend on the perception of the 
role of deposit insurance in weakening market discipline incentives and the need to 
give the deposit insurer the necessary powers to deal with the risks which might result 
to both the insurance fund and the banking system. 
Although no particular type of mandate is generally preferable,38 it is important that: 
I. The mandate and powers of the deposit insurer is in accordance with the 
public policy objectives of the deposit insurance scheme; 
II. The mandate is specified, without any ambiguity, in law and in policy. It 
should be specified and clearly understood by the deposit insurer, financial 
institutions and depositors before any crisis occurs rather than at a time of 
cnsIs; 
III. The roles and powers of other members of the financial safety-net should be 
considered. While safety-net players should complement each other. 
unnecessary overlap and possible regulatory gaps should be avoided; 
IV. The deposit insurer should be properly structured and adequately equipped in 
accordance with the specified mandate. 39 
37 FSI; Report (n I) 17. . . 
38 In deyeloped countries that operate thc pay box model, for example the UK. the deposit protL'l'tlon 
scheme is usually part of a \\idLT and well structured financial supen isory rcgime \vhere supervisory 
functions arc L'ffcl'ti\L'I~ separated. Htl\\C\C[. in dc\eloping economics with \veal\. supen isory and 
saIL-tv-net structures. it IS desirable that thc deposit insurer is conferrcd with additional regulatory and 
supe;·\ isory P(l\\LTS to protCL'l the insurance fund and to counter moral hazard. 
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4.5. Coverage 
Deposit insurance coverage can be determined in terms of level and scope. In the 
preceding chapter, it was suggested that the level of deposit insurance coverage 
should be limited in order to reduce the risk of moral hazard. However, before 
determining the level of coverage, it is important to determine and possibly limit the 
scope of deposit insurance coverage. Policy makers need to determine who and what 
should be covered by a deposit insurance scheme. 
The FSF report recommends that policy makers should define clearly in law or by 
private contract what is an insurable deposit. Factors to be considered include the 
relative importance of different deposit instruments, the inclusion of foreign-currency 
deposits and the deposits of non-residents in relation to the public policy objectives of 
the system.40 
The risk of moral hazard would be exacerbated if deposit insurance is extended to 
cover all forms of deposits and depositors as well as shareholders and other creditors. 
The primary rationale for deposit protection schemes is the protection of small and 
unsophisticated depositors who are considered to be in a vulnerable position and 
unable to bear financial loss. Small businesses and private individuals of relatively 
modest means will fit into this category . .+l 
I') Whcrc thc dcp(l~il in~urer is structured as a pay-hox. it needs powers for vcrification of depl)~il(\rs' 
claims. assessment and collection of deposit insurance contrihutions. and for depl)sltor pa~oul~. 
H(lwL'\er where thl' deposit insurer is gin.'n a risk minimi/ing mandale. it needs greater powers. \\ hich 
includc cnntwl of enlr~ and exit in the deposit insurance scheme. hank examinatiun powers. and 
intenention and failurl' resolution powers. 
·to FSF Report (nl). ~3. 
-'I A Call1phL'lI ;llld P Carl\\Ti~ht 'Thc Protection of Bank Depositors: New Developments' (:--.Jm emher 
1999) 22 :\lI/iniS Curiul' 27. 
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Deposit insurance schemes should exclude depositors who are capable of monitoring 
the financial condition of a bank and exerting market discipline. Examples of such 
deposits that should be excluded include: deposits of other banks and financial 
institutions; deposits of government authorities and agencies; deposits of corporate 
bodies; deposits of directors, shareholders and managers of a failed bank: deposits of 
companies that belong to the same group as the bank and deposits arising out of 
transactions in connection with which there has been a criminal conviction for money 
laundering.42 The scope of deposit insurance coverage varies according to country-
specific objectives and it usually reflects the emphasis on the principal purpose of 
deposit insurance, i.e. stability versus protection of small and unsophisticated 
d . 43 eposltors .. 
According to the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC), 
uninsured deposits and other liabilities should be 'credibly uninsured' :+4 The ESFRC 
contends that holders of such claims should not expect to be covered by deposit 
protection arrangements in the event of a bank failure. 45 Exclusion of sophisticated 
depositors from the scope of deposit insurance coverage would encourage these 
depositors to exert market discipline by demanding higher deposit rates from weaker 
banks in compensation for the higher risk of loss that they face or by withholding 
their funds from such banks.46 The aim is to ensure that private monitoring, when 
42 R MacDonald 'Deposit Insurance' (1996) Handbook on Central Banking No.9. Centre for Central 
Bankin~ Studil's. Bank of England. MacDonald also suggests that it may be equitable to extend 
co\era;e to sharl'holders where there shareholding is so small that it is impossible to intluence any 
decisio~l of the bank. Set' also Chapter -+ of the Financial Services Authority Handbook, COlllpcnsarion 
Sourcehook (Cnmp). 
11 Blai,. (11~(). 
H Some l'ountries pral'lice the so called 'l(l(l big to fail' principle. which is the practice of protecting 
uninsured deposilllrs. crl'ditors and others \\hen banks that are considered as large and of ~..trong 
l'L'()[1olllic i IIlportance rai I. 
l'i \':uropl'an Sh .. H.ll)\\ hnancial Regulator~ Committee (LSFRC) Statement No.5 (October IYYY). 
4tl GlIrcia (I t)Yl» (n~3). 
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large depositors, subordinated debt holders and correspondent banks realise that their 
funds are at risk, complements official supervision.47 
Insurance coverage limits can also be construed in terms of the maximum amount of 
coverage available to an individual depositor. Policy makers should decide whether 
coverage limits should apply to individual account deposits or to the aggregate of all 
account deposits held by an individual depositor. Sound practice appears to be that 
coverage limits should apply to the aggregate of all deposits held by an indi\'idual 
depositor. This would give an incentive to depositors to monitor their banks. reduce 
failure resolution costs and most importantly, ensure that deposit insurance coverage 
protects 'truly small savers' .48 
It has been argued that deposit insurance coverage should be extended to savings and 
time deposits. Although these deposits are conceptually easier for banks to manage 
than demand deposits, they should nevertheless be protected, as doing so would 
provide a degree of consumer protection, encourage a positive attitude toward saving, 
change social behaviour, help to create a middle class, and raise the national savings 
49 
rate. 
It is pertinent that the coverage limit is clearly prescribed in law without ambiguity 
and before any crisis occurs. This is because of the difficulties that would be 
encountered in applying retroactive legislation. The law should specify how jointly 
owned deposits should be treated as well as deposits held in a trust or agency 
relationship or under an assignment. The importance of this was illustrated by the case 
17 :\ Demirguc-Kunt and EJ Kane 'Deposit Insurance: Handle With Carl" (2003) Working f>u/)l'I"S, 
Cellfral Balik oj Chilt' No. l27, 
IS G Hane 'Deposit Insurance Reform: Stall' of the Dehatc' (1999) 12 FDIC Bllllkill[? Re\'il'H' (.') \. 
of Deposit Protection Board v Dalia.5o Following the failure of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991, some depositors tried to reduce their deposit 
levels by assigning part of their deposits to relatives and close friends so as to 
maximise compensation that would be recovered from the Deposit Protection Fund. 
The Banking Act 1987 (Meaning of Deposit) Order 1991 51 was made so that 
assignments of deposits made after July 30, 1991 and after the initiation of winding 
up proceedings would not qualify for compensation. The Deposit Protection Board 
rejected the claims brought under assignments that were made prior to the 1991 Order 
on the ground that they did not qualify as depositors within the purview of Section 58 
(1) of the Banking Act 1987. 
The House of Lords held that the word 'depositor' should be gIven its ordinary 
meaning as the person who made the original deposit. Although the Act provided no 
express definition, the court construed Sections 5 (3); 60 (2) and 60 (6) (c) as all 
referring to 'depositor' as the person who made the original deposit. 
This lacuna in the law has now been dealt with by Section 214 (1) (f) of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, which provides 'for a claim to be 
entertained only if it is made by a specified kind of claimant.' Section 214 also 
provides for 'limiting the amount payable on a claim to a specified maximum amount 
or to a maximum amount calculated in a specified manner'; and 'for payments to be 
h I · . s'" CI 4 f made, in specified circumstances, to a person other than t e calmant .- - lapter 0 
II) (; (;arl'ia ·Depositln~lll'i.lnl·l': Obtaining the Benl'fits and :hoiding the Pitfalls' (1996) IMF Working 
Paper No. 96/83. 
so 1199412 AC. 367 .. \Iso knnwn as Deposit Protection Board \' Harc/ays Bank PIc. 
'II SI 1991 1776 .. \n. 2 (1) 
.~~ S. 214 (I) (j) and (k). I'S~L\ 2000. 
the Compensation Source book (Comp) goes further to define 'eligible claimant' by 
listing a table of exceptions. 53 
The FSF report notes that coverage limits can also be applied per bank or across all 
member banks. It points out that even though coverage limitation across all member 
banks is likely to instil more market discipline, depositors who have diversified their 
risks among member banks may be affected by multiple bank failure and this may 
increase the risk of further collapse. 54 The deposit insurer would also require 
extensive information on depositor accounts in all banks to be able to administer this 
form of limited coverage insurance. This would result in additional costs and 
administrative difficulties for the deposit insurer. The report concludes that it is 
preferable to apply deposit insurance on a 'per depositor per bank' basis. 
Coverage can also be restricted in terms of the financial institutions that are covered. 
In some countries, deposit insurance covers only depositors of commercial banks. 
Deposit insurance coverage should be extended to cover all institutions that are 
authorized to take deposits from the public. If certain institutions are excluded and 
they experience runs, this may be contagious to insured institutions because some 
depositors may not be able to differentiate between insured and uninsured institutions 
.. f' . 55 In tIme 0 CrISIS. --
Finally, coverage can be defined in terms of the treatment gIven to foreign bank 
d . Such deposits include deposits payable In foreign currency, deposits in eposlts. 
domcst ic branches of foreign banks and deposits In foreign branches of domestic 
~.l SeL' "L'llcrall\ M Blair and G Walker (cds.) (2006), Financial Sen'ices Law (Oxford Uni\Cr"lly Pre"". 
t.. t: _ 
Oxford . .:?006) eh.5. 
~·I FSF RCpllrtll (n I ). 2..l. 
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banks. Policymakers have to decide whether responsibility for foreign deposits should 
be placed on the home or host country. In the past, the dominant practice was to 
exclude such deposits from deposit insurance arrangements because they were not 
part of the domestic payments system, the domestic supply or domestic savings. They 
were also excluded to prevent double insurance because they might already be 
protected under another national insurance scheme. 56 
This position has significantly changed in the European Union where the concept of 
'home country control'S? has now been introduced and the deposit protection scheme 
of each member state is now required to cover the branches of the state's banks in all 
other member states.58 This change reflects the commitment of the EU to establish a 
single market in financial services so that banks in member states can carry out 
business effectively on a cross-border basis and consumers can have access to more 
competitively priced financial services and products. 59 
The concept of home country control, introduced by the 1994 directive was triggered 
by the failure of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991.60 BCCI 
was registered in Luxembourg but had its operational headquarters in London and 
subsidiaries in sixty nine countries. The uncertainty and legal division in 
responsibility between authorities in London and Luxembourg left the activities of 
BCCI inadequately supervised. The closure of BCCI's operations in London, in July 
200 I, led to a panic withdrawal of funds from small and medium sized UK banks. 
SS SH Tallcy and I Mas 'Dcposit Insurancc in Developing Countries' (1990) The World Bank. Policy 
Rescarch Working Paper Serics No. 548. 
56 M{/cDol/ald (1996) (n"+2). 
S7 ;\Iso kilowil as thc l'l)lJntry of origin rule. 
ss Scc Dircctivl' 9..+119/EC. 
51) Sec the Rccital to the Dircl,ti\L'. Scc also Hl\ 1 Treasury (2005), 'A Framcwork for Guarantee Schemcs in thc 
EU: A niSL'lI~~ill(1 Paper' http://ww\\.r ... ;l.gO\.lIlJpuh~/uthl·r/cll framc\\urk.pdL al'ccsscd 13 ,\ugust 2006. 
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The closure of the headquarters in Luxembourg also led to the failure of its branches 
abroad.
61 
Under the new principle of home country control, all depositors in the EEA 
whose banks are domiciled in a member state are protected according to the 
provisions of the deposit protection scheme of that member state. Thus UK depositors 
of a UK branch of a bank registered in Luxembourg would be covered, not under the 
UK deposit protection scheme, but that of Luxembourg. Equally, legal responsibility 
for supervision and authorisation of branches is placed on the home country 
supervisor. 62 In order to develop co-operation between home and host country 
supervIsors and to ensure effective cross-border financial supervision, attempts are 
being made to integrate the roles of home and host state supervisors in the supervision 
of branches.63 The aim is to achieve a convergence in the allocation of supervisory 
responsibility.64 
MacDonald notes that the level of deposit insurance coverage provided under a home 
country scheme could be more generous than that provided by the host country.65 
Policy makers may wish to consider preventing the branches of foreign banks from 
offering more generous compensation than locally incorporated banks in order to 
ensure fair competition. 
60 On the BCCI failure, see P Truell and L Gurwin (1992), BeCI (Bloomsbury, London, 1992); N 
Passas 'The Genesis of the BCCI Scandal' (1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society (l) 57. 
(>I G Garcia and H Prast 'Depositor and Investor Protection in the EU and the Netherlands: A Brief 
History' (~003) Journal of European Economic History; RJ Herring 'BCCl: Lessons for International 
Bank Supervision' (April 1993) 11 ContemporQlY Policy Issues 76; RJ Herring 'BCCI & Barings: 
Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and Global Corporate Structure' in DO Evanoff and GG 
Kaufman (cds.) SYstelllic Financial Crises: Resolring Large Bank Insol\'(!llcies (World Scientific 
Puolishing. Singapore, ~O()5) 3~ I; G Vinten 'The BCCI Debacle Marks Watershed Case in British and 
International Bank Regulation' ( 1991) 3 International Banking Regulator (~l)) 8. 
Il~ Subsidiaries are however treated as domestic institutions and are supervised by the host ct1untry 
supervisor. They are also c(l\'Cred under the host country deposit protection scheme. 
63 Sec for examp\c, the provision for proportionate co-operation agreements in the Markets in Financial 
Instrulllents Directive (l\liFID). 
M On Home CUlIntrY Ctll1trol. sec generally DG Mayes and J Vesala 'On the ProbIcms of Home 
., '- '"' .. 
Country Control' (1996) Balik (~f Fill/alld /)iSClIssioll Paper No. 201/998; 1\1 :\ndenas 'Deposit 
(iuaral1~tec Sdlemcs and Homc Country Control' in Cranston R (cd.) The SinR/e ,Hurker {llld rhe l..mr of 
Blinking (.~Ild cd .. L1uyds pf London Press. London, 1995) 107. 
(l.~ ,l/i/cJ)ollaid (1996) (n--l~) 16. 
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Where foreign deposits are to be covered under the deposit protection scheme. policy 
makers should decide whether such deposits are to be reimbursed in local or foreign 
currency. The FSF report notes that this decision would have implications for placing 
foreign exchange risk. If foreign currency deposits are converted into local currency 
before reimbursement, then the depositor may bear the risk. If the reimbursements are 
made in foreign currency, the deposit insurer may bear the risk. The report 
recommends that if reimbursements are to be made in local currency, a transparent 
rule should be set out in advance to determine the relevant date for the exchange rate 
to be used in the conversion. A system that offers to reimburse depositors in a foreign 
currency must have access to foreign assets and sufficient foreign currency funding to 
be able to meet its obligations.66 
In the determination of insurance coverage limits, policy makers should strive to 
ensure that: 
• Coverage is at a level sufficient to sustain the required degree of public 
confidence necessary to prevent destabilising bank runs. but not so extensive 
as to eliminate all effective market discipline in the bank's risk taking: 
• Coverage is at a level that bears some relationship to average measures of 
f · 67 income or wealth, so as to provide a sufficient degree 0 protectlOn to savers. 
(l(l FSF Report (n I) ~5. , .' 
(17 A:erc/Ill (1999) (n20): scc also ,\Ic/(DulIald (1996) (n.+2). The IMF recommends the lISC 01 t\\ICC per 
. . 11"\'\ I'lll·' 1)1' tl1umh to calculate cmerage limits hut also recommends that C\lUnlnc,-
capIta Incol l: ,", "". .,. " . ," , '" ' ' ..... 
should considL'r other l"aL'lors. lIke the dlstnhutl\ln 01 depoqts accordIng to theIr "lIt:. Sec (J (JalLlil 
(19 l)l») (n23) Tah1c 5. 
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4.6. Membership 
Considerations relating to membership include whether participation in the deposit 
protection scheme should be voluntary or mandatory and the type of institutions that 
should be eligible for membership. 
4.6.1 CompulsorylVoluntary Membership 
Participation in a deposit insurance scheme can either be voluntary or a compulsory 
legal requirement for all deposit-taking institutions. Most countries operate a 
I d .. h 68 compu sory eposIt Insurance sc erne. Where voluntary systems exist they tend to 
be either private systems or those that are funded by the insured financial 
. . . 69 InstItutIons. 
A compulsory scheme may be difficult to implement in countries where banks are 
owned by lower levels of government because it is likely to be 'politically awkward' 
for a national government to compel such banks to join the scheme. Such banks are 
also generally presumed to enjoy implicit government guarantee of their deposits. 
Furthermore, a conflict of interest may arise where the government owns the deposit 
insurer as it might give preferential treatment to government-owned banks in certain 
circumstances.7o It has however been argued that because state-owned banks enjoy an 
implicit guarantee of their deposits, compulsory deposit insurance membership of 
such banks removes a potential source of distortion between financial institutions, 
thus helping to level the playing field. 71 
IlS (;an'ia ( 1999) (n23). 
(,') Tal/i'\' alld I ,\1(/\ ( 1990) (n.55). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Blair (~()()()) (n20) 9. 
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Arguments in favour of a voluntary deposit insurance system haye been described as 
'essentially political and philosophical in nature,.72 Such arguments are often 
predicated on the theory that compulsory deposit insurance involves cross-
subsidization of weak institutions by the financially stronger. While this is invariably 
true, cross-subsidy and its inherent potential to encourage risk-taking can be mitigated 
by the introduction of risk-based deposit insurance premium. 
Compulsory deposit insurance is necessary to avoid the adverse selection problem 
associated with deposit insurance. Where deposit insurance premium is not tied to 
failure-risk, a voluntary deposit insurance system is more likely to attract risk-prone 
banks that would stand to benefit most from the inherent insurance subsidy.73 If 
depositors are less concerned about deposit insurance and are unaware that it IS 
voluntary then the stronger banks may opt OUt.74 
A voluntary system may also lead to instability in membership if strong banks opt out 
when the cost of failure is high. This may affect the financial viability of the deposit 
insurance system leading to a loss of public confidence in its capability to protect 
depositors.75 Voluntary systems are often not financially viable and are undermined 
by adverse selection. A compulsory system widens the funding base of the deposit 
7~ Taller and Mils (1990) (n55) 31. 
73 DC Wheelock and SC Kumbhakar 'Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse 
Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System' (Feb 199)) 27 JOllrnal of·Hol/cy. Credir 
(lnd Bal1kin~ (I) 186: JW Gunther and others' Adverse Selection and Competing Deposit Insurance 
Systems in Pre-Depression Texas' (1997) Federal Resen'e Bank (~f Dallas, Financial !ndllsrry Srlldies 
\\'orking P(/per No.97-4: Garcia (1999) (Il~3) shows that 5 of the 1.+ voluntary schemes surn;yed do 
not imp()sL' risk-adjusted premiums as an ahematin; to countn advnse sc\ecl1on problems. 
7·' I:SF Report (n I) 21. . ' 
75 \\'lil'c/OCJ.. (/11£1 I\lIl1lhhaker (199)) (n7.') conclude that the \oluntary natun: 01 the pre-19JO dep()'olt 
insurance system in "~Ins"s ~~.rL'atly inneascd adYLTsL' selection and moral ha/ard. which ultimatel} led 
to its collapsL'. 169 
insurance system and avoids the possibility that only the weakest institutions join the 
scheme.76 
A voluntary system of deposit insurance creates a dichotomy in the banking system 
between insured and uninsured banks; at normal times, depositors that are able to 
assess bank conditions would place their deposits in uninsured banks to take 
advantage of the high deposit rates these banks would offer in compensation for the 
risk. This situation is expected to shift during a crisis with a mass exodus of deposits 
from uninsured to insured banks. This could result in a liquidity crisis and exert 
considerable strain on the lender of last resort facility. The demands of these 
depositors could also lead to a fire sale of assets by the banks. 
A voluntary system has thus been described as inherently unstable, producing large 
scale deposit shifts between protected and unprotected banks, depending on the state 
of public confidence in the banking system.77 Because of the potential nature of the 
membership of voluntary systems, such systems are likely to be less financially viable 
over time. 
A voluntary system of deposit insurance is unlikely to meet one of the cardinal 
objectives for establishing deposit insurance schemes, which is the protection of small 
depositors. This is because depositors of banks that opt out of the system would not be 
protected by the scheme. 78 A voluntary scheme also negates the desire for a safe and 
stable banking system. The failure of an uninsured bank, whether large or small, 
76 l1{Jd\('her (~()06) (11 15) II. 
77 hi/In al/(I ,\I(/S (1990) (1155) ~~. 
7S Ibid. ·For a contrary \iL'\\. SL'L' I· Baltcnspcrgcr and J Dcrmil1c 'The Role of Puhlic Policy in Insuring 
Finan~ .. ial Stahility: a Cwss-collntr~ Comparatin' PcrspL,L'ti\c' (19X6) INSE,\D Working Paper 
No.S()/33. 170 
would create panic and loss of confidence in the banking system.79 Thus, in practice, 
compulsory deposit insurance is generally preferred to voluntary deposit insurance.8o 
A compulsory system ensures a high number of participating banks thus ensuring an 
even spread of risk. However, it may be possible to attain a high level of participation 
in a deposit insurance scheme without legal obligation. This can be achieved if the 
authorities provide extra incentives to make participation in the scheme attractive to 
large banks. The authorities can also sensitize the depositing public and raise 
awareness on the existence and need for deposit insurance. 81 
While compulsory membership of the deposit insurance scheme necessarily involves 
a degree of cross-subsidization in the banking sector, compulsory schemes generally 
promote financial stability and enhance the level of public confidence: these are 
benefits that are enjoyed by all banks in the system. It is important that all institutions 
that are members of the deposit insurance system should be subject to the same 
standards of strict regulatory oversight in order to minimize the risk to the system. 
4.6.2 Eligibility 
In most cases, deposit insurance membership is automatically granted to any 
institution that has received a licence from the relevant supervisory authority.82 The 
FSF report points out two circumstances in which membership considerations arise. 
79 JU Ehhodaghe 'Bank Deposit Insurance Scheme in Nigeria' (1991) I NDIC Qllarterly (I). 
xo A rcn.'nt survey of deposit insurant practice conducted by the International Association of Deposit 
Insurers (lAD!) showed that compulsory membership existed in all the countries representcd in thc 
sllrwy. SCl' http://\\ W\\ .ladi,or~/Finalc( 2()Rcports/Dc~i~n P~IPlT Fin:t1(; .2()kh(,; 20200-l.pdr . acccsscd 
.2 May 2()07, 
XI Scc FSF Rcport (n I ) 21: scc also the Proceedings of the International Association of Deposit Insurers 
and thc European Bank for Rcconstruction and Development Seminar on Deposit Insurance for Central 
Asia. Mongolia and :\/crhaijan. January 29-3 I 2003, . . 
http://www.iadi.org/htllll/App/~il\..·cllllll·111Lt·l·lltral(;.2()Asia~ .• 20Sl·1111l1ar· ( l()PWl'CCdl n~', pd t acccsscd 2 
;\ll~ll"t 2006, 
S2 ~ kmhcrship or the SChCllll' is also tcrminated upon withdrawal of such a licence. Deposit insurer" 
with risk-ll1inill1i/in~ PO\\LTS ll"llall~ !la\ l' the PO\\LT to suspend or to terminatc memher,hip of 
inst itutions where they l'0I1stitllte risk to the deposit insurancc fund, 
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First, when a deposit insurance system is established; and second, when membership 
is granted to new banks in an existing system. After establishing the scheme, 
policymakers seek to minimize the risks to the insurer while granting extensi'e 
membership. The two options are automatic membership or requiring banks to apply 
for membership.83 
Where membership of the scheme is compulsory for all banks or a certain category of 
banks, it is inevitable that such banks that are mandated to be insured must be 
admissible into the scheme.84 The deposit insurer may however adopt certain criteria 
and minimum standards that must be complied with by all participating institutions. 
The deposit insurer should co-operate with other safety net authorities, particularly the 
licensing and chartering authorities, in the adoption and enforcement of such 
standards. 
Policy makers should also consider whether the scheme should be enlarged to include 
non-deposit taking financial institutions. Although, in terms of depositor runs, sLlch 
institutions do not pose the same peculiar risk that banks pose,85 systemic 
considerations may necessitate that some form of protection is extended to these 
institutions. As noted earlier, the traditional distinctions that existed between financial 
markets are now appearing increasingly artificial; where these institutions are pat1 of a 
group or conglomerate structure, the ripple effects of any failure or shock in the non-
deposit taking business of the group may be transmitted to the deposit-taking 
business. 
~1 I:SF Report (n I) ~ \. . 
SI (lan'ia ( I t)()9) (n2_~) opines thal all inslilutions that lake per \alue deposits from the gencral pubhc 
should be l'onsidercd for inclusion. 
s.~ C.\/: Goodhart and othcr~ 'hnancial RepJlalion: \\'hl'fC, How and Why Nl)\\''!' (ROUllcd~l'. London, 
I t)l)S) d1.l. 
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4.7. Funding 
Deposit insurance schemes must be adequately funded to function effectively and to 
achieve the objectives for which they have been established. The funding mechanism 
should be adequate to ensure the prompt reimbursement of depositors' claims after a 
bank failure. 86 An under-funded deposit insurance system would lead to agency 
problems and could create costly regulatory forbearance. 87 It is the financial capacity 
of the insuring entity that gives credibility and public confidence to the deposit 
insurance scheme and thereby removes much of the incentive for bank runs. 88 Indeed 
the ability of the insurance scheme to support financial stability is intricately linked 
with its ability to carry out a prompt payout of depositor claims when an institution 
fails. 89 
In designing a deposit insurance scheme, policymakers need to consider two basic 
issues, which are the source and the mode of funding. 
4.7.1. Source of Funding 
Issues that arise in relation to the source of funding revolve around the issue of who 
should pay for deposit insurance. Funding can be sourced in many ways, such as 
government grants, levies or premiums assessed against participating banks, market 
borrowings or a combination of these sources.90 Policymakers have to choose between 
alternative solutions available to ensure that the deposit insurance scheme is 
adequately funded. 
~Cl Sec I·'SF Report (nl) ~6. . 
~7 The deposit insurer is IikL'ly to keep L'XlL'nding the time for distressL'd hanks to compl~ With 
re!2Ulatllrv requirements hccausL' it wants to a\oid n:slllution CllstS. 
~8Kefclu; (1999) (11~()). 
89 Sec 1I1\ 1 Treasury (2005) (n59). 
1)0 FSF Report (n I ) ~6. 
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Policymakers should hinge their considerations on two factors, which are: 
(a) Those who will enjoy the benefits of deposit insurance should pay for it: and 
(b) The source of funding should be able to maintain public confidence in the 
scheme. 
The first consideration is based on equitable grounds. The FSF report recommends 
that member banks should pay the cost of deposit insurance since they and their 
clients benefit from having an effective insurance system. It has also been opined that 
the owners of banks, firms, their borrowers, and all the economic agents of a nation 
benefit from deposit insurance as far as it ensures economic stability and as such 
should contribute to the funding of the scheme.91 In as much as a government also 
benefits from a stable economy and makes political gains when the public feel that 
their wealth is secure, it should also provide funding for the scheme. 
Morrison and White argue that deposit insurance should be funded not by bankers or 
depositors but through general taxation. They note that the existence of deposit 
insurance makes bank investments attractive to depositors. In the absence of deposit 
insurance, most depositors would prefer to place their funds in less productive self -
managed projects which would not be of any benefit to the general economy. Thus, 
deposit insurance schemes increase social welfare. This benefit would however be lost 
i r bank stockholders are forced to make payments into the deposit insurance fund 
because it decreases the capital they have at stake in the bank and increases their 
incenti\'es to undertake moral hazard. They also posit that payment by depositors into 
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the deposit Insurance scheme takes away with one hand what they gIve with the 
other. 92 
Regardless of the appropriateness or otherwise of the source of funding, it is crucial 
that the funding mechanism should be adequate for the deposit insurer to meet its 
liabilities. It should be able to maintain a high degree of public confidence in the 
deposit insurance scheme and the public should be assured that the system is capable 
of paying compensation and would keep its promises.93 The funding source should 
also be able to provide the funds necessary for a prompt reimbursement of all the 
insured liabilities of a failed bank. This is of particular importance to privately funded 
systems. Such systems should strive to achieve a target level of funding that would 
ensure it would meet all demands that will be placed upon it in normal times and 
moderately adverse circumstances.94 
The source of funding should reflect country-specific factors. It is not unusual to find 
deposit insurance schemes with multiple or mixed sources of funding. In developing 
countries, the banking system may not be sufficiently strong to finance all the 
compensation that would be required if a banking crisis occurs without experiencing 
an erosion of capital. In such countries, it may be appropriate for the government to 
provide part of the funds required as a back-up to the scheme's own resources.95 The 
91 M Frolov 'Funding Deposit Insurance: Designing Options and Practical Choices' (200"+) Keio 
Unil'l'rsitr Market Qualitr Research Project (KUMQRP) Discllssion Paper Series DP2003-21. 
<)2 AD M~HTison and L White 'Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing. and If So, Who Should Pay for It'!' 
(200"+) Or/illd Fillancial Research ('entre H'{Irkillg Paper No. 2004-FE-08. 
9] Ibid. 
')., Garcia (1999) (n23) Tahle 6, \\hich shows that 17 of the countries suneyed maintain a target Ic\cl 
for the 01 fund, which is oftl'n e\pressed a s a desirahle percentage of insured deplhits. 
95 ,\IacJ)ollllld (1996) (11..+2). ~lacDonald notes that the e\.lent to which deposit insurance schellles 
should relv on gO\l'rnlllel1t a~~istanL'l' can, hom,: \ LT, onl) he determined in the light of the ,trL'ngth (\1' 
the L'oll1l1l~'I\:ial hanking sy~tem and the gO\ernIllL'nt's ahility to tind resources for this purpose. 
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government may also provide funds to augment the take-off capital of the scheme.96 
The existence or the promise of government support would serve to boost the level of 
public confidence in the scheme and the banking system because the public expects 
the government to be solvent at all times. 
4.7.2. Mode of Funding 
There are two main issues to be considered in determining the mode of funding a 
deposit insurance scheme: first, whether funding should be on an ex ante or ex post 
basis; and second the appropriate method for assessing banks for the cost of deposit 
Insurance. 
I. Ex antelEx post Funding 
Ex ante funding 
This mode of funding involves the accumulation of a reserve or fund to cover deposit 
insurance claims in the event of the failure of a member bank. Ex ante funding allows 
the deposit insurance scheme to spread the premiums paid by banks over the course of 
a business cycle.97 It is an equitable method of funding deposit insurance schemes 
because failed banks would have previously contributed to the insurance reserve or 
fund. 
96 (;a"c'ia (1999) (n~J) finds that many countries ha\l~ provision for government to assist a depleted 
fund with loans. 53 of the 66 pri\ atdy funded systems that were suneyed had some form of access to 
puhliL' funding. Frohn' (~OO.f) (n91) opines that man) privately funded systems can abn he seen as 
mixed bl'L'<lusl' the go\ernment promises to help if such fund schemes become short of liquidity. 
()7 I'SI, report (n I) ~(). :\SSL'SSIllL'nt of premiums may he on a \lat rate or risk-adjusted hasis. See the 
disL'ussion on risl...-adjusted premium in the preceding L'haptcr. 
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In an ex ante system, the mere existence of an earmarked fund or reserve helps to 
boost public confidence in the ability of the scheme to meet its obligations.98 Ex ante 
systems are generally more rule-based and provide greater certainty in depositor 
protection. In the absence of a dedicated fund, there may be political, legal or other 
obstacles to obtaining funds when they are required for deposit insurance purposes. 
With an ex ante system of funding, these funds would be available when needed 
provided the assessments have reflected 'realistic assumptions regarding potential 
losses and other deposit insurance costs. ,99 
It has been suggested that where banking failures are infrequent, a fund can augment 
its resources by investing its assets. However, such investments should be in low-risk, 
liquid assets and the fund should avoid getting involved in the allocation of credit 
among competing interests in the private sector. 100 Ex ante funding sources can also 
be supplemented by ex post levies as well as government credit or guarantees for 
funds borrowed by the scheme from the central bank or financial market, where the 
fund is insufficient to meet its obligations. 
The FSF report notes that ex ante funding has the potential to remove capital from the 
banking system because premiums paid to the deposit insurer cannot be used for other 
purposes. 101 These assets are likely to yield a lower rate of return than they would if 
held by the banks. The deposit protection scheme may have to employ administrators 
and investment experts to manage these assets and this will result in additional 
costs. \()2 Another disadvantage of ex ante funding is that institutions may find it 
t)~ La and I\'~\'ok (~OOO) (n30) argul' that an l'x-ante fund would givl' more 'psychlllogical comfort' to 
dCpllsitors. 
l)l) I\'('(c//(/ (19t)t») (11~()). 
IlX) ,\Iild)onald (I t)96) (n42); Talley lInd .\Ia.\ (1990) (n5.5). 
Inl ,\!o,.risol/ al/d \\'hife (2004) (n l )2L 
10.' IIJ! , l"l'llS/IIY (~()(}5) (1159). 
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difficult to join or leave a scheme due to the imposition of exit or entry payment 
requirements. 103 
Where a dedicated deposit insurance fund has been created, it is important to decide 
whether there should be an appropriate target ratio of the fund balance to total insured 
deposits. This usually involves making a judgement on an ideal adequacy level of the 
fund based on predictions of potential losses. However, the process of estimating the 
probability of loss where information is imperfect could be very complicated in 
practice. 
Ex post Funding 
Where this mode of funding operates, assessments are levied after the failure of a 
member bank in order to raise the funds required to satisfy deposit insurance claims. 
The earliest known deposit insurance scheme was funded through this mode. 104 In an 
ex post funded system, the deposit insurance scheme operates as a loss-sharing or 
mutual guarantee arrangement among participating institutions. lOS 
The main advantage of ex post funding is that it provides an incentive for inter-bank 
monitoring because each bank seeks to avoid the costs associated with the failure of 
another member. This incentive may be particularly strong in a banking system made 
106 ., h k b'l' d up of a small number of large banks. In countnes WIt wea accounta I tty an 
transparency regimes, ex post funding reduces the opportunities for misappropriation 
10.l Ibid. This point relatcs only III \'oluntary schcmes. 
101 This was the schcmc crcated in thc sl;lle nf Ncw Yl1rk in 1929. in which merchants who traded with 
forci!!ncrs ,1!!rCl'd tll hl' haok for cach othcr's dcots. SCl' eh .. l
~ , 
I(l) /locls('''er (20()()) (n 15) 19. 
106 FSF Rl'f'o,,' (n 1 ) 27. 
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of accumulated deposit insurance funds by public authorities. 107 An ex post funded 
system also helps to foster unity in the banking system because banks contribute to 
fund the compensation of the depositors of a member bank that has failed. 
Ex post systems do not offer the certainty present under ex ante systems. Since 
assessments and collections occur after a failure, prompt reimbursement of insured 
depositors may be more problematic. 108 They are also inequitable inasmuch as a failed 
bank would not have to contribute to the funds required to compensate its 
d . 109 eposltors. 
In relation to incentivive compatibility of deposit insurance design and moral hazard, 
ex post funding is incompatible with the rationale for risk-based premium assessment 
systems. Theoreticaly, risk-based premiums influence the risk-behaviour of banks and 
discourage excessive risk-taking as risky activity would attract the payment of higher 
deposit insurance premiums. Because banks are levied after the occurrence of a bank 
failure, ex post funded systems are limited in their ability to influence bank risk-
behaviour through deposit insurance assessment. To this extent, ex post systems are 
less effective in counteracting moral hazard incentives. 
Ex post funding concentrates the cost of compensation as it is not spread out over 
time, thereby placing an additional burden on healthy banks at a time when they may 
110 f '1 d . . d I also be under pressure. Where a al ure occurs unng an economIC ownturn, t le 
regulators may be pressurized to provide forbearance because the ability of the 
107 lIo('/sclia (2006) (n 15). 
Ins FSF Report (n I) 27. 
IO!) I\lost nati(lllal laws pnl\idL' for the depusit insurer to ha\e a claim on the failed bank's residual 
assets. 
110 This is becausL' bank failures usually llL'Cur at pniuds of gL'lleral economic recession. Sl'l' 
,\!(leJ)ol/ald (1l)l)6) (1142). 
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b k· . 111 an lng system to pay IS weakened. The main drawbacks of ex post funded systems 
have been summarized by Garcia as 'often privately run by their member institutions: 
do not have clearly specified responsibilities regarding sharing the costs of 
compensating depositors; lack back-up funding from the government; offer 
coinsurance; are limited to their roles and responsibilities; and, because they are 
privately run, have difficulty in obtaining information from the supervisor and the 
central bank.,} 12 
Although ex ante funding is generally preferable, it is possible to combine features of 
both funding models. It is important that the funding model adopted takes account of 
country-specific factors and reflects the public policy objectives for which the scheme 
was established. Policy makers should ensure that: 
• The scheme has legal authority to levy contributions from banks; 
• The nature and source of the scheme's funding should be clearly understood 
by the authorities, participating institutions and the general public; 
• The power to levy contributions is exercised in a fair and equitable manner so 
that unreasonable and damaging burdens are not placed on member banks; 113 
• Assessments take account of risk-related factors. However, because of the 
complexity in calculating risk-adjusted levies ex ante, it is advisable that new 
schemes, especially in developing countries, start off with flat rate premiums 
and this can be changed gradually, over time; 114 
• Where ex ante funding is established, the fund is well managed and readily 
available to coyer losses as they arise; 115 
I I I r\ F R £> po rf (11 1 ) :. 7 . 
112 Garcia ( Il)l)l» (1123) 11. 
11.1 ;\Ii/(D0l111ld (1l)l)6) (11-l2). 
III Sl'C Chapter 3. para.3,),:',~, 
II) FSF Rt'porl (11 I) :.(), 
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• There are provisions for back-up funding. 
II. Assessment System 
There are two main options available for building and maintaining a deposit insurance 
fund. These are the flat-rate premium system and the risk-based or differential 
premium system. 
Under the flat-rate assessment system, all insured banks are assessed at the same rate 
for the purpose of deposit insurance premium. A flat-rate system is aimed at ensuring 
that the deposit insurer maintains an adequate financial capacity.II6 The disadvantage 
of this method of assessment is that except where deposit insurance is made 
compulsory, adverse selection will be encouraged with only risky banks left to 
participate in deposit insurance. It also creates incentives for moral hazard as the price 
paid for deposit insurance does not reflect risk. The significant advantage is its 
simplicity, which makes it easy, cost-effective and practicable, especially for new 
systems in developing countries. 
A risk-based system involves the assessment of premIUm based on the risk a 
particular bank poses to the deposit insurer. Apart from being an equitable assessment 
method. under ideal circumstances, risk-based assessments should mitigate the risks 
, d· d . h d .. 1 17 I k t . th t' t of moral hazar assocIate WIt eposit Insurance. n a mar e WI per ec 
information, relating deposit insurance premium to risk is preferable. 1 18 
110 moir (20(6) (1120). 
117 Thl' limitation of this as'\c'\'\l11cnt method \\a" examined in tIll' prc\i(lu'\ chaptcr. Sl'l' para.~.5.2 .. '. 
118 "'.SF Report (n I) 2X. 
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Although a risk-related premIum system is not the perfect solution to the deposit 
insurance problem, its objective is to provide an incentive for banks to reduce 
excessive risk-taking and to create a fair assessment process. Where it is adopted, the 
approach used should be effective at differentiating banks into appropriate risk 
categories and have access to, and utilize a variety of relevant information. It should 
also be forward looking and acceptable to the banking industry and other safety-net 
. . 119 partIcIpants. 
Because of the complexities involved in calculating risk ex ante, a regular review 
process should be put in place to ensure that any changes in the sources of risk over 
time are put into consideration and insurance premiums are subsequently adjusted. 
Risk-related premIum systems are necessarily information intensive. As such, 
attention should be paid to the accuracy of the information being relied upon to 
calculate risk, particularly where the deposit insurer has to rely on another safety-net 
participant as the source of such information. A balance also needs to be struck 
between the information requirements of the deposit insurer and the need not to create 
a burdensome regulatory regime for banks. 
Risk-adjusted premlUms are susceptible to subjective judgement and political 
manipulation, thus it is expected that banks might want to contest the decision of the 
h · . . . k 120 Al h h deposit Insurer to place t em In a certain premlUm or ns category. t oug 
judicial reVIew IS an available option In most jurisdictions. the establishment of a 
119 SL'C IADI (2005), 'Gcncral (~uidance for Developing Differential Premium Sy stems' 
lillp://\\\\,\\. iad i. or!.,!/( J 1I idallL'L' (Il 20PaplTs/IA D 1- Di 1'1'(/; 20prc m(i( 20paper(/'c .2otin~ II Ich.2005. po f, 
aL'L'L'SsL'd 1 X DCL'L'lllher 2007. 
120 Scc for e,ample the U.S. casc of Duolin Securiry Sm'. Balik \. FDIC. 53 F.3o 1.~l)5, where the 
FDIC's dccision to terminate the insurcd slatlls of a healthy hank in a dispute mer its asse""lllent ri"k 
classi fil'ation \\as dmllengco. 
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formal and independent reVIeW and dispute settlement mechanism would serve to 
settle any disputes that may arise and also to review decisions of the deposit insurer in 
d· . 121 h' an expe It10US manner. T IS would ensure fairness and consistency in the 
assessment system and also limit the scope for arbitrariness. l22 
4.8. Intervention and Failure Resolution 
The FSF Report notes that the objectives of an effective bank failure resolution 
process are to 'meet the deposit insurer's obligations; ensure depositors are 
reimbursed promptly and accurately; minimise resolution costs and disruption of 
markets; maximise recoveries on assets; settle bona fide claims on a timely and 
equitable basis; and reinforce discipline through legal action in cases of negligence 
and other wrong doing. ,123 
A properly designed deposit insurance system should provide an effective exit 
mechanism for winding down a failed bank and provide the public with ready access 
to insured funds. From a public policy perspective, the main objective of bank 
regulation is not to prevent individual bank failure but to protect the stability of the 
banking system as a whole. As such, the failure of an individual bank should not, in 
all circumstances, raise serious systemic concerns. In a competitive market, the 
survival of the fittest institutions promotes the health, viability and efficiency of the 
121 An example of a similar body that has been established in the UK is the Financial Services and 
Markels Tribunal. although the UK has not adopted a differential assessment system, The tribunal is an 
independent body scI up to re\iew the FSA's regulatory and supervisory decisions in individual cases, 
SL'L' s,13~, FSMA ~OOO. 
122 In Doolin Security Su\'. Bank \' FDIC (n 120) Doolin alleged institutional bias and non-adherence to 
duc proccss on thc parI of the FDIC in withdrawing its deposit insurance covcr. 
1]1 !-SF Report (n I) 31. Profcsoor R()y Goode has also described the overriding objectives of an 
insol\cncy la\\', which arc equally important in bank resolulions, These arc: the restoration or the 
L'lHllpany to profitable trading \\hae practicable: maximi/ation of returns to creditors where the 
company cannot hc saH'd: L'slahlishment of a fair and equitable system for the ranking of claims and 
the distrihution of assets among creditors: and identi rication of the cause of failure and imposition or 
sancllons on culpahle managL'lllent. SL'L' Rr-..t Goode Principles (~/ Corporate Insoil'encY Law (Sweet 8: 
r-..Ia\wcll, London, 2005) 3tJ, 
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sector. However, the process of resolving such failure has important systemic 
implications and can affect the confidence and viability of the regulatory authorities. 
It is important to note that intervention and failure resolution powers are not always 
the exclusive right of the deposit insurer. These powers may be allocated to, or 
exercised in concert with other safety net participants. In countries that operate the 
pay-box model of deposit insurance, the failure resolution powers are usually 
conferred on another agency within the financial safety net. The failure resolution 
powers are often conferred on the deposit insurer where it has a risk minimizing 
mandate. It is important that specific legislative provisions support arrangements for 
close co-operation and exchange of information among safety net participants. 124 
4.8.1. Legal Framework for Bank Resolution 
The special nature of banks and their vital role in an economy is the main justification 
for regulation and supervision of banks. As noted above, banks that are no longer 
financially viable must be allowed to fail. However, because the manner of resolving 
such banks could have systemic consequences and affect the rights of depositors, 
there could also be an extension of the argument for regulation to justify a special 
regime to deal with failing banks. 
Generally, the declaration of insolvency is based on two tests: the balance sheet test 
and the cash flow or equity test. With the first test, an institution becomes technically 
insolvent where its liabilities exceed its assets. With the second test, insolvency is 
determined where the institution is unable to pay its debts as they become legally 
I~·I J Sahourin 'The Drpnsil Insurer's RoIL' in I\laintaining Financial Stahility' Presellled (/Ilhe Chicago 
Fl't/alll Rl'Sl' 1"1"1 , COII!i'rcllce Oil S\"\rcmic Fillallcial Crisis: Resolvillg Large BlIllk IlIsol\'(,lIcies, 
Septemher 30. ~(X)4. 
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due. 125 Where banks are concerned, there is an additional test, which is generally 
referred to as regulatory insolvency. Regulatory insolvency connotes non-compliance 
with capital adequacy requirements. 126 For banks, the two tests mentioned above are 
not relevant trigger points for regulatory intervention. The triggers for regulatory 
action precede the state of insolvency and the conditions for commencement of 
proceedings under general insolvency law. 127 Regulators may need to intervene before 
the state of over-indebtedness is reached 128 or some degree of regulatory forbearance 
may be permitted to give the bank the opportunity to return to a position of 
1· 129 comp lance. 
Policymakers must decide whether to introduce a special insolvency regime for banks 
or whether general insolvency laws would govern bank insolvencies. There is a 
contrasting approach across jurisdictions. 13o Whereas in some jurisdictions banks are 
subject to court-administered insolvency proceedings governed by general insolvency 
law,131 others have introduced a special insolvency regime for banks, which is 
implemented by the bank supervisor or the deposit insurer. 132 While it has been 
argued that there may be no need for a special insolvency regime in countries where 
125 Goode (2()().'1) (nI23) 95. 
I~(, I: Hupkes 'The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency' (Kluwer, Boston, 2000) 12. 
I ~7 E Hupkes 'Insolvency-Why a Special Regime for Banks' in Current Developments in Monetary 
and Financial Lenv, (Vol. 3, IME Washington DC, 2003) ch.25. 
I~X Hupkl's (2000) (n 126). Banks differ from other financial firms hecause of information asymmetry 
and the nature of their contracts' hence supenisors, depositors and other creditors would he unahle to 
access the exact nature of their halance sheet until it is too late. See K Simons and S Cross 'Do Capital 
~LII"l'ts Predict Prohkms in Large Commercial Banks' (May 1(91) New England Economic Review 
)\. 
I~<) .\ Camphell 'Bank Insohl'ncy and the IntLTests of Creditors' (2006) 7 Journal of Banking 
Regulation (112) I.n. 
DO For a comparati\e analysis, Sl'l' HlIpkes (200m (nI26) 49. 
DI This is the appn1ach in most Europl'an l'ountries. 
1'2 hH' l'\.ampk. US.\. Canada and S\\ Il/LTland. 
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bank failure are rare,133 an isolated bank failure, if not effectively resolved could ha\"e 
far-reaching systemic consequences. 
Arguments in favour of a special regime for bank insolvency are based on the grounds 
that the goals of a bank insolvency resolution are different from those of general 
. I 134 h corporate Inso vency, ence the general insolvency framework would be 
insufficient to treat certain features of bank resolution. 13) In many countries, the 
general insolvency law is required to balance the interests of only three competing 
interests, namely, creditors, employees and owners; however in banking insolvency, 
the public interest in a sound banking system must be considered as an additional 
. 136 
mterest. 
Given that bank failures affect the public, entailing costs to the taxpayer and the 
deposit insurer, regulators, as representatives of the public interest, should endeavour 
to intervene early in order to minimize or avoid losses to creditors and the deposit 
insurer. Essentially, good timing is critical for an efficient resolution and exit 
policy. 137 General insolvency laws may not provide the necessary intervention powers 
to deal with failing banks prior to insolvency. The need for preventive and corrective 
action at the pre-insolvency stage is crucial to minimizing the costs and disruptions 
Ln See HN Schiffman 'Legal Measures to Manage Insolvency in Economies in Transition' in Rr-. f 
Lastra and HN Schiffman (eds.). Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition, 
(Kluwer, Boston, 1999) 85. 
131 These goals include: prompt resolution to minimize credit and liquidity losses. as well as costs to 
ta\payers and the deposit insurer: market discipline: and the promotion of public confidence by 
Cl\ (liding interruptions to financial services. See GG Kaufman 'Using Efficient Bank Insolvency 
Resolution to Soln' the Deposit Insurance Problem' in A Campbell and others (cds.), Deposit 
Insurance (Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 2(07) 198. 
135 On the nL'L'd for a special insohL'ncy regime for banks. see Hupkes (2003) (n 127); RM Lastra 
'Cross-horder Resolution of Banking Crisis' in DO Evanoff and others (cds) International Finuncial 
Instability: (;[0/)(11 Ballkillg alld Nution(/I Regulation (World Scientific Publishing. Singapore. 20(7) 
311. 
Db T :\s:-.n (.2000) Legal :"pccrs of ReglilatOlY Treatlll(,lIt of B(/nks in Di.\rrcss (li\IF. \\ashington DC. 
2(00) 155. 
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associated with bank failure. A special bank insolvency regIme also proyides 
consistency and certainty to stakeholders as to how banks would be treated in 
insolvency. This would help to prevent loss of confidence resulting from uncertainty 
in a bank failure. Hence, policymakers must consider whether general insolvency 
laws are adequate to support an efficient intervention policy or whether a special 
insolvency regime for banks should replace or complement them. 
Policy makers must ensure that the approach adopted is fast and efficient and allows 
for early intervention by the supervisor. In countries with a slow judicial process. it 
may be advisable to adopt an administrative procedure, which would be implemented 
by the supervisor. However, in the absence of a uniform international framework for 
bank insolvency, a court based system might be more acceptable where there is an 
international dimension to a bank failure. 138 Factors such as political independence of 
regulators, accountability and transparency, and the availability of remedies for 
infringement of rights should also be considered. Where the institutional framework 
for these factors is weak, a court based system is preferable. 
An effective resolution framework should include early warmng and prompt 
corrective action (PCA) mechanism. This would serve to reduce the cost of resolution 
and to prevent sudden banking crises. 139 The appearance of the early warning signs 
should trigger intervention and failure resolution powers of the deposit insurer or the 
rekvant supervisor. It has been suggested that a 'non-viability' test should be the 
tri ooer for determination. This should include the bank's ability to meet capital l.:'C-
1.17 SI\I Da\ics and D,\ I\kl\lanus 'The Efkcts or CI(lsurc Policics on Bank Risk Taking' (1991) I) 
Journal o/Banking 1I11d FillOllce (-l-5) l) 17. 
us Campbell (~()()6) (n I ~9) I JR. 
1.19 ElIwpcan SIl;tdll\\ Financial Rcglllat(lry C()mmittce 'Reforming Banking Supcn ision in Europc' 
(~(){)5) S(a(l'lIIclI( So.23. :! I ,\'ol'l'lIIbcr: IS Goudman S Shaffer 'Economics of Dcposit Insurancc: .\ 
Critical E\ alliatil)n uf Prop(l~L'd Rcforlll~' (I 9R-l) 2 rail' Jounwl Oil Regula(ioll I. 1-l5. 
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requirements; sIgns of deterioration in the quality or value of assets; liquidity 
problems or severe decline in earnings. 140 These mechanisms must be clearly defined 
in law, transparent and credible. The powers should not be too discretionary in order 
to avoid arbitrary action and the scope for harmful forbearance; this must however be 
balanced against the need to avoid over-prescriptive regulation and the need to allow 
a sufficient degree of flexibility based on regulatory judgement. These considerations 
must be consistent with the objectives of the deposit insurance scheme and other 
macroeconomic policy objectives. 141 
There are numerous steps that are required to liquidate the business of a failing bank. 
Such steps include the resolution or disposition of the failing bank, reimbursement of 
insured depositors, liquidation of the bank's assets, settlement of claims and 
disposition of pending or outstanding litigation. 142 The deposit insurance system 
should be designed, with the support of the relevant legislative provisions, to 
effectively and promptly carry out these functions so as to minimise the disruption 
associated with bank failure. 
4.8.1.1. Resolution Options 
The legal framework should help to determine the type of resolution option that is 
most effective in achieving the goals of the resolution process. The priority of claims 
on the receivership, the rights of claimants, and the authority of the receiver to take 
control and dispose of assets should all be provided for in legislation. I .B There are 
generally three resolution options that are available. These are: liquidation and 
reimbursement of depositors' claims: purchase and assumption transactions. use of 
I hI Sabourin (11 1 ~-l). 
III ('111011 (2()O-l) (n~7L 
I·I~ I:SF Report. 31. 
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bridge banks and open bank financial assistance. The main features of these resolution 
options will be considered in turn. 
I. Liquidation and Reimbursement of Depositors' Claims 1++ 
This involves the closure of a failed bank while its assets and uninsured claims are 
transferred to a receiver/liquidator for liquidation and settlement. 145 Insured depositors 
are also reimbursed up to the specified coverage limit,146 or the insured balances may 
be transferred to another open bank, thereby making the balances available to the 
depositors. 
Adoption of this option effectively terminates the existence of the insured bank, and it 
can be used where it has proved impossible to secure a merger or acquisition deal 
mainly because the failing bank has no franchise value. It may also be adopted where 
it is considered to be the fastest way of ensuring that depositors are reimbursed in 
order to prevent contagious runs, which may trigger a systemic crisis; or when the 
costs involved are considered to be less than that of other resolution options. 147 
This method can be disruptive because depositors would be forced to find new banks 
and there would be a reduction in the availability of credit due to the closure of the 
institution. 148 It may also be costly for the deposit insurer to effect a deposit payout, 
especially where a large bank is involved. 
14.1 A:/'Iella (1999) (n~O); Campbell (2006) (n 129). 
111'1'1' . I k d' t't' liS 1:-0 a su 'no\\n as cposll pay-o . 
14.~ FSI: Rcport. 3~. 
1·lh The insurer taKL':-O the placc of thc insurcd depositors in the receivership. 
117 For \arious reasuns adduced hy differcnt countries that have adopted this option. :-oee \V Su 'Gcneral 
(,uidance fllr the Rcslliution of Bank Failures' in :\ Campbcll and other:-o (cds) !>CpOSiT !flSI/IWICC 
(p;t1~r;I\L' i\la(millan. Ncw York. ~OO7). eh 10. 
I I~ "'~('(('Il(/ ( 1999) (n20). 
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Where reimbursement is to be used, the law should provide a realistic time limit from 
the date of the bank closure to actual reimbursement. This would avoid unnecessary 
delay, which could result in loss of confidence and contagious runs on other healthy 
banks. The deposit insurer should also be given access to the relevant information and 
deposit records for the purpose of the payout. 
II. Purchase and Assumption Transactions 
A purchase and assumption (P & A) is a transaction in which a healthy bank or group 
of investors assumes some or all of the obligations, and purchases some or all of the 
assets of a troubled bank.I49 It has been noted that many banks and other firms 
provide products and services that are similar to those offered by a failed bank and 
that because of this similarity, operations and most of the assets and liabilities of 
insolvent banks tend to be acquired by other institutions. I5o The assets that are not 
acquired under the P & A transaction are disposed of by the receiver/liquidator. 
P & A transactions minimise market disruptions by avoiding interruptions in banking 
operations and allowing credit relationships to be maintained. I5I P & A may also be 
considered to be less costly than depositor reimbursement. In a P & A, the assets that 
arc taken over by the assuming bank will not end up in the receivership, where they 
1,1'1 lNG's acquisition or Barings in 1995, and the recent acquisition of Bear Stearns by lP :-dorgan 
Chase arc exalllpks or similar transactions, See FSF Report 32. Instead of a P & A transaction, the 
railurl' resolution authority may also arrangl' a financially assisted merger of the railing hank with 
another healthy ban\.... On the usc or thl' P&A hy the FDIC. see generally rDIC Resollltio1l Handho(lk. 
~()(n. 
ISO GJ Henston and GG Kaurman 'The :\ppn lpriate Role of Bank Regulation' (1996) 106 TIll! 
FO>l/ol1lic jOlln1al -lJ(1. 6XX. 
lSI A"l'!c/1ll ( IYYY) (n.2O). 
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would have had to be liquidated at unfavourable prices. 152 Another ad\'i.U1tage of the 
P&A transaction is that it is usually a private sector funded transaction. not needing 
the injection of public funds. A key hindrance to the use of P & A transactions is that 
it may be difficult, in a financial crisis, to find a bank with sufficient liquidity and 
willing to take over a failing bank. This is particularly true in developing countries. 15J 
III. Bridge Bank 
A modification of the P & A transaction, which is often used in the resolution of large 
and complex banks, involves the use of a 'bridge bank'. The relevant supervisory 
agency takes over ownership or control of the failed bank, through a temporary 
structure, until a final resolution can be achieved. 1S4 A bridge bank maintains banking 
services for the customers, gives supervisory authorities sufficient time to evaluate 
and market the failed bank, and prevents a bank from failing while prospective 
acquirers take time to evaluate the quality of its assets. 
The major disadvantage of using the bridging bank structure is the time, expertise and 
financial resources that would be expended in running the institution. It is important 
that the bank does not remain under official control for a long time as it may lose 
value and draw deposits away from other banks. ISS This may also lead to increased 
costs in the final resolution of the bank. The relevant law should provide a maximum 
time limit for a bridge bank to remain in operation. 
IV. Open-Bank Financial Assistance 
I.~~ J a/ler (Jlld ,\IU\ ( 1990) (n55). 
15] In tk'\l'Ioping L'Ountnl'~. it is orten thl' L'a~l' that the ;1L'quiring bank \\ ill be a foreign hank; such an 
acquisition will giH' the pppurtunity III mow into a new marKL'1. 
15,1 The COJ1lpeliti\e I quality Banking .\(t of 19~7 gi\es the FDIC authority to charter a tempm;lr: 
hank. which call be u~l'd II) manage a failed hank for up to ~ years until the hank is acquired or mergl'd. 
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In open-bank assistance, the resolution authority provides financial assistance in the 
form of cash, loans, or assets purchases to a troubled institution to prevent its 
failure. 156 Open bank assistance is usually provided to banks that are deemed 'too big 
to fail.' 157 In certain cases, open bank assistance may also be adopted where the cost 
of doing so is considered less than that of a depositor payout. 
One significant disadvantage relating to the use of open bank assistance is that public 
funds are required to keep the troubled bank afloat. The use of open-bank assistance 
raises issues relating to fairness, cost and moral hazard. This failure resolution method 
is also susceptible to intense political lobbying and may lead to shareholders and other 
uninsured creditors and depositors receiving compensation that they would not 
otherwise have done. 158 To avoid adverse effects on market discipline, private sector 
solutions should always be explored in resolving failing banks, with public funds 
being utilized only in exceptional circumstances, such as where there is a grave 
d f' .. k 159 anger 0 systemIc ns . ' 
This authority has heen used by the FDIC hetween 1987 and 1994 to solve 11-.+ failed hanks with ~89.9 
hill ion in total assets through 32 hridge hanks. 
I~" I 'SI' R ") ~ ,. " . epmt. ,',', 
I.~b Ketcha (1999) (n20): J Mingo 'Open-hank t\ssistance Transactions and Prompt Correcti\e Action' 
( 199-.+) 8 Journal (~l Fillullcial Sen'ices Research -.+. 313. 
1'>7 This rekrs to the kar that the potential failure of a large hank poses significant dlsrupti\l.! threats to 
other financial institutions. the financial system as a whok. and possihly to the economic and .social 
order. Sl'e generally GH Stern and RJ Feldman Too Big To Fail: The Haamis of BUllA: BailO/lfs 
(Bwokings Institution Press. Washington DC. 2()()-'+ l. 
I.'iSl'SI'R 1~ 
" . eport. ,',', 
l:i') :\ Campbell 'Bank insohenc~ and the Problem of Nonperforming Loans'(2007) 9 Jourl/al of 
BlIllkillg Nt'glilutioll I. 25, 
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4.8.2 Policy Considerations in Failure Resolution 
In designing the failure resolution framework and in adopting the appropriate 
resolution option for a particular institution, the regulator should be guided by the 
following policy considerations: 
• The need to enhance public confidence and maintain the stability of the 
financial system; 
• The need to minimize moral hazard by promoting market discipline; 
• The need to minimize losses and costs, essentially by controlling the timing of 
the intervention and applying a least-cost resolution test; 
• The need for an equitable, consistent and transparent process: 160 the deposit 
insurer should put in place well-defined policy guidelines and standard 
operational procedures for all bank resolution processes; 161 
• The need to minimize disruption of banking services in the communities 
where the insolvent banks are located; 162 
• The need to limit government involvement in the ownership and management 
of financial institutions. This makes it imperative for market-based resolution 
options to be explored as far as possible. 
An efficient failure resolution framework puts the extent of the losses suffered during 
a bank failure under the control of the regulator or deposit insurer. 163 Kaufman 
articulates four principles for an efficient failure resolution regime, all of which are 
160 Due to information impcrtCctitll1s, any perception of inequitahle treatment in the distrihution of 
di\ idends and lossl's from the liquidation process could undermine puhlic confidence and consequently 
the entire process. 
161 .\'11 (~()()7) (n 147). 
162 JF Bll\L'I1/.i and I\IF MuldlHHl 'Failure Resolution l\lL-thuds and Polic: Considerations· (19l)O) 3 
I-DI(' Blinking Rf\·il'lI' I. I. 
hinged on the concept of timely and prompt action by regulators. These principles 
• Prompt legal closure where the bank's capital declines to a pre-specified and 
well-publicized minimum value greater than zero; 
• Prompt estimates of the recovery value and assignment of any credit losses 
(haircuts) to de jure uninsured bank claimants; 
• Prompt re-opening, particularly of large banks, with full depositor access to 
their accounts on their due dates at par value for insured deposits and recovery 
value for uninsured deposits, and full borrower access to existing credit lines; 
• Prompt re-privatization and re-capitalization of the bank in whole or in part at 
adequate capital levels. 
The above-mentioned principles presuppose the existence of the necessary legal 
and institutional framework that permits early intervention and prompt corrective 
action. For timely intervention to be possible, it is important to put in place a rule-
based or statutory trigger mechanism for early intervention when the warning 
signs for a bank failure appear. 
It is also important that the relevant bank insolvency laws provide for the various 
resolution options discussed above. The absence of alternatives may lead to 
unnecessary liquidation of banks which may be economically inefficient in most 
cases. It is also possible that in the absence of alternative resolution options other 
than liquidation, thl' banking supervisor may delay closing the bank and engage in 
harmful regulatory forbearance. 
1(11 111_ Ral'1 '\\'hat Wl' Know J\houtthc Deposit Insurancl' Prohlcm' (1990) ~5 Chicago Fed Lefta I. 
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Generally, the resolution process for failed banks should involve a balancing act 
on the part of the regulator. Where the least-cost resolution test is required by law. 
the question arises as to whose interests should be considered. It is submitted that 
in applying the test, the relevant authority should not only choose the resolution 
option that is least-costly to the deposit insurance fund, but should also consider 
the interests of other stakeholders such as depositors. 
While a least-cost test is important, it is pertinent to note that the least-cost option 
may not necessarily be the most effective option in all cases. 'Effectiveness' 
should be determined by reference to the deposit insurer's mandates and 
objectives. Hence, such factors such as the interests of depositors and overall 
financial stability should be balanced against the need to minimize cost. The 
deposit insurer should therefore adopt the most cost-effective resolution option. 
4.9. Public Awareness 
Public information and awareness about the existence, purpose, functions and 
limitations of deposit insurance is a factor that is often overlooked in the design and 
implementation of deposit insurance schemes. 165 The characteristics of a deposit 
insurance scheme need to be publicized regularly so that its credibility can be 
maintained and strengthened. 166 More than anything else, it is the knowledge of the 
existence and purpose of deposit insurance that provides confidence and reduces the 
possibility of a shock occurring in a crisis. It is impossible for deposit insurance to 
foster public confidence in the banking system if the public is not aware of its 
led A.'l/util/l/I/ (2007) (n 13-0. 199. 
Ie,:; I'SI": Wl)rkill~ Croup on Deposit Insurance. Dis(,II.\siol/ Paper 01/ Public A~mr(,l/ess. 
Ihb I-'SF Report. 21). 
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existence. If depositors are uncertain whether or not their funds are safe, there is a 
strong likelihood that they will withdraw their funds at the slightest hint of a problem 
at their banks. This situation could lead to a bank run with possible systemic 
implications. 
In many countries, the level of deposit insurance awareness is low. 167 Most people 
assume that the deposit insurer is just another supervisor and that the government 
protects all of their deposits. 168 This has necessitated the establishment of public 
awareness programs in most countries that have deposit insurance schemes. It is 
crucial that a public awareness program is introduced as soon as possible after the 
decision has been made to establish a deposit insurance scheme. This would ensure 
that when financial crises occur, the public would be aware about the protection that 
the scheme offers, thus maintaining confidence in the financial system. 169 
A properly designed public awareness program would promote the dissemination of 
information that facilitates an understanding of the deposit insurance scheme, its main 
features and limitations. Public awareness programs should be designed to achieve the 
following objectives: 
• The dissemination of information to facilitate the understanding of the concept 
of, and the rationale for deposit insurance; 
• The promotion and sustenance of confidence in the financial sector; 
Ih7 R 1\ \arko\a 'Case Study on Public A \\areness - Bulgaria' (200~) Preselltatio/l llt the IADlfEBRD 
Scmillor Oil Dl'IJOsitlllslIrllllceti),. the H'estem Balkolls, BIS. 8-9 December 2003, 
IhS CI )IC. 'Publil' :\ wareness and Education Programme OVLT\in". http://\\'''\\',nlic.l'a/"?id= 1.+2 , 
;!l'l'C sscd .2 () Aug u s t .2 006. 
Ih') I:SF Report. 2 l), 
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• The dissemination of vital information to insured depositors when bank failure 
occurs. 170 
It is important to determine the target audience for a public awareness program. The 
target audience should include: 
• The general public; 
• Media; 
• Banks and Banking Associations, including their employees; 171 
• Law makers and public officials; 172 
• Uninsured depositors and other creditors of failed banks. 173 
Special communication strategies need to be developed to ensure that the goals of the 
program are achieved and that the target audience is reached. Some of the 
communication techniques that can be used include: 
• Press releases and conferences; 
• Printed material (annual reports, periodic journals, Q & A brochures); 
• Regularly updated websites and telephone help lines; 
D· . d . 174 d • IScussions an semInars ; an 
• Research. 175 
170 FSF Working Group on Deposit Insurance, Discussion Paper on Public A H'areness. 
171 FSF Report 29 notes that hank employees. especially those in operations and those on the front-line. 
are important conduits for providing information ahout deposit insurance. 
In Lawmakers and puhlic nlliciab need to be sensitized where there is need for deposit insurance 
reform and on the dirL'L'lion llf such reform. 
17 \ M (/ rk (! \'(/ (2 ()()3) (n 1(7). 
17·1 II . J ){( . 
m NationalqualitatiH' and quantitative studies can he carried Ollt to e\aluate the Sllccess of the puhlic 
a\\ dll'nL':-':-' pro~ram. 
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4.10. Interrelationship with Safety Net Participants 
Efficient interrelationship between financial safety net participants is essential to the 
success of a deposit insurance scheme. The FSF Report states that: 'when a single 
organisation performs all the safety net functions the smooth resolution of potential 
tensions is dependent on clarity of mandates and an adequate accountability regime 
among the relevant departments. However, when the functions are assigned to 
different organisations, issues related to information sharing, allocation of powers and 
responsibilities, and coordination of actions among different functions are more 
complex and need to be addressed clearly and explicitly.' 176 Thus interrelationship 
considerations will vary according to a country's specific institutional arrangements. 
The basic features of a financial safety net are: 
• The Lender of Last Resort (LoLR): this IS usually a function of the central 
bank; 177 
• Supervision: this IS also a function of the central bank or other specialized 
. 178 
agencIes; 
• Deposit insurance: usually managed by a public agency or privately or a joint 
. / bl' 179 prIvate pu IC venture. 
17Cl FS F Report, 19; whi Ie most countries have the financial safety net functions separated. some 
countries have adopted consolidated regulatory and supervisory regimes. for example. the UK and 
Taiwan. 
177 In (~er1l1any, the LoLR is managed hy the Liko hank. a private company owned by banks and the 
Ccntral Bank. 
178 In the UK and Australia. supervision is done hy separate ageneies. In the US. Canada and Nigeria. 
the deposit insurer carries out some supervisury functions. 
179 J..\C Santos 'Is the Institutional :\lIucation of Deposit Insurance Important'?' PreWnl(llion al the 
II/ll'/"I/Oliono/ ,\ssociarioll of Deposil Insurers' ,\lccring, ;\/ani/a,16-17 Febnwry 2006. Apart from 
thesL' safety nL't participants. most countries have a government department (the ~lini"try of Finance or 
TrL';\Slln) that is usually I'l'spl1nsiblc for financial scdor policy; also a third safety-net componcnt. 
namely,- an L'xit 111L'chanism fur \\cak financial institutions. may cxist on its l)\\n or may be merged into 
the llL:posit insurancL' ur sllpen i"ion function. SL'C S Ing\cs and :\1 Quintyn 'Financial Stahility 
:\S"l'ssments: Implicatilllls for (io\L'rnance .\rrangcments' Prestl/latioll ul lhe Inlerllalimw/ 
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Differences in mandates, interests, opInIon and policy of financial safety net 
participants create a potential for conflict. This makes co-ordination and co-operation 
essential if the effectiveness of these bodies is not to be undermined. The major 
considerations for policy makers in the development of an effective interrelationship 
strategy will now be considered in tum. 
4.10.1 Information Sharing 
The different safety net functions contribute to the stability of the financial system but 
they create a potential conflict of interest because their functions necessarily overlap 
and are also interdependent. The deposit insurer requires information to function and 
the primary source of information is usually the supervisory authority. The deposit 
insurer can also obtain information directly from banks. 
A deposit insurer's information requirements vary according to its mandate and this is 
illustrated in Table 4.1 below. Where deposit insurance is operated through a simple 
pay-box model, the deposit insurer only requires basic information for the calculation 
of premiums and the prompt settlement of depositors' claims when banks fail. 18o A 
risk-minimizing deposit insurer requires more information because of its broader 
mandate. It should have access to financial statements and other reports of banks in 
order to be able to monitor their financial conditions and anticipate any problem. 
The information requirements of the deposit insurer in normal times also differ from 
the requirements in a crisis, While information in normal times is required for the 
t\.\S(I('illfion (~f f)l'IJ(lsir Insllrers (nDI) 2nd .\nll/wl Conference, SI'OIlI, SOllth ",'orell. 23 - 2,,/ Ocro/Jcr 
.!(}03. 
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purpose of calculating premiums and risk evaluation, during a bank failure or crisis, 
the deposit insurer requires more information for the purposes of depositor 
reimbursement and bank resolution or liquidation. I81 
The supervisory authority is the safety net participant that is best placed to assess 
accurately and ensure the quality of information provided by financial institutions. 
This makes it important for policymakers to ensure close and effective co-ordination 
between the supervisory authority and the deposit insurer. It is often necessary for the 
deposit insurer to supplement information obtained from the supervisory authority 
with information obtained directly from banks. The need to obtain relevant and 
sufficient information should however be balanced against the need not to place an 
excessive burden on the banking industry~ an effective information sharing 
arrangement would prevent unnecessary duplication thus reducing the regulatory and 
reporting burden on banks. Safety net participants should also ensure that the 
confidentiality of certain information is respected and maintained in the process of 
• .f' • h' 182 lillormatlOn s aring. 
180 The information required relates to a hank's deposit hase including the amount of deposits held hy 
individual depositors. This \\i1lenahlc the deposit insurer to apply cO\erage limits. 
181 WK Carr 'I\kasures to Promote Effective Interrelationships among Financial Sakty Net 
Participants' in :\ Camphell and others (cds) Deposit Insurance (palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
2(07).. 
IS~ \:\\)I 'C'l'neral (~uidance to Promote Efkcti\l' Interrelationships among Financial Safety Net 
Part ic i panls' ( ~()()6) :\ \ ai lahk at !til p:/ /\\\\\\. i ad i. (11"""/(" uid:l ncc(/~ 20Paper,J20()()-O I -
12 (iuid;\I1l'l' (In InlL-rll'latillnship-fina1.pdf. ;\l'ce-"Sl'd 18 Decemher ~()07.: sec also I'"SF Report ~(), 
- - 2()() 
Table 4.1 Deposit Insurance Mandate and Interrelationship Issues 183 
Mandate Powers Interaction Effecti veness Interrelationship 
During Life and Issues 
Cycle Cost 
Of Minimization 
Institutions 
(Beginning, 
Middle, End) 
(1) Pure Reactive (e.g. Failure Low Mainly information 
pay-box clean up, sharing 
liquidation) 
(2) Cost- Mainly reactive, Approaching Low- Requires well 
reducing some proactive failure Medium defined roles, 
objective features (e.g. (but some responsibilities, 
clean-up but some interaction upon information sharing 
risk assessment and failure) 
and coordination 
limited role in 
fai I ure resolution) 
(3) Full Proacti ve (e.g. risk Beginning, High Requires well 
risk- identification. risk Midlife, defined roles, 
assessment and Troubled responsibilities, mInImIzer 
management) 
information sharing 
and coordination 
-
111.1 S(lllrL'l': JR LaBwsSl' 'Interrelationships and Its Role in Promoting Effective Deposit Insurance 
S, stelllS' I)"I'\('I/Iolioll to lilt' ,\ I)Fe Polin' Dialogue Oil /)c{J0.\lt Insurallce. 17 Fehruary 2004. 
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4.10.2 Allocation of Regulatory Powers 
In order to fulfil its mandate effectively, each member of the financial safety net 
would prefer to monitor and supervise financial institutions in its own right. This 
would be impracticable and would result in a conflict of interests and mandates as 
well as increased regulatory costs. Thus, it becomes important to determine the 
institutional allocation of regulatory powers and functions. A clear designation of 
powers and responsibilities of safety net participants is a critical step toward 
achieving effective interrelationship. Institutional allocation is affected by vanous 
factors, which include the development level of a country's financial sector, political 
. + d h .. f 184 mterlerence an t e supervIsory In rastructure. 
The FSF Report recommends that regulatory allocation arrangements can be 
formalised through legislation, memoranda of understanding, legal agreements, or a 
combination of these methods. 185 Legislation is the primary means for allocating 
institutional arrangements among regulators. However, it is impossible for lawmakers 
to envisage all the practical possibilities of regulatory conflict at the time the law is 
being promulgated. It thus becomes important that a combination of all the methods 
mentioned above is utilized in regulatory allocation. Furthermore, the allocation of 
regulatory mandates and co-ordination arrangements should be made clear ex ante 
hefore any crisis occurs. Prior discussions and a high degree of transparency are 
essential requirements when establishing the co-ordination framework to facilitate 
information sharing and effective communication. 186 
lSI I J)(lIl!2 I 'Role of Dep(l~it InSlIrallL'L' :\~L'ncies in an Integralin~ i"inancial SlIpcnisory Environment' 
Pr(;'\/Jnfu;ion af fhe /nfenwfional A\socillfioll (~f Deposif Insurers' \/l'I'ring. ,\lulli/a. February 16-17, 
~( J06, 
IS.~ I'SF Report ~(), 
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Examples of practical problems that may arise between regulatory institutions and the 
deposit insurer will be considered below: 
I. Deposit Insurer and the Termination/Closure Authority 
Where the function of the termination or closure of failed banks is assigned to a 
different regulatory body, it is possible that the terminating authority may adopt a 
looser closure policy than the deposit insurer would have adopted. This can lead to a 
potential conflict of interest because deposit insurance losses are closely related to the 
timing of the closure of a failing bank.I87 Thus, the interest of the deposit insurer in 
ensuring the timely closure of a bank when a failure is imminent might be different 
from the interest of the closure authority. The closure authority will not necessarily 
bear the full costs of delaying a bank closure as such costs is usually the deposit 
insurer's responsibility. 
Policymakers can mitigate this problem by introducing regulation that protects the 
deposit insurer from other regulatory policies or regulation that targets institutions 
whose policies may give rise to conflict. Such regulation includes: 
• Giving the deposit insurer the right to withdraw insurance; 
• Giving legal priority to insured depositors; 
• Introduction of PCA mechanisms.
I88 
Introduction of risk-adjusted capital standards can also help to protect the deposit 
insurer against the policies of a different closure/ termination authority. A high capital 
I~(l /.\/)1 C~O(6) (n I X~), 
I~l 1\1 H(lnitl (19X3). 'TIlL' ClSl' Against Risk-Relall'd Deposit Insurance Premiums' in E G .. mkner 
(l't!) Uf..: Blinking SII/J(,(l'ision: FI'(I!lIrion, PracriCl' and ISSIIl'S (Allen l\.: Unwin, London. Il)X6), 
standard would reduce the probability of the deposit insurer incurring losses when a 
bank fails because losses are first absorbed by capital. 189 
II. Deposit Insurer and Lender of Last Resort (LoLR) 
The LoLR helps to prevent contagious bank runs by providing liquidity support to 
banks that are illiquid but solvent and have good collateral, in order to allow them to 
meet depositor demands and avoid closure. 190 Where the LoLR function is allocated 
to an institution other than the deposit insurer,191 the institution may also adopt a loose 
liquidity support policy. By giving liquidity support to banks through short-term 
collateralized loans, the LoLR gives itself priority over depositors and avoids costs 
that may result from failure. 192 Where the LoLR function and the terminating function 
are allocated to a single institution, there is the high probability for regulatory 
forbearance, which may be damaging to the deposit insurer's interest. 
It is also important to note that some deposit insurers can also provide liquidity 
support to insured banks. This creates a potential conflict as provision of such support 
is the traditional function of the LoLR. While the deposit insurer is usually given this 
power for the purpose of preventing individual bank problems from resulting in 
systemic crisis, it could also create an internal crisis where the deposit insurer is also 
responsible for failure resolution. A deposit insurer with such 'conflicting mandates' 
ISS 
" Salltos (2006) (n 179). 
I~ U) Halle (1999) (n-L'I . 
19() The tllL'llr\ on the need for LoLR was developed hy \\' Bagehot, in his hook Lombard Street: . i 
/)nlTiptioll (1 tire ,\lOlIl'Y ,\larket (H.S King, London, 1873); sec also H Thornton. \n Enquiry Into the 
Nature alld Effects (~f'thl' paper Credit (~f Great Britaill (1. Hatchard, London, 1802). Sce Chapter 2 for 
a disL'llssion on the LoLR. 
I'll The I.lli ,R is the principal functi(ln of most ('cntral Banks around the world. 
II)~ ('I\t Khan and J:\C S;\I1((lS ':\Iiocaling Bank Regulalory Powers: Lender of Last Resort. Dep(lsil 
insuranL'l' ;lI1d SupenisllHl' (2001) BIS Workillg Papers .\'0. IO:l. 
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should be gIven access to appropriate and sufficient information to make its 
. d 193 JU gement. 
This problem can be solved by enacting laws and regulation to give priority to deposit 
insurance claims. This should also stipulate penalties to be imposed on the LoLR 
when its loans lead to losses for the deposit insurer. Such regulation will create the 
incentive for the LoLR, in the exercise of its discretionary powers, to provide liquidity 
support only to solvent banks. 194 It is however important that the discretionary nature 
of the LoLR function is maintained. This will allow the LoLR to assess the severity of 
individual cases and subsequently determine whether or not to grant liquidity 
support. 195 
In order to solve potential interrelationship problems, policymakers should consider 
whether or not other safety net participants should be allowed to sit on the deposit 
insurer's governing board or have some input in the deposit insurer's decision-making 
process. In this regard, it would also be useful to establish a body to ensure co-
operation, co-ordination and harmonization of policies and activities of financial 
safety net participants. 196 Government-owned deposit insurance systems and other 
financial safety net participants should also have a degree of accountability to another 
supervisory or government authority.197 Although statutory and formal arrangements 
arc necessary for the effective co-ordination of the activities of the safety net 
193 Clirr (2007) (n 181). 
19-1 Followin ll the findino of a US House of Representatives Stud)1 in 1991 that Federal loans to L' C' 
troubled hanks in the 1980s resulted in increased losses to the FDIC. Congress, through the FDICI.\, 
introdul'l'd restrietions and stipulated a penalty for lending to hanks that suhsequently fail. 
1<):\ RM Lastra 'Lender of Last Resort: :\n International Perspective' (1999) 4X !nfernUfiOlwl and 
COII/parali\'{' Law Quarlerly 22, 339. 
1% In Canada, COllllllilll'es of officials llr the Deposit insurance scheme and the supen isury authorit) 
baH' bcen l'stablished to facilitall' the consideration of all matters of mutual interest. In the US, the 
banking ;lgl'llL'ics arc I11l'lllhns llf a cUlll1cil l'slahlisbed to promote consistency, uniformity and 
progrl'''s in banking supen Ision, 
2()) 
functions, goodwill and commitment IS required on the part of each safet\' net 
participant for such arrangements to succeed. 
4.11 Provisional Conclusion 
While the concept of deposit insurance is a relatively simple one. its design and 
implementation is undoubtedly complex. Its intricacies involve setting realistic 
objectives against the background of institutional factors, and matching the objectives 
with the appropriate structure and design features. An attempt has been made in this 
chapter to develop a set of sound practices in order to create a model of deposit 
insurance that creates the right incentives to mitigate the perverse effects of deposit 
msurance. 
The application of the design and structural principles enunciated in this chapter 
should be considered against the backdrop of two important considerations. The first 
consideration is the role which certain factors, which are exogenous to the deposit 
insurance scheme, play in its successful implementation. These factors include 
political stability, macroeconomic stability and overall soundness of the banking 
system, and the adequacy of the supporting regulatory and legal framework. 198 
The second consideration is the fact that there is no 'one size fits all' approach to the 
design and implementation of deposit insurance schemes. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, design features vary according to country-specific peculiarities. With regard 
to these di fferenccs. the various design options ha\'c been considered \\'ith the trade-
offs necessary to strike a proper balance. As noted in the FSF Report, a continuous 
1<)7 In Korea. the safety net is cnordinatcd hy the Ministr\ or Finanl'c and the Econllim and till' 
Finanri:t1 Supervisory Committee (FSC), 
J<lS Till'''l' can hl' rcferrnl to a" foundational issue", 
206 
evaluation and improvement process can be useful In achieving the balance 
. d 199 requIre. 
I')<) FSF Rl'lwrt 17: I.\DI (~omn (n~). Principle I. 
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CHAPTERS 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES 
5.0 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the basic design and structural issues to be considered by 
policy makers in the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme were considered. 
This was done in an attempt to develop a set of sound principles. However, abstract 
arguments do not achieve much without the context of historical factors; financial, 
political and legal systems; contracting environments; and regulatory objectives 
which vary across jurisdictions. These have a significant bearing on the design and 
implementation of deposit insurance schemes in different jurisdictions. This 
notwithstanding, the continuous elimination of sectoral and geographic limitations in 
financial markets has raised certain international dimensions to the introduction of 
deposit insurance schemes and a consequent need for co-operation or harmonization 
among national schemes. 
This chapter starts with an analysis of the deposit insurance laws and arrangements in 
two key jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and the United States. The deposit 
insurance schemes in both countries serve as key models of the pay-box and risk-
minimizer deposit insurance systems respectively. The latter part of the chapter 
considers the cross-border issues and means of achieving efficient and effectiye co-
ordination among national schcmcs. 
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5.1 Country Experience: The UK 
5.1.1 An Overview of UK Banking Regulation 
The UK financial sector is made up of a wide range of deposit -taking and non 
deposit-taking institutions. 1 For the purpose of this thesis, more attention will be 
focussed on the regulation of deposit-taking financial institutions. Prior to 1979, there 
was little or no formal regulatory law applying to banking business in the UK. 
Historically, the supervision of the banking sector was a function of the Bank of 
England, which was established in 1694 by an Act of Parliament. 2 It is remarkable to 
note that until 1979, the Bank of England operated its supervisory functions on a 
largely non-statutory basis? In this regard, it has been observed that: 
'Self regulation operated by the Bank of England relied upon personal 
knowledge of the banks which operated in the UK. Moral persuasion, a 
form of coercive persuasion, was very much the order of the day. 
Whenever the bank wished to exercise its considerable authority, in the 
event of a suspected deviation from acceptable practice, the Governor of 
the bank would simply send a polite letter to the appropriate institution 
indicating the way in which the bank expected the institution to conduct its 
business. When it wished to enforce a policy of general application, it 
would send out formal letters of request requiring each bank to conform to 
new practice and new procedures which the bank deemed appropriate. 
I For a dassification, scc J Revell The British Financial System (I\L1L'millan. London. 1<:)7J): J Gilhody 
The VA.' Moneto!"\' (\ Finllncial SYStem: An Introduction (Routledge, London. 1<:)88) 
2 For a histllricai narrativc scc iH Clapham The Bank of England: ;\ History \'01. I & 2 (CamhridgL' 
UniHTsilV PrL'SS. Camhridgc. 19-+-+): ,\M Andrcades History of the Balik of Englund: 1640-1903 
(ROUlkd~l'. I.l1l1don. 1 <:)66): RS Sayl'rs The Bllnk of Englalld: 1891-1944 (Camhridge L1ni\crsity Press. 
Camhridge. 1976): RD Ridl,uds Farly History (~r Bal/killg il/ England (.\ugustus 1\1 Kl'ily Puhs. New 
Yllrk.I<:)65) . 
. 1 C (,hallerin' and :\ I.dcll\ itch SlIpt'rri\iol/ alld SlIl1'eilllll/('(,: rhe POII'ers of the Fil/ul/cial .\cn;('(',\ 
Authority (i'lI1an(ial \\'()r1d. Cantcrhur~. 200 I) (h I, 
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Although such letters had no force of law, the Bank expected its views to 
be observed in the spirit as well as the letter, and it was often remarked that 
no banker in his right mind would buck the Bank of England. ,4 
A number of factors necessitated a change in the supervisory regime that existed at 
the time as the volume and complexity of banking activities increased significantly. 
The first UK Banking Act of 1979 was motivated in particular by two factors. First 
after the secondary banking crisis of 1973-74,5 which was characterised by over-
lending followed by a fall in property values, it became clear that a large number of 
banks operated outside the ambit of the Bank of England's supervisory regime. 
Second, as a member of the European Economic Community (EEC), legislation was 
necessary to implement the first EEC Banking Directive of 1977 which was partly 
aimed at harmonising the authorisation of credit institutions throughout the member 
states of the EEC.6 
However, the Bank of England did not admit the ineffectiveness of the existing 
regulatory framework, insisting that the main policy lesson from the period of the 
secondary crisis was that 'self-regulation can be put to too great a test if competition 
from the less-regulated and less-disciplined is too easily permitted.' 7 The Bank also 
recognised the dangers that the failure of individual banks posed to the system and 
noted that it had to mount a rescue operation 'for the benefit of the depositors of a 
-l (.i,\ Penn Banking Supervision: Regulation of the UK Banking Sector Under the Banking Ad 1987 
(Butter\\(lrtils. London. 1989) 3. For the history of the supervisory functions of the Bank see: (.' 
HadjiL'rnmanuil Banking Regulation and the Bank of England (LLP. London. 1(96). See also Lord 
JlIsliL'e Bingham Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and COl1/merce Intemmiollal 
(H~ ISO. London. <ktoher 1992). An analysis of the report can he found in MJB Hall Banking 
Regulation and Supen'ision: :\ ('olllparatil'e Study of the UK. USA and Japan (Ed\\ard Ugar. 
:\ldershot. 1(93), 
:\ hlr a di~L'lIssion on the crisis. ~L'l' 1\1 Reid The Sccolldary Banking Crisis. ft)j3-75: Its Causl's and 
lourse (~lael11illan.l.ondon. It)S~). 
6 \\ Blair and other~ Bunking Ol/(/ Filli/llcia/ Sen'ices Regulation (Butte("\\orths. London. ~()()~) eh.l. 
7 'Speeehe~ hy the (;ll\ l'J'nor llf the Bank of England' 14 Bank ofFllgland Quarterly BIIIh-rill 54. 
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group of institutions which were not fully recognised banks, but whose otherwise 
inevitable collapse would have threatened the well-being of some recognised banks. ,:-; 
This led the bank to press for a reform of its regulatory arrangements and the 
tightening of the legal regime governing use of banking names and descriptions. 
The key feature of the 1979 Act was the introduction of new authorisation procedures 
requiring any company desiring to operate as a deposit-taker in the UK to secure 
authorisation from the bank unless it was specifically exempted under the Act. A 
deposit-taking institution was recognised as a bank based on the range of banking 
services it provided. Such services included sterling or foreign currency current or 
deposit account facilities; the acceptance of funds in the wholesale money markets: 
provision of overdraft or loan facilities; and foreign exchange services.9 
As a result of the historically informal evolution of banking supervision in the UK, 
there is still no formal list of permitted or prohibited lists of activities that banks may 
engage in, as is found in the banking laws of many countries. 10 The term 'bank' has 
been interpreted to connote different things at different times and for different 
purposes. II Due to historical differences, there is no international uniformity in the 
definition of 'banking business' and most countries tend to define it in a fairly general 
way or by reference to a list of permissible activities. 12 However, for EC member 
countries, the Credit Institutions Directive can be regarded as a point of reference. 
Under the directive, a 'credit institution' is defined as an undertaking whose business 
is to receive deposits and other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits 
s Balik (~lElIglm/l1 Quarterly BIII/erill. June 1978.233. 
9 Bankin!..! Ad 1979. Sl'il . .2. 
10 Bllli,. {;lId orhcrs. (.2002) (n6). 
II Bank of CIll'ttinad Ltd of (\)lombn \ Income Tax Commissioner (If Colomho [ 19-181 :\C 378 .. ,8.'. 
PC; United Dominions Trw .. t Ltd \ KirbH1lKII19661 .2 QB -l.' I. -l37. Lord Denning 7\ lR. 
I:! IUd Pccchioli Prudt'lltilll SIIPt'll'isioll ill Ballkillg (OLCD. Paris. 19X7). 
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for its own accounts. 13 Article 18 of the Directive provides that a credit institution can 
freely carry out throughout the EC any activity listed in Annex 1 provided it is 
permitted to carry out the activity in its home member state. The activities enumerated 
in the annex can serve as a general guide as to what will be classified as constituting 
'banking business' . 
Apart from the authorisation requirement of the 1979 Act, banks were also subject to 
the supervisory procedures adopted by the Bank of England which included the 
requirement of prudential returns; meetings with management; and the measurement 
and assessment of capital and liquidity adequacy, and foreign currency exposure. The 
bank also scrutinised large loan exposures, the operations of banking groups and bank 
ownership. The bank was also responsible for the administration of the Deposit 
Protection Scheme. 14 
While the Banking Act of 1979 was motivated by the inadequacies of the Bank in 
dealing with the secondary banking crisis of the 1970s, the failure of 10hnson Matthey 
Bankers Ltd. (1MB) in 1984 was the catalyst for the promulgation of the Banking Act 
1987. 15 1MB went into liquidation mainly because of a high concentration of 
excessive loans granted to select customers. It was discovered that if 1MB had been 
subject to the strict supervisory regime that applied to deposit-taking institutions. 16 its 
financial difficulties would have been uncovered earlier. The 1987 Act gave the Bank 
11 Credit Institutions Directive 20001121FT Art I. 
\.J For an analvsis sec FR Ryder The Banking Acr 1979 (Sweet & Maxwell, London. 1(79). 
15 TilL' Act ca'me into force on I April 1988. For a detailed analysis of the JMB failure. see MJB Hall 
'The Johnsoll Matthey :\ffair: Ha\e the Lessons Been Learnt?' (1987) I JOllmal (~f International 
Sl'cllritil's ,\Ii/rkers (,\utllmn): \\' Ollard and N Routledge 'Hm\ the Bank of England Failed the 1.:\I.B. 
Test' lIl)X)) /:'lIrolllone." lFebruar~) -+9: i\11B Hall 'UK Banking supenision and the John:-.on \latthe~ 
Allair' in CAE Goodhart and others (L'ds) Thl' O{I('1'ation and R(~/llation of Financial ,\Iarkers 
(i\Lil'l11illan, LO[H.\on. 1(87) ch.l. 
16 .Ii\18 \\as liL'L'llsL'd under the 1979 ,\l'1 a:-. a 'recogni"L'd hank'. TIll' collapsL' highlighted Ihe prohlem, 
in making a dislinction hel\\een rel'llgnised hanks and licL'nscd dcposit-tal--er:-.. 
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significant new powers to cover the supervisory lapses that were exposed following 
the failure of 1MB,17 but the general approach to regulation under the 1979 Banking 
Act was not altered. 18 
After the failure of 1MB, a committee set up by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
reviewed the issue of bank supervision. 19 The Committee proposed that the new 
Banking Act should create a Board of Banking Supervision to assist the Governor of 
the Bank of England in his supervisory responsibilities.2o For the purpose of this 
thesis, it is critical to note that the committee observed that the role and aim of the 
banking supervisor was 'to ensure that the bank is managed in such a way as not to 
put at undue risk the interest of depositors, with that institution or more generally.'21 
The Bank of England Act 1998 was also passed into law and it transferred the 
regulatory powers previously exercised by the Bank of England under the 1987 Act to 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA).22 
The closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 and 
the problems at Barings in 1995 precipitated further change in the UK approach to 
banking supervision. n There was also a growing trend toward the formation of 
17 Pellll ( 1(89) (n4). 
18 The two-tiered authorisation system was abolished. The Bank's powers to investigate and to seek 
information were enhanced substantially, as well as the notification requirements applicable to 
authorised institutions. 
19 The Committee to Consider the System of Banking Supervision. The committee's recommendations 
were sL'l out in Cmnd. 9550, 1985. 
~() The purpose of this was to bring outside expertise to bear on the Bank's supervisory functions as the 
Board was to consist of a majority of independent members. 
21 This underscores the point that traditionally, depositor protection has been one of the cardinal 
ohjectin's of UK hanking sU)1enision. 
~2 . Forll1LTly known as the Securities and Investment Board. Sec generally: 1\1 Blair and others 
Blackstoll£' 's Guide to the Balik (~f England ,\ct /998 (Blackstone Press. Llmdon. 1(98): DH Gowland 
'hnancial Reform in the llK' in l\IJB Hall (ed), The /ntematiol/ul Handbook 011 Fillal/cial Re/lJrln 
(hi ward Flgar. Chcltenh;II11. ~O(3). 
~.1 BCel was liquidated while Barings \\as purchased by the Dutch Bank ING. For a descriptil)[1 of the 
BCCI affair. sec P Trucll and 1_ Gurwin BeCI (Bloomsbury. London. 19lJ2), The B;lrings affair is 
dl'slTihed in J Capper and N Denton All th(/I Glitters (Hamish Hallli Iton, II )l1don, 1996). Sl'l' also RJ 
Herring' Bet'T 8: Barings: B;lIlk Rl'stllutions Cllmplicated hy Fraud and Global Corporate StrUL'lure' in 
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financial conglomerates as UK banks strived to have an international presence to 
compete with their global counterparts.24 Following the election of the Labour 
Government in 1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer made an announcement to 
parliament on 20 May, 1997 that the government intended to reform the UK's regime 
for the regulation of financial institutions. The principal feature of this proposal was 
to create a single, statutory regulator for the full range of financial institutions,25 with 
'clearly defined regulatory objectives and a single set of coherent functions and 
powers.,26 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) came into force on 1 
December, 2001.27 The Act confers extensive broad regulatory powers over the whole 
financial services sector on the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA has 
been described as 'the broadest financial regulator in the world, combining prudential, 
conduct of business and market conduct regulation across the full range of financial 
services, including banking, securities, investment management and insurance.' 28 The 
FSA has a broad regulatory scope in three respects. First, it is cross-sectoral, as it 
DO Evanoff and GG Kaufman (eds) Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies 
(World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2005) 321; G Vinten 'The BCCI Debacle Marks Watershed 
Case in British and International Bank Regulation' (1991) 3 International Banking Regulator 29, 8. 
24 V Rohh 'The Genesis of Regulation' (1997) Bank of England Financial Stability Review (Autumn). 
Available at http://www.hankofcngland.eo.ukJpuhl ications/fsrll997 lart4( bsuec!r 203 ).pdf, accessed I 1 
March 2006. 
25 This entailed the bringing together of nine regulatory bodies: the Securities and Investments Board, 
the Personal Investment Authority. the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation. the 
Securities and Futures Authority, the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England. 
the Building Societies Commission, the Insurance Directorate of the Department of trade and 
industries. the Friendly Societies Commission and the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
~(, HM Treasury Financial Sell'ices and M(/rkets Bill: A Consultation Document. Part One. Ore/Tiew 
(~rFillancial Regulatory Ref(JrI11 (HM Treasury, London. July 1988).8. 
~1 For a detailed analysis of the act, sec M Blair and others Blackstone's Gllide to the Financial 
Serrias and Milrkers :\c( 2000 (Blackstone Press. London. 2001): EZ Lomnicka The Financial 
Sen'ices and J/arkets :\ct: :\n Annotated Guide (Sweet & MaxwelL London. 20(2): J Perry The 
Fillancial Sen'ias alld Markets :\('{: A Practical Legal Guide (Sweet & Max WI.: II, London. 2(01); :\ 
AllcllL'k The Financial SerriCl's and ,\/ilrkets ;\ct 2000: A Guide to rhe New Law (Jordans. Bri"llli. 
200()): DA Sahalot The Fillancial Serriccs and ,\larkers Acr 2000 (LexisNexis UK. London. 2(04); ~I 
Blair and GA Walh-r Fillancial Sell'ias Lmr (Chford Uni\CI'sities Press. Oxford. 20()h); G,\ Walker 
and ~l Blair Fillan('iill.\larkers (lnd /:'x('/ul1Iges /.(/1\' « hford Uni\ersity Press. Oxford. 2()06), 
~x C Briault 'The Rationale for a Sin~k National Financial Services Re~l1lator' (May 1(99) ISA 
(h('(l.\iollal Papers ill lillollcial Nt'glilarioll. So.2, 
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covers the whole financial sector; second, it regulates both the prudential and conduct 
of business aspects of regulated businesses and third, it has enormous powers; 
authorization, rule-making (such as the Handbook), monitoring, investigating, 
enforcement and the administration of the compensation scheme. 29 
In performing its quasi-legislative and policy-making functions, the FSA has four 
statutory regulatory objectives. These are (a) market confidence, (b) public awareness, 
(c) consumer protection, and (d) the reduction of financial crime.3o The treasury 
retains regulatory responsibility for the overall regulatory regime and the Bank of 
England retains responsibility for the stability of the financial sector. The division of 
responsibilities between the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA is contained 
in a Memorandum of Understanding which sets out their obligation to co-operate 
closely.31 It is believed that an integrated national financial services regulator in the 
UK is best suited to achieve the intended regulatory objectives based on four primary 
considerations: 
• Market developments, such as the increase in the number of financial 
conglomerates and the blurring of the boundaries between financial products, 
make sector-based regulation increasingly less viable; 
29 EP 1·lIin}.!er and othns Ellinger's '\/oi/em Banking Ltnl' (-1- th edn, Oxford Uni\'nsity Press, Oxford, 
~()06). Thi~ re}.!ulatory c(lnsnlidati()(l is becoming a key feature of many financial markets. ,\lhtralia 
has adopted a~ distinctiH' appwach where responsibility for cross-sectoral pru~enti~1 regulation. is 
\l'SlL'd in (lne body (the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority) and conduct ot bUSIness regulatIon 
in anothn (the Australian Securities and ImestI11l'nt Commission), \\ith an umbrella body c()-
ordinatin<' both rl'}.!ulatnrs. Sec SJ ~Ltlks()n" ;\lIsfra/illn Finallcc Lml' (-1- th edn, LBC Information 
Scr\ iCl's.ryrlllont. ~NS\\'. 1(99). On regulat(lry structure, sec C\F GU(ldhart 'Organisational Structurl' 
of Banking Supl'nision' (~()()O) FSI Occi/siolla/ Papers No.1. 
;(1 S. ~ (2). I-'S~l:\ 2000. tllL'''l' Ilhjl'L,ti\es arL' dctincd in ss.3, -1-, ) 8: 6 rcspl,cti\c1y . 
.11 Sec I'S,\ 'Financial Sn\icl's .\uthority: .\n Outlinc" (1997) r\ppl'ndi\ 2. 
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• There are economies of scale and scope available to an integrated regulator. 
and there is value in being able to allocate scarce regulatory resources 
efficientl y and effecti vel y; 
• There are benefits in setting a single regulator clear and consistent objectives 
and responsibilities, and in resolving any regulatory conflicts within a single 
agency; and 
• There are advantages In making a single regulator accountable for its 
performance against its statutory objectives, for the regulatory regime, for the 
costs of regulation and for regulatory failure. 32 
The set-up of the legal provisions that underlie the present regulatory regime can be 
understood in the form of a hierarchy. At the top of the structure is the FSMA 2000, 
which provides for the establishment of the FSA, its powers and duties, and other 
regulatory matters. This is followed by a layer of regulation in the form of statutory 
instruments;33 and after this comes the provisions that are made by the FSA itself, 
which are contained in the FSA Handbook. 34 The FSMA 2000 also retains the 
requirement for institutions to be authorized in order to engage in banking in the UK 
in the sense of 'deposit taking'. It imposes a general prohibition on anyone carrying 
on regulated activity in the UK?5 Only 'authorized persons', or 'exempt persons' may 
undertake such activity. 
32 C Briault 'Re\ isiting the Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator' (I·'ehruary 
.200.2) FS:\ Occasional Papers in Fina1lcial Regulation No. 16. 
,B Fpr L'\ampiL' the FSi\L\ 2000 (Regulated /\L,tivities) Order 2001 (SI 2001/5..+-+), 
.l-t ThesL' L't)f1sists of ruiL's m;ldc under the general rule-making power in FSM.\ 2000. s. 13X, or under 
specific rule-making pU\\L'rs: guidance Illade pursuant to s.IS7 and 'evidential pn)\'isions' tending to 
estahlish a COnlLI\ention of. ur L'ompliance with anothLT ruiL' made under s.I"+9. SL'e Blair and other.' 
( .2 00.2) (n 6) I 7. 
1" I,Si\1.\ .2()()0-..19; I:Si\L\ 2000 (Regulated :\Ltivities) Order 2001 (SI 20()1/544): FS~I:\ 20()O 
(Carry ing on Regulated :\lli\ Ities hy Way of Business) Order .2()() I (SI 20()) II 177). art. .2, 
216 
5.1.2 Deposit Protection in the UK 
A deposit guarantee scheme, to compensate depositors in the event that their bank is 
unable to repay their deposits, has existed in the UK since the establishment of the 
Deposit Protection Scheme under the Banking Act 1979.36 There were also similar 
h ~. d . 37 SC emes lor Investment an Insurance. Under the Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
Directive, EU member states are now required to have deposit guarantee schemes.38 
As part of its regime of consolidated financial services regulation, the FSMA 2000 
provides for the creation of a single Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) 
under Part XV of the Act,39 covering all regulated activities undertaken by authorised 
persons.40 Although the scheme operates as one consolidated scheme, there are 
differences between the different financial sectors covered with regard to the main 
features of the scheme.41 The main features of the scheme will now be examined in 
turn. 
I. Organizational Structure 
The FSMA 2000 provides for the FSA to establish a body corporate (the scheme 
. ~, h 
manager) to exercise the functions of the deposit protectIOn scheme. - T e 
constitution of the scheme manager must provide for a Chairman and a Board. 
3(, Scc Chapter 2 for a discussion of the historical evolution of the UK Deposit Protection Scheme. 
l? The Invcstors Compensation Scheme (lCS) under the Financial Services Act 1986, s. )-+ and the 
Policyholders Protcction Scheme under the Policyholders Protection Act 1975 . 
. 18 Directi\l' l)-t-1l9IEEC. The UK Scheme is substantially designed in compliance with the provisions of 
the directin'. 
3') For a rcview uf the relevant provisions on the compensation scheme. see Blair and Walker (2006) 
(1127). ch.5. 
III The protcL'lion of consumers of financial scrvices is one of the statutory ohjectives that wcrc set for 
the I:SA under the FSMA ~()()(): an etlective compensation arrangement for consumers has a kcy role 
to play in aL'llieving this ohjectivc. The Act requires the FSA to make rules estahlishing a scheme for 
compensating consumers when authuriscd firms are unahle. or likely to he unahle to satisfy claims 
<I!.'.ainst them. The rclnant rules arc L'()I1tained in Block -+ of the Handhook (COMP l\11)dulc). 
It This is cll\isa!.'.cd h\ I:SI\IA 2000. s. ~ 1-+ (I) (h). The main focus of this discussion on the I,ses is on 
thc deposit pwt~'L'lio~ suh-sdlellll' although rcferellcc will he made to the scheme a" a \\hole where 
appropriatc. See I"SCS I Ollt/ook (Nmcmher :::00 I). 
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Although the Chairman and the Board are to be appointed and liable to removal from 
office by the FSA, the terms of their appointment must be such as to ensure their 
independence from the FSA and the operation of the compensation scheme. The 
FSCS is thus independent of the FSA although accountable to it and ultimately to the 
Treasury.43 This provision is compliant with sound practice advice.44 Membership of 
the main board of the FSCS is confined to 'public interest representatives'; this is a 
clear departure from the practice where commercial bankers sat on the old Deposit 
Protection Board without being required to operate in a public interest capacity.45 
The FSA and the FSCS have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoUr~6 
to provide a framework for the relationship between the FSA and the FSCS. The MoU 
recognises the operational independence of each body but also acknowledges the 
importance of close co-operation, assistance and effective interrelationship. 
II. Funding 
The FSMA 2000 allows the compensation scheme to make prOVISIon 'for the 
establishment of different funds for meeting different kinds of claim'; and for 'the 
imposition of different levies in different cases. ,47 What the Act envisages is an 
industry funded scheme where the FSA makes the rules to share the costs of 
compensation across the industry. It has been argued that this option 'encourages 
bankers to keep their institutions sound and lays the cost on those [i.e. the banks] who 
12 FSMA 2000, s. 212 (I). This hody is the Financial Services Compensation Scheme Ltd. (FSCS). a 
cllmpany Iimill'd hy guarantee which was estahlished in March 2000. 
·u Thl' sL'ileme managcr is required to suhmit a report on the progress made at least once a year to the 
I:SA. including a statement idl'ntifying the value of each of the funds l'stahlished under the scheme. Sl'e 
f'SI\I;\ 2000. s. 218: COl\lP. 2.2.SG. 
II SCl' Chapter 4: also G (;;tn~ia 'Deposit Insurancl': A SurVl'y of Actual and Best Practices' (1999) 
l\!F \\'orking Paper \\P/l)()j5.J.. 
-'5 1\1.113 Hall 'Incl'ntin' Compatihility and the Optimal Design of Deposit PWll'ction Schemes: .\n 
Assessment of lll\. :\rrangelllenls' (2002) 10 jOllrnal (~l Fil/ancial Regulation alld Complial/('(' 2, 1/:\ 
1(, :\ \ ai table at !ill,eJ/",w\\' IS;\'!2l)\ .1IIJplIbs/lll11u/fsa fs(s. pd f aCl'l'Ssl'd 17 Decemher 2007. 
-'7 I:SI\J,\ 2000. s, 214 (I) (h) 8: (d. 
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benefit most from the scheme. ,48 The provIsIOns In relation to the funding of the 
FSCS are set out in the FEES Module of the Handbook. The principle is that the firms 
that are still trading fund the compensation costs for those firms that have failed (ex 
post funding). The levies that are charged are proportional to the size of the protected 
deposits held by the firm.49 
Under a new funding system introduced in April 2008,50 the FSCS is split into five 
broad classes for levying purposes: Deposits, General Insurance, Life and 
Pensions, Investment, and Home Finance.51 With the exception of the deposits class, 
each class is further divided into sub-classes. Firms are allocated to these sub-classes 
based on the activities they are permitted to undertake, and it is possible that a firm 
could be allocated to one or more sub-classes. 52 The FSCS cost structure also includes 
'management expenses' and 'compensation costs' .53 Management expenses are the 
costs of establishing, maintaining and operating the FSCS. Compensation costs are 
the amounts paid to claimants (or for their benefit).54 
The FSCS operates a funding model with a mixture of advance and retrospective calls 
possible to provide flexibility. 55 Each firm contributes proportionally to the tariff base 
applicable to its relevant class or sub-class. A threshold for each sub-class is set by the 
.ftl 11(/1/ (2002) (n45) . 
.fl) , 
Scc FEES 6.3.5R. 
~o See generally FSA 'FSCS Funding Review' (2006) DP061/; FSA 'Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme Funding Review'(2007) CP0715; Oxera 'Funding the Financial Services Compensation 
Schell1e: Analysis of Policy Options'(2007) Report prepared/or the Financial Services Allfhority. 
51 FEES 6 ANNEX 3. The rationale for this differentiation is that there are considerahle di rkrences 
het\\een the various seclors in terms of the products involved, the hehaviour of consumers, the risks 
ill\ohetl, the ahility of each sector to fund compensation and in terms of the scope and practice of 
business. Firms arc not expected to meet the cost of claims arising from areas of husiness in which they 
dll not participate. See FS:\ 'Consumer Compensation: A Further Consultation' (June Il)l)l») FSA 
Consliitation Pi/rer CP l.J.. 
~2 Sel' Illlp://\\\\\\,r"l'".tlr!2.uklindu"trylfullding/, accessed 16 May 2()08 . 
.'iJ FI:ES h.1.5G. 
:'i.' l\lanagemellt npl'IlSl'S arl' further di\ ided into 'hase l'UStS' and '''pecific C(lStS'. 
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FSA, which represents the maximum that the FSCS can levy for compensation in any 
one year.56 Under the funding model, compensation costs are initially met by the 
relevant industry class up to the threshold. Where compensation costs exceed the 
threshold, there is a possibility of cross subsidy among the classes, so that the FSCS 
can use money held to the credit of one class to pay compensation costs in respect of 
another class.57 All funds received by way of levy or otherwise are to be managed as 
the FSCS considers appropriate. In doing so the FSCS must act prudently,58 and is 
expected to use its resources 'in the most efficient and economic way' .59 
III. Powers and Mandate 
The UK depositor protection scheme has been described as having 'the essentially 
social purpose of shielding retail customers who may be ill-placed to assess the 
financial soundness of particular intermediaries. ,60 The functions of the FSCS are to 
assess and pay compensation to claimants in relation to claims made in connection 
with regulated activities carried on by regulated persons (whether or not with 
permission) in accordance with the rules. 61 The FSCS is an example of a relatively 
narrow scheme, responsible mainly for the management of the fund and the payment 
of compensation.62 According to the MoU between the FSA and the FSCS, the FSCS 
has the following responsibilities:63 
I. The effective operation of the scheme; 
55 The FSCS makes calls for funds from institutions for the amount of compensation that analysis has 
prl'liiL'led would be payable in the year. See FEES 6.3.1 R; 6.3.3G. 
(, I:U:S 6.:1.7R: FEES 6 ANNLX 3R. 
57 FEES 6",~.15R: FEES 6.3.17R. 
5S I.I.I·S 6.3.1 ~R. 
:i'l COMP 2.2.6R. 
(I() E (;eor~e 'Sollle Thoughts on Financial Regulation' (1996) 36 Balik of Engla1ld Quarterly Bul/etill 
) 
hi I'S~I.-\ ~OOO s.~ 13 (3) (a). 
h2 PR Cart\\ri~ht Banks. COllsumers and Regulation (Harts Publishin~. Oxford. 20(4) ch.7. 
63 TIlL'~l' are also \)utlined in C( )\IP ~.~. 
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II. Making and implementing procedures to enable the FSCS to operate its 
functions; 
Ill. Making levies for management expenses, compensation costs and 
establishment costs as are required under the rules to enable it to carry out its 
role; 
IV. Using its resources in an efficient and economic way; 
v. Reporting to the FSA on the discharge of its functions; and 
VI. Publishing information on its operation. 
The general powers of the scheme are set out in Section 214 of FSMA 2000. The 
compensation scheme may make provisions in regard to the following: 
l. the circumstances in which a relevant person may be considered to be unable 
or likely to be unable to satisfy claims made against him; 
II. setting up different plans for meeting different kinds of claim; 
Ill. imposition of levies in each case; 
IV. limiting the levy payable by a person for a specified period; 
v. repayment of the levy whether in full or in part in specified circumstances; 
VI. entertainment of claims made only by a specified kind of claimant; 
VII. consideration of a claim only if it comes under a specified category: 
Vlli. the procedure to be followed in making a claim; 
IX. whether to make interim payments before a claim is finally determined: 
x. amount payable on a claim to a specified maximum amount. or a maximum 
amount calculated in a specified manner: and 
x\. where payment is to be made to a specified person other than the claimant. 
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Section 215 of the Act makes provision for the rights of the compensation scheme in a 
relevant person's insolvency. The Act gives the scheme a right to recover money paid 
as compensation from an authorized person. Where a person other than a 
Compensation Scheme manager presents a petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 or Article 22 of the 1989 Order concerning a company or partnership that is 
a relevant person, the Compensation Scheme manager will have the same rights as are 
conferred on the FSA by Section 362 of the Act. On the capacity to present a 
winding-up petition against a body that is a relevant person, the Scheme manager has 
the same rights that are conferred on the FSA by Section 371 and Section 37-1- with 
respect to an individual bankruptcy.64 
In order to allow the FSCS to perform its functions effectively without any legal 
hindrance, the FSCS and its staff are entitled to immunity, except where they act in 
bad faith or where damages may be sought under section 6( 1) of the Human Rights 
Act 1998.65 
IV. Coverage 
To avoid moral hazard deposit protection schemes should exclude from their coverage 
the deposits of those who are deemed capable of exerting market discipline and those 
who bear some responsibility for a bank's failure. Under the FSCS regime, certain 
deposits are excluded from coverage. These include: deposits of banks and large 
compames; overseas financial services institutions; governments and central 
administrative authorities: directors and managers of banks (and their close relatives): 
hodies corporate in the same group with a defaulting bank; auditors of the defaulting 
M FSf\l:\ .2000 s . .215. 
(lS rSf\I:\ 2000 s . .2.2.2. On the implications of the Human Rights .\l't 1998 for the \·s,\ and regulated 
firms. "l'l' P Parish 'The Human Rights Ill' Banks and Financial Institutions: An ,\nalysis of the Impact 
111 
bank~ and persons holding five per cent or more of the capital of the defaulting bank. 
or any body corporate in the same group.66 In accordance with the EC Directive. 
deposits of those connected with a criminal conviction for money laundering are also 
excluded.67 
The level of compensation payable under the FSCS is dependent on the type of 
business involved. For the purposes of deposit-taking business, a claim is a 'protected 
claim' if it is a claim for a protected deposit. Further, a deposit is a 'protected deposit' 
only if the deposit was made with an establishment of a UK deposit-taking institution, 
or a branch of a UK firm which is a credit institution established in another EEA state 
under an EEA right.68 Until recently, the maximum level of compensation available 
to an individual depositor was £31,700.69 However, following the run on Northern 
Rock, the compensation limit was raised, initially to £35,000, and currently, 
depositors have full coverage of £50, 000.70 This limit applies to the aggregate 
amount of claims in respect of the protected deposits that an eligible claimant has 
against the relevant person.71 
V. Compensation 
Section 214 (I) (a) of the FSMA 2000 gives the FSCS the power to make provisions 
as to the circumstances in which a relevant person 72 is to be taken (for the purposes of 
the scheme) to be unable, or likely to be unable, to satisfy claims made against him. 
or the Human Rights Ad 1998 on u. K. Financial Regulations '(2000) 15 JOllrnal of /nfel7lafional 
Bunking Lmr 10. 230. 
(l(l (-' t 1 1R OI11P -t._.k . 
67 Directin' l)'+!l9/EC Art. 2. 
('s (' C .., I R 
'-- llIllp .J .• '. 
hI) Olll' hundred per l·L'llt of the first £2000 and ninety per cent of the next LB.OOO. 
70 Comp 10.2 .3R. 
'1(, 1()11(' 0111(1 ._._ I. 
72 :\ rd .. '\ ant per"lln is a participating firm or an appointed rl'prL'sL~ntati\l' of a participating firm. 
(. t... 1 1(' ,--Ol11pu.~._ I. 
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The FSCS may make a claim to an eligible claimant if it is satisfied that the claim is 
in respect of a protected claim against a relevant person who is in default. 73 
A relevant person is in default if in the opinion of the FSCS or FSA, it is unable or 
likely to be unable to satisfy protected claims against it.74 The FSCS may determine a 
relevant person to be in default if it is satisfied that a protected claim exists and that 
the relevant person is the subject of one or more of the following proceedings: 
1) The passing of a resolution for a creditors' voluntary winding up; 
2) A determination by the relevant person's home state regulator that the relevant 
person is unlikely to be able to meet claims against it; 
3) The appointment of a liquidator or administrator, or provisional liquidator or 
interim manager; 
4) The making of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction for the winding 
up of a company, the dissolution of a partnership, the administration of a 
company or partnership or the bankruptcy of an individual; 
5) The approval of a company voluntary arrangement, a partnership voluntary 
arrangement or an individual voluntary arrangement.75 
From the date the compensation scheme has been triggered by any of these events, the 
FSCS must be in a position to pay compensation within three months. 76 This is in 
n Compo 3.2.1 R; Compo _~.2.2R also makes provision for payment to a person who makes a claim on 
nehalf of another person. Examples of such circumstances include personal representatives claiming on 
nehalf of the decl'asl'd: trustees claiming on hehalf of heneficiaries: or a donee of an enduring power of 
attorney making a claim on nehalf of the donor of the power. See Comp 3.2.3G. Compen~ation is 
pa~;lhk only to the dail11ant or as directed hy the daimant. Comp II however sets out circumstance ... 
1IlH.kr "hidl compensation may he pa~ ahle to persons other than the claimant. 
'1 Compo 6.3.2R. 
7<, ('omp () .. ~.3R. 
76 Comp l).2.IK the FS .. \ ma~ grant the I·ses an n.tension nut pa~ment must he made within ... i, 
months (\1' that time. Comp l).2.2R Sl'ts out the conditions under which the FSCS ma\ P(lstpone 
eOlllpl'nsat illn. 
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adherence to the Deposit Guarantees Scheme Directive requirement that 
compensation should be paid within three months of the non-availability of deposits. 77 
5.1.3 Deposit Protection in the UK: An Assessment 
An assessment of the UK deposit protection scheme done on the basis of the number 
of bank insolvencies that have occurred since its inception would present a high 
success rate, since relatively few deposit-taking institutions have failed. The only 
systemic crisis experienced in the UK since the introduction of deposit protection was 
minor,78 and was one about which deposit protection could do little.79 However. the 
recent Northern Rock crisis has highlighted certain deficiencies, not only in the 
deposit protection scheme, but in the overall regulatory system. 
5.1.3.1 The Northern Rock Debacle 
Northern Rock presented a classic case of a bank run. The bank, which was the UK's 
fifth largest mortgage lender, was bailed out by the Bank of England with an 
emergency loan facility following problems in the credit markets originating from the 
U.S sub-prime mortgage financial crisis. 8o This triggered anxiety and loss of 
confidence by savers and shareholders leading to scenes of thousands of savers 
77 Art. 1 0 of the Directive. It is also compliant with IMF recommendation of 30 days. Sec Garcia 
(1999) (n ..+..+). This is also a marked departure from the requirement under s.58 of the Banking Act 
19X7 wilere the Deposit Protection Board was required to 'he in a position' to make payments within 3 
months. Sec D Turing 'Deposit Protection' in F Oditah (ed) Insolrfllcy of Banks: ;\/llllagillg (he Risks 
(Sweet & 1\1a\well. London. \996). 
's After the collapse of BCCI there was a mass movement of deposits from smaller hanks to hanb that 
\\L'I'l' perL'L'i\ed to he higger and safer (/light to quality). 
79 ('II rtwright (200"+) (n62). 
80 For an (l\en iew, sec ;\ Camphell 'The Run on the Rock and its Consequences' (200X) 9 Journal (~l 
Blinking Regllilition 2. 61: GA Walker 'Credit Crisis: Regulatury and Financial S:- ...;tellh Reform' 
(2007) 22 Bllfffl1l'Orths JOllrnal (~llntfmati()nal Bankillg alld Fillancial Lmr 10, 567: G.\ \\'alkL'l' 
'SlIh-prillll' Loans. Inter-hank 1\1arkets and Finanl'ial Support' (200X) 29 Compliny LUllycr I. 22: CIA 
Walker 'Northern Roc\., Falls' (20()X) 2 BlInk('f's' Luw 2."+; (,.\ Walker 'Reglilall1r:- Re,iew: :\orthern 
Rlll'k. Financial ('()l1lplction and Financial Slllll'k: Part \. (Fehruary 2OGS) Fil/ul/cilil R(t.;ulll(iol/ 
/n(t'rnllfiolllli. I. 
queuing up to withdraw their funds and close accounts at the bank's branches. Despite 
assurances from the Government and the Bank of England, the savers \\'ere not 
assuaged and a sum exceeding £ 2 billion was withdrawn within days, with the bank's 
share value also falling sharply. Fears of a contagion also led to a fall in share prices 
of other UK banks.81 
The run on Northern Rock has raised questions as to the nature and adequacy of the 
regulatory tools available to the authorities to resolve such problems. In particular. the 
ability of the FSCS to sustain consumer confidence in the financial system must be 
considered. The FSA has admitted that there were key failings in the supervision of 
Northern Rock.82 In January 2008, HM Treasury, the Bank of England, and the FSA 
(the authorities) published a consultation paper containing proposals for strengthening 
the framework for financial stability and depositor protection. 83 In July 2008, a further 
consultation paper was published by the authorities, which contained additional 
details of the proposals for reform.84 
Following the consultation process, the government intends to enact new legislation 
to address five key objectives, which are: strengthening the financial system; reducing 
the I ikelihood of banks failing; reducing the impact of failing banks; effective 
compensation arrangements; and strengthening the Bank of England and improving 
SI Alliance 8: Leicester shares lost nearly one-third of their value while shares in Bradford & Bingley 
kll hy more than 151,;, See Tire Independent, 'Alliance & Leicester Shares Take a Beating' Tuesday, 
I H Septe mher 2007, A \ai lahlc at http://\\ \\ \\. i ndepende nl.cO.ll h.inl· \\ ... !hll"i Ill·" ... ! IlL'\\ "/all i ance n 
h'll'l'''1L'!_-~llare''-take-;I-hl'ating-7-l-l 793.l1tml , accessed 17 Decemher 2007. 
S~ I:Of a "llmmary of the reVll'" of FSA supervIsIOn of Northern Rock, '-oee 
http://w\\w.I's;tguv.uUl2!!l",,,'\)tlll'r/exel· summarv.pdf accl·""ed 20 April 2()()~. See also, G:\ Walker 
'The I·S.\ 's RL'\ iL'\\ of its Supenisilln of Northern Rock' Financial Sen'ices Briefing (\b:- 200X), .~1. 
Sl Bank of Fngland. H~1 Treasury. & '·X·\, 'Financial Stahility and Depositor Protection: 
Strengthening the Irame\\()('\...' ('m 730H, 200X. .\ vailahle at http://\,\,\\.I1I11-
tre,l"lII\ ,~ll\.uk"lll·dial3/5/hankin~ "uhilit\ pu-l77.pdf, accessed 2() April 200H. 
s'l3~lr~k nf EIlglar~d. H~1 Trl'asury. 8: '-'S.\ 'Finanl'ial Stahility and Depositor Protection: Further 
(\lIl"ultation' ('111 7-l36. 2(X)X. A\ailahlL' at 
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coordination between authorities. The five objectives are geared towards reforming 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis aspects of UK banking supervision. While the main focus 
of this thesis is deposit protection, which falls under the post-crisis category of 
regulatory intervention, there is a strong link between pre-crisis and post -crisis 
regulatory mechanisms. A strong pre-crisis regulatory regime will, most importantly, 
reduce costs that would accrue to the compensation scheme in the aftermath of a 
CrISIS. 
It is pertinent to note that the immediate cause of the crisis in Northern rock was the 
refusal of other banks to lend to it. Northern Rock's business model, which relied 
heavily on wholesale funding, was dependent on an uninterrupted flow of funds 
through the inter-bank and wholesale markets. This meant that the bank became 
vulnerable as soon as liquidity dried up in the banking sector. However, a better 
structured pre-
crisis regulatory regime could have prevented the escalation of the problem. 
The UK regulatory regime has been described as being 'worryingl y flat-footed in a 
crisis,85 as the crisis has underscored the need for a wider range of regulatory options 
in dealing with bank failures. The main limitation of the UK regulatory regime in the 
management of a potential crisis is the absence of a statutory prompt corrective action 
(PCA) mechanism86 and the potential for regulatory forbearance. 87 The consensus of 
http://www . han kl) k nglanu .co.lIkipuhl icat ionS/l)t hcr/fi nanc ial stahi lit y/ fi nanc ial stahi I i tyuepo~ i torprotect i 
onOX070 I.puf, accessed 10 July 2008. 
85 'This Financial Crisis Should Never Have Been Allowed to Happen' The Independent 22 September 
2007. Available at http://'',,,\,,,,\\,. inuepenuent.co.lIkiopinion/lcading-artic Ics/lcading-article-this- financial-
crisis-should-ncn:r-ha\l:-heen-allowcd-to-happcn-..t.O~ 122.html , accessed 17 December 2007. 
86 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury 51h Report of Session 2007-08, The Run on the 
Rock' Available at hllp://w\\\\.parIiamcnl.lhc-stationery-
orticc.co.lIk/paIL'1l12()070XIl·I1l~cIc1.·tlL'mtrcasy/56/5602.htJll , accessed 16 May 2008. 
87 Hall (2002) (n45). For an analysis of supervisory forbearance and PCA, see K Narayana and I Shim, 
'Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action' (2007) 39 Journal of Money. Credit and Banking 5, 1 107. 
PCA mechanisms are generally absent in most EU supervisory regimes. See MJ Nieto and LD Wall 
227 
opinion among critics of the regulatory reaction to the Northern Rock crisis is that the 
regulators should have acted promptly to avert the crisis escalating. It has been 
observed that 'comparisons between the US and the UK have been made, to the 
detriment of the UK, following the speedy rescue package the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York arranged for Bear Stearns in March 2008, which contrasts with the 
lengthy, slow and rather inefficient resolution procedure for Northern Rock. ,88 
Regulatory authorities faced with financially troubled institutions must decide to 
either resolve the institution or delay action for a period of time in the hope that the 
institution's position will improve. In most cases, a decision is delayed until it is too 
late, resulting in significantly higher resolution costs which fall on the taxpayer. In the 
case of Northern Rock, it appears that no member of the tripartite regulatory structure 
would have been willing to close the institution either before it obtained the LoLR 
facility or after billions of taxpayers' money had been expended on rescuing the 
institution. The desire to maintain the reputation of a capable monitor89 and the fear of 
lawsuits from the bank's shareholders would have prevented any regulator from 
making this decision.9o A solution to the problem of regulatory forbearance is the 
introduction of a statutory PCA mechanism into the regulatory regime. PCA would 
create specific statutory trigger-points to serve as the basis for regulatory intervention. 
-Preconditions for a Successful Implementation of Supervisors' Prompt Corrective Action: Is There a 
Case for A Banking Standard in the EU?' (2006) 7 Journal of Banking Regulation (Marchi April), 191. 
The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) also recommends the introduction of 
'pre specified trigger capital ratios' which should initiate a progressive series of restrictions on a failing 
bank's activities. SCL' I':SFRC 'Dealing with Problem Banks in Europe' Statement No.1. 22 JUlie 1998: 
thc ESFRC also argues that implementation of PCA in each individual member state would contrihute 
to l1u"t country supervisors' trllst in home country supervisors. See ESFRC 'Reforming Banking 
Supenisiun in h1rol1L" Sri/temellt No. 23. 21 November 2005. 
ss RI\I Lastra 'Northcrn Rock, UK Bank Insol\'cncy and Cross-horder Bank Insohcncy' (200X) l) 
./ollmal (~lB{/"ki"g Regulatioll 3, 165, 167. 
IN :\ \\':\ Boot and :\ V Thakor 'Self-interested Bank Regulation'( 1l)l)3) X3 ,\meric(lll Fcollolllic Re\'ieu' 
2,206, 
90 Memorandulll fwm Dr. Paul Hall1aLtinen to the Commons Select Committee on Treasury, <1\ ailahle 
at !.H1E//\\\\ \\', pll h I ic at ion", par II; IIllC nt.u k/palc m2()( l 7( lS/c 1l hl' Iectlc mt rL' <I" \ 156156\\ e 23, ht III , accesscd 
10 .\pril ~()()S. 
The existence of a statutory basis for early regulatory intervention would enable the 
regulatory authorities to detect bank problems and take appropriate correcti \'e action 
without the fear of litigation. 
While the introduction of PCA based on solvency ratios In the United States has 
generally been considered successful,91 it has been suggested that any introduction of 
PCA in the UK should go one stage further by incorporating both solvency and 
liquidity ratios in the various threshold categories. This would enable the primary 
causes of bank failure to be covered by the regulatory regime.92 While this would not 
prevent banks from encountering problems, it would enable the regulators to detect 
bank problems earlier, thus affording them time to act efficiently. PCA mechanisms 
have been described as 'speed bumps to slow a bank's deterioration and to force 
regulators to become more involved with troubled banks well before insolvency, so 
that they may be ready to close them legally when the minimum capital ratio is 
breached and not be caught by surprise and delayed. ,93 
Though the introduction of PCA mechanisms would ensure that the likelihood of 
bailing out banks with severe liquidity or solvency problems is greatly reduced, it is 
important to emphasize that the introduction of PCA would necessitate several 
changes in the overall legal and regulatory framework. The regulatory authorities 
must possess the appropriate regulatory tools to act once a PCA trip wire has been 
1)1 (.(1 Kaufman (cd) Prompt Correctin) Action ill Banking: 10 Years Later (JAL New York, 20(2). 
')2 Ibid. Bank prohlems in the UK have always heen attrihuted to a comhination of various factors. 
Hu\\L'\ LT, CUIlCLTnS of assel quality and liquidity are the main causes of such prohlems. Sec P Jackson 
'\)epusit Protection and Bank Failures in the United Kingdom' (1996) Bank of England Fil/(lIlcilll 
Stabilit\' RCl'iel\' (.\utumn), a\ailahle at 
11111'://\\_" ~,-,hankllfcn~land,L'u,u\Jpuhl iell illn~/br/ IYY6/art7( \s~LlL'( ( 20 I ),pdr , accessed 16 [\lay 2007. 
9,1 Scc ~cnerally (~G Kaufman 'Using Fllil'icnt Bank Insohcncy Resolution to Sohe the Deposit 
Insurance Prohlem' in :\ Camphell and others (cds) Deposit InslIrance (Palgra\e ;\ tal'millan. Nc\\ 
Yl1ri, 20(7). 201. See alSll S[\l Da\ics and D,\ [\lc[\lanus 'The Effects of Closure Policies on Bank 
Ri~\'" Ta\"'ing' (IYl.) I) I) jOllrnal oj Banking and Finance -+-), 917. 
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breached. A number of factors must also be considered when defining the ratios that 
would trigger mandatory supervisory action. These issues are beyond the scope of this 
thesis,94 however, it is important to state that the introduction of a PCA mechanism 
would significantly increase the information requirements of the supervisory 
authorities95 and also increase the need for effective co-ordination between the 
various authorities. Particularly the roles of each member of the tripartite regulatory 
structure in a crisis should be clearly defined. The successful implementation of PCA 
would also depend on the political will to close insolvent banks as soon as the legal 
conditions are triggered. 
5.1.3.2. Reform of UK Deposit Protection 
The main legislative changes that have been proposed following the Northern Rock 
crisis include the introduction of a Special Resolution Regime (SRR), the granting of 
additional powers to the FSA and Bank of England for heightened supervision and 
financial stability respectively, and the introduction of a more efficient compensation 
schcme. lJ6 Much of the emphasis here would be on the reform of the deposit 
. 97 protection arrangements. 
As ohserved earlier, deposit protection in the UK was conceived primarily as a means 
or achieving the 'consumer protection' objective of the FSMA 2000. In addition to 
'II Sl'e !..!elllTalh Nic(o and \\'(/1/ (2006) (n87). 
Ih ThL' I:SA l'n;lsultation paper has highligllll'd thL' need for new rules to rcquire hanks to pnl\ ide more 
information to the I,Si\ to pn)\l' that they are Illccting thrcslwld conditions. Sec Cm7308 (2()()~) (n83). 
d1.3. 
1)(1 See Cm7.j(}S (2008) (n~'): ('1II1-13() (2(X)8) (n8"+). 
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this, the scheme also assists in achieving the 'market confidence' objective of the Act. 
Previously, debate on reforming the compensation scheme has centred on the 
adequacy or otherwise of the cover provided under the scheme. However, following 
the Northern Rock crisis, the extent to which the scheme contributes to market 
confidence has also come under consideration. 
One of the prime concerns of policy makers in the design and implementation of 
deposit protection schemes is to provide sufficient cover for depositors while at the 
same time limiting the propensity for moral hazard. One of the ways in which moral 
hazard can be checked is through the introduction of co-insurance.98 Before the 
advent of the FSMA, the deposit protection scheme in the UK included an element of 
co-insurance. Initially protection was limited to seventy five per cent of the first 
£ I 0,000 of protected deposits. Following the implementation of the Directive, this 
was raised to ninety per cent of the first £20,000 with no protection thereafter. 99 All 
depositors were thus subject to co-insurance at a very low level, a position which 
elicited a lot of criticism. 100 Under the current regime, co-insurance was removed in 
part, with one hundred per cent coverage for the first £2,000 and ninety per cent for 
the next £33,000. From the point of view of protecting the consumer, this limit was 
still described as being too low, as the poorest and least sophisticated bank depositors 
should not be expected to provide a degree of co-insurance for small deposits. 101 
Following the run on Northern Rock, the element of co-insurance has now been 
97 For a detaikd discllssion of the reform proposals, see Lastra (2008) (n88). 
I)K Sec chapter .~ for an analysis of the cffectivcncss and desirability of co-insurance as a mcans of 
l'()untnacting moral hazard. 
1)1) 
Sl'C SI 1995/)·+'+2. 
1110 , . h B 1. d' P' h D . P . S h Scc A Campbcll and P Carl\\rlg t' anr\.s an (onsumer roteL'llOn: t e eposH rotectlon, L' erne 
in the United Kingdom' ()998) Lloyd, ,\Iaritime alld Commercial Law Quarterly, )2~;.\ Campbell 
'Protecting Bank ))eposilor,,: :\n International Paspeclivc' (200'+) 7 COlltell/pom,-y issues ill Law 2, 
I.tO: /fllll (2002) ~n'+)): ~ UB Hall 'The Deposit Protection Scheme: Thc Case for Reform' ()987) 
.\'utiolllli H'nfl1lillsfer BUllk (}uarter/r Rerinl', '+5. 
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removed from the UK scheme and depositors are now fully covered up to a maximum 
of£50, 000. 
With the removal of the co-insurance element, the debate over its inclusion may have 
been laid to rest; however, due to consumer protection and moral hazard 
considerations, it remains debatable whether or not the current limit is sufficient and if 
it should be raised. The UK deposit protection scheme was hitherto less generous than 
arrangements in other countries. 102 The justification for this was that higher cover 
would adversely affect market discipline incentives for depositors and bank 
managers. I03 While market discipline remains an important element in banking 
stability, it is important that the level of deposit insurance cover is adequate enough to 
create and maintain the required level of confidence, which is also central to banking 
stability. 
Deciding the appropriate and adequate level of compensation is a difficult process. 
While it can be argued that the current limit of £ 50,000 is adequate to protect the 
unsophisticated depositor, the same can be said of the previous limit of £35,000. It 
remains to be seen whether a suggested increase to £ 100,000 would have a significant 
effect in distorting market incentives. Even then, the need not to distort incentives 
must be balanced against the importance of maintaining a sufficient degree of 
confidence in the system. The consultation paper lists factors that should be 
101 Cartwright (~()()-+) (n()~): /\ Camphell and P Cartwright 'Co-insurance and I\lur~11 H'.IIard: Sume 
Rcllcetiolls on Deposit Protection In the UK and USA' (200~) ,) jOllrnal or /ntenllltiOlwl Bunking 
Regulation I. 9. 
102 em 73(}S (~()()~) (n~3) Chart 5.1. 
lUI See P Jacbllll 'J)epl)"it Protection and Bank Failures in the United Kingdom' (1996) BUllk (~I 
F;l/glul/t! Fillul/ciul Stability Nl'l'inl' (/\1I1umn). /hailahle at 
!l!.!n Ii"" \\. h.llll . \ liL'll!.!land.cll.lIh./plIhlicalilllls;r"rl 1l)l)()/~lrt7( ls"lIe c i 2() I ).pJL. accessed 16 \ Ia: ~()()7. 
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considered in setting the compensation limits, which include the appropriate level of 
consumer protection, and simplicity and consumer understanding. 104 
The majority of retail deposit accounts in UK banks hold less than £35,000 and it has 
been shown that increasing the limit would not have a significant impact on the 
number of depositors covered. 105 However, the Government's response to the run on 
Northern Rock and subsequent bank failures by guaranteeing all bank deposits is an 
indication that the present coverage level is not sufficient to maintain consumer 
confidence in a crisis. The guarantee, which was necessitated by the need to prevent a 
full-scale financial crisis, created an implicit guarantee of deposits in all other banks 
which in itself creates distorted incentives for moral hazard. 
With the removal of coinsurance, there is currently no other mechanism, apart from 
compensation limits, to counteract moral hazard in the UK Compensation Scheme. 
Coinsurance is founded on the principle that the person who pays the coinsurance is 
responsible for creating the risk. It is worthy of note that while coinsurance was 
introduced to make depositors exert market discipline,106 risk-related assessments 
(primarily targeted at the behaviour of regulated firms) are absent. This appears to be 
hased on the rationale that consumers of financial services, and not regulated firms. 
should bear the costs of counteracting moral hazard. While there is no evidence to 
suggest that coinsurance is inimical to banking system stability, there is evidence that 
risk-hased premiums work better in mitigating moral hazard and risk-taking by 
hanks.I07 
Ilq ('m 730S (~()OX) (nX3). 70. 
105 Ihid. 6X. 
lOll Cninsuranl'l' was rl'llHl\l'd only hecuusl' rl'cent nl'nls ha\l' sillmll that it creatl'S an incenti\\.~ for 
dCpllsitllrs to run on their hank:--.. Sl'C Cm730S (~()08) (nX3), 68. 
10' Sl'l' :\ :\khi~hl' and ,\ \\'hytc 'The Impact or FDIC!:\ on Bank Returns and Risk: Evidence from Ihe 
Capital ~ larkl'ts' (.~OO I) 2~ journal (~l Ballkillg alld Fill(/Ilce ~. 3l)3; ,\ Demirguc-Kunt and E 
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A major limitation to the UK compensation scheme is public awareness. Public 
consciousness of the existence of the scheme and its features seems to be very low, 108 
and consumers who are unaware of the existence of the scheme might assume that 
there is no protection. This also raises concern on the possibility of systemic risk. 
Even if the compensation limit is raised, depositors who are ignorant of the protection 
that is available are still likely to run on their banks.109 The long queues that were 
witnessed during the Northern Rock crisis can partly be attributed to the ignorance of 
the depositors of the existence of a compensation scheme. 
In order to avoid banking runs, insured depositors also need to be assured of 
immediate access to their funds. The consultation paper notes that it may take several 
months for depositors' funds to be reimbursed in a complex failure involving a high 
volume of claims. This fact partly contributed to the run on Northern Rock.IIO Thus, it 
has been proposed that the FSCS should aim to make compensation payments within 
one week of a bank closing. III This target might however be impracticable unless 
certain other aspects of the Scheme are considered, particularly the need to revise the 
mode of funding the scheme. 
DClragiache 'Docs Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation' 
(2()()2) 131M F Working Paper No. 00/03, note 15. 
10K A rCCl'nt sur\'cy by the FSCS showed that less than a quarter of researchers were correctly told the 
namc of the compensation schcmc whcn they asked about compensation arrangements if a firm is 
unable to meet claims made against it. 41 % of researchers were either told that there was no protection 
at all. or \\'L'rC not pro\'ided with any information about the protection a\'ailable. See 
I·ses Olltlook. Issuc 4 (August ~()(l.~). Note also that there are restrictions on the usc in ad\crlising of 
information on the FSCS. 
109 One of the statutory ohjccliH's of the FSA is to promote puhlic awarcness and understanding of the 
financialsyslcm. Undcr C()~IP. 2.2.3R, the I·ses is mandated to publish information for claimants and 
pOlL'Iltial claimants on the operation of the compensation sl'heme. The means /1) \\ hich clll'L'li \ c puhlic 
;1\\ ;1Il' nl'SS L' an he ;tcllIL' \ L'L1 arc d i scusscd in Chapter -+. 
1101/uIflala;Ill'n .\/el1lo (n90). 
III ('m 730S(200X) (nX'), 71. 
The FSCS funding method has been described as being reactive rather than 
proactive. 112 The fact that the FSCS adopts a mainly ex post funding model, where 
banks have to be levied to meet compensation payments after a failure that has not 
been forecast, means that without government support, it would be difficult to raise 
the funds for a deposit pay-out within a week, especially where there has been a 
failure of a large bank.113 The adoption of a risk-based deposit insurance system is 
also not compatible with an ex post funding model. The purpose of risk-based 
assessments is to ensure that risky banks pay for the cost of insurance, this would be 
defeated if assessments are made only after banks become insolvent. 
As noted earlier, in companson with other parts of the world, bank failures are 
relatively rare occurrences in the UK.114 The run on Northern Rock did not lead to the 
collapse of the bank, thus the Compensation Scheme was not actively involved in 
managing the crisis. This notwithstanding, the run could have been prevented if a 
Compensation Scheme had been in place that gave depositors the awareness that their 
funds were substantially covered and also the confidence that the funds would be 
made promptly available in the event of their bank experiencing difficulties. 
The reform of the UK Scheme should be guided by the need to tailor the scheme to 
suit its statutory objectives. Recent events have shown that the scheme, as currently 
sl ructurcd, is neither appropriately designed nor appropriately publicized to meet 
112 flall/alainn! Memo (n90). 
II \ 'Only t-lA 111 left to protect UK's hank deposits' The Independent 25 Septemher 2007. Availahle at 
btl 11://\\\\ \\. i ndcl1l'nlk n LCl ).uk/ncws/hll~ i Ill' ~,,/ nl' w~/un I \ -pl lUIllI-l-l Ill-Ie Il~ t( 1- pn ltect -ub-han k -dcpt I..., it ...,-
-l(H-l50.llli!l! . ;ll'l'C~~cd 17 Decembcr 2007. Thc House of Commons Sclect Committee on Treasury 
also l](lte" in its report that an cxamination (If FSCS funding indicates that 'it would not he ahle to cope 
with the failure of a mediull1-sized, let alone a major financial institution.' Proposals for pre-funding 
and I'S( 'S acccss tll puhlic scctor funding arc containcd in Cm7308 (2008) (n~n), ch.5. 
II~ Compellsal ion payouts from the UK Scheme haH' heen small in comparison with other countries 
that operate deposit protectiun scheIllcs. While this rdlecls thc Ies~ generous nature of the Sdleme. it i .... 
mainly due to thc rl'lati\cly small numher and site or hanks that ha\c failed. Scc Jackson (1996) (n92). 
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these objectives (particularly market confidence and consumer protection). Most 
importantly, a Compensation Scheme that engenders confidence would also reduce 
the incentive for runs, thus creating more time for regulators to react appropriately 
and avoid taking panicky decisions aimed only at placating running depositors. 
There are various options open to supervisory authorities in resolving a failed bank, 
and these were considered in the previous chapter. These options include deposit pay-
off, open bank financial assistance and the use of bridge banks. These options should 
be available to the appropriate regulatory authority, to be applied in individual cases 
guided, among other things, by the need to minimize losses and disruptions to the 
banking system. 
The intended reform includes proposals for the introduction of an SRR. 115 This is a 
welcome development given that it has been posited in this thesis that the special 
nature of banks justifies the adoption of a bank specific insolvency regime. However, 
it has been argued elsewhere that the existing regulatory tools open to the UK 
authorities in dealing with bank failure have not been fully utilized. Particularly, that 
it would have been worth retaining the administrative order procedure in the 
Insolvency Act 1986, more so as this procedure has been used with a relative degree 
of sliccess in the past, an example being the administration of Barings Bank in 
1995. 116 
115 ('1117308 (200X) (n83). chAo 
116 :\ Call1phell and others (2008), 'Response to Financial Stahility and Depositor Pnltection: 
Stren~thenill~ the I-"ralllework' A \ailah\c at http://\\ww.lnl1-
lrl';ISUr\ .!2()\ .uk/l11edia/F/I/AIldrl'''~':lll1phdl.pdr, accessed 15 June 2008. the British Bankers' 
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Ih L'Xistin~ rl'~lIlall)("y powers and that clllphasis should he placed on dlecti\e utili/ation of the tllllis in 
the IWllls of till' regulatory authoritil's. Sl'l' BB:\ 'Financial Stahility and Depositor ProteL'lion: 
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The foregoing reservation notwithstanding, it is apparent that the UK authorities will 
go ahead with the introduction of a Special Resolution Regime. Under the 
proposals,117 the SRR will provide the authorities with a wider range of tools to deal 
with banks in difficulty. The SRR consists mainly of the 3 stabilzation options. the 
bank insolvency procedure and the bank administration procedure. The stabilization 
options involve the use of bridge banks, private sector purchasers and temporary 
bl ' h' 118 pu IC owners Ip. 
Under the proposals, the FSA, as regulator, will be responsible for determining 
whether a bank has breached the regulatory threshold conditions that would trigger 
the SRR. The Bank of England will be responsible for the implementation of the SRR, 
including taking the decision on which of the SRR tools to use. The Treasury will 
generally be responsible for decisions involving the use of public funds. The 
objectives of the SRR include the protection and enhancement of the stability of the 
financial system, protection and enhancement of public confidence and depositor 
protection. I 19 
Under the proposed Bank Insolvency Procedure, where threshold conditions have 
heen breached, the Authorities can make an application to the Court for a bank 
insolvency order appointing a person to act as bank liquidator. The first responsibility 
of thc bank liquidator is to arrange for all of the bank's eligible claimants to recei\'c 
compcnsation from the FSCS or have their accounts transferred. after which the bank 
is wound up. 
W Sl'l' C11/ -:43() (200X) (nX-t.). para "+.1 X. 
liS SCl' Illlp:!/","''' .publ il'al iUIl-.. pari i lime nl.ul,Jpak m~O()7()X/cmhi II ,,/1"+ 7/0X 1..+ 7. 1 -:;. hlml 
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The FSCS will be given an enhanced role in relation to depositors protected under the 
compensation scheme. In the context of the Bank Insolvency Procedure, the FSCS 
would be entitled to participate in proceedings for or in respect of a Bank Insolyency 
Order. The FSCS would nominate a member of a Bank Liquidation Committee, which 
will have the responsibility for overseeing the work of a bank liquidator appointed 
pursuant to a bank insolvency order. The liquidator would work with the FSCS to 
ensure rapid payout of depositors under the scheme and provide relevant support and 
information to the FSCS. The FSCS can also be called to contribute to costs arising 
out of the use of any of the resolution tools. 
The main advantage of introducing a special regime is that there would be a clear and 
consistent policy and mechanism for resolving troubled banks. This would further 
promote confidence in the banking system by removing uncertainty as to how 
creditors will be treated in the event of insolvency. Uncertainty increases the 
probability of bank runs, by creating incentives for early withdrawal of funds while 
the bank's assets still have sufficient value. In such a situation the initial runners 
enjoy the benefit of receiving full payment, while those unable or unwilling to run 
receive less. 12o The need for a clear and consistent policy should however be balanced 
against the need to avoid a rigid and overly prescriptive regime. As such a reasonable 
degree of regulatory judgement should be retained for flexibility. 121 
It is important to note that despite the enhanced role which the FSCS has been given 
under the SRR. the Scheme still remains primarily a pay-box scheme. with its 
responsibilities confined to cffectiyc depositor payout following a bank failure. In 
119 Bank nf En~land. H 1\ 1 Trl';lslIrY. & FSr\ 'Financial Stahility and Depositor Protection: Special 
Reslliuliun Re!..!ime.· em 7459 . .200g. 
I~O A"lII~/'I/(/Il (iOO7) (1193). .20 I. 
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contrast to the extensive powers to be granted to the Tripartite Authorities. the 
proposals do not give the FSCS any definite powers in relation to the actiYation and 
implementation of the SRR. It is suggested that the Compensation Scheme should be 
given a wider role to play during bank insolvencies. This becomes imperative given 
that when the SRR is triggered, the FSCS would invariably incur costs. Issues of 
fairness and the need to minimize costs dictate that the FSCS should be given wider 
risk-minimizing powers. The House of Commons Treasury Committee published a 
report in January 2008, in which it recommended the creation of a single authority, 
similar to the US FDIC, with the power to resolve failing banks and the responsibility 
to administer the deposit insurance scheme. 122 
Despite the proposed introduction of the SRR, the scope for harmful regulatory 
forbearance still remains. The proposed SRR still remains a discretionary power of 
the tripartite authorities. It is recommended that the adoption of a US-style PCA 
mechanism would be more appropriate. This would grant extensive risk-minimizing 
powers to the deposit insurer, with pre-specified mandatory regulatory action where 
corresponding pre-specified tripwires are breached. I23 
5.2 Country Experience: The United States 
5.2.1 An Overview of U.S. Banking Regulation 
In comparison with other countries. banking regulation and super\'ision in the US is 
highly fragmented. The panoply of laws. regulatory agencies and financial institutions 
I~I Sdl'('( Committee _')/1: Rl'IJOrr (.2007/X) (1186). para.Il)O. 
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has been described as 'quirky' with 'many oddities explainable only on historical 
grounds' .124 The history of banking in the United States is punctuated with accounts 
of financial crises and wide-spread banking failures. 125 A unique feature of the 
American regime is the dual banking system under which banks may be chartered and 
regulated by either the Federal or a State Government. 126 This can be attributed to the 
federalist nature of the American political system and the unwillingness to 
concentrate too much power in the central government. 127 The Federal Reserve 
System, which performs both monetary and regulatory functions, was also created by 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which created the twelve regional Federal Reserve 
banks which are supervised by the Federal Reserve Board. 128 
Perhaps the most important historical factor that has shaped the form of banking 
regulation in the United States was the great depression of the 1930s. There was a 
significant decline of confidence in banks which resulted in a total collapse of the 
banking system in 1933. The number of banks in the United States fell by half during 
this period. 120 This led regulators and legislators to conclude that the existing 
regulatory framework was insufficient to deal with the troubles that occurred at the 
time, particularly the loss of public confidence. Radical changes were introduced in 
124 lR Macey and others Banking Lali' and Regulation (3 Td ed.) (Aspen Law & Business, New York 
200 I) 2. The chronology of the U.S. bank regulatory system and is complicated and an entire field of 
study on ils own, which does not fall within the scope of this research. For a full historical review see 
K Spong (2000), Bank Regulation: Its Purposes. Implementation and Effects (5th edn, Federal Reserve 
Bank or Kansas City, Kansas City, 2000) ch2. 
125 \\T Spahr 'Bank Failures in the United States' (March 1932) 22 The American Economic Re\'ieH' I, 
2()X; A Camphell and P Cartwright Banks in Crisis: the Legal Response (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2()()2) 
IX7. 
1~11 On Dual Banking. see KI: Scott 'The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in 
Rl'!2ulation' (1977) 30 Stanford Law Re\'ieH' 1, 1. 
m I'S Redford 'Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism' (1966) 31 LaH' & Contemporary Prohlems 
-l (:\utumn) 7-ll); :\1\1 Pollard and others Banking LaU' in the United States (Butterworth Legal 
Puhlishers, Stoneham, 1l)~X), ch.2: HS Scot International Finance: Transactions, Policy. lllld 
Regulatioll (13 lh edn. Foundation Press. Nc\\ York, 2006) ch .. ~. 
I~S For a historical narrati\l.:, Sl'l' AH Ml'IlIl'f and ;\ Grl'ellspan ,\ Histor\' of tile Federal Resenc: 1<)13-
Jl)51 (Uni\ersit\ nfChica~ll Prcss. Chicago. 20()3). 
I~() B Ikrnanke :Non-moIlL'lary Erkcls of the Ii nancial C1'i"is in the Propagation or the Great 
Depressinn' (19~'n) 73. \ml'ric(/1/ Fconumic RC\'icH' 3.257. 
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the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935. Although the Acts introduced many changes. the 
most significant of these was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). 
There are four maIn categories of financial depository institutions in the United 
States: commercial banks; savings and loans associations; savings banks and credit 
unions. The major regulatory agencies that have control over depository institutions 
are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (O.C.C)130 for national banks; the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for state member banks 131 and 
bank holding companies; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for state 
non member banks; the Office of Thrift Supervision 132 for savings associations; and 
the National Credit Union Administration Board133 for credit unions. The antitrust 
division of the Department of Justice is also responsible for the review of bank merger 
applications under the federal antitrust laws, and the prosecution of criminal 
violations of federal law by bank officials. These agencies carry out bank safety and 
soundness examinations, compliance, data processing, and other numerous 
supervisory functions. 
5.2.2 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Federal deposit insurance was introduced by the Banking Act of 1933 with the 
establishment of the FDIC to help restore public confidence in the banking system 
through the provision of insurance coverage for bank deposits and the promotion of 
1.10 Till' oee \\as estahlished hy the National Bank Act of 186~ as an autonomous hureau of the 
Treasury Department. The nec supervises the operation of national hanks and is responsihle for the 
estahlishment and chartering of such institutions. Sel' 12 CFR ~ '+.2: 12 USC ~ 27. 
I.lI 12 USC ~ 2.+X: 1\ !emher hanks ,Ul' those which own stock in their local Federal Reserve Bank 
1\2 EstahlisllL'd hy the Financial Institutions Reform. Rec(Hery. and Enforcement .\l'l of 19X9 as an 
autonomous unit or the Treasury Department. 
1\.\ 12llSC ~175'+. 17)h. 1771. 
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safe and sound banking practices. 134 By providing deposit insurance, the FDIC senes 
as a stabilizing influence in the economy by fostering public confidence through its 
role in protecting funds in deposit accounts. National banks and state banks that are 
members of the Federal Reserve System must be insured by the FDIC, while other 
institutions may apply for FDIC coverage. The main features of the deposit insurance 
scheme will now be considered in turn. 
I. Organizational Structure 
The FDIC is organized as an independent agency of government, which is 
administered by a five-man Board of Directors. The Board members are appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and with no more than three 
members being from the same political party. One member must be the Comptroller 
of the Currency and one member must be the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision. 135 The members of the Board are barred from holding any office, 
position, employment or interest in insured depository institutions. The Board IS 
required to carry out the affairs of the FDIC fairly and without discrimination. 136 
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) 
made changes to the structure of the FDIC. I37 It placed the responsibility for 
administering insurance for thrift institutions on the FDIC. The FDIC administered 
two insurance funds: the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and the Savings Association 
I.l-l Sl'l' FDIC, ;\IlIl11al Report 3 (1987), 
Il.~ Although estahlished as an independent agency, the requirement the requirement of OCC and OTS 
representation on the FDIC Board is capahle of undermining the independence or the corporation as the 
Trl';\sury l'an intluel1l'l' the dirl'l,tion llf Board resolutions, See WM Isaac 'A Look at Deposit Insurance 
Funds: Financial Reform's Unrinished Agenda' (2000) The Regioll. Special Issue, Federal Re,>crH.' 
Bank or I\linneapolis. 
11(, I~ usc * IRI~: * IRI9, 
1.'7 The .\l'l was p;\,>,>ed follll\\ing the crisis in the Federal Sa\ ings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(I:SI...I( '), .\1\ a'>'>l'!S and liahilitie,> or the FSLIC were transferred to the FSLIC Resolution Fund. \\ hich 
i'> managl'd hy till' FDIC. SL'l' 12 llSC ~ I ~~ la, \-'llr analysis of the F1RRE:\ rd(lrm,>, ,>ee JR Barth and 
Insurance Fund (SAIF). These funds were not to be commingled and were to be used 
solely for their respective insurance purposes.1 38 Following the promulgation of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 (FDIRA) 139, with effect from March 
2006, the BIF and the SAIF have been merged into a new fund known as the Deposit 
Insurance Fund (DIF), with all assets and liabilities of the BIF and the SAIF 
140 transferred to the new DIF. 
The Corporation is required to submit an annual report of its operations, activities, 
budget, receipts and expenditures to Congress. The report is expected to include inter 
alia: the current financial condition of the Deposit Insurance Fund; the purpose, effect 
and estimated cost of each resolution action taken for an insured depository 
institution; and the exposure of the insurance fund to changes in economic factors 
likely to affect the condition of the fund. The Corporation is also required to submit 
financial and operational reports to the Treasury on a quarterly basis. 141 
II. Funding 
Initially, the FDIC obtained capital of $150 million from the U.S. Treasury and $139 
million from the Federal Reserve. 142 The FDIC's insurance fund is maintained by 
assessments on insured banks and savings associations; earnings on investments in 
U.S. Treasury securities; and a line of credit of $30 billion from the U.S. Treasury.I~-~ 
The amount each insured institution is required to pay is based on statutory factors 
such as the balance of insured deposits and the degree of risk the institution poses to 
others 'The Need to Reform thc Federal Deposit Insurance System' (1991) 9 Contemporary Policy 
/\I//('S I. ~-l. 
138 1 ~ USC * 1 X~ I (a)(-l). (5) & (6). 
IN 
. L. I ()l)- 171. enacted Fehruary 8. 2006. 
Ito II . I ~ ) 1 (») )/( s - L.. 
I~I 12 lise * 1 X~7. 
II' These fUllds \\ L'rL' rq)aid in full by 19-1X from the FDIC's accumulated re\enUL',>. SL'L' 
\\'1{ Sdllichting and (lthers Hunking Lmr (\'01. 2. I\latthcw Bender. Ncw York. Il)X~ updatcd~O(4). 
the insurance fund. The method of calculating assessments is known as the 'Risk-
based assessment system', which was introduced by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDCIA).I44 
Under the rule adopted by the FDIC Board in November 2006,145 insured institutions 
will be placed in different assessment risk classifications based on two criteria: capital 
level (capital group assignment) and supervisory ratings (supervisory group 
assignment). Institutions are classified into three capital group descriptions: well 
capitalized, adequately capitalized and undercapitalized. Supervisory group 
assignments are classified into three subgroups: Subgroup A, which consists of 
financially sound institutions with little or no weaknesses; Subgroup B, which 
consists of institutions that reflect weaknesses which if not corrected, could result in 
significant deterioration of the institution and increased risk of loss to the DIF; and 
Subgroup C, which is made up of institutions that pose a substantial probability of 
loss to the DIF unless corrective action is taken. The subgroup evaluations are based 
on the institutions' composite CAMELS rating. 146 
III. Mandate and Powers 
The mandate of the FDIC is to preserve and promote public confidence in the U.S. 
financial system by insuring deposits in banks and thrift institutions. The FDIC can be 
classified as a 'risk-minimizer' deposit insurer with a broad mandate and extensive 
powers. To achieve its mandate, the FDIC has been given both insurance and 
'·0 12 USC 182~. 
1-1-1 Sl'e 12 USC ~ 1817 (h)( I). For an ()veniew of FDICIA provisions. see S Huher 'The Federal 
I kp(lsil Insurance Corporation Impnl\l'ment ACI of 1991' (1992) 109 Banking Lml" JOllnw/ 4. 300. 
II~ 12 (TR Parl~27; under Ihe FI )ICI:\. Ihe FDIC Board of Directors was required to reyiew premium 
rale~ ~l·lI1i-annually. This requirement has been removed hy the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform .\CI 
of 2007. 
regulatory functions: 47 The FDICIA confers extensive powers on the FDIC. 148 The 
Corporation has the authority to examine FDIC-insured state chartered banks that are 
not members of the Federal Reserve System. Further, it can conduct a special 
examination of any other insured depository institution whenever the Board of 
Directors determines that a special examination of such insured depository institution 
is necessary to determine its condition for insurance purposes. 149 
The FDIC also has the power to terminate the insurance of an insured depository 
institution that is involved in unsafe and unsound banking practices. 150 Other powers 
of the FDIC include: 
• Power to approve converSIons, mergers, consolidations, or assumptions of 
deposit liability transactions involving insured depository institutions; lSI 
• Power to act as receiver for all insured depository institutions placed In 
. h' 152 receIvers IP; 
• Power to protect depositors by making loans to, or purchasing assets from and 
assuming liabilities of insured depository institutions, and to facilitate mergers 
or consolidations in order to reduce risks or avert threatened loss to the 
FDIC; 153 
1-16 CAMELS is an acronym for component ratings assigned in a bank examination: Capital adequacy, 
;\ssL'l quality, Managcment. Earnings, Liquidity. and Sensitivity to market risk. The ratings are on a 
scale of 1-5, with I being the highest rating and 5 being the lowest. 
11712 USC ~ 1811. 1819. 
IIX 'In FDIC Wl' Trust" The Economist (U.S) I April 1989. 
1-1<) I ~ USC ~ 1820; a Memorandum of Understanding with the other supenisory agencies has limited 
slIch examination to institutions \\ith a CAMELS rating of 3, -+ or 5. The FDIC also has formal 
il1\ estigatory pO\\l'rs in L'llJll1eL"lion with which it may issue subpoenas to require the attendance of 
\\ilnesses and the production of documents from any place within the jurisdiction of the llnited Statl',", 
ISO This Pll\\l'f can be c\l'rcised aftcr the issuance of the statu(()ry notice and an opportunity for a 
ilearil1!.!. Sel' I ~ llSC ~ I ~ 18. 
151 11 cl1S( .... sIX1X( ) . 
- , s (-( c . 
1'\112l1SC ~I~~I(L'). 
1.\1 I 2 USC ~ I ~.2 3 (l·). (t). (k). 
• Power to prohibit payment of interest on demand deposits; I 54 
• Power to review proposals to reduce or retire capital of insured banks; 155 and 
• Power to organize a new bank to assume the insured deposits and temporarily 
perform the functions of a closed insured bank, or to form a bridge bank. 156 
IV. Coverage 
Each depositor in an insured depository institution is protected based on the aggregate 
of all deposits in that institution held by the depositor in the same right and capacity. 
for the benefit of the depositor, either in the name of the depositor or the name of any 
other person, other than any amount in a trust fund. 157 In 1934, deposit insurance 
coverage was pegged at $2,500 but this amount was increased over time. 158 Under the 
FDICIA, the maximum coverage limit is set at $100,000. 159 The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Reform Act requires the FDIC to consider, at five-year intervals, whether to 
raise this cap to account for inflation and the Act also raised the coverage limit for 
many retirement accounts to $250,000 per depositor per institution. Following the 
recent financial crisis, the US Congress has approved a temporary increase in deposit 
insurance coverage limit to $250,000. 
Deposits held in separate branches of an insured bank are not separately covered but 
those held in one insured bank are covered separately from deposits in another bank. 
It is possible to have deposits of more than $250,000 at one institution and still be 
I~I 12 lise ~lX2X(g). 
I.\~ 12 lise ~ 182X(i). 
I)h 12 lise §IS21(m).(n). 
1.~7 Thc FDIC's rc!..!ulations rdatin!..! 10 insurance l'O\cra!..!c arc containcd in 12 CFR part Y~O. 
I)S Thc limit \\as l~aisL'd to ~5.()()() in 19.~-+. III 'j; 1 0.000 i~ 1950. to $15,000 in 1966, to S2().()()() in 1969, 
to ~-+().()()() in 197-+, and to S 100.000 in 1980. 
1:1
1
) 12 lise ~ 1 X21 (a)( 1 )(b). Undcr thc FDIR.\ of 2005. thc dcposit l'll\L'ragc fllr rdirement accounts has 
hCL'n 1~li"'L'd to S250,O()(). hlr an llHT\ll'\\ of the l'hanges introduced by the FDIRA. Sl'l' JL Dougla ... and 
llllll'l'''' 'I kpnsi t [nsural1l'L' Reform EnaL'led' (2006) [23 JOll mal of Banking LaU' 5 ( i\ 1;1: l. -+-+7. 
fully insured if the deposits are kept in different categories of legal ownership.160 
Where there has been a merger of insured banks, the separate insurance of assumed 
deposits continues for six months after the deposit assumption, or in the case of a time 
deposit, until the earliest maturity date after the six-month period. 161 
FDIC insurance does not cover money invested in stock, bonds, mutual funds, life 
insurance policies, annuities or municipal securities even where these investments 
have been bought from an insured bank. However, the FDIC insures accounts held by 
d . 162 government eposltors. 
Insurance for deposits denominated in foreign currency is determined and paid based 
on the equivalent value of the amount in U.S Dollars as of the close of business on the 
date of the insured institution's default. 163 
V. Payment of Insured Deposits 
Prior to the introduction of federal deposit insurance, depositors would recover a 
certain percentage of their money from a failed bank's receivership. Depositors were 
unable to receive their funds for several years because disbursements were made only 
after the failed bank's assets had been liquidated; in the absence of a depositor 
preference rule, depositors and unsecured creditors shared equally in the available 
assets of a failed bank. This led to a decline in confidence in the banking system, and 
depositor-runs became more frequent, consequently triggering more bank closings. 
1!10 I ~ CFR ~ .nO.3. 
1!11 I ~ CFR * .no.--l. 
Ih~ I~ CFR ~ T~O.15. 
ltd The L'xchanl!L' raIL'S for such cOl1\ersions are tlwse as of I ~ noon on the Jate of default. lI-.ing the 
l'\Lhan~l' rate ;)1' the particular Jep(lsit agreement if specitied. otherwisl' the 'noon huying rates fllr 
cahle tran-.fer-.· (If the I'-ednal ReserYL' Bank of Nl'\\ York are uSl'd .. SL'l' I ~ CFR ~ .~~O .. ~(c). 
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Under the FDIC regime, the FDIC pays out insurance funds to insured depositors and 
then becomes subrogated to the claims of the insured depositors. 
There are three different payment options open to the FDIC for depositors in the case 
of a liquidation of, or other closing or winding up of the affairs of an insured 
depository institution. First, the FDIC can pay each depositor up to the limit of 
insurance by means of cash or cheque; second, the FDIC can make available the 
insured portion of the failed bank's deposit liabilities by transferring them to an open 
bank; third, the FDIC can create a Deposit Insurance National Bank (DINB) to which 
the insured portion of the failed bank's deposit liabilities will be transferred. l64 The 
FDIC is required to pay insured deposits 'as soon as possible' .165 
In exercising any of the options open to it, the FDIC is required to adopt a least-cost 
determination. The Corporation must determine that the option is necessary to meet 
its obligations to provide deposit insurance. Further, the action must not, directly or 
indirectly, have the effect of increasing losses to the insurance fund by protecting 
depositors for more than the insured portion of their deposits, or by protecting 
:t . hid . 166 cree Itors ot er t lan eposltors. 
5.2.3 An Assessment of Federal Deposit Insurance 
TIll' FDICIA was promulgated mainly in response to the Savings and Loan Crisis in 
the 1980's. The legislation mandates the regulator with the main goal 'to resolve the 
161 12 lise ~ 1 X21 (t). (m). 
165 Ihid.: Historically. the FDIC has hL'L'11 paying insured deposits \\ithin a few days. h)r a detailed 
anahsis of how the FDIC cfkL'led the payment of insured deposits during the hanking crisis of the 
19H()s and L'arl~ 1990s. sec FDIC\I(II/lI,l;illg the Crisis: The FDIC lIlId RTC Experiellce. 1<)80-1<)<)../ 
\'pl. I. (FDIc' WashingllHl DC. 199H) ch9. 
1I161~ llSC ~ IH23 ((')(4): 12 CFR ~ 360.l(a). 
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problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term loss to the 
deposit insurance fund.,167 The cost-minimizing mandate represents a significant 
change in the approach to regulatory objectives, which previously emphasized on 
reduction in the number of bank failures. Under the FDICIA, the extent of losses to 
depositors and the FDIC are largely under the control of the bank supervisors, and the 
range of intervention powers under the Act are expected to be used to fulfil the 
mandate to minimize losses. 168 
The mam regulatory tools that have been introduced for the attainment of this 
mandate are capital-based PCA mechanisms 169 and the risk-based deposit insurance 
assessment system. 170 This reflects the focus of discussions on moral hazard, which 
have been less on creating the right incentives for consumers and more on how it 
relates to banks and their officers. The adoption of this mechanism rather than co-
insurance recognises the fact that the consumer does not possess the know ledge and 
sophistication to judge the risk profile of depository institutions; instead, the FDIC is 
given the responsibility to assess risk and charge premiums accordingly. 
The maIn atm of the FDICIA reform is to align the incentives of bank owners, 
managers and regulators with the interests of the deposit insurance fund. 171 The 
167 Sec I ~ USC ~ I X~ 10. 
168 Sec R Fisenheis and L Wall 'Reforming Deposit Insurance and FDICIA' (2002) 76 Federal Resen'(' 
Balik of;\llallla Economic Review I, I, 
Ihl) For a detailed analysis of the concept and operation of the U.S. PCA mechanism, see Kallj/non (ed) 
(~()()2) (n91). 
170 Prior to the FDICIA, it \\as thought that direct supervisory regulation was sufficient to control risk 
and that pricing deposit insurancc to retlect risk was neither ncccssary nor fcasihlc. HowC\cr. 
rollowif1~ the Sa\in~s & Lllans Industry dehacle, which was attrihuted in part to regulatory 
furhearallL'l'. jl( 'A mcchanisms and the risk-hased asscssmcnt systcm was introduced. Sl'e GJ Ben~ton 
and e;e; Kaufman 'The FDICI:\ :\ftcr Fi\c Years' (1997) II The Journal of /:conomic Perspeclircs 3. 
I.'N: LJ White 'The Reform of h'dcral Deposit Insurancc' (19X9) .~ JOIln/al of Ecollomic Perspeclil'l's 
4, II. 
171 The "DIC!:\ has hecf1 LTitici/cd for (l\l'r-protel'tion of the Deposit Insurance Fund to the detriment 
of other rC!2ulaton nhjecti\ l'S. Sl'l' SJ HlI~hl'~ 'Bankif1~ and Deplhit Insurancl': An Untinished 
~ ., 
.\~l·lH.la· (19l)~) 6X Intiiul/ll LllII'Joltn/a/~. X3S. 
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capital-based PCA ensures that institutions falling below minimum capital standards 
face increasingly stringent regulatory restrictions and requirements. The PCA 
mechanism classifies banks into different risk categories based on book-value capital 
ratios 172 and prompt termination of a bank is prescribed once its capital turns negative. 
Banks classified as well or adequately capitalized are generally not subject to 
regulatory intervention, while undercapitalized banks come under increasingly severe 
regulatory constraints as their capital position declines. PCA should prevent 
regulatory forbearance and help to detect problems in banks before they escalate and 
cause losses to the insurance fund. 173 
A major criticism of the PCA regime is that it is too rigid. It is argued that had PCA 
been in effect during the 1980' s, supervisors would have been compelled to close 
banks that ultimately survived. However, in the theoretical situation where PCA had 
been in effect, the banks and supervisors would have had different incentives and 
risky strategies would not have been pursued or condoned. 174 
The main limitation of the U.S. PCA model appears to be its reliance on book-value 
capital standards for classification of banks.175 The absence of market-value standards 
could potentially lead to a situation where apparent insolvencies might escape 
172 These categories are well capitalized, adequately capitalized, under capitalized, significantly under 
L'apital i/L'd and critically under capitalized. See Table 5.1. 
I"i \ Under the FDICIA, if the failure of an insured depository institution results in material loss to the 
Dep():-.il InsurancL' Fund, the inspector general of the appropriate federal banking agency is required to 
make a written report which reviews the supervisory process of the institution. The report should 
ascertain why the failure resulted in a material loss to the deposit insurance fund and make 
rl'commenoations for prnenting future losses. See 12 USC 12310 (k). This reporting requirement 
w()uld chL'ck incenti\es for regulatory forhearance: as such reports would generally be made plIhlic, 
imprudent forhearancL' would tarnish the reputation of those responsihle. See RS Carnell ':\ Partial 
:\nlidote to Pener:-.e IncentiH's: The FDIC Improvement :\ct of 1991' (1993) 12 :\/I/llIal Reri('I\' of 
Bunking LllIl" 317. 
17·1 Us('nhcis and \\'all, (2(}()2) (nI6g). L~. 
m Whife. (Il)gl» (11 170): 1 Shim'£): n .. lIniL' Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective ,\L'lion 
Optimal'.)' (2006) illS \\'orking Papa So.206. For a comparison of the accuracy and timeline .... :-. of 
~Il\'ernmellt a:-':-'L'-.SIllL'1l1 again:-'l mar\...L'l L'\ aillation of hank conditions. sec :\N Berger and other .... 
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regulatory scrutiny until it becomes too late because such banks remain book-value 
solvent. During insolvencies, book-value tends to increasingly overstate market-value 
for assets and understate them for liabilities. Reliance on book-value capital may also 
encourage the regulators to circumvent the provisions of the FD ICIA by engaging in 
harmful forbearance to prevent potentially embarrassing insolvencies. 
Market-value based standards are however not without limitations. The inherent 
limitation in adopting market-value standards is the availability of reliable and 
accurate information on which the regulator is to base its judgement. Adoption of 
market-value standards will necessarily involve estimations by the regulator. Market 
conditions are also transient in nature, therefore to avoid reliance on misleading 
information, bank positions would have to be assessed at very short intervals, creating 
additional regulatory costs and burden. 
The foregoing notwithstanding the contribution of PCA can not be understated. From 
a legal perspective, the main advantage lies in the existence of a clearly specified and 
well publicized insolvency rule. It goes a long way to limit the scope for discretionary 
action thereby reducing the scope for forbearance on the part of the regulator. 176 The 
lise of corrective action has contributed to successful remediation of problem banks 
before insolvency and in reducing the number of bank failures. 177 
The practical difficulties involved in implementing a risk-based deposit insurance 
system have been considered in this thesis. 178 However, actuarial fairness dictates that 
'Comparing 1\ Ltrkl'l and Regulatory /\ssl'ssments of Bank Monitoring: Who Knows What When?' 
(.20()O) 3.2 Journal o/Molle),. ('redit and Banking (August Part 2),6-+ I. 
17tl On rc!..!ulatorv forhearancl'. sel' Nil!"ilml/(l Shim (2007) (n87). 
177 Sl'l' C:lmptn;lkr of the CUITClll'y :\n;lllal Report Fiscal }'ear l()()7 :\\ailahlc at 
!Jllp:/I\\~~.\ leC.t rC;I~\'/anlHJ1[/.2()()7 :\nnu,,1 RCpllrl.pd r . accessed 20 1\ larch 200X. 
J7S 1,.' {'I 1 ,~l'l' '-- Hlpter .'. 
the premiums that banks pay on insurance should reflect the expected costs that they 
impose on the insurance fund. Such costs should however be reduced by the PCA 
provisions, which mandate regulators to intervene in advance of insolvency to reduce 
costs to the deposit insurance fund. This has led to the conclusion that the existence of 
both measures in the U.S. deposit insurance system is superfluous. 179 
It is true that in an ideal situation, PCA should prevent the FDIC from suffering loss, 
except in cases of fraud. 180 It is however important to note that perfection is very rare 
in bank supervision and supervisory errors may occasionally cause the deposit 
insurance fund to suffer loss. It is also possible that occasional large, adverse macro 
economic shocks may have sudden impacts on the balance sheets of many banks, 
rendering them insolvent before prompt supervisory action can be taken. This justifies 
the retention of an equitable means of pricing deposit insurance because losses can 
occur even with PCA. 
In the event of a sudden macro economic shock, banks with stronger capital positions 
are more likely to survive the shock than banks with a low capital base; thus such 
banks pose little risk of loss to the deposit insurance fund. Hence, deposit insurance 
premiums should not only reflect the risk of loss to the deposit insurance fund but also 
the magnitude of loss. 
The le\'el of public awareness of the existence and functions of the deposit insurance 
scheme in the U.S. appears to be more than that in the U.K. This is due to the 
179 Sec Sllad(l\\ Financial Regulatory ClHlllllittl'e, 'Deposit Insurance Reform Options' Sraremenr No. 
I () -". .j j) (' ('(' 11/ h IT. :l (JOO. 
ISO h'<lud \\a~ a ~igl1iricant fal'tllr in the failure of Keystone Bank, WV, which resulted in a "no 
millinl1 lo~~, \\ hil'h rqnl'~cl1tl'd ahout 75 per l'L'nt of the institutilln's assets, 
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historical antecedents 181 of the FDIC and the wide ranging role that the corporation 
plays in the banking system. In terms of depositor protection, U.S. depositors are in an 
apparently better position than their U.K counterparts. Although the principal purpose 
of deposit insurance in the U.S has always been the reduction of systemic risk, the 
philosophy underlying this approach has been that systemic stability can be achieved 
by promoting public confidence in the financial system through a substantially 
adequate level of depositor protection. 
Although the U.S deposit insurance scheme contains no element of co-insurance, in 
an apparent bid to retain an element of depositor discipline, deposit insurance 
coverage was pegged at $100,000. The wisdom behind this coverage cap is 
questionable when the complexities of the legal provisions for coverage allows most 
depositors to enjoy full insurance coverage by ensuring that deposit accounts are held 
in different rights and capacities. 182 It has been noted that the limit of $100,000 was 
excessive when it was set in 1980 as it exceeded what was needed to cope with 
inflation at the time. However, the real value of this amount has now been roughly 
halved by inflation since 1980 and is now below the real value of coverage in 1974 
when the nominal coverage limit was $40,000. 183 The inadequacy of the coverage 
limit. particularly in providing the desired level of public confidence, has prompted 
the temporary increase in the coverage limit to $250,000. 
The reform introduced by the FDIRA is a welcome development for allowing the 
FDIC to rc\'il'w the coverage limit at five-year intervals by indexing it to intlation. 
This \\'ollld furthcr aid financial stability as it engenders public confidence in the 
181 Traditionally. there has bL'L'11 a high k\L'1 of oank failure and depositor losses in the United State". 
banking system through effective depositor protection: 8.+ Since it is unreasonable to 
expect individual depositors to effectively monitor bank risk, the coverage limit 
should be substantially increased while the legal provisions relating to coverage 
should be simplified to apply to a single individual in an institution. The deposits of 
government entities, banks and other depositors that are better placed to assess and 
monitor bank conditions, which are presently covered, should be excluded from 
deposit insurance coverage to reinforce market discipline. 
Table 5.1 Mandatory Actions under peA 185 
Classification Mandatory Action 
Well Capitalized and Adequately None, but cannot pay dividends or 
Capitalized management fees that would lead to 
undercapitalization 
Undercapitalized Close monitoring; 
Capital restoration plan required within 
45 days; 
Restriction on growth, and prior approval 
required for acquisitions, branching and 
new lines of business. 
Significantly Undercapitalized Subject to provisions applicable to 
undercapitalized; 
Recapitalization required; 
Restriction on interest rates, growth and 
activities; 
New Directors and officers required: 
Restrictions on holding company. 
Critically Undercapitalized Conservatorship, receivership or other 
action required; 
Appointed of receiver required if other 
action fails to restore capital within 
stipulated time. 
1~2 It has hccn ohsLTYL'd that a t~lI11i\y of four, for cxample, can hold insured dcposits of up to S2 million 
III a sin~1c institution. Sl'l' FDIC 'Options Papcr' (:\lI~lI"t 2(00). .\vailahle at 
1.)1 tp://\\\\ \\ .1·l~:2)\llkpl)" i Iii 11:-. urllnL"di nil illt i \ clOpl ionpapcr. hi ml aCL"csscd 15 J unc 2()()7. 
I~l I-D/(' Optiolls Pal)l'1" (nl ~C). 
I~I SCl' H Sr;ll'l'\ 'Confidcl1L"l' Bac\.'l'd hy Dcpo"it Insurancc' (IS BlIllker. r-..la) 1.2006. 
IN~ SllurL"C: \)S H(lc\"d1L'r 'Hank Rcslrllcturil1~ and Rcsll\ution' (I~lF. \\'ashin~lon DC. 200fl) 1-l6. 
5.3 Deposit Insurance: Cross-border Issues 
5.3.1 International Financial Stability 
The erosion of traditional borders in financial markets has not been limited to sectoral 
lines but has also cut across geographic boundaries, raising systemic risk concerns. 
According to Alan Greenspan: 
'The global financial system has been evolving rapidly in recent years. 
New technology has rapidly reduced the costs of borrowing and lending 
across national borders, facilitating the development of new instruments 
and drawing in new players ... This burgeoning global system has been 
demonstrated to be a highly efficient structure that has significantly 
facilitated cross-border trade in goods and services and, accordingly, has 
made a substantial contribution to standards of living world-wide. Its 
efficiency exposes and punishes underlying economic weaknesses swiftly 
and decisively. Regrettably, it also appears to have facilitated the 
transmission of financial disturbances far more effectively than ever 
before.' 186 
With the expansion of international financial markets, new aspects of risk have been 
neated which have the potential to undermine international financial stability. The 
adverse effects of bank failure become even more damaging where it involves an 
internationally active bank exposing financial safety-net players to various insolvency 
and intervention regimes. While the failure of BeCT has highlighted the inherent 
I~h A Grl'clhpan 'The Current ,\sia Crisis and thl' Dynamics of I nternational Finance' TlJsfif1lollY (If 
Cllllimlllll Boord of Gorallors (~l fhl' Federal Resl'll'l' SnfclI/. ,\Iall Creellspall hejlm' fhl' ('oll/mittee 
011 hllllkillg 1IIldjillllIlCial\(,!"I'iCl's l 'S House o/ReprCSl'llfufi\'cs. 30 January I t)t)X, 
difficulties in supervIsIng internationally active banks,187 recent financial cnses In 
some parts of the world 188 have raised the awareness of the role of contagion In 
international financial markets. 189 Under panic conditions, markets do not effectively 
discriminate between countries with strong and weak economic systems, which may 
cause such panics to spread to countries with sound economic structures and policies. 
The emergence of multinational banking190 and international financial conglomerates 
has also increased concerns about the efficacy of bank regulation and supervision at 
an international level. 191 Financial conglomerates have been at the forefront of 
globalization as they operate in different countries through different legal entities. 
Although these firms offer the advantages of diversified assets, risks and sources of 
earnings, their structure poses several problems for regulators. Apart from systemic 
concerns bordering on the potential spill over effect of the failure of an international 
conglomerate, 1 ')2 national supervisors also have to deal with the allocation of 
supervisory responsibilities. Conflicting approaches to the legal regime governing 
IH7 For a general discussion on the implications of the BeCI failure for international banking 
supervision, see RJ Herring 'BCCI: Lessons for International Bank Supervision' (1993) II 
COlltemporary Policy Issues (April) 76; Herring (2005) (n23); Vinten (1991) (n23). 
188 For example, the 1998 Asian financial crisis, and the Russian and Latin American Crises of the late 
I 99(l" s: for an analysis of the Asian financial crisis, see BJ Eichengreen Towards a Ne~v International 
Fillallcial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda (Institute for International Economics. 
Washington DC, 1999); see also J Peek and ES Rosengren 'Implications of the Globalization of the 
Banking Sector: The Latin American Experience' (2000) New England Econornic Review (September), 
45: DArner and M Yokoi-Arai (eds) Finallcial Crises in the i990s: A Global Perspectin! (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 2003) Part 3. 
189 On international financial contagion. see R Chang and G Majnoni 'International Contagion: 
Implications for Policy" (2000) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 2306: PR 
i\lasson 'Contagion: Monsoonal UTects. Spillovers and Jumps Between Multiple Equilibra' (1998) 
/,\1 F Working Papers No. H'PI98Ii.J2. 
190 This refers to the conduct of banking acti\ities through a branch or subsidiary located in a foreign 
country. Sl'e RM Pecchioli The illternationalisatioll of Banking: The Policr issues (OECD. Pari..;. 
19S3) eh . .2. 
191 G.-\ Walker intenllltional Bunkillg Regulation: L(/II' Policy ([nd Practice (Kluwer La\\ International. 
London . .20(1) part .2; liD Skipper 'Financial Senices Integration Worldwide: Promises and Pitfall ... : 
(2000) OE("f) insuran("£' lIlId Primte Pensions Compendium for Emerging Economies, Book i. 
I()~ The interrelationship of \ arious entities within a llluitinational conglomerate increa..;es the risk that 
plllhklllS \\ ithin an affiliate in one jurisdiction will spread to other affiliates in other jurisdictions. Sl'l' 
K :\Inander and others Glohal Gm'l'l,,/w/cl' (~r Filluncial Systems: The IlIfcnwliollal Regulatioll oj 
Systl'mic Risk (O\ford UniH'rsity Prl'ss. (hl'ord . .2(06) eh.l. 
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bank insolvencies across jurisdictions could also pose considerable challenges in the 
event of a failure of a large international conglomerate. 193 
The development in the international financial market has highlighted a fundamental 
problem: the enormous mismatch that exists between an increasingly sophisticated 
and dynamic international financial world with rapid globalization of financial 
portfolios, and the lack of an adequate institutional framework to regulate it. 194 The 
response to this has been the establishment of international financial bodies and 
efforts to develop international standards (soft law) 195 and harmonize basic features of 
national regulatory regimes. 196 Most of these bodies have no legal status as 
international organisations and hence have no legal capacity to promulgate 'hard law', 
however, they serve as a forum where peer pressure can act as a powerful incentive to 
improve policy and implement soft law. 
193 R Herring (2002) 'International Financial Conglomerates: Implications for Bank Insolvency 
Regimes' A vailahk at http://www I. wurldhank.org/financc/a:-setslimages/Herring--
inti finan cunglol1l-doc.pdr, accessed 15 June 2007. 
194 This was particularly highlighted hy the collapse of BCCI and Barings. See Herring (2005) (n23). 
()n the prohlems of supervising multinational hanks, see G Calzolari and G Loranth 'On the Regulation 
or Multinational Banks' (200 I) 4- Ril'ista di Politica Economica 275, reprinted in L Lambertini (ed) 
,\ntitrtlst, ReRulatioll and Competition; Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003). 
195 As opposed to 'Hard law', 'Soft law' refers to quasi-legal agreements which are not of a hinding 
nature and is (lften associated with international law. See VD Degan SOllrces of International Law 
(Ni.iholl Puhlishers, London, 1997) 238; Alexander (2006) (n 192), ch.4: see generally KW Ahhott and 
() Snidal 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance' (2000) 54 International OrRalli:(/fion 3, 
421. 
196 The Brctton Woods System was the first attempt to estahlish a set of rules. institutions and 
procedures to go\CrIl fi nancial relations among independent nation states. The system led to the 
L'stahlishmcnt of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World B;lIlk) and the 
International Monetary Fund (lMF). The Bretton Woods System collapsed hetwccn 1971- 1973. SeL' 
generally J Williamson The Failure (1/ World ,\!olletary Reform. 1971-7-1 (Ncw York University Pres:-. 
Ncw York, 1977): MD Bordo and J Harold 'The International Monetary Fund: Its Present Role in 
Historical Perspecti\c' (2000) NBER \\'orking Papers. No. 77::'-1: Rr---I Lastra 'The Intern,ltional 
1\ lonetary Fund in Historical PerspeL'li\c' (~()(){)) 3 Journal of Illfenwfioll{/l Economic Lwl' 3 
(Septcmher). 507. 
Examples of such bodies include the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)197 and the Basel 
. B k' S .. 198 M CommIttee on an Ing upervlslon. ost proposals for the reform of the 
international financial architecture are centred on improving the roles and functions of 
the few international financial institutions. Improved regional co-operation has also 
played a significant role in international financial stability.199 The EU has taken the 
initiative200 in developing an international legal framework with high profile efforts at 
financial integration, but there have been other regional efforts such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the West Africa Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU).201 At a more general level, the International 
Organisations with responsibility for international monetary and financial relations 
are the International Monetary Fund (lMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Settlement (World Bank), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).202 
5.3.2 Cross-border Banking and Deposit Insurance 
As noted earlier the failure of a multinational bank could raise significant concerns for 
regulators because of differences in national insolvency rules. Such a failure could 
also be further complicated by different approaches to deposit insurance across 
197 The FSF was established to 'promote international financial stability through information exchange 
and international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance.' The FSF's Compendium of 
Standards lists the standards that are internationally accepted as important for international financial 
stability. Sec generally T Bennett Tolley's International Initiati\'es Affecting Financial Havens (Tolley. 
Lundon. 200 I) ch7. 
198 The Committee was created by the Central Bank Governors of the G 10 nations in 197-'+. with a 
mandate to improve the soundness of banking systems, and to establish a level playing field for 
intnnational operators. It is also a forum for international co-operation within G 10 countries and 
bet ween G 10 and non-G 10 countries. The Committee formulates supervisory guidelines and standards. 
and rL'commends best practice. The Committee is best known for its International Standards on Capital 
:\dequacy, the Core Principles for Etlective Banking Supervision, and the Concordat on Cro ........ -bordcr 
Banking SlIpL'nision. Sl'e generally \Ldker (200 I) (n 191), part l. 
11)1) SL'L' the Report of the Task Force of the I'xecutive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (If the 
United Nati(lns. 'Towards a Nl'\\ International hnancial Architecture' 21 January. 1999. 
200 This has been through till' EC trl'at) regime and IcgislatiH' framework implcn;enting the Single 
I\Ltr"-et Pw~ramme. 
201 I Salami ~Bankin~ HarIl1oni/ation in the /\frican C(lntext' (2008) 9 JOllrnal of BUI/king Reglllation 
3, I ~7. 
202 For a disl'lIssion on the kgal frame\\(l(""- for international financial regulation. sec ,\/n'(l1/(ler (2006) 
(n 192), ch.3. 
different national jurisdictions. Thus it is pertinent to examlne the feasibility of 
establishing an agency to act as an international deposit insurer or at least harmonize 
basic features of national schemes. It is also important to consider the current 
provisions of national deposit insurance laws on cross-border banking. 
5.3.2.1. Internationalization/Harmonization of Deposit Insurance 
The rISIng trend in globalization of banking activities has prompted calls for 
internationalization of financial safety net measures to protect international financial 
markets from the effects of contagion.203 In the same vein, Grubel204 has also 
proposed the establishment of an International Deposit Insurance Corporation (lDIC). 
He argues that such a scheme would lead to the elimination of negative international 
externalities, which each country alone has inadequate incentives to combat. The 
proposed scheme would function like existing national schemes but would serve the 
multinational banking community. 
International co-operation In the area of deposit insurance is essential to ensure a 
"level playing-field" on which banks can compete internationally. It has been shown 
that domestic deposit insurance policies affect the international location of deposits?05 
Hence, in the absence of international harmonization, countries have an incentive to 
2(U In addition to recommendations for international supervision, there have also been calls for an 
International Lender of Last Resort. See H Kaufman 'Preventing the Next Global Financial Crisis' 
WiI.lhi/lgto/l Post, 28 January 1998. A 17: S Fischer 'On the Need for an International Lender of Last 
Resort' (1999) A \'ai lable at http://w\\\\.imLorg/e\krnallnph.peechc .. /Il)l)t)/o10399.htl11. acce""ed 23 
july 2006; JD Sachs 'The International Lender of Last Resort: What arc the Alternatives'!' in J Lillie 
and (; OlivLT (cds) Rethillkillg the /Ilfcmatio/la/ MO/lCrilIT System, Conference Series No .. +3, (Federal 
ResL'J've B;lIlk of Boston, Boston, 1(99), 
10·1 Hei Ciruhd ':\ Propo"al for the Establishment of an International Deposit Insurance Corporation' 
1:'.I.\(/\,.1 ;11 /lItl'l'natiolla/ FillanC£'. No, 133 (Department of Economics Princeton University, Princeton 
NJ. 1(79) 
~()5 II Hui/in!..!<1 and G Nil'lH.kme 'Depo"it In"urance and International Bank Dl'posits' (2002) Flimpean 
C(!II1I1/;\'\';OIl~ Fcollomi£' Paper .\'0,/6./: "el' also H Hui/ing.a (2005) 'The Ell Depl)"it Insurance 
Dirl'l'Ii\l': Dill'S ()nc Si/e Fit .\II'!' Cl:PR D;,\('/1.\.\;OI1 Paper Sail''\. So, 5277. 
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use deposit insurance as a competitive tool to attract international bank deposits rather 
than the traditional goals of depositor protection and financial stability.206 
The proposal for an international deposit insurer would encounter some practical 
problems, which would make it complicated, perhaps impossible to implement. The 
main barrier to such a scheme is the cross-country differences in regulatory culture 
and the disparity between levels of financial development in different jurisdictions?07 
It has been argued that a convergence of British and American policy makes it easier 
to harmonize international banking regulation. 208 From the analysis of the deposit 
insurance schemes in the UK and the US, it is apparent that differences in regulatory 
culture and objectives have greatly shaped the evolution and design of deposit 
insurance in both countries. Hence it is difficult to see how both jurisdictions would 
agree on the features of an international scheme; for example, on the issue of co-
insurance where both countries previously adopted diametrically opposite policies in 
h . d . h 209 t elr omestlc sc emes. 
Another potential difficulty with the proposal for an international deposit insurance 
agency is that of ensuring participation in the scheme by all countries and the 
potential for free-riding. Where a few countries refuse to join the scheme. 
~(}() For a gelleral discussion on international competition among bank regulators and the scope of 
illternational policy co-ordination, see G Dell' Ariccia and RS Marquez 'Competition Among 
Reglliators' (2()()6) IMF Working Papers. No. WP/OI173; G Dell'Ariccia and RS Marquez 'Competition 
Among Regulators and ('redit Market Integration (2006) 79 JOllrnal of Financial Economics .2 
(Fehruary). -W I. 
~07 EJ Kane 'What Kind of Multinational Deposit Insurance Arrangements Might Best Enhance World 
\Vel fare'," (2003) II PucUic-Basin Finance JOllrnal-l (September). -lIJ, 
~()X I'B Kapstein 'Between Po\\er and Purpose: (\'ntral Bankers and the Politics of Regulatl1r> 
Cl11l\ergellce' (1992) -l6 International Organialfioll I. Knowledge. Power alld Internmional Polic\ 
Coordinatioll (Winter), 265, 
~(}t) Recl'nt SUl'\l'VS of deposit ill~urance schl'mes around the world have sho\\ Il that very fev, deposit 
II1~ULII1Cl' ~l'helll~'~ are e\,adly alike, The only l'ommon denominator is that majority of countrie~ that 
ha\l.~ adopted deposit insurance ha\l.: Ll\oured the adoption of l'xplicit sl.'hemes over implicit 
guarantees, Sl'e :\ Kyei 'lkposit Protection Arrangellll'nts: :\ Comparative Study' (1995) /'\/F 
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multinational banks within their jurisdiction would not have to pay for insurance. This 
has the potential to give such countries a competitive edge, as banks would haye an 
incentive to transfer their business to such countries. Grubel however argues that 
market forces would counteract such an incentive as uninsured banks would be 
required to pay higher interest rates on their deposits to compensate depositors for the 
higher risk of loss. He also posits that domestic legislation could be adopted to 
penalize branch banking in 'non-IDle-member countries' .210 
It is doubtful whether market forces can play the role described above especially 
where the country concerned is, for example, the United States (or another important 
financial power, such as the UK), where there is a strong institutional framework for 
prudential supervision of foreign banks already in place. In such a case, refusal to 
participate in an international deposit insurance scheme would not ipso facto denote 
higher risk to depositors. It would also be self-detrimental for domestic law to prohibit 
branch banking where such a country has opted out of the scheme. 
An international scheme would also fail to have a desired effect of boosting 
confidence in the international financial system if none of the major financial powers 
decides to take on a hegemonic role within the deposit protection arrangement. The 
assumption of such a role might be understood as that of a guarantor, and in the 
absence of this. any international arrangement would lack credibility. 
Ffforts to ensure financial stability at the international level can be grouped into crisis 
prevention and crisis management measures. The provision of deposit insurance at the 
Working Paper No. 95/13-J: r\ Dcmirguc- Kunt and others 'Deposit I nsurancc Around the \\' mId: :\ 
Comprchcllsi\l' Datahasc' (.~()05) \\,)rld Bank Policy Rese(/rch Workillg Paper No. 3():!8. 
21 () " 1 () 1) 1-(IruiJel(1979)(IL'"t. ), 
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international level falls under the latter category while the development of rules for 
risk assessment and capital standards at the international level falls into the former. 
National interests will often override international considerations when it comes to 
protecting a country's safety net resources. Therefore, national agencies that 
otherwise co-operate to forestall financial crisis often compete with each other to 
avoid or minimize the use of their funds when failure eventually occurs.211 In the 
event of a failure with an international dimension, host countries will also be reluctant 
to expend taxpayers' money to prevent instability in another jurisdiction. Thus in the 
absence of an international regime for bank insolvency and deposit insurance, the 
main challenge after the failure of an internationally active bank is that of burden 
h · 212 S anng. 
It has been aptly observed that 'crisis prevention strategies present an attractive 
alternative to regulators who are unprepared to shoulder the world's banking 
problems but who are nonetheless concerned about the financial system's safety and 
soundness. ,213 A crisis management regime may allow free-riding on the guarantor by 
institutions from small states while crisis prevention measures are primarily aimed at 
monitoring financial institutions and ensuring that they have sufficient capital to 
withstand financial difficulties. 
Whereas it is practically impossible to implement an international deposit insurance 
scheme effectively, it is still desirable to implement international harmonization of 
211 I.: HlIpkL's 'Who Killed Burden Sharing?' Proceedings nOlle IADI Cross-horder Symposillm, Basel, 
3 .\I(/\' l(}07. 
212 B~lI'llcn sharing iSSlll'S t~ piL'ally involve: emergency liquidity assistarlL'e (ELA). primary supen i,,(lr~ 
rl,,,pollsibility, dep(lsit pruteL'lion responsibility, and failure resolution responsibility. On the need for an 
international failure reS(lllltion regime, Sl'l' R~1 Lastra 'Cross-horder Resolution of Banking Crisis' in 
1)1) h anolT and others (l'lIS) International Financial Instahility: Glohal Bankillg and .\'(/tional 
Rl)glllarioll (World Scientifil' PlIhli"hing, SlI1gapore. 2(07) 311. 
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basic features of national schemes. The need for harmonization should be balanced 
against the equally important requirement for countries to design national schemes 
that reflect country-specific circumstances. The International Association of Deposit 
Insurers (lADI) was established in May 2002 with the objective to 'contribute to the 
stability of financial systems by promoting international cooperation in the field of 
d .. ,214 eposlt Insurance. 
Harmonization is perhaps more realistically feasible on a regional rather than on an 
international basis, as there is likely to be more convergence of regulatory objectives 
at the regional level. 215 At the international level, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
set up a study group to review experiences with deposit insurance schemes and to 
develop international best practices. 216 The fact that the report of the study group is 
characterized by an open-ended approach with few conclusive recommendations 
further highlights the inherent difficulties in developing an international framework 
for deposit insurance. 
A rciatively successful attempt to harmonize deposit insurance at the regional level is 
the EU Deposit Guarantee Directive (the Directive).217 Unlike other efforts to 
21.1 EB Kapstein 'Resolving the Regulator'S Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking 
Regulations' (1989) -B International Organization 2 (Spring) 323. 
'1-1 'd S b . 
- Scc I1llp://w\\\\.i;tdi.or~ . The IADI has recently formed a research and gUl ance u -commIttee on 
deposit insurance cross-horder issues to develop guidance for national schemes faced with cross-horder 
nanking risks . 
.'I.'i In rl'ccnt ycars. regional cooperation and institutions have developed faster and more easily than 
multilateral systcms. On Regionalism gcnerally, see ED Mansfield and HV Milner 'The Ne\\' Wa\c of 
Regionalism' (1999) 5.~ International Organization .~ (July) 589. 
216 The terms of rL'fcrcnl'l' of the study group were. among others, to: (a) study recent experiences with 
deposit insurance schemes hy cxamining systems that worked \vith and those that did not work with a 
\ iew to s~ nthcsi/ing the key lessons learned: (h) assess the desirahility of setting out international 
guidancc on deposit insurancc rccognising that different country circumstances may imply distinct 
policy presLTiptions: and (c)l'\aluate \\hat form such guidance could take (including formulation of 
gl'neral principles for depPsit insurance scl1cml's and setting out pitfalls to he a\oided in their design 
and operation). Sl'l' FSF. TSF Study Group on Deposit Insurance- Terms of Reference'. N(\\l'mher 
Il)l)l) .. \ \ ailahle at http://\\\\\\. rsronllll.(lr~/puhlil'atil)ns/publiL'atipn Il) 60.html . al'l:essed .2 Fehruary 
2005 . 
.'17 1:'lIroPl'llll /'U,./iallll'flt and COllncil /)if'l'ctil'c Y-/I/WEC of 16 MllY 1994. 
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harmonize regulatory and supervisory regimes, harmonization has been possible at the 
European level because of the Ee legislative framework. 218 Harmonization under the 
Directive will be considered briefly below. 
5.3.3. EU Harmonization 
The Directive mandates all member states to adopt an explicit system of deposit 
insurance,219 and adopts the principles of 'mutual recognition' and 'home-country 
control,220 in assigning deposit insurance responsibility for internationally active 
banks. Foreign branches are insured by the home-country deposit insurance scheme 
while foreign subsidiaries are covered by the host-country scheme. 
The Directive requires national schemes to provide a minimum coverage of €20,OOO. 
Member states are allowed to introduce co-insurance up to a share of ten per cent for 
depositors. The directive expressly excludes inter-bank deposits from deposit 
insurance coverage but states are allowed to choose whether or not to insure the 
deposits of authorities, insurance companIes, pensIon funds and deposits not 
denominated in EU currency. 
218 On the legal framework for the harmonization of EC financial markets, see generally J Goddard and 
others 'European Banking: An Overview' (2007) 31 Journal of Banking and Finance 7, 191 I; D 
Alford The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Preliminary Assessment and Future 
Prospects' (2006) 21 Journal of International Banking Lenl' & Regulation 2, 59; J Marttila 'The Main 
Challenge for CEBS: Convergence of Supervisory practices Across the European Union' (2005) 20 
journal of'International Banking Lmv & Regulation 7, .l-l I; GA Walker European Banking Lml': 
Polin' and Programme Construction (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 
2(07). 
219 Sel' Article .~ of the Directive. In principle, the Directin: also requires every credit institution to join 
a deposit guarantee scheme. 
220 On r-..lutual Recognition and Home Country Control, sec generally K Armstrong 'r-..lutual 
Recognition' in C Barnard and J Scott (cds) Thl' Law (~ffhe Single European Marker (Hart Puhlishing, 
Oxford, 20(2) 22.": SJ Key 'r-..lutual Rl'cognition: Integration of the Financial Sector in the European 
COllllllunity' (I <)X<) Federal Rl'.\l'/l'l' Bltllerin (Sl'ptemher): DG r-..layes and J Vesala 'On the Prohlem" 
of I hlllle ('ountry Control' (I <)<)6) Bunk of Finland /)i\cus.\ion Paper iVo. 201/998; r-..l ;\nuena'i 
'Deposit (Iuarantl'e Schemes and Home Country (\lntrtll' in R Cranston (cd). FIll' Single M{/rk£'{ and 
rhe l.u \I' (If B{/nking (2 nd cd n, Llll;, d s of London Pre'is. London, Il)l) 5) 107. 
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Economic reforms in Europe are geared towards the development of a single market 
in financial services and the presence of a 'level playing field' is germane to the 
attainment of this objective.221 To this extent, the Directive contains three principal 
provisions that serve to limit the use of deposit insurance as a tool for regulatory 
.. 222 
competitIon. 
The first of these provIsIons IS the restriction on advertising. Article 9 reqUlres 
member-states to establish rules limiting the use in advertising of deposit insurance 
information. This provision restricts banks from using differences in deposit insurance 
schemes for competition purposes.223 
Second, the 'topping up' provision contained in Article 4 allows foreign branches to 
supplement their insurance cover up to the level of the host-country by joining the 
host-country scheme. The essence of this provision has been considered by the 
European Commission and it was noted that though the 'topping up' provision has 
rarely been used in practice, it should still be retained as it allows branches from 
accession countries to compete favourably in other parts of the EU.224 
221 The Ell Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) has been the legislative framework for the 
tlc\c\opment of the single market in financial services. See generally HM Treasury, FSA and the Bank 
olTngland Thl' EU Financial Sl'nicl's Action Plan: A Guide' (2003) /\vailablc at 
U!lP://\\ \\\\ .I<l .. ~(l\ .uk/pubs/other,fsap ~uide.pdf, accessed 20 August 2006. 
222 On regulatory competition in the EU, see G Hertig 'Regulatory Competition for EU Financial 
Scnices' (2000) .~ Journalllf International Economic Law 2,3'+9. 
22.1 This is a hye-result of the application of this provision as the Directive stall's that the provision is to 
'prl'\l'nt such USl' from affecting the stability of the banking system or depositor confidence'. See 
AniL'le l) (3). 
221 Sl'l' Luropean Commission 'COIlllllission Rep(lrt on the Operation of the 'Topping up' Pn\\ision, 
.. \rtil'\c'+, paragraphs 2-5 of thl' DireL'livl' on Depllsit (,uarantee Schemes (9.+/lWEC)' COl\1 (01) )l»), 
2001. 
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The third of these provisions is Article 4, which initially limited the leyel and scope of 
coverage of deposit insurance provided by home-country schemes to the le\el and 
scope of coverage available under the host-country scheme. 225 
The possibility for deposit insurance policies to be used as a tool for international 
regulatory competition has not been completely eliminated by the Directive. In 
particular, it has been shown that countries that charge a low deposit insurance 
premium have a competitive edge over others.226 To this extent, it is surprising that 
EU policy makers do not appear to have given adequate consideration to the 
prescription of a minimum deposit insurance premium or a means by which premium 
may be ascertained. In the absence of such prescription, countries are left to determine 
deposit insurance premiums and in practice these are low, as most member states 
charge on an ex post or demand basis, which means that effectively the insurance 
.. 227 premIUm IS zero. 
The recital to the Directive notes that 'harmonization must be confined to the main 
elements of deposit guarantee schemes'; undoubtedly, this underscores the importance 
of tailoring deposit insurance schemes to country-specific circumstances and the 
inherent difficulties in trying to achieve harmonization.228 Indeed, the directive is 
open-ended on several key elements of deposit insurance design with the most notable 
mandatory provision of the directive being the requirement of a minimum coverage 
limit or f20,OOO. This requirement is designed to ensure a fair level of depositor 
225 See Art ide -J. (I); this prmision expired on J 1 Decemher 1 999.The provision was only necessary as 
a transitory measure as some countries were granted a transitional derogation from the requirements of 
the Directi\L'; sec ;\rtick 7( I): see generally European Commission 'Commission Report on the 
:\pplil'ation of the Fxport Prohihition Clause. Artick -J.( I) of the Directi\'e on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes' COl\1 (99) 7:":". 1999. 
'26 . . 'f") ) )")) ') () -) 
- Sl'e 1I111;:'lI1g(/ and N/('(}{ emc (_( (_ (11- ,) . 
227 For a detailed discu:--:--inn. SL'e IIlli;:.inga (:"005) (n:"05). 
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protection across member-states; however, because of the uneven state of economic 
development and wealth, it has also been criticized as leading to over-insurance and 
exacerbation of the moral hazard problem in accession countries. 229 As the directi \'C 
only stipulates a minimum coverage limit, it is also possible that coverage limits may 
be used as a means of competition for international bank deposits, as banks whose 
home-country schemes provide a generous level of coverage would be more attractive 
d . 230 to eposltors. 
The extent to which the EU harmonization efforts can help to contain systemic risk 
remains questionable. The recent events following the run on Northern Rock assumed 
an international dimension when the queues in the bank's UK branches were 
replicated in Ireland. The queuing depositors were only assuaged following an Irish 
government announcement that the full guarantee of Northern Rock deposits by the 
UK government also applied to Irish depositors. 231 Because the Directive only 
harmonizes general aspects of deposit insurance, member states have the discretion to 
determine the level of coverage to be applied, including coinsurance, as well as the 
funding mechanism to be adopted. 232 As a result, the design and functioning of 
deposit insurance schemes differs from one state to the other and there is little clarity 
as to the fate of foreign depositors in the event of a bank failure. 233 
228 Sec S Mohamed 'A Single Regulator for the EC Financial Market' (2001) 16 JOIln/al of 
Inten/atiol/al Bal/kin/? Law 819, 203. 
229 Sec IIl1i-;illgu (2005) (n205): N Nenovsky and K Dimitrova 'Deposit Insurance During EU 
AlTessinn' (20(H) William Davidson II/stitute Working Paper, No. 617. 
2l(} The European Commission is currently reviewing the minimum coverage threshold with a view to 
determining whether ,my changes might he necessary. See European Commission 'Report on the 
Minimum Guarantee Lnd of Deposit guarantee Schemes Directive 94/19/EC (2005) Availahle at 
hllp:/lcl'.eurllpa.l'ulinternal market/hank/doc,/",uarantee!report en.pdf , accessed 3 August 2007: 
i:lIwpean Commission 'Rcview of the Depllsit Guarantee Schemes Directive (9--l/l9/EC)' (2005) 
"\ai lahh: at htlp:/lel' .l'uropa,culi nternal ll1arket/hank/doc"/~uaranll'l'iL'( lIhultal ionpapl'r cn,pd r ' 
acccssed 3 ,\1I!.!lIs1 2007, 
2.11 Scc hllp:II\\~\\\\.rtl,.ldn_l'\\ 'o/~()()7/ol) I ~/northcrnrock,htll1l . accc'osed 17 Decemhcr 20()7. 
212 Fllr a detailed disL'llssinn, 'ol'l' J Carihoni and others 'Dl'posil Protection in the EU: State of Play and 
hIlurc Prospcct-.' (.2008) I.) JOllrnal u(Runkil/g Reglliatiol/ 2, X2. 
2.n '\\'hen the SaklY Nct Fails' The ('col/omist (U.K), 3rd_ 9th i\Lt~ 20()X, 94. 
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The foregoing notwithstanding, the Directive, by requiring member-states to adopt a 
system of deposit protection within their territories, has ensured that the twin 
traditional objectives of deposit insurance, which are financial stability and depositor 
protection, are enshrined in the financial safety-net regimes of member-states. The 
directive has also eliminated, to a relatively successful degree, the use of deposit 
insurance as a tool for regulatory competition between member-states. Finally, the 
directive has harmonized the legal position of national deposit insurance laws on the 
allocation of deposit insurance responsibility between home and host countries for 
multinational banks. 
5.3.4. Cross-border Provisions of National Deposit Insurance Laws 
Deposit insurance is a relatively simple concept but its design and implementation is 
complex. Due to the complications involved, which mostly arise from country-
specific factors, cross-border issues are easier to deal with by national law provisions. 
More importantly, policy makers should ensure that troubled international banks do 
not negatively impact the resources of the host-
country deposit insurance scheme. The cross-border prOVIsIons III the deposit 
insurance laws of the two jurisdictions examined earlier in this chapter will now be 
considered. 
I. UK Cross-border Provisions 
In relation to an incoming LEA firm's passported activities, its home-state deposit 
protcction schcmc must provide co\cr in respect of business within thc Dcposit 
Guarantce Dircctivc, whcther that busincss is carried on from a UK branch or on a 
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cross-border servIces basis.234 Section 214(5) of the FSMA 2000 allows the 
compensation scheme to provide for a person who qualifies for compensation under 
Schedule 3 of the Act,235 and falls within a prescribed category, to elect to participate 
in the scheme. 
Where there is no cover provided by the EEA firm's home state, or the scope or leyel 
of cover is less than that provided under the UK scheme, the firm may elect to obtain 
'top up' cover from the UK scheme for its passported activities carried on from a UK 
branch.236 Where an incoming EEA firm obtains 'top up' cover, the FSCS is required 
to establish a co-operative link with the firm's home-state compensation scheme in 
order to establish its procedure for the payment of compensation to claimants.237 
A firm granted 'top up' cover under the UK scheme must comply with the rules in the 
Sourcebook which apply to participant firms; where a firm fails to comply, the FSCS 
must notify the FSA and the firm's home-state regulator, and where the firm fails to 
meet its obligations for a period of twelve months, the FSCS may terminate the firm's 
T~8 
'top up' cover.-' 
II. US Cross-border Provisions 
Foreign bank operations are generally governed by the International Banking Act of 
1978.239 A foreign bank is defined as any company organized under the laws of a 
.' ,I , ') , ( omp 1-+.1 .. (I. 
21:; This rL'fers to EEA firms L'XL'rClSll1g 'passport rights' under the Single ~larket Directives. 
Participation in the scheme hy such firms is not mandatory hut hy election. See S, 2 \3( 10) FS\L\ 
2000; Regulation .3 of the Financial Services and Markets Ad 2000 (Compensation Scheme: Electing 
Participants) RL'!!ulations 2()() l, SI 2()() 1/l7X~. 
2.16 S (' I t~ 1 
. l'L'Omp -t._. 
237 CUlllP 1-+.3.1 R. 
238 S (' 1 1 1 
,L'l' omp -t.-t. 
~1') ()n thL' 0pL'ration and rl'guiatinn of foreign hanb in the US. see generally .\Ii/cc.'" alld others (2001) 
(1112-+). eh.11. 
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foreign country, a territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American 
Samoa, or the Virgin Islands which is carrying on the business of banking, or any 
subsidiary or affiliate of any company organized under these laws. 24o A foreign 
branch is any office or place located outside the domestic branch areas at which 
banking operations are conducted. 
Foreign banks in the US are required to conduct all domestic retail deposit activity 
through an insured bank subsidiary.241 The FDIC would only insure deposits in a 
branch of a foreign bank if the bank agrees that every branch established or operated 
by that bank in the same state would also be insured.242 The objective of this provision 
is to afford equal competitive opportunity to foreign and US banking organizations in 
their US banking operations.243 It is also easier for a deposit insurer or relevant 
supervisor to deal with a subsidiary as a separate legal entity than with a foreign 
branch. This explains the rationale for the home-country principle enshrined in the EU 
Deposit Guarantee Directive. 
As a precondition for FDIC insurance, foreign banks are required to deliver to the 
Corporation a surety bond, a pledge of assets, or both, in such amount and of such 
type as the Corporation may require. 244 This is to serve as protection to the deposit 
insurance fund against the inherent risks of insuring foreign banks whose activities, 
assets and personnel are for the significant part outside US jurisdiction.245 Before 
approving an application for a foreign bank to be insured, the FDIC Board must 
consider among other things the financial history and condition of the bank, the 
~1ll12 usc ~ IXL~(r); 12 LISe ~ .~IOI(7). 
~II 12 lISt' ~ 310·-l(d): (he foreign hank musl also allow the FDIC to examine any of its hranches. 
ofliL'es, a !!l' nL' Il' s nr a Ili 1 i all's h l( a IL'd in the LIS. 
'P 12 CFI{ * 3.t7.201. 
~·n 12 llSC ~~ 10.t(a). 
~11 12 USC ~ IXI5(c)( I): 12 CFR ~ 3.t7.210. 
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adequacy of its capital structure, its management and the risk presented to the deposit 
. f d 246 msurance un . 
The FDIC may also co-operate with foreign supervisory agencies; the Corporation 
may disclose information obtained in the course of exercising its supervision or 
examination powers to a foreign bank regulatory or supervisory authority, if it 
determines that such disclosure is appropriate for supervisory and regulatory purposes 
and that the interests of the United States will not be prejudiced. 247 
5.3.5. Cross-Border Co-operation Agreements 
Dealing with cross-border banking problems involves co-ordinating information and 
decision making, and dealing with potential conflict between jurisdictions, for 
example, relating to cost and burden sharing. These problems pose a peculiar 
challenge in the absence of an agreement or protocol to be used in a crisis. Cross-
border agreements can be used to ensure adequate supervision of internationally 
active banks.248 Such agreements ensure mutual recognition of supervisory efforts by 
home and host country supervisors, thus avoiding duplication or the existence of 
749 
regulatory loopholes.-
2·15 12 USC § 1815(c)(-l). 
,'Ill 12 USC § 1815(b); a foreign bank must give a written commitment to provide the FDIC with 
informatioll about the bank's allairs and those of its affiliates which are located outside the US. This 
would cnable the FDIC to determine relations between a foreign bank and its insured branch, and to 
tIL-tennillc the financial condition of the foreign bank as it relates to the insured branch. See 12 CFR 
~ J-.f7.203. 
2-17 12 CFR ~ 347.2()7. 
2.JS On information sharill~. SCL' R Pratt and H Schiffman 'Cross-Border Cooperation and Information 
I':\l'han~e: ()\lTl'()min~ the Barrins to Regulatory Cooperation' in Working Together: Imprm'ing 
R(',I;II/lItor\' C(lojJ('ration alld Information Exchange (Monetary and Financial Systems Department, 
1r-.11:. \\'ashin~t()n DC. 2007)" 
'I') 1:\<Implcs ~)f these a~rCl'l1lents include the European Central Bank's Memorandum of Under"tanding 
(r-.lI1U) on l'()operation betwl'l'n the Bankill~ Supenisms, Central Banks and Finance 1\1inistril's of the 
l:urOpe<l1l Unioll in Financial Crisis Situations: the LU Dircl,tiYe on Re-organilation and \\'inding up of 
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Cross border co-operation agreements are particularly useful for deposit insurers in 
terms of information sharing. As noted in Chapter 4, a well designed deposit 
insurance system should have in place an effective information sharing arrangement. 
Information sharing arrangements could be formal or informal but the nature of 
information that is shared has led to such agreements being formalised in legislation. 
memoranda of understanding or other agreements. 
Information sharing agreements at the domestic level are adapted to suit the 
information requirements of the financial safety-net participants involved. This IS 
determined by their respective roles, mandates and responsibilities. 25o These 
agreements become more complex at the cross-border level as there are many more 
safety-net participants with varying roles, objectives and powers, thereby making it 
difficult to coordinate information and activities. For example, it will be particularly 
difficult to establish an information sharing agreement where there is a pay-box 
system operating in one country and a risk-minimizer in the other. 
Information sharing agreements should take account of the roles, responsibilities, 
mandates and powers of the parties in their respective jurisdictions. The agreements 
should specify what information is to be shared and by whom. The nature, level of 
detail and frequency of information to be exchanged between deposit insurers should 
b 'f" f 7')1 e speci ICC.-· 
Crl'dit Institutions; and thl' Nordic 1\ IoU on crisis management intenention procedures and information 
sharint! in hanks with LTllss-hl)rticr cstahlishmcnts. 
~~() , ~., 
. Sl'e I ahlc 4.1. 
~'\I Sec HP 1);\\ ies 'SL'ltin~ Out the I. .... sues: CrllSS B()rder Information Sharing and the Need for 
Formali/l'd .\rrall~L'ment< f..\f)1 S\1/1posiulll 011 Cross Border Issues. Basel. S\rir:crlalld. J May :'()(}7. 
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Apart from the challenge of aligning the differing mandates, powers and objectives 
from various jurisdictions, any agreement at a cross-border level also has to take 
account of differences in intervention and legal insolvency regimes. 
The success of an information-sharing arrangement is dependent on the freedom of 
national authorities to release certain information. In many countries, there are legal 
constraints on the publication or release of prudential information by supervisory 
authorities. For supervisory authorities from this countries, it is pertinent to ensure the 
confidentiality of any information shared under any agreement. In the absence of a 
confidentiality clause in an information sharing agreement, most deposit insurers 
would be loath to provide information. 252 
Information sharing agreements must make provision for the timely release of data, so 
that prompt action can be taken. The fact that different jurisdictions will have 
different views on prompt corrective action must be taken into consideration.253 Some 
areas in which there may be conflicting approaches in different countries include the 
point at which a failing bank requires intervention and which entity initiates the 
resolution process. Supervisory authorities may also have divergent views on whether 
a particular failure should be treated as having systemic effects and if so, whether in 
the host or home country. Most importantly, the success of an information sharing 
agreement would depend on the political will of individual countries. 
~)~ Sl'L' Ba.'-.l'l COlllmittL'c on Banking Supcr\ ision "~/i)mwtion Flml's between Banking Supen'isof\ 
,\lIt/writic\ (L\'II/'/'/l'IlIl'lIt 10 thl' Concordat) 1990. 
~.'.l f)m'it'.\ (2007) (n2) I). 
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5.4 Provisional Conclusion 
The differences in the deposit insurance systems of the two countries studied in this 
chapter underscore the importance of policy objectives and individual country 
characteristics in the design features and modalities of deposit insurance schemes. 
Historical antecedents have also been a major factor in the development of the deposit 
insurance scheme. The high number of bank failures in U.S. banking history has 
contributed to the development of a robust scheme for protecting bank depositors. In 
contrast to this, a hitherto relatively stable banking system in the U.K., with the 
Compensation Scheme remaining relatively dormant, had relegated the issue of 
deposit protection to the background of banking regulation policies. The Northern 
Rock debacle however, has marked a watershed for the UK Compensation Scheme 
following proposals for wholesale changes to be implemented in new legislation. The 
continuous evolution and reform process in these countries underscores the complex 
nature of deposit insurance adoption and design. 
Globalization has highlighted the risks associated with cross-border banking services. 
Thus, initiatives to introduce or reform deposit insurance systems must take these risk 
factors into account. While policymakers should design their deposit insurance 
schemes to suit country-specific factors, it is equally important to consider the impact 
that international banks have on the resources and effectiveness of home-country 
deposit insurance schemes. 
While cross-country differences make the establishment of an international scheme a 
ncar impossible task, well designed deposit insurance systems should ensure effective 
co-operation hL'tween host and home-country safety net participants. Particular 
attention should he paid to the allocation of supervisnry responsibility, information 
27.+ 
sharing arrangements and burden sharing arrangements in the event of cross-border 
insolvency-
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CHAPTER 6 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN NIGERIA: 
EXPERIENCE, POLICY AND REFORM 
6.0 Introduction 
The adoption of explicit deposit insurance in Nigeria was a significant development, 
representing one of the key features of government economic policy in the 1980' s. 
The Nigerian scheme, established in 1988, was only the second in Africa after Kenya 
had established its own scheme in 1985.This chapter reviews the deposit insurance 
experience in Nigeria, beginning with an overview of the history and structure of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework for the financial sector in Nigeria. Major 
developments leading to the adoption of explicit deposit insurance are reviewed. 
Subsequently, the design and operation of the deposit insurance scheme is analyzed, 
with recommendations for reform. 
The main objective of this chapter is to highlight aspects of the deposit insurance 
prohlem in the Nigerian context. In reviewing the experience of this country, the main 
challenges and lessons that can be learnt are identified; comparisons are made with 
the schemes examined in the previous chapter where relevant, and the sound practice 
principles developed earlier are used as a guide. 
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6.1 Bank Regulation and Supervision in Nigeria: Historical 
Background 
The development of banking regulation in Nigeria can be classified into three phases. 
namely: 
I. 1892 - 1952 
II. 1952 - 1985 
III. 1986 to date 
I. 1892 - 1952 
This was the first period in the evolution of banking in Nigeria. It can be described as 
the 'Free Banking Era', as any firm that wanted to carryon banking activity only 
needed to register under the Companies Ordinance if it consisted of more than ten 
members. I Apart from this requirement, which only came into operation in the 
1920' s, there were no other laws or regulations to control the business of banking in 
Nigeria. 2 
The history of banking business in Nigeria3 can be traced back to the 19th century~ 
when the Elder Dempster Company was involved in specie movement of money from 
one part of the country to another. 5 The African Banking Corporation6 was later 
established in 1892 and it took over specie movement from Elder Dempster. The 
I SCl' S 2( I) Banking Ordinalll'l' Cap. 38 1922 
2 Scc JO Sanusi 'Dcvclopments in the Banking and Finance Industry: Institutional Framl'work 1970 To 
Date - Cllangl's in Ownl'rship Structure' Papers {[nd Proceedings of the Balik Directors Semillar. The 
Nigerian Banking and Finallce IlldustlY ill Transition: Shaping the Fu{ure (Financial Institutions 
Trainin~ (\'ntrl" La~(ls, 1(92). 
1 On tl~c l'\ (llution ~ of hanks in Nignia, see gcnl'rally F Olalusi 'Introduction to Banking' (E,an'> 
Brothers, Ihallan. 1(83) ell. 5: GO Nwankw() (;(!{d{'// Though{s 011 Money and Banking (('18:\ Pre'>,>, 
La~os, 200 I) 1134. 
I Tilis was 1()11~ hefore Nigcria attained political independence in 1960. 
:i SCl' ~cnl'rall\', C\' Bnm'n Thl' Sigcriilll Banking Sys{elll (,\lIen 8: Unwin, London. 1(66), I; (;0 
N\\an'l-,. \\\1 Th~) ,\'igl'l"iilll Fillllllcial S"'{OIl (1\ laclllillan Puhlishers, London. 1(80) ch.l. 
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Bank of British West Africa (BBW A) 7 was established in 1894 after which it merged 
with the African Banking Corporation. For many years after its establishment, the 
BBW A was the sole banker to the British Government in Nigeria and all the major 
firms that existed at the time. The BBW A remained the main player in the banking 
industry until the establishment of Barclays Bank D.C.O.8 in 1925. The British and 
French Bank9 was also established in 1948, and these three banks formed the core of 
the banking industry in Nigeria at the time. 
Like most developing countries, the banks that dominated the early period of banking 
evolution in Nigeria were foreign owned. This can be attributed to the fact that 
banking was introduced in the 19th century mainly for the benefit of European 
merchants that traded in Nigeria. 1o As the Nigerian economy developed, indigenous 
banks evolved to challenge the foreign monopoly.ll The early indigenous banks12 
included the Industrial and Commercial Bank, established in 1914; 13 the Nigerian 
Mercantile Bank, established in 1931; 14 and the National Bank of Nigeria, founded in 
1933. The Abgonmagbe Bank was also established in 1945. 15 
6 A bank with its headquarters in South Africa. 
7 Suhsequently renamed Standard Bank of Nigeria Ltd., and now First Bank of Nigeria PLC. 
8 Now Union Bank PLC. 
Q • Nuw U.S.A. pte. 
III ;\ large percentage of the indigenous population at the time was illiterate and the level of economic 
aCli\ity that required hanking was low. The indigenous people also held a very cynical view of hanks 
and hanking husiness and would rather dig secret places to hury their money than keep it in the hanks. 
Sec EO Oloyede 'Thl' Bank Customer and Banking Law in Nigeria' (1975) 19 Journal oj,\ti'icQn Lmr 
I/~. 66. 
II SCl' gl'nerally NC Okigho Nigeria's Financial System (Longman Group. London. 1981). 
I~ For a fulliisl (If hanks that operated in NigLTia at thl' time the country attained independence in 1960. 
sec ( 'en tra I Bank () r N i !.!eria. ;\ 1/ 1/ ual R clJort (~l Statemen t of, \cCOIl1/f .t(J/' Period Endcd 3///2/6/. 
U The bank failed in 1930 as a result (If poor capitali/ation and mismanagement. 
\.j The bank failed in 1936. also due to poor l'apitali/ation and mismanagement. 
I~ The bank's ;' ...... l·l...; \\LTe taken (l\L'I in 1969 hy then \\'estLTn State Government to whom the hank Web 
hea\ih indebted. it IS now knuwn a" \\ema Bank PI.C. 
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One dominant feature of this early period was that most of the banks collapsed almost 
as soon as they were established. 16 Apart from inadequate capitalization and 
mismanagement, most of the failed banks embarked on a policy of rapid branch 
expansion within a short period of commencing operations. In sharp contrast to the 
foreign banks that existed at the time, the indigenous banks lacked adequate qualified 
and experienced personnel. 17 The collapse of the Nigerian Penny Bank, another 
indigenous bank, in 1946 generated so much controversy that it led to the setting up of 
the Paton Commission of Enquiry in September 1948 to investigate banking practices 
in Nigeria. The report of the commission noted a number of factors that were 
responsible for the high rate of bank failures. These include: 
• Poor management~ 
• Inadequate capital base~ 18 
• Fraud~ 
• Reckless and imprudent lending~ 
• Illiquidity. 
The commission's recommendations formulated the basis of the first banking 
legislation in Nigeria, the Banking Ordinance 1952. 19 Presently, the Nigerian Banking 
system is made up of a mixture of foreign and indigenous banks as well as banks 
financed by both foreign and local capital. 
16 Scc Tahle 6. I. The only hanks that survi\cd the carly period were the National Bank and the African 
Contincntal Bank. 
17 SCl' KI I~\\l'ikc LaU' or Banking {[nd Scgotiable Instruments (,\fricana-Fep Puhlishers. Onitsha, 
19(1)L'h.1. 
IS Fach of the Banks had a paid up l'apital of kss than t; I ~.OOO. 
III h)J' a L'iassifiL'atioll of Ni~crian laws and legal system, Sl'e ,\() Ohilade The SigericLn Legal Sntl'1II 
tSWl'l't 8: 1\ ta\ wl'lI. l.nndoll. 1979). 
Table 6.1 - Failed Banks in Nigeria (1892-1960)20 
Bank Name Date Remarks 
Established 
The Industrial & Commercial Bank 1929 Failed in 1930 
The Nigerian Mercantile Bank 1931 Failed in 1936 
The Nigerian Farmers & Commercial Bank 1947 Failed in 1953 
Merchants Bank 1952 Failed in 1960 
Pan Nigerian Bank 1951 Failed in 1954 
Standard Bank of Nigeria 1951 Failed in 1954 
Premier Bank 1951 Failed in 1954 
Nigerian Trust Bank 1951 Failed in 1954 
Afroseas Credit Bank 1951 Failed in 1954 
Onward Bank of Nigeria 1951 Failed in 1954 
Central Bank of NigeriaLl 1951 Failed in 1954 
Provincial Bank of Nigeria 1952 Failed in 1954 
Metropolitan Bank of Nigeria 1952 Failed in 1954 
Union Bank of British Africa 1952 Failed in 1954 
United Commercial (Credit) Bank 1952 Failed in 1954 
Cosmopolitan Credit Bank 1952 Failed in 1954 
Mainland Bank 1952 Failed in 1954 
Group Credit & Agricultural Bank 1952 Failed in 1954 
-
Industrial Bank 1952 Failed in 19)4 
West African Bank 1952 Failed in 19)4 1 
-
II. 1952 - 1985 
The failure of many of the early indigenous banks led to cymcism and loss of 
confidence in the banking system. Local depositors suffered considerable loss and this 
also affected some foreign investors who had engaged the services of the failed 
financial institutions. The Paton Report, which emanated from the 1948 enquiry, 
resulted in the Banking Ordinance of 1952. In addressing the problems that 
characterised the growth of the banking industry, the legislation made provisions 
for: 22 
• Minimum paid-up capital requirement; 
• Maintenance of adequate liquidity ratio; 
• Imposition of ceiling on unsecured loans; 
• Examination and supervision of banks; 
• Licensing. 
The Ordinance prohibited the carrying on of banking business in Nigeria except by a 
limited company registered in Nigeria and holding a licence granted by the Financial 
Secretary to the Government. A distinct feature of the 1952 Ordinance was the two-
tiered capital adequacy regime. Banks were classified into indigenous and expatriate 
banks, with different capital adequacy requirements applying to both groups.23 The 
logic behind the differential treatment is still not clear as the expatriate banks were 
generally speaking, better managed than the indigenous banks that were beset by 
liquidity problems at the time. 
~I This hank is not ((lnneL'led with the Government of Nigeria or the Central Bank or Nigeria (CBN) 
~2 SI..!C (,0 Nwank\\lll'mdent;al Regulation ojNi,l!,crian Banking (University of Lagos Press. Lagos. 
1990) 1 H. 
'1 f 12.500 for indl~l'nolls hanks. and UOO.OOO for expatriate hanks. 
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In order to check the incessant illiquidity problem in most of the banks, each 
institution was required to maintain a reserve fund into which twenty per cent of its 
annual profit was paid until the total reserve fund equalled its paid-up capital. 
Enforcement powers were vested in the Financial Secretary, who undertook periodic 
examinations to ascertain the level of compliance with the provisions of the 
Ordinance. The Financial Secretary was empowered to withdraw the licence of a bank 
if, after an examination, it was discovered to be in violation of the Ordinance's 
prOVISIons. 
The 1952 Ordinance was the first attempt to supervise banking business in Nigeria 
formally and it had its shortcomings. These include: 
• Absence of a liquidity assistance mechanism; 
• Absence of an institutional mechanism for supervisory purposes; and 
• Absence of an explicit deposit protection scheme. 
As a result of these shortcomings of the 1952 Ordinance, two main legislations were 
enacted in 1958, the Central Bank of Nigeria Ordinance of 1958 and the Banking 
Ordinance of 1958. The major changes introduced include: 
• The establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN);24 
• Increase in the authorized paid-up capital of expatriate banks to W400, 000;25 
• Increase in the percentage of annual profit to be allocated to the reserve fund 
to twenty five per cent: 
21 The ('BN is respnnsihle for the issue of legal tender currency in Nigeria, the maintenance of external 
rL'~l'nL'S in ortiLT to safeguard the international value of the currency, the promotion of monetary and 
fin;lIlcial slahililv, aL'lin~ as hanker and financial adviser to the Federal Governmcnt and acting a~ 
lendLT of lasl re~()rl. PI~ior to the L'~tahlishmL'nt of the CBN. the \Vcst ,\frican Currenc) Board was 
L'harged with the rL'~ponsihility for the operation of a common monelary system in all the formcr 
Brilish CllloniL's pI' WL'sl :\frica. See generally BC Onyido 'The Role of the Central Bank in the 
N i ~LTian Fi 1l;t1lL' ial S \ ~IL' m' (2004) ~g Blllliol/ I. 13 ; \'1\ WlkH'o (200 I ) (n3) ,"\80. 
~~ 'I'IIL' capilal requirL:rnelll for illdigL'lloliS hanks under the old law was retained. 
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• A new credit ceiling at twenty five per cent of the paid-up capital of the bank 
per customer; and 
• Further restrictions on banks, including prohibition from investment m real 
property; ownership of subsidiary compames not carrymg on banking 
business; engaging in wholesale or retail trade. 
The Central Bank Ordinance was amended in 1961 mainly to give the CBN power to 
liquidate troubled banks; and in 1962 to provide for an increase in the capitalization 
requirements for indigenous banks,26 and to remove the prohibition on the ownership 
of real estate. The 1958 legislation was repealed by the Banking Act of 1969,27 with 
the aim of strengthning the banking system and increasing the powers vested in the 
CBN. It has been aptly observed that the 1969 Act marked an improvement on the 
earlier law through the 'range of additions to the Central Bank's armoury of control 
techniques, and in broadening the sphere of monetary control to embrace most 
banking institutions other than commercial banks. ,28 Significant provisions of the 
1969 Enactment include: 29 
• Increase in the capitalization requirement for indigenous and foreign banks;3o 
• Mandatory incorporation of all banks operating in Nigeria as Nigerian 
. 31 
compames; 
• All advertisements by banks were made subject to scrutiny and approval of the 
CBN/~ and 
26 The requirement was raised to W500, 000. 
27 Cap 2X. LFN 1990. 
2S Sl'l' 0 Teriha 'The 1967-69 Banking Amendments in Nigeria: An Appraisal of Financial Adaptation 
in an UnderdL'\L'\oped War Economy' (1969) II The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies 
I. -U quoted in N Danjuma The Bankers' Liability (Heinemann Educational Books. Ihadan. 1(93) 7. 
'() 
- /)i/lljlll1l11 (Il)ln) (n2X) 9 . 
. ~o Bankill!..! Alot 1969. s.N I). 
11 BankinL!..! Al't 1969. s.1 (I). Prior to this. foreign hanks operating in Nigeria were only required to 
rl'gister tl;eir prCSl'l1L"e but since they werl' technically not Nigerian companies, they were largely 
unalleL'led hv 1c!..!,i1 re!..!lIlation of Nigerian companies. The legal requirement currently in force is 
• L C 
l'ontained in the Companies and ,\lIied I\latters :\(1. CAP 59. LFN 1990. ss.S4-60. 
P. ) ) )) 
0- Bankln ll '\lot 1969. s._X(_ . 
C' 
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• Establishment and closing of branch offices by banks was subject to the 
approval of the CBN. 33 
In the 1970' s, there were other significant developments In the banking sector in 
Nigeria. First, the period saw the emergence of merchant banking business In the 
country. Second, the country evolved from a poor agricultural economy into a rich 
oil-based economy, the boom in the oil sector and increased earnings in foreign 
exchange from oil sales created increased liquidity in the banking system.34 Thirdly. 
the Indigenization Aces changed the ownership structure of most Nigerian banks by 
introducing minimum equity participation of Nigerians in banking companies.36 After 
the promulgation of the Indigenization Act, the Federal Government began investing 
in banking business, and acquired majority shareholding in the three biggest banks -
First Bank, Union Bank and the United Bank for Africa. Hence, the Nigerian banking 
industry changed from the hitherto foreign-investor dominated market to a 
government dominated market. 37 
The implementation of the indigenization law, and the resultant government 
domination of the industry, created some problems for the Nigerian banking industry. 
First, because the management of most banks were government appointees, such 
management invariably changed as often as government changed. Thus the political 
instability that existed at this time also resulted in management instability. The nature 
of the appointments also meant that individuals with little or no experience in bank 
.n Hankin!..! Act 1969, s.-+. 
31 RW ()g~lInleyl' 'Bank Density and Bank Licensing in Nigeria' (1991) I NDIC Quarterly 2 (June), 3). 
35 Sel' the Nigerian I'nterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977: Banking was classified under 
SdlCdule 2 of the Decree. which requilnl that at least 60% of the equity of hanks must he i\lgerian-
owned. 
3b The ,\l·t required 60 per cent indigenolls and -W per cent foreign equity participation. This la\\ was 
repealed in 19X9 h~ the NigLTian Enterprises Promotion Act. Cap. JOJ. LFN 1990, foreigners are now 
allowcd to hold a 100% sharchnlding in Nigerian hanks. 
\? This \\ as in aCC(lrdal1Cl' \\ ith gn\L'rnment polic~ at the time to take control of certain critical '-.L'ctllr'-. 
of the econ(lIl1Y. which included till' financial and oil Sl'l'tors. Sl'l' 51l11l1si (1992) (n2) 10, 
management were appointed to mange banks. This led to a high incidence of fraud 
d . 38 S d . an mIsmanagement. econ, government ownershIp of banks created a high 
incentive for moral hazard with most bank management and depositors operating 
under the assumption of an implied government bail-out in the event of a bank failure. 
The resulting deterioration of the financial condition of banks and concern for the 
safety of depositors' funds led to the reforms that were introduced in the next phase 
discussed below. 
III. 1986 to date 
In 1986, developments in the domestic and world economy39 compelled the Federal 
Government of Nigeria to introduce a new economic policy.4o This was referred to as 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).41 In implementing the policy, the 
government deregulated the financial services sector and introduced a more liberal 
38 JU Ebhodaghe 'A Century of Banking in Nigeria: Lessons for Bank Deposit Protection' (1992) 2 
NDIC Qllarterl)' 4, 13. 
39 Particularly, the debt crisis of the 1980's. See generally J Sachs (ed) The Developing Countries Debt 
Crisis (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989) . 
.to R Adeyemo and A Iwayemi 'Nigeria's Macroeconomic Crisis 1970-1986: An Overview' in A 
Iwayemi (ed) Mucwc('ollomic Policy Issues in an Open Economy: A Case Study of Nigeria, (NCEMA 
Publications, Ibadan, 1995). 
II Sec National Economic Emergency Powers Decree, No. 22 of 1988. The SAP was intended to 
restructure the macroeconomic framework through the alteration and realignment of the aggregate 
dOllleslic expenditure and production patterns by reducing the dependence on imported goods and 
petroleum exports: and diversification of the revenue and production base of the economy to ensure 
stable growth. This invohed an initiati\'e to use the private sector as a catalyst for economic growth 
lhrough pri\'atisation and commercialisation of gmernment owned enterprises. Various laws were 
enacted in furtherance of the policy and these include: Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (issue of Non-
Vllling Equity Shares) Decree 1987: Pri\'atization and Commercialization Decree 1987: Securities and 
I:\change COllllllissilln (knee 1988: Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Decree 1988: Mortgage 
Inslilulions Decree 1989: Companies and ;\lIied Matters Decree 1990; Central Bank of Nigeria Decree 
1999: Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree 1991: Insurance Decree 1991: and People's Bank 
of Ni!.!LTia Denee 1990. For a discllssion of the provisions of these laws. sec TC Osanakpo ',\ Critical 
Rc\icw of Banking-Related Legislation in the Structural Adjustment Era' in Banking al/d Other 
Fil/al/cial ,\IolpUlctias il/ Nigeria, Fedemi ,\/il/ist,)' (~l Justice LaH' RerieH' Series (1\ lalthouse Press. 
Lagus. 199m 28: () Y l'ro"un Legal ,'-'peets of Stl'llefllral /\djlls(mel/( Programme il/ Nigeria 
(Department of I.a\\ Uni\l~rsily of Ilorin. Oyn. 1989). 
2~5 
bank-licensing scheme.42 It also divested itself of its interests in most of the 
commercial banks. Naturally, this led to an upsurge in the number of banks in the 
country.43 While this period has been described as the 'time to practice the new found 
ability and confidence of Nigerians to manage their own banks',44 the proliferation of 
banks in the sector also introduced new problems which necessitated new legislation 
to minimize the incidence of bank failure and control the effects of such failure where 
. d 45 It occurre . 
Three principal legislations were enacted, which now constitute the mainframe of the 
regulatory and supervisory structure in Nigeria. These are: the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act 1998;46 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act of 
1991 ;47 and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) 1991.48 While 
the NDIC Act established an explicit deposit insurance scheme for Nigeria, the CBN 
Act and the BOFIA were introduced to strengthen the existing regulatory powers and 
supervisory functions of the CBN and NDIC.49 The laws also brought non-bank 
financial institutions under the control of the CBN.5o 
Presently, the superVIsory functions of the CBN are performed through two malO 
departments. The Banking Supervision Department is responsible for the supervision 
42 In dL'l'L'gulating the sector, the government's objective was to improve economic efficiency and 
dll'ctiVL' rL'SourcL' allocation through increased competition and enhancement in quality and spread of 
financial :-'L'I'vicL'S delivery. 
-11 BctwL'cn 1986 - 1993. the numher of hanks in Nigeria increased from -1-1 to 120. representing a 
IlJ2 1/i incrcasc. 
-1-1 Silllusi (1992) (n2) 1-1-. 
-15 Of\ Osunhor 'Trends in the Regulatory Framework in Banking Legislation: 1970 to 1992' Papen 
alld Proaedings (~f the Bank Directors Seminar: The Nigerian Banking and Finance Industry in 
Transition: Shaping the Future. (Financial Institutions Training Centre. Lagos. 1(92) 21. 
Ih This :\d has hccn rcpealed hy till' Nigcria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act 2006. 
1-' This al·t has hccn repcakd hy the CBN Ad 2007. 
IS DL'crcL' No,25 of 1991. IHl\\ Banks and Othcr hnancial Institutions Act. 
-I') Scc ~L'nLTalh OS Odll\L'mi 'The Challenges of the Nc\\' Banking Lcgislations' in The Ni,r.,:l'fiun 
Ballkill.~ and rin(/nCl' Il/("~stry in Transition: Shapillg the Future: Papers and Proceedings of the BUllk 
Direc'fo,-,\ Semillar, I(N2 (Financial Institutions Training Centre. Lagcls. 1(92). 
2X6 
of Deposit Money Banks and Discount Houses while the Other Financial Institutions 
Department supervises other financial institutions such as Community Banks, Micro-
Finance Banks, Primary Mortgage Institutions, and Development Finance 
I . . 51 nstltutlons. 
The main areas of regulatory focus in the current regime can be broadly grouped into 
three, namely: entry, risk evaluation and containment, and failure resolution. 52 The 
entry process involves licensing, which is the sole prerogative of the CBN under the 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA).53 Risk evaluation and 
containment is carried out through banking supervision, which is the joint 
responsibility of the CBN and the NDIC. Failure resolution functions are also shared 
between the NDIC and the CBN. 
Other agencies responsible for the regulation of the Nigerian financial system include 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);54 the National Insurance 
Commission (NAICOM);55 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC).56 Due to the plethora of regulatory agencies in the Nigerian financial system, 
the Financial Services Regulatory Coordinating Committee (FSRCC) was established 
50 See generally AA Adeogun 'A Review of the Genesis and Implications of Recent Promulgations' in 
EO Akanki (ed) Unilag Readings in Law (University of Lagos, Lagos, 1999) 
51 Sce eBN, 'Supervision Framework' Available at 
http://\\ \\ w.ccnhank.org/~lIpeni~i{)n/frame\\ ork.a~p , accessed 3 July 2007. 
52 See GA Ogllnleye C~O(7) 'The Role of Deposit Insurance in Promoting Financial System Stability in 
Nigcria' in A Campbell and others (eds) Deposit Insurance (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007) ch. 
I~. 
:13 The eSN has the powcr to grant and revoke banking licences. Previously, the approval of the 
Prc~idcnt was requircd before a banking licence can be revoked. and this resulted in delays in granting 
apprmal for the revocation of licences for terminaIly distressed banks. This requirement was remu\ed 
through an amendment to the :\L·t in 1998. See Ss 3 & 5 SOFIA 
51 The SEC \\as L'~lablished by the Imestments and Securities Act (lS;\) of 1999 to regulates the 
l'apital market and t(l approvc mergers and acquisiti(lns 
\:i NAIL '()I\ 1 is \l'SIL'd with tilL' rcsponsibility for regulating the insurance industry under the National 
Insuranl'c Commission Decree No. I of 1997 and thc Insurancc ;\ct 2003 
56 The ]·TCe \\as established hv the EI'Ce .\l't 2()().~. and is resp(ll1sible for the prevention, 
inve~tigation and pnlSL'cution of financial nil11e. 
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in 1994, to promote co-operation and co-ordination in the activities and policies of the 
various regulatory bodies. 
The Nigerian financial system has undergone remarkable changes over the years and 
it has been shaped by economic as well as political factors. Regulatory initiatives haye 
mainly been in response to crisis in the sector or as a tool for attaining certain policy 
objectives. While there was another crisis at the onset of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme, during which a significant number of banks failed, the sector enjoyed 
relative tranquillity thereafter.57 
On 6 July 2004, the Governor of the CBN announced a major policy initiative that 
affected the banking sector as the minimum capital base for banks was increased to W 
25 billion. This development triggered a 'regulatory-induced restructuring,58 as banks 
had to pool resources together through mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in 
the so-called 'consolidated' Nigerian banking sector, which is currently made up of 
twenty five universal banks. This is perhaps the most significant event in the history 
of Nigerian banking and its regulation as it is believed that this would solve the 
various problems that have plagued the sector. 59 
Table 6.2 - Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions in 
Nigeria 
.~7 There "LTe 89 hanks in operation at the end of 200-l. 
:is GA O&unlcye 'Regulatory Challenges in a Consolidated Nigerian Banking System - NOll' 
Pnsj1l'l'li\l" (2005) 15 NDIC Quarterly I (March). 
)'J Sl'l' l'(' Soludo .( 'onsolidating the NigLTian Banking Industry to ~1cet the Development Challen&es 
of the 21 ,I (\'ntury' .\ddress de/i\'cred to the special 11Ieetillg of the Bankers' Committee, held 011 6 Jul)' 
.}(}(}.J lIf the (BN Headquarters ,-\/mja. a\ailahk at 
lliIP://W\\\\.cl'nhanl...or!.!,/( )llJL"PLL CHES/20(l4/Gm add-6Jul.pdf accessed _~ July 2007: 01 Imala 
'Challcn&l's of Bankin& Sector Reforms and Bank Consolidation in Nigeria' (2005) 29 Bullioll 2 
(.\priIiJunc) 26. I'ur lTitil'isIll of the policy, sel' '1'1 Og\l\\l'\\() and C UdlL' '(~Iis)ll\ing Bank Share 
Capital as a '1'\ H)I to Force Bank Con\ol idations in Ni&lTia' (2006) 50 Journal (If ,\ji-iC(l1l Lm\' 2. I h I: () 
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Financial Applicable Law Supervisory Insurance/ 
Institution Agency Compensation 
Scheme 
Licensed CBN Act 2007, Banks & Other CBN/NDIC NDIC 
Banks Financial Institutions Act 
(BOFIA) 1991, NDIC Act 
2006, Companies & Other 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 
1990. 
Other Non- CBN Act 2007, BOFIA 1991, CBNINDIC NDIC 
bank Financial NDIC Act 2007. 
Institutionsl 
Licensed 
Deposit-taking 
Financial 
Institutions 
Capital Market ISA 1999, CAMA 1990. SEC None 
Operators 
Insurance NAICOM Decree 1997, NAICOM None 
Companies Insurance Act 2003. 
6.2. Deposit Insurance in Nigeria 
Deposit protection III Nigeria is the maIn responsibility of the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (NDIC). However, prior to the establishment of the NDIC (and 
even after its establishment), the CBN has, through its functions, directly or indirectly 
introduced policies for the protection of bank depositors. The financial safety net for 
the Nigerian banking sector consisted mainly of the Lender of Last Resort (LoLR) 
facility pro\'ided by the CBN and bank supervision. The government pro\'ided an 
OI01nipekull 'Due Pwcess as an Instrument for Nigeria's Rehirth' S{){'('ch de!i\'ered hy rhe Presidenr. 
Nigl'rill Bur A\,\(I('iarioll at rite /Il\rirllrt' (lr Din'('(or, .\tell/bers' Erellillg, Lagos, 28 Jllly 200-1, 01\ O1ilO1hk 
al hI! 11:/ Iww \\ . \\P\l'plan i pe kun \a \\ .C(lIll/'eD~..,:h 13.011' accessed J J u 1 ~ 2()()7, 
I 
implicit blanket guarantee of depositors' funds with no formal arrangements for 
funding. 
The establishment of the CBN followed a period of mass bank failure60 and loss of 
depositors' funds. Although the laws establishing the CBN and governing its activities 
have been reviewed over time, they have contained basic provisions that serve the 
purpose of protecting bank depositors, albeit as an incidental purpose to the main 
object of the bank, which is to 'promote monetary stability and a sound financial 
system in Nigeria' .61 These provisions include:62 
• Banking supervision; 
• Capital requirements, Reserve Fund requirements and restriction of 
• 
• 
d· 'd d 63 IVl en s; 
Emergency liquidity assistance; 
Restrictions on certain activities of licensed banks.64 
Before the establishment of the NDIC, the government generally adopted a policy of 
preventing bank failures to avoid adverse effects on public confidence in the banking 
system. Thus, the government had given financial support to most ailing banks, 
particularly where they had substantial interest in such institutions. However, 
following the adoption of the SAP, which was aimed at deregulating the economy. it 
was no longer viable for government to provide direct support to failing banks 
regardless of the financial position or quality of management. 
60 Sl'l' Tahk 6. I. 
bl CBN '\l't 2()07, s,2. 
1>2 N Umoh 'Bank IkpllSil PnHl'(tion: The NigL'rian ExperiencL"(2003) U NDIC Quarterly -l. -l2. 
1>3 BOFI:\, ss.16 "-: 17, 
M BOI.!:\, s.20. 
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Deregulation opened the floodgates for new banking institutions and products. 
Increased competition among banks necessarily implied increased risk-taking, which 
put depositors' funds at risk. The emphasis was thus shifted from failure prevention to 
the protection of small, unsophisticated depositors.65 This led to the establishment of 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme in 1988, which is administered by the NDIC. 
6.2.1 The Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation 
I. Organization/Institutional Structure 
The NDIC was originally established by the repealed NDIC Act 1988. The NDIC Act 
2006 provides for the establishment of a corporation with perpetual succession and a 
common seal. The authorized share capital of the Corporation is subscribed in a 
proportion of sixty per cent and forty per cent by the CBN and the Federal Ministry of 
Finance respectively.66 The NDIC is governed by a Board of Directors, which consists 
of the Chairman, the Managing Director, two Executive Directors, a representative of 
the CBN, a representative of the Federal Ministry of Finance, and six other members. 
Employees and directors of insured banks are precluded from being appointed as 
directors of the Corporation.67 
The Corporation is required to keep proper accounts in respect of each financial year, 
and the accounts must be audited within six months after the end of the financial 
ycar.!18 The management of the Corporation is required to prepare and submit to the 
(,~ N Ul110h (cd) Balik Deposit Insurance in Nigeria (NDIC Ahuja. 1997): 1U Ehhodaghe 'The Changes 
and Challellgl's in the Nigerian Econl l l11Y ~ The Banking and Finance Sector and the Rcgulall1ry 
1':l1\iwnl11ent' (1993) .' NDIC Qua,.terly 4. 17. 
1>1> Sl'l' NDIC .\l'l .200(). s.ll. 
('7 II . / -)Il • s.). 
(1~ 11'/ I 1 )(l • S.--tX. 
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Board, not later than three months after the end of each financial year, a report on the 
activities of the Corporation during the immediately preceding financial year. The 
report is also to be submitted to the Governor of the CBN and the Minister of 
P· 69 mance. 
The establishment of the NDIC as an entity distinct from the CBN gIves the 
Corporation a degree of independence to carry out its functions effectively without 
undue interference and conflict of interest. The Corporation's independence is further 
strengthened by the requirement for the appointment of the Corporation's Board 
members to be confirmed by the Senate. Under the 1988 Act, appointment of Board 
members was the sole prerogative of the President. However, some provisions of the 
NDIC Act have significantly undermined this independence. 
The Board of Directors is established by section 5(1) of the Act as the Governing 
body of the Corporation, and section 7 vests in the Board, the powers to perform the 
various functions that the Corporation has been charged with under the Act. Section 
5(4) gives the President the exclusive right to appoint all the members of the Board of 
Directors. 
The extensive powers vested in the President, with regard to the composition of the 
Board. have the propensity to attenuate the Corporation's ability to perform its 
functions independently. It is important to note that the NDIC Act 2006 merely makes 
the powers of the President subject to confirmation by the Senate. The confirmation of 
executive actions by the Senate in Nigeria has been known not to entail more than a 
ruhher-stamping and political horse-trading prucess. The powers of the President 
69 II . I Jil • s.-N. 
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leave the Corporation's management susceptible to political pressure,70 as they will be 
keen to remain in favour with the President, to whom they invariably owe their tenure 
in office. This might result in political lobbying and interference. 
The prOVIsIons regarding appointment and composition of the Board, mIrror the 
provisions of the 1988 Act, which was enacted at a time when Nigeria was under 
military dictatorship, when it was customary for appointments into important 
positions to be made solely by the President, without consultation with any other 
person or authority.71 This is in contrast with the norm in a democratic government 
where parliamentary review and approval is required for key appointments. 72 
It is arguable that the political implications of regulatory failure will deter the 
government from exerting undue pressure on the Corporation, since it takes 
responsibility for the overall performance of the economy. However, it is important to 
note that experience with African governments has shown that decisions are not 
always necessarily motivated by the public good. It has been aptly opined that 
'leaders act on behalf of private factions, be they social classes, military cliques, or 
ethnic groups. They engage in economic redistribution, often from the poor to the rich 
and at the expense of economic growth. These are the central themes in policy 
formation in Africa and their prominence serves to discredit any approach based on a 
conviction that governments are agents of the public interest.' 73 
7(} hn L'XaJllPIL'. thc govcrnmcnt can put pressure on the NDIC to provide official support to politically 
conncctcd but badly managcd hanl·;.s. This has the tendency to distort market incentives and rcduce 
mar\..L'1 disL'iplinc. 
71 For commcnts on a similar prmision for the appointment of the CBN Gll\ernor, see OSlIlliJor (1992) 
(n45) 2h. 
'.' SL'L' I(lr L'\<lmpk. thc requirL'mcnt for thc appointment of thc FDIC Board discussed in Chapter ). 
7l R BatL's '(jllHTnments and :\~ricultural ~larkcts in :\frica' in JD Gale and E SL'huh (eds) fhe Role 
o/.\I11rkl'f.\ ill rhl' World Food Fcollomr (\VL'slvic\\ Press. Boulder CO. 1983) 53. 
A reform of the NDIC Act should include appropriate provIsIOns making the 
appointment of the members of the Board subject to parliamentary reyiew and 
approval. Such review should involve the process of appointment as well as the terms 
of appointment of the Board members.74 This will not only go a long way in ensuring 
that the independence of the Corporation is guaranteed, it will also ensure that only 
competent and reputable persons are appointed to sit on the Board. 
While the need to prevent arbitrariness and to promote accountability is imp0l1ant. the 
various provisions of the Act making the NDIC accountable only to the executive arm 
of government and the CBN do little to serve this purpose. Statutory provisions, 
similar to the provisions under the U.S. FDIC,75 which make the FDIC accountable to 
both the Treasury and Congress, should be introduced. Such provisions will make the 
Corporation 'independent' but 'accountable' .76 
II. Mandate and Powers 
The primary goal of the NDIC has been described as the maintenance of 'stability and 
public confidence in the banking sector by guaranteeing payments to depositors in the 
event of failure of insured institutions as well as promoting safe and sound banking 
practices through effective supervision.' 77 Paragraph 3 of the NDIC Service Charter78 
II Scc the pn)\isions of FSMA 2000, s.212(..f) & (5) which provide that the Chairman and other 
IllL'mbers o/" the Board of the FSCS are to be appointed by the FSA but the terms of their appointment 
(particularly relating to rcmoval from office) must be such that they are independent of the FSA in 
{lpcrating the compensation scheme. 
"s" 11 lISt' ~ I V1 7 ,l:l: _ ,\.. CI_ • 
76 Scc FSA, (P58 (Financial Serrices Compensation Scheme Draft Rilles), July 2 ()()O. p,u'a ..f.g. where 
the relationship betwccn the FSA and the FSCS is described as independent on a day-ttl-day basis but 
accountable . 
71 Scc (;A ()~unlL'\L' 'The Ni~LTia Dcposit Insurance Corporation: The Journcy S(l Far' Speech 
ddi\'('/'cd hy C~:\. O,~llnl('\'l', ,\Ia;lllging Di rcctor and Chief Erecilril'l' O.fJicer N Ole. 18 Febrtla ry 2004, 
:\ \ ;tilable at l!!.!j1://\\'\\\\.ndlc-n~ .L'lll11/pdtJndicjsl'O..f,pdf , acccssed 3 July 2007, 
IS ThL' NDIC SL'I\ice Chartcr \\ as introduced pursuant to a social contract initiativc llf the Federal 
(ill\ nnment of NigLTia tll impw\L' the standard of public scn iL'CS in NigL'lia, This initiatl\ c is knl)\\ n 
as SI,:R\'I('()I\1. which is an aL,(,(lll\1l1 fllr 'Senicc C(lmpact \\ilh :\\1 NigL'lians', All g()\L'lIlIllent 
29--l 
also describes the NDIC's mission as the protection of depositors 'through effective 
supervision of insured institutions, provision of financial and technical assistance to 
insured institutions, prompt payment of guaranteed sums and early resolution of failed 
insured institutions.' 
The NDIC can be described as a 'risk-minimizer' deposit insurer, with powers and 
responsibilities for deposit insurance, bank supervision and failure resolution. The 
functions of the NDIC are set out in Section 2 of the NDIC Act 2006 and these are: 
• Insuring all deposit liabilities of licensed banks and other deposit-taking 
financial institutions operating in Nigeria so as to engender confidence in the 
Nigerian banking system; 
• Giving assistance to insured institutions in the interest of depositors, in case of 
imminent or actual financial difficulties, particularly where suspension of 
payments is threatened, to avoid damage to public confidence in the banking 
system; 
• Guaranteeing payment to depositors in case of imminent or actual suspension 
of payments by insured institutions up to the maximum coverage limit 
stipulated under the Act; 
• Assisting monetary authorities In the formulation and implementation of 
banking policy so as to ensure sound banking practice and fair competition; 
• Pursuing any other measures necessary to achieve the functions of the 
Corporation provided such measures are not repugnant to the objects of the 
Corporation. 
departments and llrgani/ations arl' required to ha\l' a SERVIC( )i\1 Charter to express its commitment 
205 
In order to perform the functions it has been saddled with under the Act, the ~DIC 
also has the following powers: 
• Power to appoint examiners for the periodic examination of insured banks: 79 
• Power to conduct special examinations of insured banks where the Board is of 
the opinion that an insured bank may be carrying on business in a manner 
detrimental to the interests of its creditors and depositors; may have 
insufficient assets to cover its liabilities; or may be contravening the 
provisions of the Act; 80 
• Power to remove any officer or director who has committed any violation of 
the law, rules or regulations of the Corporation or is engaged in unsound 
practices that may lead to the bank suffering financialloss;81 
• Power to terminate the insured status of any bank;82 
• Power to act as liquidator and receiver of closed banks;83 
• Power to invest funds not immediately required on Federal Government 
securities or in such other securities as the Board may from time to time 
d . 84 etermme; 
• Power to establish a separate Deposit Insurance Fund for each category of 
insured institutions;85 and 
• Power to require information relating to matters affecting the interests of 
depositors of insured banks.86 
to good senil'L' delivery. Thus, SERVICOM Charters are not legally binding documents. 
79 NDIC Act. s.~~; the examiners appointed shall have access to any accounts, returns and information 
\\lIh respect to any insured bank, which arc in the possession of the CBN. For a detailed description of 
the NDIC supLT\isory and examination process. see Umol! (1997) (n65) 89. 
NO NDIC :\ct, s.30. 
~I Ihid. s.7 (k). 
S2 . .., /Ind. s._3. 
Sl Ihid. s.--lO 
s-t Ihid. s.13. 
S'i Ihid. s.1 0(2). 
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• Failure resolution powers of the Corporation are contained in sections 37 to 44 
of the Act. 
The Act also imposes certain duties on insured banks in order to ensure the effecti\'c 
implementation of the objectives for which the NDIC was created. These duties 
include: 
• The production of all books, accounts, documents and all information upon 
request by the examiner in the exercise of his functions;87 
• The obligation to pay premiums to the NDIC. The premium payable under the 
Act is not to be charged to depositors in any form by the insured banks;88 
• The obligation to render returns of fraud or theft, which shall include a 
detailed report of such event, to the NDIC;89 
• Insured banks must inform the NDIC of any staff dismissed or advised to 
retire on grounds of fraud. Insured banks are also required to inform the 
Corporation before employing any staff who has left the services of another 
insured bank under the above circumstances.9o 
The last two requirements are essentially designed to enable the NDIC minimize the 
incidence of bank failure caused by fraud. 91 The Act also prescribes various offences 
and penalties to be imposed on insured banks where they fail to comply with the 
. l)1 
rcqlllremcnts. -
86 Ihid, s.~7. 
87 II . / .) l) )) Ji( , ". _ (_ . 
~s Ihid, s.17(1), (.~). 
IN . /lJid, s.3'). 
90 . /lJid, s.36. 
"I Sec O\(llIllkpo (1l)l)O) (11-l1) .~l). 
l)~ Sl'e NDIC .\l.'l ss.27(-l): ~l)(,): 17(7), J()(J). 
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III. Funding 
Section 10 of the NDIC Act 2006 provides that the funds of the Corporation shall 
consist of assessed premiums paid by insured banks; income from the investments of 
the corporation; money borrowed from any source with the approval of the board: and 
money from any other source as may be approved by the Corporation. 
Deposit Insurance premIum IS assessed on a flat rate based on the total deposit 
liabilities of insured banks.93 The NDIC can levy special premiums where the funds of 
the Corporation are insufficient for its functions. 94 Although Section 52 enables the 
NDIC to borrow funds from the CBN for the discharge of its functions, it is doubtful 
if this option will ever be utilised, except for the purposes of deposit payouts 
following a major banking crisis. This is due to the fact that it may be interpreted as a 
sign of insolvency capable of undermining public confidence in the deposit insurance 
system. Thus, the main source of funding for the deposit insurance scheme is the 
premium levied on insured banks. 
As noted earlier, a fundamental principle of insurance contracts is that the premiums 
charged for an insurance product must adequately reflect the risk posed to the insurer. 
For deposit insurance purposes, a risk-based assessment system not only ensures 
equity but also adequacy of funding and it helps to mitigate the risk of moral hazard. 
The problem with risk-adjusted premiums however is that of practicability, especially 
for developing countries. This centres on the availability of indices to measure risk 
dnd the difficulties in calculating risk ex ante. In Chapter 3. it was suggested that 
113 This is fiftecn si\\L'L'nth of I ~ per annum for licensed hanks and eight-si.\teenth of one percent per 
annulll for other deposit-taking financial institutions of the total deposit liahilities standing in its hooks 
as at -' I I kl'clllher of the prcL'L'ding ) L'ar. SL'e NDIl' Acl. s,17. 
'>I Sec NDIC . \,:1. -.,17(.:" L 
developing countries should apply 'simplicity' and 'gradualism' in introducing risk-
based assessment systems. 
Banking supervIsIon In Nigeria has been transaction and compliance based. 
Supervisory measures are reactionary and applied uniformly to all financial 
institutions regardless of their risk posture. This is reflected in the average cycle of 
periodic on-site examination (once a year), which is the same for all institutions.95 
As part of recent measures to reform the supervisory process in Nigeria, the CBN and 
NDIC jointly approved a 'Framework for Risk Based Supervision in Nigeria' ,96 and 
implementation of this framework commenced in September 2006.The adoption of 
risk based supervision has become necessary for two main reasons. First, new 
technology and products, and the nature of financial transactions have changed the 
nature of banking. Second, the need for compliance with the Basel Core Principles on 
Supervision and the New Capital Accord.97 The adoption of risk-based supervision 
would also enable the NDIC to introduce a risk-based premium assessment system. 
Section 17(2) of the NDIC Act 2006 gives the NDIC power to vary the rate or basis 
for assessment of deposit insurance premium or to charge preium at a rate which 
retlects the risk posed to the Deposit Insurance Fund. The transition from a flat-rate 
(\\scssmcnt systenl to a risk-based system must be carefully planned and managed. 
Policymakers and stakeholders must fully comprehend the objectives and resource 
rcquircments of the new system. This necessarily implies a transition period of 
<») Sl'e CBN 'Frame\\nrk for Risk-Based Supervision of Banks in Nigeria' (.200). :hailahlc at 
bllp:!I\\,\\'\\, .l·~' nhank.\ )r!!/( )UT/PU BIle. \Tl( ):\ SIB S D/.200YRB S'; .20FR, \ \I I :\\'( )R K. PDF accessed .~ 
Juh .2007. 
\)6' Ihid. 
'17 Ihid. 
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extensive research and consultation. In introducing the new assessment system, the 
following points should be considered: 
• An important precondition for the implementation of a risk-based assessment 
system is that risk evaluation must be based on available and verifiable 
information; 
• In differentiating banks into risk categories, the number of categories should 
depend on the information that is available to the deposit insurer and the 
resources at the disposal of the deposit insurer for evaluating such 
. .[: . 98 InlOrmatIon; 
• A fair balance should be maintained between the need for a transparent 
process and the need to protect confidentiality of information. Care should be 
taken so that depositors do not use the risk-profiling criteria or premium 
categorization as a means for choosing where to place their funds. It is also 
possible that the movement of financial institutions across the different 
categories of risk might be misunderstood as a sign of insolvency, which may 
. d' 99 tngger eposltor runs; 
• In determining the rate to be ascribed to each premium category, the need to 
ensure adequate funding for the system should be balanced on the one hand, 
with the need to provide an incentive-compatible system for insured 
institutions on the other. The rates charged should be seen more as a means of 
I)S See J..\ .\flliahi and RW Ot!unkYL' 'Issues in Implementing Differential Premium :\-..se'>smcnt 
S ~ '>(ems' (~(){)-l) :"ai lahk at l!!.!e-:I/\\\\ \\. ndic-n~ .~·l llll/pd I/di Ikrentiaprcmiulllpapel \ Ii nal ).pd r 
;!l'L'e'>'>L'd -l Juh ~007. 
1)1) • 
Ihid. 
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encouraging better risk-management in insured institutions than a means of 
increasing revenue for the deposit insurer. 100 
Whereas 'simplicity and gradualism' has been recommended for new deposit 
insurance systems, after twenty years of operation, the NDIC can not strictly be 
described as a new system. Nonetheless, a simplistic approach should be adopted in 
introducing the proposed assessment system. The process should not be made 
complex but should be easily understood by insured banks and depositors. An 
intensive public-awareness campaign would ensure that depositors clearly understand 
the purpose of the new assessment system. 
The NDIC should also ensure that the system is not too complex for it to implement, 
considering the capacity building challenges faced by the Corporation. 101 The 
adequacy of the overall supervisory framework, particularly the availability and 
reliability of information should be the most important consideration. 
IV. Coverage 
All deposits of licensed deposit-taking institutions are insured with the Corporation. 
Ilowever, the following types of deposits are not covered by deposit insurance: 
• Insider deposits (deposits of staff and directors of licensed banks); 
• Counter-claims from a person who maintains both a deposit and loan accounts, 
the fortner serving as a collateral for the loan: or 
110 Sl'l' IJ \\'hilc 'Thc Reform of Fcdcral DCPllsil Insuranl'c' (19~l» ~ The jourl/u/oj Economic 
Pfl"ll'l'I'Ti\'('\ -L II. 
101 "1'1" . I I I . II I I liS IS l'\)f1Sll crl'l .Ill'! In 11" l' lap cr. 
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• Such other deposits as may be specified from time to time by the Board. 102 
The NDIC excludes coverage of foreign deposits in domestic banks because such 
deposits do not affect the level of money supply in the domestic economy.103 Inter-
bank deposits are however covered by the NDIC and such deposits form part of the 
premium assessment base. They are generally viewed as deposits in the receiving 
bank on which premium is to be charged. This has also been justified on the basis that 
it removes the incentive for banks to develop a series of 'swap games' for premium 
avoidance. lo4 The inclusion of inter-bank deposits in deposit insurance coverage is a 
departure from sound practice as it could potentially exacerbate the moral hazard 
problem associated with deposit insurance. There are proposals to exclude inter-bank 
deposits from deposit insurance coverage under a new deposit insurance law. 
At the establishment of the Corporation in 1988, deposit insurance coverage was 
pegged at N 50,000 per depositor per insured bank. The coverage limit remained until 
2006 and the adequacy of this amount was a subject of contention. In 1994, the 
research department of the NDIC conducted a survey to access the public perception 
of the Corporation's activities, and majority of respondents to the survey opined that 
the N 50,000 coverage limit was generally inadequate. IDS Following the promulgation 
of the NOIC Act 2006, the coverage limit has been increased to N 200,000 for 
licensed banks and N 100,000 for licensed deposit taking financial institutions. 106 It is 
however interesting to note that the old coverage limit remained the same despite the 
fact that its value was significantly reduced by inflation over the years. When the 
102 NDIC' :\d, S, 16, 
10.\ SL'e N Umoh (L'lI) :\ Decade (~(Deposit Insurance in Nigeria: Iss/les and Cllallcnges (NDIe. 
Ahuja, 1999) d1.5. 
I\q II' '/ )[( , 
105 Sec l 111/011 (1999) (n I (3) :' I. 
Il)/) NDIC .\L't ~006, s.~(), 
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NDIC commenced operations in 1989, the value of the maximum coverage limit \\'as 
equivalent to $10,860; at the time the limit was increased, it was equivalent to $390. 
At the current exchange rate, the new coverage limit is equivalent to SIll 0 for 
licensed banks and $555 for licensed deposit-taking financial institutions. 
There have been several calls for an increase in the maxImum coverage limit in 
Nigeria with majority of depositors and insured banks advocating full coverage of 
deposits. In Chapter 4, it was recommended that deposit insurance coverage should be 
set at a level that bears some relationship with the average measure of income or 
wealth in a nation. The IMF recommends using 'twice per capita income' as a rule of 
thumb in fixing coverage limits. 107 Nigeria's per capita income currently stands at 
approximately $1000;108 hence based on the measure of income, the coverage limit 
can be described as inadequate. 
The previous coverage limit of W 50,000 was set in 1989 (through a survey) to ensure 
that approximately eighty five per cent of the total deposits in insured banks would be 
fully covered by deposit insurance. 109 This raises two basic issues in relation to the 
coverage limit: 
107 Sec G Garcia 'Deposit Insurance: A Survey of Actual and Best Practices' (1999) 1M F Workillg 
Papl'r HPI99154. 
lOll SL'e CC Soludo 'From a Pariah, Failed State to an Emerging Market Economy: The Obasanjo 
ll'~acy and Challenges Ahead' Sf/adl by the Gorernoroftlre eBN. Prof Clrllkmmw SO/lido Oil 10 
Mill' lOO7. :\ \ailah1c at hllp:llwv.'v..l'L'nbank.ot"L!!( H I TIS PEEl 'H ES(1()07!Go\add 1-+-5-07 .pd r acce""ed 
) July ~()()7; sec also II\IF Country data, a\ailable at 
hllp://\\ \~~\J.D.!l~rg/L'~lernaljpll hsht/wL'ol 2007 /0 I Ida (;1/\\ ellrepl.a" j1\ '.'s \ =2()O-+<\:L" =~O()Xl\: "" 111= Il\: "L'-.. 
III J<\~-..d= l&~(~I"L'ollnll~ ,\lL-..:::.&hr= I &l'=69-+&,,='.;(,DPRPC; "Cl'\CiDPPC(; 2CN( ;I)PI)P( " (2CPP 
I~P(2i~( 'PCPI( {2( '1>t'PIPCII(" 2CBC:\~_.X'BC.\ 1\( ;I)PD&!2rj1=(),\:a=&prl.\=~i)'~rIL~=17 ' 
aL'Cl'""cd 3 .lui, ~()()7, 
101) Sec ('II/ol! (Il)l)l)) (n 1 0)) 52. 
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1. Moral hazard considerations, if any, did not play a significant paI1 in this 
policymaking process. It appears that the primary concern was the protection 
of small, unsophisticated depositors. 
2. The policymakers did not give any consideration to a likely change In the 
circumstances on which the limit was based~ hence the NDIC Act makes no 
provision for the coverage limit to be reviewed as these circumstances 
necessaril y change over time. 
In relation to these issues, the new coverage limit of N 200,000 is a welcome 
development as this is the first time the limit will be reviewed since the introduction 
of deposit insurance in Nigeria. However, in real terms, the new coverage limit 
(approximately $1,110) is not commensurate with the country's per capita income, 
and is less than the value of N 50,000 in 1989. In relation to the second issue raised 
above, section 20(2) of the NDIC Act 2006 gives the NDIC the power to vary 
upwards the maximum coverage limit. 
V. Bank Supervision 
Bank supervision is an important aspect of the NDIC's risk-minimizing mandate. As 
noted earlier, an effective system of bank supervision is a necessary precondition for 
the successful implementation of a deposit insurance scheme. The NDIC's 
involvement in banking supervision complements the supervisory functions of the 
CBN but with an emphasis on consumer protection. I 10 The main objective is to reduce 
the risk to the deposit insurance fund and the risk of failure by ensuring that unsafe 
and unsound pract ices are promptly detected. III 
110 See Ot!,IIIIIl'\'1' ,2(07) (n52) .n2. 
III {hid.' On' the ubjecti\l'~ uf the NDIC~ hank supcl'\lsury process. ~L'C htlp:l/w\,.\\.ndiL'-
ng.l'ull1/slIpcn ~~~l! . ;tLLl'ssed -' July 2007. 
The supervision process entails on site examination and offsite surveillance of insured 
financial institutions. Bank examination involves onsite assessment of insured banks , 
which is carried out through the Field Examination Department of the NDIC. The 
Department conducts two types of bank examinations, which are: routine l12 and 
. I ., 113 
specla examInatIons. 
Off-site supervIsIon involves the surveillance of the activities of insured financial 
institutions through the analysis of their statutory returns and monitoring of their 
compliance with laws and regulations. Il4 It consists of three main supervisory 
activities. The first involves the continuous evaluation of the financial condition and 
performance of insured banks, and monitoring compliance with prudential guidelines. 
The second activity involves the assessment of the deposit base of insured institutions 
for purposes of determining deposit insurance premium, while the third is the 
financial and technical assistance to insured financial institutions and the management 
of railing banks, which includes the review of turn-around plans and failure resolution 
. lIS 
optIons. -
The aim of off-site supervision is to give the supervisory authorities early warning 
signals of emerging problems at insured institutions. However, the attainment of this 
goal depends not only on the accuracy and reliability of the data gathered from the 
process employed, but also on the quality of its subsequent analysis and evaluation. 
112 Routine cxaminations are conducted at periodic intcnals, usually oncc a year. and carried out in 
cllnjullction with the Bank Supenision Department of the CBN. 
ILl Spccial naminations are carried out undcr circumstances stipulated in the NDle Act. .., . .10. 
III Sec lill/oll (llJlJlJ) (n I (n) ch.6. 
II' SCl' D.!.!V://www.ndll·.Il!.!.Cllll1/11llsitl .. htm.al.cc .. sl.d 2lJ June 2007. 
J( )) 
In order to improve the accuracy and reliability of the data gathered in the 
surveillance process, the NDIC is presently upgrading its main tool for off-site 
surveillance, the Bank Analysis System (BAS),116 to the more advanced electronic 
Financial Analysis and Surveillance System (e-FASS).117 While this is a plausible 
development, there is a dearth of skilled and experienced manpower in the 
Corporation, and this makes it difficult to provide qualitative analysis and evaluation 
of returns generated from the surveillance process. This poses a capacity building 
challenge for the Corporation's management, and recently, the NDIC has focussed on 
capacity building efforts through training and development of relevant skills for off-
site surveillance and modern information technology systems. 118 
In addition to these efforts at capacity building, the NDIC also requires technical 
assistance from relevant international organizations toward the full training of its 
staff. It should also be noted that the shortage of skilled and experienced personnel is 
not a problem that pervades the entire Nigerian financial sector. Rather, the problem 
lies in the increased competition from the private sector, that the regulatory agencies 
race for the services of such skilled employees. The private sector is generally more 
attractive to prospective employees because of the better remuneration it offers. 
VI. Failure Resolution/Payment of Insured Deposits 
116 . t' i h' d I" I' BAS IS a computL'r pr(l~ramIllC or <. ata gat cnng an pre 1I11Inary ana YSIS, 
II' l'-F:\SS is a \\ch-cnablcd analytical and validation programmc. The systL'm automatically picks data 
from an in~litlltion's datahasL' and ~L'ncratc~ L'lcctronic reports. 
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Generally the NDIC can resolve a troubled financial institution through 
rehabilitation, 119 the use of bridge banks, liquidation or depositor payoff. 
The NDIC is required to give assistance, in the interest of depositors, to banks faced 
with imminent or actual financial difficulties particularly where there is the threat that 
payments might be suspended. 12o Section 37(1) of the NDIC Act enables the NDIC to 
give assistance at the request of an insured bank and under such circumstances as may 
be specified by the Corporation if the bank: 
a) has difficulty in meeting its obligations to depositors and other creditors; or 
b) persistently suffers liquidity deficiency; or 
c) has accumulated losses which have nearly or completely eroded the 
shareholders' fund. 
Section 37(2) gives the NDIC the following options in assisting a failing bank: 
a) Grant loans on such terms as may be agreed upon by the Corporation and the 
bank; 
h) Give guarantee for a loan taken by the insured bank; 
c) Accept an accommodation bill with interest; 
Section 38( I) provides that the NDIC in consultation with the CBN may: 
118 This has ill\oh ed training and exposure of NDIC staff to modern techniques of banking supenision 
at fllrL'i~n re~l1lator\ a~encies such as the Federal Reserve. FDIC. Toronto Leadership Centre. 
hnan(i~1I St<;hility institute. and the Financial SeniL'es Authority. See Oguflleye (2007) (n52) '.12. 
Ill) Since the L'stablishment of the CBN. rL'habilitation of distressed banks had always been the preferred 
option fllr resllhi Il~ failing financial institutions. Howl'\l'r, follo\\ing the intruduction of the Structural 
,\dlustl11ent rro~ral11 (s:\p) and the deregulation of the banking sector. depositor prutection hL'C<.lI11L' the 
primarY (on"idnation in choll"ing a res()lution option. 
I~(l NDic :\d. s.2( 1 )(h). 
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1. take over the management of the bank until its financial condition has 
substantially improved; 
ii. direct specific changes to be made to the management of the bank: 
111. arrange a merger with another bank or contract to have the deposit 
liabilities assumed by another insured bank. 
Where the Corporation directs that a failing bank should merge or consolidate with 
any other financial institution, the institution merged or consolidated with the failing 
bank will assume the deposit liabilities of the failing bank or settle any other financial 
liability. Any asset of the failing bank will be transferred or vested in the other 
financial institution. 121 
Whenever the licence of an insured financial institution is revoked by the CBN, the 
NDIC is mandated to act as liquidator of such failed bank, with powers conferred on a 
liquidator under the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 and shall be deemed to 
have been appointed as provisional liquidator for the purpose of that ACt. 122 The 
Corporation is required to cause notice to be given by advertisement for depositors of 
the institution under liquidation to send their claims to the Corporation. l23 In its role 
as liquidator, the NDIc is expected to realise the assets of the failed bank and wind up 
its affairs. The Corporation is entitled to receive from the liquidation any such amount 
on account of its subrogation to the claims of depositors, and the net amount available 
for distribution would be paid to depositors and other creditors. 12.+ This net amount is 
rL'ferred to as the liquidation dividend. 
121 Ihid. s.-'X (l'). 
122 Ihid. s ... W( 1 ). 
L!.l Ihid. s.41 ( 1 ). 
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Where the licence of an insured bank has been revoked, the Act requires that the 
Corporation shall make payments of insured deposits to depositors within 90 days 
either by cash, negotiable instrument or by transferring the deposits to another insured 
bank in an amount equal to the insured deposits of such depositors. 125 Paragraph 6 of 
the NDIC Service Charter also provides that insured depositors of closed insured 
deposit-taking institutions are to be paid within ninety days of the closure of the 
institution and the appointment of the NDIC as liquidator by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
Prompt payment of insured deposits is essential to the maintenance of depositor 
confidence and the prevention of bank runs. The Corporation has always attempted to 
effect the payment of the maximum insured deposits as soon as practicable. 126 
However, the recent run on Northern Rock in the UK has shown that a time limit of 
three months is not sufficient to sustain the level of confidence needed to prevent a 
bank run. Furthermore, because of the low maximum coverage limit, payment of 
insured deposits is unlikely to assuage concerned depositors until liquidation has been 
completed and the Corporation starts to payout significant sums to depositors as 
liquidation dividends. 
6.2.2 NDIC and Bank Failure in Nigeria 
The deposit insurance scheme was introduced at a time of crisis and the Corporation 
had 11L'cn involved in managing distressed banks 'even before it could settle down and 
muster enough resources for the gigantic task .. 127 The introduction of the Structural 
Adjustlllcnt Programme necessitated the liberalization of the financial sector, which 
I:!.\ Ihid. s.-ll (2). 
I~) II . I 1 1 I J/l. S._ ( ). 
12(> SCL' Ol!,I1I1/('\'(' (200-l) (1177). 
eased restrictions on market entry, interest rates, bank ownership, foreign exchange 
and capital movement. The immediate explosion in the number of financial services 
providers and products was however not accompanied with an adequate supervisory 
and regulatory framework. The implications of the economic policy, coupled with the 
political crisis experienced in Nigeria in the early nineties, meant that the NDIC was 
created at a time when the banking sector was significantly weakened. 128 
The problem in the financial sector was further exacerbated by the decision to transfer 
all public sector funds from the banks to the CBN in order to reduce excess liquidity 
in the system. As many banks relied on government funds for liquidity, this decision 
triggered a serious liquidity problem in the sector. 129 Shortly after the NDIC 
commenced operations in 1989, it had to provide assistance in the form of 
accommodation bill facilities worth N 2.3 billion granted to ten distressed banks. no 
This measure helped in restoring a degree of public confidence in the system, 
however the problems persisted and the Corporation had to grant further assistance to 
banks in 1992 and 1993. 131 
The persistence of the problem in the banking sector made the NDIC to evaluate its 
failure resolution policy and to explore other appropriate means of addressing bank 
distress. The regulatory philosophy of preventing bank failure was expanded to 
include the protection of depositors' funds and minimization of the disruptive effects 
of bank failure when it occurs. Several banks have become distressed since the 
1~7 Scc UII/oh (1997) (n65). 
128 Half (If Ihe lolal numher licensed hanks were dislressed or insohl'lll. \\ilh two-thirds of assets and 
75(; (If lkposilS al risk. Sl'C P Ll'wis and H Slein 'Shifting Fortunes: The Political h:onoll1! (If 
hnancial Liherali/alion in Nigl'ria' (1997) ~5 World Dnelopll/cl/t I. 5. 
I~l) Sl'l' £III/oil (1997) (11(15) dIS. 
II() Scc NDI(' Presel/tatiol/ to thc SCI/ate ('oll/II/ittl'l' 01/ Bal/kil/g. II/Sll/WICC al/d Fil/al/cial bl\ritlltiol/.\ 
II .\la reli :lO(};;;'. 
III Scc l'I//(III ( 1997) (n65) l·hX. 
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inception of the Corporation to date and the Corporation has used several options 
permitted in its enabling law, which include: 132 
• The provision of accommodation facilities, worth N 2.3 billion, to 10 banks in 
1989; 
• Take-over of management and control of 28 distressed banks by the 
CBNINDIC to protect their assets and depositors' funds; 133 
• Acquisition, restructuring and sale of 7 distressed banks to new investors: and 
• Closure of 36 banks for failure to comply with regulatory/supervisory 
requirements. 
It appears that bank liquidation has become the preferred option for resolving 
distressed banks by the NDIC. The Corporation has sought to close distressed banks 
in a cost-effective way with minimum disruption to the banking system. The 
liquidation process can only commence after a bank's licence has been revoked by the 
CBN. LI..f Previously, after the revocation of the licence the Corporation was required 
to apply to the Federal High Court for a winding up order of the affairs of the bank 
and to be appointed as liquidator. This procedure has now been abrogated under the 
NDIC Act 2006 and the NDIC assumes the role of liquidator by default following the 
revocation of a bank's licence.135 The procedure to be followed by the NDIC, in 
carrying out its functions as receiver/liquidator of a failed bank, is contained in Part 
IX of the NDIC Act 2006. 
I I' 
- See ()gllllln'c (.2007) (n5.2) J~-l, 
I.H Recent n;tlllplcs include the removal of the Board and !\ LlIlagement of 3 han"-s in 2005. and the 
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Table 6.3 provides the details of distressed/failed banks that have been liquidated in 
Nigeria since the inception of the Corporation. There are various factors that haye 
contributed to bank distress in Nigeria; these factors include liquidity risk, foreign 
exchange risk, credit risk and political risk.136 Table 6.4 however shows that credit 
risk has been a major factor in the crisis in the banking system. In most cases, bad 
loans exceeded fifty per cent of the total loan portfolio and realization of these loans 
would have been sufficient to recapitalize the distressed banks. Table 6.5 also shows 
the extent to which excessive specialization contributed to the problem. There was a 
high concentration of insider loans to a certain group of borrowers, consisting mainly 
of directors and major shareholders. 
The problem of non-performing loans is not peculiar to Nigeria; it has been observed 
that 'bad debts are by far the most common cause of bank failure.' 137 What appears to 
be a specific problem is the extent to which insider abuse has contributed to the 
problem. Generally, banks have devised means of dealing with credit risks which 
include the use of individual credit limits, risk-related interest rates, collateralization, 
and diversification of loan portfolios. While these mechanisms have been found to 
have limited effectiveness,138 the problem of credit risk management becomes more 
complex where there have been incidents of insider abuse. Where loans are given out 
to directors and shareholders, the prospects of recovering such loans becomes 
11(, Sl'l' (\'ntral Bank of Ni~LTia 8: Ni~L'ria Deposit Insuranl'l' Corporation Disfrc.\s in flie .\'igeriull 
Fillallcial SlTl'iCl's IlIdllstr" (I.a~()s, 19 l )5) SR. 
I.n V Beattie and others ,i(/I/b ~und Bad De/Jfs: ,\CCOllllfillg for Loall Losses ill IlIfernarionul Bunking 
(John \Vi In, London, 1995) I. 
J1S ;\ Clmp'hell 'Bank InsnhcnL'Y and the Prohlcm of Nnnperformin~ Loans' (2007) 9 JOllrnal of 
Bunking Rl'gllillfioll I. 2S. 
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particularly low. 139 In this regard it is important to consider the contribution of the 
Failed Banks Decree towards the recovery of bad loans in Nigeria. 
6.2.2.1. The Failed Banks Decree 18 of 1994 
The promulgation of the Failed Banks Decree of 1994 represents a major 
development in the experience of the NDIC with bank failure. A major contributory 
f d· . h h' f 140 actor to lstress In t e sector was t e Issue 0 bad debts. The closing reports of 
many of the failed banks revealed a high degree of insider dealing characterized by 
the granting of unsecured credit facilities to owners, directors and connected 
companies. In most cases, these facilities exceeded the banks' lending limits.141 Thus, 
in addition to other regulatory measures that were introduced at the time, the 
government also introduced the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial 
Malpractices Decree. 
The main objectives of the decree were to facilitate the recovery of debts owed to 
distressed banks, and to introduce a framework for the prosecution of persons 
involved in financial malpractices that led to bank failure. Although most of the 
offences were already covered by existing criminal laws and procedure, such laws and 
procedure were considered slow and insufficient to deal with the special nature of 
bank failure. 
Section I of the decree established a special court, known as the Failed Banks 
Tribunal. The tribunal had the power to: 
II') Sl'l' Intervicw with ~loscs U/Pcghu, Dcputy General Manager. Risk ~lanagement & Operations, 
Chartcrcd Bank Pic 'On Deht Rel'o\,cry in Nigeria' Credit Risk & Lender's Deskmate, July-Sq1!cmhcr, 
2004, 
I.tO Scc Umoh (1997) (n65) eh, 10: JU Ehhodaghe 'The Impact of Failed Banks on the "igcrian 
h'onoIllY' (1996) 6 Nf)te Quarterly J 8: 2,24. 
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• Recover the debts 142 owed to a failed bank, which remain outstanding at the 
date the bank is closed or declared a failed bank by the CBN; 143 
• Try the offences specified in part III of the decree; 144 
• Try the offences specified in the Banks and Other Financial institutions 
Decree 1991, and the NDIC decree 1988; and to 
• Try other offences relating to the business or operation of a bank under an y 
enactment. 
The Tribunal consisted of a single judge, with both civil and criminal jurisdictions. In 
order to eliminate the delay that had become a feature of the Nigerian judicial system. 
under Section 4 of the decree, the Tribunal was required to decide matters brought 
before it within twenty one days from the first day of sitting. To achieve this, Section 
3 of the decree gave the Tribunal the power to decide any ancillary matters, including 
remand, bail and any other preliminary issues connected with an offence or hearing. 
Section 1 (5) of the decree specifically restricts the High Court from exercising its 
supervisory jurisdiction by way of judicial review over the decisions of the Tribunal, 
and appeals from such decisions could only be made to a special military appeal 
'b I 14'i tn una. . 
141 Scc SA Oluyemi 'Banking Sector Reforms and the Imperatives of Good Corporate GmL'rnance in 
rllc NigL'rian Banking System' (2005) 16 NDIC Qllarterly 1.72. 
1·12 'Debl' in Ihe interprclation section is defined as any loan, advance, credit, accommodalion. 
gliaranrcL' or any other crcdit facililY, together with the interest thereon. which remains outstanding. 
111 The applicalion for debl rcc()\L'rY was required to he filed hy the receivC[ or liquidator of the failed 
hank. s.I)( I) of the decree ernpowL'rcd the Irihunal to have a dehlor's property, against \\ hich an order 
is made. sold hy auction or hy private contracl, and the proceeds applied towards settling the deht. 
1-11 Under pari III of tIll' decree. any director. managn, ufficer or employee of :1 hank is guilty of an 
offcllL'C i I' he grants or appnncs a loan without adequate sccurity or collateral: grants a loan in 
cllntr;l\cnlion of allY law or regulation: or rL'cci\cs any gratificalion for granting a loan, 
1·1) rhis is kIHl\\n a~ an '(Juslcr clausc', and was a main kature of military legislation in Nigeria, Sec F 
.\/in~L' 1.1I11',\I{/killg Ullder .\/ilirary Regimes: lhe IVigeriall Experiellce (Oliz. Benin Cit!. Il)l)-l) 
cll.IO. 
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The establishment of the Failed Banks Tribunal was particularly complementary to 
the efforts of the NDIC in failure resolution. The treatment of bad assets and loans is 
central to an effective resolution framework, particularly the legal issues pertaining to 
the recovery of loans and the disposal of assets. The Failed Banks Tribunal was 
effectively used by the NDIC to realise risk assets and to recover from debtors of 
failed banks and from insiders who abused their positions to fraudulently appropriate 
loans worth millions of Naira to themselves. 146 
The concept of the Failed Banks Tribunal has been described as a 'speedy, simple, 
efficient and effective judicial machinery devoid of legal technicalities for 
aggressively recovering debts owed to failed banks.' 147 Banking malpractices in 
Nigeria can rightly be classified as an 'elitist' crime. Such crimes are often committed 
for economic gains with the individuals or corporations involved belonging to an elite 
political and economic class. Most recalcitrant bank debtors also belong to this class, 
which shields them from the consequences of their actions. 
The influence wielded by the perpetrators of these malpractices limits the ability of 
the criminal justice system to bring them to account for their actions, the failed Banks 
Tribunal was a potent tool in the prevention and punishment of such malpractices and 
in the recovery of debts, as the Tribunal was instrumental in the recovery of W 6 
hillion in had debts. 
The aho\e-Illentioned success notwithstanding, the tribunals set up under the Decree 
\\'ere dissol\ed in May 1999, with the onset of democratic go\ernance in Nigeria. The 
11(, Sl'l' (JlI1oh (Il)l)l») (11103) dl.l). 
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use of military-style Tribunals is generally considered an aberration in a democratic 
society. This is mainly because of the violations of human rights and due process 
provisions in the processes and procedure followed by such tribunals. 148 Human rights 
and due process considerations become particularly important as the Failed Bank 
Tribunal was vested with civil and criminal jurisdiction,149 with no possibility of 
review by the High Court. 
Following the dissolution of the Tribunal, its jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Federal High Court and since then no new or pending case has been concluded. This 
underscores the need for the establishment of specialist courts to deal with banking 
and other allied matters in Nigeria. The special nature of banks and the need to 
promote financial stability is the justification for the various structures that exist for 
the supervision of the industry. This same justification can be extended for the 
establishment of such courts, with special procedures, which would ensure the speedy 
resolution of cases involving the recovery of debts owed to failed banks, and in turn 
ensure that depositors and creditors of such banks are promptly reimbursed. 
117 (;A Ogunkyc 'Overvicw of Recovery of Debts Through the Failed Banks Tribunals: The NDIC 
I xpnil'l1cl" in Procl'l'liings «f the National Seminar on Banking and Allied M(/tters for Judges (CIBN. 
l.a!2Os. 2()()2), 
IIS'Sl'e ~l'I1L'1'all)' I~ Iheme ,\/ilitar\' Tribunals and Due Process in Nigeria (Constitutional Rights ProjL'L'! 
(,RP. LI!2os. 1999): G Irokal ibe 'The Faikd Banks and Failed Institutions Tribunals and Thcir Impact 
on the Rule of LI\\' in F Oko)'l' (cd) Special and ,\/ilitQl}' Tribunals and The Administration o{Jusrice 
ill ,\,i~t'ri(/ (Human Ri~hls 1\1(ll1itor HRM. Kaduna. 1997) 
11') In relation to thc Failed Banks Tribunal. thcsc considerations include the arbitrary powers of the 
tribunal; ;,h"l'I1L'l' pI" judiCial revil'w: strin~l'nt bail cllnditions: and absence of a right of appeal to 
n:,!2ular courl-., Sl'e ~L'l1l'1'all) Chapter IV of the C(lnstitution of the Fcderal Republic of Ni~cria 1999, 
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Table 6.3 - DistressedlFailed Banks in Nigeria (1988 to date )150 
Banks Date of Closure 
Abacus Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
ABC Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Allied Bank of Nigeria PIc 16 January 2006 
All States Trust Bank PIc 16 January 1998 I 
Alpha Merchant Bank PIc 8 September 1994 
Amicable Bank of Nigeria PIc 16 January 1998 
Assurance Bank of Nigeria PIc 16 January 2006 
Century Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
City Express Bank PIc 16 January 2006 
Commerce Bank PIc 16 January 1998 
Commercial Trust Bank Ltd 16 January 1998 
Continental Merchant Bank PIc 16 January 1998 
Cooperative & Commerce Bank PIc 16 January 1998 
Credite Bank Nigeria Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Crown Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Financial Merchant Bank Ltd. 21 January 1994 
Great Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Group Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Hallmark Bank PIc 16 January 2006 
Highland Bank of Nigeria PIc 16 January 1998 
ICON Ltd. (Merchant Bankers) 16 January 1998 
I vory Merchant Bank Ltd. 22 December 2000 
Kapital Merchant Bank Ltd 21 January 1994 l 
-
I ,cad Bank PIc 16 January 2006 i 
- 1 
Lohi Bank of Nigeria Ltd 16 January 1998 I I 
--- -
Mercantile Bank of Nigeria PIc 16 January 1998 
----
Merchant Bank of Africa Ltd. 16 January 1998 
r--
i\klropolitan Bank Ltd. 16 January 2006 
1)0 SOllrl'C: hllp://\\'\\w.ndic-n~ ~')llllfaikd_ttl"titlllt\)ll"l!ltlt . accesscd 3 July 2007, The table dl)l'S not 
(nillain details of SOIllC banks \\IHlSl' lil'cnl'l's havc bccn ("noKL'd by Ihe CBN because the Federal High 
Court has nol !.!ranlcd winding up orders and has not appointed the Corporation as liquidator for the 
hanb. 
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Nigerian Merchant Bank Ltd 16 January 1998 
North-South Bank Nigeria PIc 16 January 1998 
Pan African Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Pinnacle Commercial Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Premier Commercial Bank Ltd. 22 December 2000 
Prime Merchant Bank Ltd 16 January 1998 
Progress Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
Republic Bank Ltd. 29 June 1995 
Rims Merchant Bank Ltd 22 December 2000 
Royal Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 , 
Trade Bank PIc 16 January 2006 
United Commercial Bank Ltd. 8 September 1994 
Victory Merchant Bank Ltd. 16 January 1998 
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Table 6.4 - Portfolio of Distressed Nigerian Banks (1989-2000)151 
Period Number of Total Loans Bad Loans Amount 
Distressed (N Billions) (N Billions) Required for 
Banks Recapitalization 
(N Billions) 
1989 7 4.3 2.9 1.1 
1990 9 6.4 4.7 2.0 
1991 15 5.4 4.1 
1992 16 15.7 6.8 5.5 
1993 38 29.1 18.4 13.6 
1994 55 39.4 26.2 23.4 
1995 60 66.5 44.5 38 
1996 50 51.8 40.8 42.5 
1997 47 49.6 39.7 42.4 
1998 15 24.2 18.6 16.2 
1999 13 29.1 20.9 15.3 
2000 7 26.4 20.0 10.3 
I~I SllllrCe: NDIC .\l1nual Report and Bank Returns. 
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Table 6.5 - Extent of Insider Credits in Selected Failed Banks in 
Nigeria1S2 
Bank Percentage of Insider Loans as a Ratio of 
Total Loan Portfolio 
Abacus Merchant Bank Ltd. 47.00 
ABC Merchant Bank Ltd. 50.66 
Alpha Merchant Bank PIc 55.00 
Amicable Bank of Nigeria Ltd. 56.00 
Century Merchant Bank Ltd. 32.00 
Commerce Bank PIc 52.00 
Commercial Trust Bank Ltd 55.90 
Credite Bank Nigeria Ltd 76.00 
Financial Merchant Bank Ltd. 66.S9 
Group Merchant Bank Ltd. 77.60 
-
Highland Bank of Nigeria PIc 3S.00 
---- --
Kapital Merchant Bank Ltd. 50.00 
~ 
--
Nigeria Merchant Bank Ltd. 99.90 
- -
North-South Bank of Nigeria Ltd. 32.00 
-
Pinnacle Commercial Bank Ltd. 20.00 
-
Prime Merchant Bank Ltd. SO.70 
---
Republic Bank Ltd. 64.90 
--
Royal Merchant Bank Ltd. 69.00 
United Commercial Bank Ltd. Sl.00 
6.2.2.2. Challenges in Resolving Failed Banks in Nigeria 
An effective and orderly failure resolution mechanism is essential to avoid or 
minimize the disruptive effects of bank failure. Is3 In Nigeria, certain conditions have 
prevented the effectiveness of the failure resolution mechanism; these conditions will 
he disclissed below.IS.l 
152 Sllllrl'C: Closin~ Reports. ReceiH'[ship & Liquidation Department. NDIC. 
1)1 ,-' ('1 1 1 U 
,")l'l' lapIn "to para,"t.('I. 
1).\ On the procedure fill' dealil1~ \\ itll bank failure in Ni~nia. sec I· Odilah 'Bank Failurl'" in Ni~nia' 
1'1I1't' '1'1'1'.1 ('1/ r ('d III Ihl) fIl11 idell cOllfe rellce of Ihe Sectioll (~f 8usi 1/ css Law (~f Ihe Nige ria 8a r 
\',o('ialioll, . \ hllja, Sig crill, 011 l() \/,I/(h I ()96. ,\ \ ai lable at IlJ lp:/IV. \\ \\ ,11 h~l- sbl.or!!/pd liB an'" i n !!(/~ 2()-
« ~()J I\)I~IIS( (2()( >1)\1 \_pdl. acccssed 2 i\larch 2008. 
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I. Absence of Contingency Planning and Prompt Corrective Action 
A framework for contingency planning for banking crises was jointly articulated by 
the CBN and NDIC in 2001. The framework provided for the roles and 
responsibilities of regulators and regulated institutions in a crisis. These included 
specific thresholds for Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) measures; failure resolution 
options; and approved contingency plans by each regulated institution. 
Despite this effort, most of the plans submitted have been considered as 'inadequate 
or unrealistic', and no serious attempts have been made towards implementing any of 
the contingency plans. ISS This could be attributed to the fact that PCA must be 
statutorily formalised to have the desired effect. The successful liquidation of a failed 
bank is based on the value of assets to be realised from the liquidation exercise. PCA 
would allow distressed banks to be closed promptly before the value of their assets 
turn negative. In the absence of a statutory based PCA mechanism, the potential for 
regulatory forbearance still exists, particularly because of the fear of litigation in the 
event that a bank has to be closed. 
A corrective action framework should include the powers for regulators to require that 
internal control systems are in place and are being complied with. The supervisor 
should also be given the right to have access to relevant information and more powers 
to conduct on-site examinations where necessary. The CBN recently announced plans 
to deploy 'live-in examiners' in all supervised banks in a bid to ensure adherence to 
internal control mechanisms. 
I~~ Sec G.\ ()~lInkyL' 'Contemporary Challenges in Resohing Prohlem Banks in Nigeria' (2()05) 
ht'ynott! :\ddrn.\' al Ihe SOl/inar Oil Prohlt'l11 Ballks Reso/lIliulI Organised by the NDle Training ('clltre 
I,ago.\'. 
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Although there have been many incidents of bank failures, Nigeria has not vet 
experienced a systemic crisis of a serious magnitude since the inception of the 
Corporation. In the absence of a well articulated and implemented contingency 
framework, the ability of the system to cope with a systemic crisis remains largely 
uncertain, and this remains an undermining factor in the level of public confidence. 
II. Corporate Governance 
There is the need to strengthen the corporate governance regIme m the Nigerian 
banking system. The lack of effective internal control mechanisms has been a major 
factor in the distress of most Nigerian banks, which has been characterised by insider 
lending. With the dissolution of the Failed Banks Tribunals, it has become particularly 
difficult to recover bad debts arising out of such imprudent transactions or to apply 
. . I . 156 
cnmma sanctIons. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision notes that 'a system of effective 
internal controls is a critical component of bank management and a foundation for the 
safe and sound operation of banking organisations.' 157 Principle 8 of the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision also enjoins supervisors to ensure that 
banks put in place a credit risk management process with prudent policies for 
controlling credit risk. Principles 10 and 11 also recognize the need for supervisors to 
\d limits to restrict bank exposures to concentration within the portfolio. and to 
I 'ill On the Supcn isory initiati\cs for good corporate gO\LTnance. scc 10 Imala 'Regulatory Frame\vork 
ror Lnsuring (~ll()d Ctlrpllr;llL' GO\l~rnancc: A Focus tln the Banking Industry" in () ,\Ill (cd) f'SIU!S ill 
ellporaf£' (;o\,emal/ce (FITC. Lagus, 2()(H)' 
1~7 Basel Commiltcl' on Banking Supcnision Frameu'ork for Inferl/al Confrol S\\(OI/S ill Blil/king 
()n;lIlIi.\lIfiol/\ (1l)l)H) :hailahlc at http://''''''. hls.or~/J1uhllhL'hs-l().pdr,)norrdll1l'.""= I . aL'l'l'''''L'd 7 July 
2007. 
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prevent abuses ansIng from exposure to related parties and to address conflict of 
. t 158 
mteres. 
The need for effective internal control systems should be made a priority in the reform 
of the deposit insurance system. It should however be noted that the insider abuses 
were still perpetrated despite the existence of some supervisory internal control 
mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms must thus be complemented by an effecti \'e 
system of prudential regulation and monitoring, backed up by effective supervisory 
enforcement powers. Presently, there is little or no supervisory enforcement 
mechanism in the Nigerian banking industry apart from the threat of revoking an 
errant bank's licence. This further underscores the need for the introduction of a 
statutory PCA mechanism, which would stipulate mandatory supervisory action based 
on the degree of non-compliance. 
III. Least Cost Resolution 
The laws governing the operation of the NDIC do not provide any mandatory 
requirement for the Corporation to adopt a least cost resolution test in the resolution 
of a failed bank. As a matter of policy, the NDIC has adopted a least-cost approach in 
resolving failed banks. The effectiveness of this is however limited in the absence of 
PCA intervention powers. The powers of the NDIC to protect the deposit insurance 
fund are limited, even where risks have been identified following the exercise of its 
hank supervisory powers. In this regard, it is important to note that the NDIC has no 
power to determine the timing of closing a distressed bank. The power to revoke 
hanking licences is conferred exclusively on the CBN. The NDIC only steps in to act 
as liquidator after a licence has been revoked. 
15M SCl' Ba~l'I COll1ll1iltcl' on Banking SlIpcn i~ion Cure Principles for E.tfecfirc Banking 511pelTision 
(2006). :\ \ ai lable al IHlp://"''''\\,. hi~.llr!.!/pllhl/bl'b~ I ~ l). pd r . al'l'cs~l'd 7 J ul y 2007. 
323 
IV. Legal Framework for Liquidation 
As noted earlier, prior to the promulgation of the NDIC Act 2006, the NDIC was 
required to apply to the Federal High Court to be appointed as liquidator of a failed 
bank. This requirement resulted in lengthy delays in the commencement of winding-
up activities in failed banks, especially where the shareholders or management of the 
failed bank instituted court actions to challenge the revocation of their bank's licence 
and the appointment of the NDIC as liquidator. 159 The NDIC now automatically 
assumes the role of liquidator upon the revocation of a bank's licence. 
The licence of a distressed bank must be revoked by the CBN before the 
commencement of liquidation and the trend of bank shareholders instituting court 
actions to challenge the revocation of their bank licences is expected to continue. The 
generally slow nature of the judicial process in Nigeria resulted in a situation where 
depositors and creditors have to wait for several years while court suits challenging 
the revocation of licences are determined. 160 This problem has been addressed under 
section 40 (7) of the NDIC Act 2006, which stipulates that where any such action 
involves an application for an interim interlocutory injunction to restrain the NDIC 
from paying depositors of a failed bank, the trial court shall refer such an application 
to the Court of Appeal for determination. The Court of Appeal is mandated to 
determine the application within sixty days of the referral. 
I~l) , 0") 
. Scc Ogllllleye (~()()7) (n52): Ogllllleye (2005) (n58): VII/oil (1999) (n I -~). 
160 Suits instituted hy shareholders and directors of 2 hanks whose licences were revoked in 2002 and 
~()(n. challenging the rcypcation of their licences and the application of the NDIC to he appointed as 
liquidator. are still pending in the Federal High Court. In the casc of Rims Merchant Bank, its licence 
\\;\S rc\pkcd in ~()()O and the hank's shareholders challenged the re\ocation in court. The action \\a" 
e\entualh dismisscd in ~()(H after 3 years of delay. Similar court actions institutl'd by shareholders (If I) 
hanks \\I;ose lil'cnsl's \\LTl' rc\ph'd hy the CBN in January 2006 ha\c preH'nted the winding-lip of the 
hanks and pa~ mcnt of insurcd depl)sits. Sce http://w\\w.ndicll''l.·PIII/faikd institutiolh.hlll1 , accessed 
J JlIl~ 2007. These ddays haH' rcsulted in difficult Ji\ing conditions for depositor". See 
'Consolidation: \';lIkd Banks DCp(lSltllrs \L1~ Wait Longer' Daily SIIII. i-.londay, 26 \:ehruary 2007. 
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The reform introduced by the NDIC Act 2006 is commendable. However, it is 
important to note that the problem has not been completely eliminated, as provisions 
of section 40(7) apply only to applications seeking to restrain the NDIC from paying 
insured deposits. As noted earlier, because of the low deposit insurance coverage. the 
payment of insured deposits is unlikely to provide any relief to depositors until 
liquidation has been completed and the Corporation starts to payout significant sums 
as liquidation dividend. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Court of Appeal 
posseses more spevialized knowledge of banking related matters than the Federal 
High Court to enable it deal with such applications speedily and effectively. 
The foregoing underscores the need for the creation of specialist or dedicated courts 
to deal with banking related matters. The need for the prompt and orderly resolution 
of failed banks has been given judicial affirmation by the Court of Appeal in the case 
of Savannah Bank of Nigeria Pic v. NDIC,161 where the Court enthused thus: 
'I cannot grant a blanket order suspending further liquidation. To do so would compound the 
problems of appellant and cause untold hardship to the depositors. It is only in the course of 
liquidation that the depositors get back some of their money. Assets in the form of equipment, 
huildings and furniture will deteriorate with time, if not realized.' 162 
6.2.3 NDIC: Interrelationship with Safety Net Participants 
l'ITecti ve interrelationship among financial safety net participants is essential to the 
Sllccess of a deposit insurance scheme. This is important both when safety net 
functions arc assigned to different participants and when the responsibilities are 
ltd Appeal No. C,VLl~().2/.2()().2. 
Ib2 PCI' OguI1(;ldc. Jc.\. 
shared. 163 Although deposit insurance is the exclusive preserve of the NDIC, the 
Corporation also shares various responsibilities with the CBN and other regulatory 
bodies. 
Co-ordination of the activities of the regulatory and supervisory institutions in the 
financial sector is achieved mainly through the Financial Services Regulation 
Coordinating Committee (FSRCC). Although the Committee was created in 1994 
through an initiative of the CBN, it was only accorded legal recognition by an 
amendment to the CBN Act in 1998, and subsequently by the CBN Act 2007. It was 
formally inaugurated in May 1999. 
The membership of the Committee consists of the Governor of the CBN (as 
Chairman); the Managing Director of the NDIC; the Director General of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission; the Commissioner for Insurance; the Registrar-
General of the Corporate Affairs Commission; and a representative of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. 164 It is interesting to note that despite the pivotal role which the 
NDIC plays in the Nigerian banking sector, the Corporation was conspicuously 
initially unrepresented in the statutory list of members contained in Section 38A of 
the CBN Act 1991. The NDIC was only co-opted as a member 'in order to enhance 
I t't" t' h C . , 165 t le e ectlveness 0 t e ommlttee. -
Th b" t' h C' 166 e 0 Jectlves 0 t e ommlttee are to: 
• Co-ordinate the supervision of financial institutions, especially conglomerates: 
1(,1 Sec ( 'haplcr ... L para. -+.10. 
1M Sel' ('BN Ad ~()()7. s .... H. 
Ih'i Sl'l' hltp://\\\\\\.l'cnh;lnk,llr~/sllpl:J\ ISi(lIl/FSRCC.asp. acccsscd 31uly 2Ot)], 
• Reduce regulatory arbitrage usually created by differing regulations and 
supervision standards among supervisory authorities~ 
• Deliberate on problems experienced by any member in its relationship with 
financial institutions~ 
• Eliminate any information gap encountered by any regulatory agency in its 
relationship with any group of financial institutions~ 
• Articulate strategies for the promotion of safe, sound and efficient practices by 
financial intermediaries~ and 
• Deliberate on such other issues as may be specified from time to time. 
With regard to information sharing, all the members of the FSRCC executed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to promote information sharing among the 
regulatory bodies. The NDIC also collaborates with the CBN in the planning and 
conduct of bank examination. To this effect, section 53 of the NDIC Act 2006 makes 
provision for: 
• The NDIC to have access to the report of bank examinations conducted by the 
Banking Supervision Department of the CBN~ 
• The Corporation to make a report of its examination and any other information 
essential to safe and sound banking practice available to the CBN ~ 
• The CBN to make available to the Corporation, relevant information on the 
insured institutions licensed by it: 
• The Banking Supervision Department of the CBN to inform the Corporation 
uf any regulatory contra\'l~ntions committed by insured banks; and 
1M .'Icc CBN .\CI 2007. s . ..l4. 
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• The Corporation to co-operate with the CBN on matters affecting any of the 
insured banks. 
The foregoing provIsIons are designed to ensure that the NDIC gets all the 
information and assistance it needs in performing its functions, particularly in the 
protection of depositors' funds and the minimization of risk to the deposit insurance 
fund. They are also designed to prevent unnecessary duplication of efforts and 
conflict. To give effect to the provisions, the CBN and the NDIC meet at the 
beginning of every year to decide on a bank examination programme. The NDIC's 
involvement in bank examination has shortened the bank examination cycle to once a 
year. The current arrangement is that licensed banks are divided into two, with both 
bodies taking alternate responsibility for supervising each group on a yearly basis. 167 
The provIsIons of Section 5(1)( d) of the NDIC Act, which reqUIres that a 
representative of the CBN should sit on the NDIC's Board of Directors is also aimed 
al ensuring co-ordination of policies and prevent conflicts caused by differing 
mandates. 
I Jfective interrelationship between the safety net participants has now become more 
imperative with the introduction of the risk-based supervision framework and the 
proposed introduction of a differential premium assessment system. The new system 
necessarily involves a high level of reliance on off-site surveillance by the supervisory 
authorities. Therefore, an effective information sharing strategy will reduce the 
regulatory and reporting burden on insured banks by eliminating unnecessary 
duplication. 
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6.2.4 Public Awareness 
Deposit insurance schemes play an important role in financial stability by promoting 
public confidence in the financial system. For this role to be effectively performed, 
depositors need to be fully aware of the existence of the scheme, its nature and 
1. ., 168 ImItatIOns. 
Public awareness has been a major challenge in the implementation of the deposit 
insurance scheme in Nigeria. Awareness of the existence and mandates of the 
Corporation is very low. It is better known for its supervisory functions and it is 
sometimes misunderstood to be a conventional insurance company.169 Findings of a 
recent survey conducted by the NDIC shows that ignorance of the scheme cuts across 
all sections of the Nigerian populace, including bankers. l7O This lack of awareness has 
also resulted in the failure by most depositors of failed banks to submit their claims 
before the expiration of the former statutory period of eighteen months. 17I Deposit 
pay-offs embarked upon by the corporation have generally been characterised by a 
low level of response from depositors. In 
The NDIC has recently embarked on a public awareness campaign to enlighten the 
public on the activities, benefits and limitations of the deposit insurance system. The 
Corporation has also provided public information on the claims process for depositors 
of closed banks. It is however important that any public awareness program is 
designed and implemented before bank failure occurs. The public awareness strategy 
II,S S ('I 1 1 <) 
,l'L' laptl'r '-t. para. '-t. • 
1(,') • Sl'l' (}-":/IIl!nl' (.2(}(}4) (n77). 
170 r-..ll\. ,\llIllati 'NDIC as a Deposit Insurer and Liquidator: Challenges and Prospects' (2mn) n NDIC 
(Jua ria!\, .2 . .2.2 at 29. 
1'1 . 
Sn' () -..: /Ill !nt' (.2(}(}4) (n 77), 
172 See J', ."hi·mil' 'The Puhlil' Perl'l'ption of NOll' as an Insurer and Liquidator' (.2004) 14 Sf)IC 
(Juana!.\' .~, 64. 
J2() 
should be grouped according to different target audiences; this is particularly 
necessary in a developing country like Nigeria where information can not be passed to 
all classes of society through the same medium. 
6.3. Reform of Deposit Insurance in Nigeria 
Based on the foregoing analysis of the deposit insurance scheme in Nigeria, it is 
evident that certain aspects of the scheme are in need of reform. The NDIC Act 2006 
was the first attempt to reform deposiot insurance in Nigeria. Significant changes 
have been introduced by the Act, which include: 
• Creation of separate insurance funds for each category of insured financial 
· .. 173 InstItutIons; 
• Increase in the maximum coverage limit from W 50,000 to W 200,000 and 
N 100,000 for licensed banks and licensed deposit-taking financial 
· .. 174 InstItutIons; 
• Granting of powers to the NDIC to introduce a differential premIUm 
assessment system; 175 
• Granting of powers to the NDIC to make regulations for the 
· I . f h A 176 Imp ementatIon 0 t e ct. 
The Act also improves the failure resolution process by giving the NDIC power to: 
• P . . .,:- . d' 177 resent petItIons lor WIn Ing-up; 
• Act as liquidator for failed banks without the requirement to apply to the 
Federal High Court: 178 
17.\ NDIC .\L'I 2006. s.10(2). 
17~ Ihid. s.20(1l. 
175 11 '/17 1 m.s. (_). 
176 Ihid. s.56. 
177, ') Ihili. ", .. W(_). 
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• Establish bridge banks; 179 and to 
• Extend the time for submission of deposit insurance claims. 180 
While most of the above mentioned reforms are laudable and would improve the 
efficiency of the deposit insurance scheme in fulfilling its mandates, it is apparent 
from the analysis in this chapter that more far-reaching reforms are necessary. The 
major inadequacies of the scheme are extrapolated from the discussion and 
summarized below with suggestions for further reform. 
I. Coverage Limit and Prompt Payment of Guaranteed Deposits 
As noted earlier, the current maximum coverage limit of N200, 000 for licensed banks 
and N 100,000 for licensed deposit taking institutions is inadequate. Most depositors 
would rather withdraw their deposits at the slightest hint of insolvency than go 
through the cumbersome claims process to recover this arguably meagre amount. 
While the recent increase is significant, the new limit is still not sufficient for the 
deposit insurance scheme to fulfil its mandate effectively. It is pertinent to note that 
the perceived ignorance of the existence and benefits of the scheme is attributable to 
apathy on the part of depositors, who consider the benefits of the scheme as 
insignificant. 
Given that it has taken almost twenty years for the current coverage limit to be 
rc\ icwc<.l, the provision of scction 20(2), which gives the NDIC power to vary the 
co\cragc limit is a welcome development. This is similar to the provision in the U.S. 
I 'S 
, Ihid. s.40( I). 
I 'q Ihid. s .. W. 
ISOll'j ) t )/( . s. _O( -t). 
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Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act, gIvmg the FDIC the power to undertake 
periodic reVIews of the adequacy of the coverage limit and to make necessary 
adjustments where inflation or any other factor necessitates this. 
Closely related to the adequacy of the deposit insurance coverage is the timing of the 
payment of guaranteed sums after a bank failure. Depositors need to be given the 
assurance that their funds are safe and also accessible in order to prevent bank runs. In 
practice, there has been considerable delay in reimbursing depositors because of the 
lack of depositor records and protracted court actions by shareholders of failed 
banks. 181 
Any reform of the deposit insurance scheme should not only ensure that depositors 
are promptly reimbursed within days of a bank failure, but should also make 
provisions for the Corporation to have early access to the necessary records ex ante. 
An early detection process should also be introduced so that the Corporation can start 
making arrangements for compensation as soon as it is detected that an insured bank 
is inevitably going to be closed. 
II. Differential Premium System 
While the Nigerian system is due for the introduction of a risk-based deposit 
insurance assessment system, it is suggested that gradualism and simplicity should be 
adopted in the implementation of the system. The success of such a scheme 
necessarily depends on the availability and credibility of relevant information for the 
deposit insurer. The sllccess of the newly introduced risk-based supen"j"ion 
framcwork is alsu a major determining factor. 
lSI Sl'C Ahmad (~()O~) (n 170) ~O. 
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A well managed transition process is recommended. This will promote understanding 
and acceptance of the proposed system. A transition plan should be put in place which 
would set out the objectives of the proposed system and the resource and legal 
requirements for achieving the stated objectives. The transition process should also 
involve a public enlightenment campaign to educate depositors and insured banks on 
the workings of the new system. 
III. Independence 
The NDIC Act 2006 has made the powers of the Presudent relating to the appointment 
of the NDIC Board members subject to confirmation by the Senate. However, as 
argued earlier, the mere requirement for confirmation is not enough. It is suggested 
that further reform of the Act should also make the process and terms of appointment 
subject to paliarmentary review. The process and terms of appointment must be such 
as would ensure the independence of the Corporation. Parliament should also be given 
general oversight responsibility over the activities and accounts of the Corporation. 
Independence of the NDIC and other supervisory agencies is particularly important 
given the proposed introduction of a PCA mechanism. It has been shown that the 
introduction of PCA rules in developing countries can only improve bank regulation 
and create right incentives if the rules are part of a comprehensive reform process that 
strl'ngthens the independence of the bank regulator and improves transparency. 182 
IV. Prompt Corrective Action 
---~~-------
IS~ Sec ~ 1 Br()\\nbrid~l' and S [\ laimho 'Can Prompt Correcti\t: Action Work in the De\ eloping 
\\orld?, (2003) -+ JOIln/al o/.\li'icall 811.\i1/(:'ss 2.47. 
The absence of a statutory basis for prompt corrective action to allow early 
intervention in problem banks by regulators has been considered to be a deficiency in 
the Nigerian regulatory framework. Section 32(1) of the NDIC Act 2006 makes 
reference to prompt corrective action. The section empowers the Corporation to take 
prompt corrective action where an examination of any insured institution discloses 
that its management are engaged in unsafe and unsound practices; or have violated 
any law or regulation. Where such violation may lead to insolvency or dissipation of 
assets the NDIC is empowered to direct the management of the concerned bank to 
take specific corrective measures. Section 31 (2) provides that where such corrective 
action is not implemented within thirty days, the NDIC shall, in consultation with the 
CBN, initiate such corrective action which it may deem necessary. 
The main aim of PCA mechanisms is to prevent harmful regulatory forbearance and 
to mandate regulators to become more involved with troubled banks well before 
insolvency to allow recapitalization or prompt legal closure. It is difficult to see how 
the terse and general provisions of Section 32 can achieve this aim. It is proposed that 
more specific and detailed provisions, similar to the US PCA provisions, are required. 
Such provisions should include specific thresholds, based on capital and liquidity 
ratios, which should trigger mandatory regulatory action. Under PCA, more stringent 
regulatory restrictions would apply as a bank's condition deteriorates. Such thresholds 
and corresponding mandatory action should be clearly specified ex-ante. 
As noted in Chapter 5, the introduction of a PCA mechanism would significantly 
increa~e the information requirements of the supervisors and also increase the need 
fur effecti \'l' co-ordination between yarious super\,isors. Independence of the 
regulatory authouritics should also be ensured to prevent political manipulation. 
6.4. Provisional Conclusion 
The banking system in Nigeria has been generally unstable. From the historical 
overview in this chapter, this can be attributed to two main factors: first, the changing 
structure of bank ownership; and second, government economic policies. As in most 
jurisdictions, the financial safety net in Nigeria is a product of history and was 
introduced at a time of crisis. In this chapter, elements of the deposit Insurance 
problem have been identified, analysed and solutions have been proffered. 
The deposit insurance scheme in Nigeria is going through a critical evolution period 
with the promulgation and implementation of the NDIC Act 2006, particularly the 
proposed introduction of a differential premium assessment system. As posited 
earlier, the first and most important step in the design or reform of a deposit insurance 
scheme is to set out and understand the public policy objectives which the scheme is 
to implement. Whereas it would appear that the NDIC has been successful as a 
supervisory agency (complementing the CBN), it has so far been largely ineffective as 
a means of depositor protection and a source of confidence to the banking system. 
In Nigeria, bank depositors did not enjoy any form of explicit protection until the 
introduction of the deposit protection scheme in 1988. The level of protection offered 
by the scheme has been a contentious issue in Nigeria, as it has been in other 
countries examined. While it is necessary to limit the level and scope of deposit 
insurance coverage in order to contain the moral hazard problem. the level of 
protect ion must also be sufficient to fully protect the small unsophisticated sa\er. This 
i~ \ery important if depusit insurance is to establish an\' form of confidence and 
~Iahility in the hanking system. 
'-'5 
.' .' 
Since the inception of the deposit insurance scheme in Nigeria, the banking system 
has not suffered a serious systemic banking crisis. If this occurs in the near future, it is 
doubtful if the deposit insurance scheme is adequately designed and equipped to cope 
with the effects of such a crisis. Thus the appropriate time to introduce changes to the 
scheme is during a relatively crisis-free period. The fact that the deposit insurance 
scheme in Nigeria has just undergone its first major reform process in about twenty 
years understates not only the importance of the scheme, but also the inherent 
complexity and difficulty of introducing and implementing deposit insurance 
schemes. This complexity is evident in the constant modification of deposit insurance 
schemes around the world and the growing academic and policy debates at the 
international level on the design of financial safety nets in general and deposit 
insurance in particular. 
It is hoped that further reform to the system would address the issues highlighted here, 
which include the adequacy of the protection offered, the legal and regulatory 
framework, the failure resolution process and the capacity building challenge among 
others. Most importantly, a self assessment methodology should be put in place to 
ensure a periodic assessment and review process, which would enable the design 
features of the scheme to be modified to meet specific country needs and other 
challL'ngcs that come up over time. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.0. Introduction 
This chapter sums up the various themes and conclusions in this thesis. These are 
grouped into analytical themes and policy conclusions. The analytical themes provide 
a summary of the theoretical analysis involved in the thesis, while the policy 
conclusions recapitulate the various operational and structural issues considered in the 
thesis. The policy conclusions are synopsized generally and also in terms of the 
jurisdictions that have been examined. 
7.1. Analytical Themes 
The main analytical themes in this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
7.1.1 The Rationale for Banking Regulation: 
The rationale for banking regulation is derived from the desirability of a stable 
financial system for sustained economic growth and the nature of banking contracts, 
which distinguishes the banking sector from other services. 1 The special nature of 
banking is found in the nature of fractional reserve banking and the potential for 
maturity mismatch, which means that temporary illiquidity problems can result in 
insol \'cl1cy. Where isolated bank failures result in a general loss of confidence in the 
I Sec ChapIn .2. 
banking system, the risk of contagion means that such isolated cases could ha\e 
widespread systemic effects. 2 
Bank contracts are also special because of the nature of information asymmetry 
between the bank, as suppliers of financial services and products, and the consumer. 
This means that consumers do not possess the relevant knowledge and expertise to 
make the necessary judgements in the course of their interaction with banks. 
The special nature of banking means that the rationale for regulation and supervision 
can be justified on two general public interest grounds. First, banking regulation exists 
to protect the financial system from instability and second, it exists to protect 
consumers of financial services and products. 
7.1.2 The Rationale for Deposit Insurance: 
Deposit insurance schemes enhance confidence in the financial system; hence it 
reduces the incentives for bank runs to occur by ensuring that isolated problems in a 
troubled institution do not result in a general loss of confidence in the banking 
system . .\ Deposit insurance also guarantees a minimum level of protection to bank 
depositors against the consequences associated with bank failure. 
2 Banks arc particularly \ulnerable to a loss of confidence, and it has been obsenl'll that 'a bad bank 
Ihal enjuys Ihe public's l'onfidence may operate in peace (at least for a little \\hile) whercas a good 
hank can risk failure if it hCL'l)JlleS subject to a bank run and all its deposits arc withdrawn on "hl1rt 
nOlice,' SCl' F Hupkcs 'Insohl'l1l'Y - Why a Special Regime for Banks' Seminar 011 Currellt 
Dl'l'doplIIl'nts in ,\I(II/eril'-Y and Financial Lmr Mu\' 7-/7. 2002 Published in Current Derclopmellts ill 
\'of/l'tan and Financial Lol\', \'01.3, IMF. April 292005, ch,25. 
\ It iJ;I" l~l'CI1 al"!.!ul'd in this thesis Ihal it is the )..IH1\\kd~c of the cxislcncc of dCJ1llsit insurance "chemc", 
a" oppu"l'd 10 ~lll'ir mere n.i"ll'nce. that helps to pron;ote financial stabilit~, Hence in countries \\ hcre 
Ihere i" a \ LT~ 1(1\\ In cl of public awarcnes" on the exislCIll"C and purpose of deposit insurance. depo"il 
IIhurancl' l'onlribull'" little to Ihe \e\cl of confidencc in lhe banking systcm, 
, '8 -~ .' 
Thus, there is also a two-fold justification for the existence of deposit insurance 
schemes: the first is the promotion of financial stability and the second is the 
protection of small and unsophisticated depositors.4 There have been attempts to 
identify a primary justification for the existence of deposit insurance schemes. While 
some jurisdictions have identified financial stability, consumer protection has been 
identified elsewhere. It has been argued in this thesis that these two objectives are not 
mutually exclusive, and that an effectively designed deposit insurance scheme can 
achieve both. 
7.1.3. The Deposit Insurance Problem 
The benefits associated with deposit insurance notwithstanding, the concept has its 
perceived problems. Chief among these problems are the moral hazard and the agency 
problems, which have the tendency to weaken incentives in the banking system. A 
new dimension has also been added to this as a result of globalization and cross-
border banking.5 
Despite the existence of these problems, there is still a prevailing argument for deposit 
insurance.6 This is based on the vital role that deposit insurance plays in promoting 
financial stability by providing confidence, and the importance of protecting small 
and unsophisticated depositors.7 The main consideration for policymakers is not 
whether or not deposit insurance should be adopted but how it can be effectively 
I Thesl' are the t\\O primary objectives which are common to most jurisdictions, Policy objectives \ar} 
according to national conditions and other possible objectives are listed in Chapter 3, In most casl'S, 
thesl' objl'clives arl' irlL'idental to the pursuit of financial stability and depositor protection, 
5 Therl' arl' also the related issues of Sl'clor integration and the dl'\clopment of tinancial c(lnglomerates. 
Sec disclIssion in Chapter fi\L'. 
6 The benefits of deposit insurance in promoting tinancial system stability have been described as being 
'I(l() \aluable to hlSl" Sl'C M Horvitl 'Pr\~\entin~ Banking Sector Distress and Crises in Latin 
, . '- '-
:\lllLTil'a' in Pro('eedillgs oj a COII/i'rl'llce held ill H'ashillgroll DC. April 15-16 1<)<)6, Hor/d BUllk 
/);\('/lS.\;OIl Papa No. 3M) (The World Bank. \\'ashington DC. 1996) 53. 
: The belll'fit:-- of <.icp():-.it insurancl' arc disl'lIssl'd in Chapter three, 
designed and structured, in an incentive-compatible way, to mlnIIlllZe the deposit 
insurance problem. Therefore, the deposit insurance problem has primarily become 
one of design and structure. Although a set of sound principles has been developed for 
policy purposes, these principles need to be considered within the context of country-
specific circumstances and objectives. 
While there has been considerable debate generated in the literature on the 
relationship between deposit insurance and moral hazard, it should be noted that 
deposit insurance is not the only source of bank risk-taking incentives. Thus the 
search for a solution to the perennial problem of risk-taking must go beyond the 
confines of deposit insurance. Internal control mechanisms, prudential regulation and 
supervision, and the legal and institutional framework should also be strengthened to 
contain risk-taking. 
7.2. Policy Conclusions 
7.2.1 Deposit Insurance and the Financial Safety Net 
Deposit insurance forms an integral part of the financial safety net. As such, in 
designing a deposit insurance system, consideration should be given to the overall 
effectiveness of the banking supervisory and regulatory framework. 
An effective legal framework for supervision and regulation should make provisions 
for monitoring and enforcing limits on risk-taking by banks. Effective regulation and 
sllpcr\'ision helps to counteract the effects of moral hazard in weakcning market 
discipline and the inccntin~ structure. In the absence of cffecti\'c super\'ision, 
excessive risk-taking will have the effect of exposing the deposit insurer to significant 
contingent liability. 
With recent and ongoIng changes in the financial serVIces industry in terms of 
globalization, structure, scale and scope of financial institutions, services and 
products, it is imperative that policymakers consider the structure of financial safety 
nets. This would ensure that the safety and soundness of the entire financial sector is 
maintained by preventing regulatory gap, conflict and overlap. With respect to the 
general regulatory structure, policymakers must consider whether an institutionaL 
functional or integrated model of financial regulation should be adopted. 
Policy makers should have particular regard to the interrelationship between deposit 
insurance and the lender of last resort (LoLR) function. Whereas the LoLR function is 
largel y based on discretion, explicit deposit insurance is governed by rules that are set 
out ex ante. LoLR discretion is generally based on the ability to distinguish between 
illiquid and insolvent institutions. This distinction is blurred in practice because of 
information asymmetry and the fact that it is almost impossible to place a value on a 
hank's assets in a crisis. Where a loose liquidity support policy is adopted, a potential 
contlict may be created with a deposit insurer with a risk-minimizing mandate, which 
often requires early intervention and possible closure. 8 
Regulatory allocation and co-operation arrangements can be formalized through 
legislation, memorandum of understanding, legal agreements or a combination of 
these methods. Such arrangements must be made clear ex ante.9 
S Sl'C Chapter 4. para.4.1 0.2. 
I) • /Ind. 
7.2.2 The Choice between Explicit and Implicit Deposit Insurance: 
In companson with implicit deposit insurance, explicit deposit insurance has a 
number of significant advantages. In summary, explicit deposit insurance is preferred 
because it is rules-based, and as such there is clarity, certainty, consistency and 
10 transparency. 
7.2.3 Design Features of Deposit Insurance Systems 
An appropriately designed deposit insurance system is the most effective panacea or 
solution to the deposit insurance problem. In designing a deposit insurance system, 
the first and perhaps the most important consideration for policy-makers is the 
identification of policy objectives. 1 1 The purpose and aims of the scheme should be 
clearl y defined and understood. 12 The various design and structural issues should then 
be considered in the context of these policy objectives. The primary structural and 
design issues considered in this thesis and the set of sound practices developed are 
summarized here. 
(1) Institutional/Organizational Structure: this should be determined primarily 
by the nature of the deposit insurer's mandate. 13 To avoid potential conflict of 
interests and to ensure independence and accountability, it is preferable that 
the deposit insurance function is administered by a separate agency. 1.+ 
(2) MandateIPowers: the deposit insurer's mandate can either be broadly or 
narrowly defined. It appears that the choice is mainly that of public policy 
10 Scc Chapler 3, para.JA.J. 
11 Sl'C Chapler -+. par:l. -+.1. 
12 i\llholl~h the main llhjcL"li\L's of deposil insurance sclll'1l1es are usually financial stahility and 
~ . 
COIlSlll11LT protection. olhn possihle ohjeL"li\ es are mentioned in Chapter J. para.3.2.1. 
1: rhe "idn Ihe depl)"it inStIrlT'S mandate, thl' greater the need for a separate in"titlltion to admini"lL'r 
thc deposit insural1L'l' function. 
11 Sl'l' Chapter -+. paraA . ..:' 
dictated by the objectives which the scheme aims to achieve. The deposit 
insurer should be given appropriate legal powers to fulfil its mandate. IS 
(3) Membership: deposit insurance should be made compulsory for all eligible 
institutions to avoid adverse selection, control risk exposure and to ensure the 
system's financial viability. 16 
(4) Coverage: deposit insurance coverage can be determined in terms of level 
and scope. In order to limit moral hazard, the level of coverage should be 
restricted. Coverage levels should be consistent with local economic factors, 
the deposit insurer's policy objectives and availability of funding. Deposit 
insurance coverage should be set at a level that would prevent destabilising 
bank runs but should not be made so extensive as to eliminate all forms of 
market discipline. The level and scope of coverage should be prescribed in 
law without ambiguity and before any crisis occurs.17 
(5) Funding: the source and mode of funding is critical to the effectiveness of a 
deposit insurance system. The financial capacity of the deposit insurance 
scheme creates credibility and public confidence which is essential in 
preventing bank runs. In determining the source of funding, two essential 
guiding principles should be applied: 
I. Those who will enjoy the benefits of deposit insurance should pay for it; 
and 
I I. The source of funding should be credible enough to maintain public 
confidence. 
15 Ibid. para . .f . .f. 
Ih II '1 J{( • par;I.-U). 
17 Ibid. P;II';I.-+..5. 
The mode of funding should also be clear and easily understood by the 
authorities, participating institutions and the public. The deposit insurance 
fund should be properly managed and readily available to cover losses as they 
arise, and there should be credible provisions for back-up funding. 18 
(6) Intervention and Failure Resolution: an effective intervention and failure 
resolution policy is essential to the success of a deposit insurance scheme. 
There should be an effective exit mechanism for winding down failed banks 
and provide prompt payment of insured funds. The policy should not be to 
prevent individual bank failures at all costs but to ensure that such failures, 
when they occur, are resolved promptly and that depositors have instant 
access to insured funds. In order to reduce the costs of resolution and to 
prevent systemic crisis, prompt corrective action (PCA) mechanisms should 
be introduced. 
In designing the failure resolution framework, policy makers should be guided 
by the need to maintain public confidence in the system~ the need to maintain 
market discipline; the need to minimize losses; and the need for an equitable, 
consistent and transparent process. Different failure resolution options have 
been considered in Chapter four. However, in determining the appropriate 
resolution option, the ultimate test is to balance the need to minimize costs 
against the need for effectiveness. Hence, the failure resolution option for a 
f l:"' • 19 particular case should be the most cost-e lectlve optIOn. 
(7) Public Awareness: deposit insurance schemes promote financial stability by 
sustaining public confidence. This objectin? cannot be achien~d where there i~ 
18 !hid. para.--l.7. 
a low level of awareness on the existence, purpose and limitations of deposit 
. 20 Insurance. 
(8) Interrelationship Issues: overlap of regulatory mandates and powers among 
financial safety net participants creates potential tension and conflicts of 
interest, which could result in the overall regulatory objective of financial 
stability being undermined. To avoid this, there should be clear provisions for 
allocation of regulatory powers, information sharing and inter-agency 
coordination.21 
7.3. Country-specific Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.3.1 The United Kingdom 
The primary objective of the UK deposit protection scheme is the 'essentially social 
purpose' of consumer protection. The FSCS is designed as a relatively narrow 
scheme, responsible for the management of the fund and compensation of consumers. 
Relatively speaking, few institutions have failed since the introduction of explicit 
deposit protection in the UK. Recent developments, which led to the Bank of 
Fllgland's rescue of Northern Rock, have raised significant concerns about the fitness 
for purpose of the UK compensation scheme. 
The follo\\'in~ conclusions and recommendations can be summarized from the 
~ 
analysis of the UK compensation scheme: 22 
--------------------------------------------------------~----
II) Ihid. para.-l'x' 
20 Ibid. para.-l.l). 
21 Ihid. paraA.1 O. 
• The present method of funding the scheme, which is mainly ex post. is 
inadequate to sustain the required level of consumer confidence and to effect 
prompt payment of guaranteed sums in the event of a significant bank failure. 
Furthermore, the UK scheme, until recently, included an element of co-
insurance as an incentive for consumers to exert market discipline. With the 
removal of co-insurance and the absence of a risk-based assessment system. 
there is currently no effective mechanism in place to counteract moral hazard. 
• Despite the recent increase in the coverage limit the continuing practice of full 
government guarantee of bank deposits suggests that the level of protection 
offered under the scheme is insufficient. This should be raised if the purposes 
of deposit protection are to be achieved. In deciding the appropriate coverage 
level, the need for market discipline should be balanced against the need for 
confidence in the banking system. 
• Recent events have shown that the level of public awareness of the existence, 
purpose and limitations of the scheme is very low. For a deposit insurance 
system to be effective in maintaining confidence, it is important that the public 
is informed about its benefits and limitations. The lack of clarity surrounding 
the operation and the level of cover provided by the UK scheme contributed to 
the run on Northern Rock. 
• The proposed introduction of a Special Resolution Regime for dealing with 
problem banks is a welcome development. However, further reform should 
incorporate a Prompt Corrective Action mechanism (PCA). The FSCS should 
also be granted risk-minimizing powers and a wider role in the failure 
resolution process. 
11 ~~ See Chapter 5. para.5.1.3. 
7.3.2. The United States 
The most notable reforms in US deposit insurance have resulted from the crisis in the 
Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). In contrast to the UK 
compensation scheme, efforts at minimizing the deposit insurance problem in the 
United States are focussed on banks and their officers. This policy direction is 
epitomized by the adoption of risk-based premium assessment and PCA mechanisms. 
The US scheme also provides a more generous level of protection than the UK 
scheme. Although there is no element of coinsurance under the FDIC scheme. in a bid 
to retain market discipline, the coverage limit has been pegged at $100000. The 
justification for the coverage limit is, however, questionable as the various 
complexities in the legal provisions dealing with coverage allow most depositors to 
enjoy full coverage by holding deposit accounts in different rights and capacities. 
A common problem with limited coverage deposit insurance schemes is that coverage 
limits lose their real value over time and the difficulties and delays involved with 
statutory amendments make an expeditious adjustment of such limits impossible. To 
this extent. the provisions introduced by the FDIRA, giving the FDIC power to review 
the insurance I imit at five year intervals is an important statutory innovation. 
Given that the mandate of the FDIC is to minimize the loss to the deposit insurer 
when a bank failure occurs. and not to prevent all bank failures. it appears that the 
main l'halknge for the FDIC is to resolve any problems at insured institutions at the 
least possible long-term cost to the insurance fund. This is dependent on the reliability 
of capital ratios based on book-\alue standards to identify high risk banks. and 
.).+7 
supervisory ability and political will to act promptly and appropriately when risks are 
identified. 
7.3.3 Nigeria 
Deposit insurance was introduced in Nigeria as part of the banking sector reforms in 
the government's economic deregulation policy of 1986.23 The deposit insurance 
scheme has been in place for approximately twenty years, and while there has been 
rapid transformation in the Nigerian banking sector in this period, the deposit 
insurance scheme has only just undergone it's first significant reform. It is submitted 
that the reforms introduced in the NDIC Act 2006 are not far-reaching and still leave 
the scheme with considerable challenges in achieving its stated objectives. The 
following conclusions and recommendations can be summarized from the analysis of 
the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Scheme: 24 
• The laws setting up the scheme do not give the deposit insurer freedom from 
political interference. Legislation should be introduced to make the 
Corporation independent of the executive arm of government but accountable 
to parliament. 
• A special bank insolvency regime and a legal framework of prompt corrective 
action, which would enable the supervisor to deal effectively and 
expeditiously with distressed banks, should be established. These should be 
accompanied by a statutory least-cost resolution mandate. 
• The series of protracted litigation and the difficulties encountered in 
recovering assets of failed banks underscores the need for the establi"hmcnt of 
... 
1.1 \.' ('t 6 I ,~l'l' laplcr 6, para. . . 
2~ fhid. para.6._~. 
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a special financial servIces tribunal with special procedures to deal 
expeditiously with banking-related matters. 
• The level of deposit insurance coverage IS neither sufficient to protect 
depositors nor to create the desired level of public confidence in the banking 
system.The confidence-building role of deposit insurance assumes greater 
importance in the Nigerian context because Nigerians are generally sceptical 
about keeping their savings in Nigerian banks due to past experiences with 
bank failures. This has led to massive capital flight to economies where 
banking is presumed to be safer. 
• A major cause of bank failure In Nigeria has been identified as non-
performing loans characterized by insider-related lending. The need for 
effective internal control systems should be made a priority. This should be 
complemented by an effective system of prudential regulation backed up by 
adequate enforcement powers. 
• Gradualism and simplicity should be applied in the planned introduction of a 
differential premium assessment system. A well managed transition process, 
which would set out the objectives and the required resources, is 
recommended. The process should also include an enlightenment campaign 
for all stakeholders. 
• The fact that there has been only one significant reform of the Nigerian 
scheme underscores the need for a self-assessment methodology to be put in 
place and the need for the NDIC to make credible use of the rule-making 
powers that it has been granted under Section 56 of the NDIC Act 2006. 
7.4. Cross-border Issues 
The emergence of a global market in financial services with the use of increasingly 
complex and integrated cross-border structures has prompted the need for an 
international system of bank supervision. While there have been efforts to develop 
international standards for prudential regulation and crisis prevention, little has been 
achieved in terms of harmonizing crisis management systems. 
The establishment of an international deposit insurance agency has been proposed. 
Whereas this is desirable to protect international bank depositors and to ensure a level 
playing field, the proposal would encounter practical difficulties because of cross-
country differences in regulatory culture and approach, and disparity in the level of 
financial development. Harmonization of basic features of national schemes is a more 
realistic objective than the creation of an international scheme. Harmonization is also 
more feasible on a regional basis, as there is likely to be more convergence of 
regulatory culture at this level. In this regard, the relatively successful attempt at EU 
harmonization has been considered in this thesis. 
Any benefits of deposit insurance policy harmonization must be balanced against the 
need to design deposit insurance to suit country-specific factors. In the absence of an 
international framework for crisis management, the use of cross-border co-operation 
agreements on burden and information sharing has been advocated in dealing with the 
failure of internationally active banks. 
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7.5. Final Thoughts 
A stable and competitive banking system is critical for the economic development of 
any nation, and financial safety nets play an important public policy role in 
maintaining the stability and competitiveness of the banking system. These safety 
nets, however, create perverse effects, which throw up peculiar challenges for policy 
makers. In this thesis, these challenges have been termed the 'deposit insurance 
problem' . 
The conclusion in this thesis is that there is no fixed panoptic set of solutions to the 
deposit insurance problem. Rather, institutional, cultural, legal, experiential and other 
country-specific factors should determine deposit insurance structure and design. In 
designing a deposit insurance system, policy makers must ensure that the features of 
the system are consistent with the specified policy objectives and that the features of 
the scheme create the right type of incentives to minimize the adverse effects of 
deposit insurance. Policy consistency and incentive compatibility should necessarily 
be complemented by closer and more effective supervision of the banking system. 
While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to deposit insurance, the sound practice 
principles in this thesis have been developed to consider the trade-offs involved in the 
design of deposit insurance schemes. With globalization and sector integration taking 
a prominent stage in academic and policy debates, and with an increasing number of 
countries adopting deposit insurance schemes, the harmonization of minimum 
standards will be expected. It is hoped that this sound practice guide will be useful to 
policy makers in establishing internationally acceptable standards. 
In conclusion, it must be emphasized that the deposit insurance problem. while 
basically an issue of design, is not ultimately so. The conclusions in this thesis must 
be placed within the context of other political and social factors, as well as an 
effective legal framework. As the aphorism goes, 'prevention is better than cure'. and 
as such it is submitted that a prophylactic approach focussing on effective risk 
management, prompt corrective action and timely intervention should be put in place. 
Where banks fail, adequate and prompt reimbursement of depositors should be 
ensured. Ultimately, a deposit insurance system should promote public confidence 
and should complement and reinforce the existing regulatory and supervisory 
framework. 
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